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Although a senior Conservative politician for many 
years, Walter Long has not previously received the 
historical attention usual for a man of such eminence. 
An autobiography, entitled Memories, appeared in 1923. 
Based on personal reminiscence rather than any historical 
evidence, it is often inaccurate and is of little use as 
a source. 
In 1936 a biography, by Sir Charlbs Petrie, appeared; 
it is entitled Walter Long and his Times. Its sentiments 
are laudatory, its tone deferential. The work is a model 
of how not to write good political biography: the narrative 
is general and uncritical, and whilst there are extensive 
passages of quotation from Long's correspondence no attempt 
is made to relate the material either to its historical 
context or to the evidence 'left by Long's colleagues and 
contemporaries. 
In 1970 an American scholar, Roderick Clifford, tried _ 
to improve on Sir Charles Petrie's work with a Johns Hopkins 
Ph. D. thesis entitled 'Long of Wraxall: The Political 
Career of Walter Long, 1854-19241. Although making grandiose- 
claims to offer new insights into Long's career and based 
on primary sources, Dr Clifford's study really adds very 
little to the picture presented by Petrie, except to fill 
in the essential facts of Long's biography. Dr Clifford 
accepts at face value the critical judgements - necessarily 
" suspect - of Long's political rivals and concludes that 
'he emerges as a reactionary figure, often demonstrably 
out of touch with the realities of the political situation. ' 
The trouble is, Dr Clifford demonstrates that Long was out 
of touch not by objective consideration of the evidence, 
but by unfounded assertion. Once again, the narrative is 
general, and the author displays little sympathy with his 
subject. Many important areas of Long's career are either 
vi 
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neglected by cursory treatment or omitted altogether (See 
Appendix A). 
Although able to consult the papers of many of Long's 
contemporaries, Clifford did not have access to the full 
collection of Long's own papers, remarking that 'the 
private manuscripts of the Long family were of limited 
help because of their incomplete state. ' The forty-one 
volumes now in the British Library were not available. to 
Dr Clifford, nor was a substantial section of the papers 
now available at the Wiltshire County Record Office. 
Needless to say, the present study is in no way derived 
from Dr Clifford's work. 
The present study attempts to consider, in the light 
of recent historical scholarship and of a wide range of 
primary sources, Long's political career between the years 
1905 and 1921. For seven of those years he was a cabinet 
minister, for the remaining, nine he was a leading 
opposition figure. Long's private papers (See Appendix B) 
form the main basis for this study. Although split into 
two collections, one at the Wiltshire County Record _ 
Office and one at the British Library, they would appear 
to be more or less complete for the years under consid- 
eration, and, when used in. conjunction with official and 
published sources, and with the private papers of Long's 
contemporaries, they enable a comprehensive account of 
Long's most important years in British politics 
to be 
-constructed. 
The picture which emerges 1 . one of a senior politician 
who has been consistently underrated by historians and 
poorly served by a single biography. The present study 
makes no attempt at biography. Rather, it invites a new 
look at the later career of a now largley forgotten 
statesman and suggests that the traditional appraisal 
A 
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NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
The terms Conservative and Unionist have been used - 
interchangeably throughout, as-was the practice during 
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INTRODUCTION 
Walter Hume Long was born at Bath on 13 July 1854. 
He always claimed descent from the original Longs of 
Wiltshire, although there is some doubt owing to a 
'missing link' in the family's genealogy. 
1 The Longs 
of Wraxall have been associated with Wiltshire for 
centuries and numerous members of the family, invar- 
iably bearing the Christian names Walter, Richard or 
Robert, have represented constituencies in Wiltshire, 
Somerset and Gloucestershire. Both of Walter Long's 
grandfathers sat in parliament. 
2 They were not the 
most garrulous of MPs: his paternal grandfather _ 
never uttered a word, his maternal grandfather man- 
aged only one three minute speech. The eldest son 
of Richard Penruddocke Long, he had four brothers, 
of whom the eldest was created Baron Gisborough in -" 
3 1917, and five sisters.. 
His mother, Charlotte Anna, was Irish, a daughter 
of William Wentworth Fitzwilliam Dick, MP., of 
Humewood, County Wicklow. This gave Long his second 
Christian name and was the sole basis of his claim 'to 
'Dispute 
arose over a 'missing link' which made it 
impossible to prove the descent of the Rood Ashton Longs 
from the Wraxall Longs. Burke, whom Long derided as the 
'great autocrat' in these matters, never accepted such 
descent. See W. L. P., WRO 947/448 ESTATE. 
2Long's 
paternal grandfather sat for North Wiltshire, 
1835-65; his maternal grandfather sat for County Wicklow, 
1852-80. 
3It 
was Long who, as the newly appointed Colonial 
Secretary in Lloyd George's government, recommended that 
his brother be raised to the peerage. See recommendations 
for New Year's Honours, 1917, A. P., MS. Asquith, 32/166-71 
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be an Irishman. He was Irish in no other sense, 
although in later life he often made political capital 
out of his Irish connections, claiming to understand 
Ireland as only an Irishman could. In fact, he lived 
in Wales until the age of twelve and in England for the 
remainder of his life. He was born into a political 
family and it is not surprising that as the eldest son 
he should have become a career politician. All that is 
surprising is that he achieved such high office and at 
one time looked set to become the leader of the 
Conservative party and a possible future prime minister. 
But his life begun in fairly humble surroundings. 
His father had inherited a property at Dolforgan, 
Montgomeryshire, and here Long enjoyed a simple country 
childhood. It was as a small child in Wales that Long 
first learnt to ride horses, a passion which remained 
with him throughout life, and he was allowed to mix 
freely with his father'p tenants, so that he became 
accustomed at an early age to the ways of the country- 
side. So, too, his introduction to politics began at 
r 
an early age, for when he was only five in 1859 his 
father contested and won Chippenbam as a Conservative. 
He was educated privately by the Rev. Tiddeman from the 
adjoining village, riding on his pony the mile and a half 
to the vicarage where he would receive his lessons, then 
riding home again. Richard Penruddocke Long succeeded 
his father (Long's grandfather) as Member for Wiltshire 
3 
North in 1865, although poor health obliged him to give 
up the seat soon after, and two years-later he inherited 
the family's estates in Wiltshire. The years in Wales 
had been happy ones for Long but it was a stipulation 
of his grandfather's will that the property at Dolforgan 
be sold. And so, in 1867, Long's connections with 
Montgomeryshire were abruptly terminated. 
1 
On moving to Rood Ashton, the family estate just out- 
side Trowbridge, Long was sent to a private tutor, a 
Cambridge friend of his father's who lived nearby. He 
later described this man as 'a High Churchman ... of 
violent and at times uncontrollable temper. ' He then 
went to spend two years at a small private school on 
Salisbury Plain before entering Harrow in the fourth 
form. At about this time both his parents began to 
suffer from ill health, and regular winter trips abroad 
became a feature of family life. The youngest of the 
five boys had died shortly before the family left Wales 
and his father never fully recovered from the blow. 
Richard Penruddocke 
i 
Long retired from active politics, 
vacated his newly won North Wiltshire seat, and died in 
the South of France in 1875 at the age of only forty-nine. 
At Harrow Long took a lively interest in sport and 
played for the school cricket and football Elevens. In 
his last year, 1873, he distinguished himself in the 
1Long's 
own account of his childhood can be found in 
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Long of Wraxall, Memories (London, 
1923); this work is hereafter cited as Memories. 
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school match against Eton at Lords, with Harrow gaining 
a victory for the first time in six years. Coincidentally, 
the Eton team included his future colleague, Alfred 
Lyttelton. Long always looked back on his Harrow days 
with fondness and remained for the rest of his life a 
firm believer in the virtues of a public school education. 
He maintained a lifelong interest in the school's affairs, 
later becoming a governor and in 1924 chairman of governors. 
l 
It is significant, however, that whilst he devoted a whole 
chapter of his autobiography to his Harrow days he made no 
mention of his academic studies. To read Long's account 
one would imagine that the timetable of the public school- 
boy consisted entirely of sport. His masters were not 
altogether happy with his academic efforts, as a letter 
amongst the family's estate papers indicates: 
The enclosed report represents all I have to say 
against your boy ... he probably has so many friends 
in his room or is so much in theirs, that work is put 
rather hastily into a corner. 'I have in consequence 
been obliged to make him come and do his work . ý. 
again, not thinking him strong enough to stand altogether 
alone. He is not deficient in ability, and ought 
certainly to be higher ... andI do not say that. he is 
positively very idle. 
2 
So, too, Long's own account of his undergraduate days 
1Long's 
papers relating to Harrow School can be found 
in W. L. P., WRO 947/888-9. 
2H. E. Hutton of Harrow School to Richard Penruddocke Long, 
dated merely 11 July but probably 1871, W. L. P., WRO 947/965 
ESTATE. 
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is dominated by his recollections of university sport. 
On his own admission he spent far too much time fox- 
hunting1 and he left Christ Church, Oxford, without 
obtaining a degree -a fact which he neglected to 
mention in his autobiography. 
To be fair, Long's undergraduate days were not with- 
out difficulty, although it is undoubtedly true that if 
he had devoted less time to sport and more to study his 
academic record need not have suffered such failure. 
He lost both of his first two terms owing to an attack 
of typhus - contracted from the drains of Canterbury 
Quad - and his father died whilst he was still at 
Oxford, so that family troubles no doubt contributed 
to his poor academic showing. His failure to obtain 
a degree always reinforced the attacks of his critics 
on his intellectual mediocrity. Many of his political 
contemporaries regarded Long as much more stupid than he 
really was. He appeared to be a man who had enjoyed 
the best possible education, yet who had squandered his 
time and learnt practically nothing. He was also some- 
thing of a self-righteous killjoy at Oxford, 
2 
a fact 
which cannot have endeared him to his fellow under- 
graduates, as he condemned drinking and gambling. He 
first began to take an active interest in Conservative 






stand as a candidate for the City of Oxford, 
' 
an 
invitation which he refused. He left Christ Church in 
1877: four years at Harrow and a further four at Oxford 
had provided him with only a smattering of academic know- 
ledge but with an obsession for sport. Certainly, he 
did not possess a first-rate intellect and he was not 
well read, but nor was he an absolute mediocrity. The 
fact that his mind was not cluttered with preconceived 
ideas and erudite theories was to be a-source of 
political strength in later years, allowing him to 
respond to changing circumstances with remarkable 
alacrity and an intuitive grasp of what was possible. 
As the eldest son, Long ipherited the Rood Ashton 
estate on the death of. his father in 1875.2 He was 
not yet twenty-one years old; he was to be the master _ 
at Rood Ashton for forty-nine years. His father's 
early demise placed him in the position of guardian 
to his mother, whose health continued to be poor 
0 
4 
although she lived on for many years, and to his younger 
brothers and sisters. Today, the main road between 
Westbury and Melksham passes 4irectly in front of Rood 
Ashton and the house lies in ruins. But an impression 
ti 
of the estate as it was in Long's lifetime can be gleaned 
1Ibid., 
pp. 43-4. 
2The Longs held over 14; 000 acres in Wiltshire and 
Somerset in the 1870s, worth over £23,000 per annum. See 
J. Bateman, The Great. Landowners of Great Brit in and Ireland 
(Leicester, 1971, Repr. of 1883 edition , p. 277; W. L. Guttsmai The British Political Elite (London, 1963), p. 160. 
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from a description published in 1886: 
You have barely left the tall chimneys and quaint 
brick houses of Trowbridge behind you, when you enter 
by an avenue of Scotch firs an expanse of tree-studded 
meadows which form the favourite grazing ground 
of the Rood Ashton shorthorns. From the Castle Lodge 
the road through the home-park rises abruptly till 
you come suddenly on a carefully kept garden, and a 
house ... of Tudoresque turrets, pinnacles and 
battlements.... On one side is an Italian fountain, 
standing amidst ... trim flowerbeds ...: at the foot 
of the grassy slope, with its giant elms and beeches, 
lies a dark willow-fringed lake, tenanted by swans 
and wild ducks; on the other side rises steep Stourton 
Hill, with its covers and its famous fox-earth; while 
in the valley beyond, the distant woods, copses and 
hedgerows of Gastard seem to fade away into gray mist. 
... Passing the billiard room with its Japanese 
cabinets ... leads you into a central lobby, which 
takes in the whole height of the house. The Gothic 
tracery, the vaulted roof, and the elaborate stucco 
mouldings, all savour of the present, ... and a green 
baize door ... opens pn the ... roomy and cheerful study. 
l 
Here, then, was the centre of Longts world, his home and 
his retreat throughout a political career spanning four 
decades. 
r 
But it was not to Rood Ashton that Long returned when 
he left Oxford in 1877. Instead, he took rooms at the 
"King's Arms", Bicester, and for the next two years he 
devoted his life almost entirely to fox-hunting. It is 
1This description was published in the series 'Celebrities 
at Home', The World, 22 Dec. 1886. 
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no exaggeration to say that hunting had become an 
obsession for Long, and, until poor health prevented it 
in later life, he remained its devotee. In this early 
period he would travel to the remotest parts of England, 
Scotland, Wales or Ireland to hunt. Even when he first 
entered parliament the demands of the chase were delic- 
ately balanced against those of politics, and in his last 
years, when he was unable to ride a horse, he followed 
the hounds in a small Ford motorcar. For many years he 
was chairman of the Avon Vale hunt, resigning in 1920 
to become joint master with Sir Alfred Read. He regarded 
fox-hunting as 'the greatest of our national sports', 
' 
and his private letters are littered with hunting stories. 
A measure of his passion can be found in the fact that 
he devoted over seventeen pages of his autobiography to 
hunting reminiscences and anecdotes2 - more space than 
he gave to the electoral defeat of 1906, the People's 
budget, the struggle over the Parliament Bill, and 
Balfour's retirement and the leadership contest of 1911, 
all put together. Opposition to fox-hunting he dismissed 
with the utterly fatuous remark that those who argue that 
hunting 'is a cruel sport and ought not to be allowed can 
never have seen a fox in the course of a hunt or they 
would realise he enjoys himself thoroughly'. 
3 It is odd 
remarks of this kind which have done so much to secure 






Long's reputation, both amongst historians and contemp- 
oraries, as a thick-skinned, dull-witted Tory squire. 
Certainly, for the two years he lived at Bicester or 
other hunting centres, he behaved like one. But in 
1878, with his obsessive hunting passion still at its 
height, he did manage to find time to marry Lady Dorothy 
Blanche, the fourth daughter of the ninth Earl of Cork 
and Orrery. They were to have five children, two sons 
and three daughters. 
The other great sporting passion of Long's life was 
cricket. As a young man he played regularly at the 
Lansdown Cricket Club on the outskirts of Bath, a club 
which occasionally secured the services of W. G. Grace, 
whom Long got to know well. As he got older he played 
less, but his interest continued. He later became a 
member of the M. C. C. Committee at Lords and eventually 
president of the club in 1906, a privilege which he 
regarded as one of the greatest of his life. 
In 1880 Long turned his attentions once more to 
politics and in April he entered parliament as the 
Conservative Member for Wiltshire North, a seat which 
both his father and grandfather ihad held before him, 
although it was by no means a safe seat for a Conservative, 
for it contained the railway town of Swindon whose 
workers could usually be counted upon to vote Liberal. 
In parliament he associated himself from the beginning 
with the 'Country Gentleman Party'; he supported Disraeli 
10 
and believed in social reform wedded to imperialism. He 
made his maiden speech, to an almost empty House, on 
26 July 1880,1 and soon established himself as an expert 
on agricultural affairs. In November 1885 he moved to 
another marginal Conservative seat, the Eastern or Devizes 
division of Wiltshire. 
The following year he joined Lord Salisbury's govern- 
ment as parliamentary secretary to the Local Government 
Board, and it was here that he made his reputation as a 
hard worker and a capable administrator. As well as 
taking control of all Poor Law work, Long played a large 
part in framing the Local Government Act of 1888, and 
the skill which he displayed in carrying this and the 
London County Council Bill through parliament marked 
him out for promotion. Gladstone's return to office 
in August 1892 delayed his promotion, and personal defeat 
in Wiltshire forced him to take the West Derby division 
of Liverpool, a safe Conservative seat which he was to 
hold for seven years. When the Lords threw out home rule 
and Salisbury returned in 1895 to form his third and last 
administration, Long was given a seat in the cabinet as 
President of the Board of Agrictlture. He was just 
forty years old. 
If Walter Long is these Oays remembered at all it is 
invariably as the man who muzzled all dogs in his 
campaign to stamp out rabies in the late 1890s. Never 
1See 
254 Parl. Deb. ser. 3 cols. 1388-90. Long made his 
maiden speech on the Compensation for Disturbance (Ireland) 
Bill. He mistakenly claimed in Memories, p. 81, that he 
first spoke during the debate on the Irish Land Bill in 
1881. 
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in the course of a long political career was he so 
unpopular as during these years. At one point the Canine 
Defence League, that most worthy of Victorian philan- 
thropic societies, handed a petition of some 80,000 
signatures to Lord Salisbury demanding that he be 
dismissed, and he received a torrent of threatening 
letters. 1 The sobriquet 'the Dog-Muzzler' stuck with 
him for the rest of his life. 
2 In actual fact, Long's 
muzzling orders never applied to more than about twenty 
per cent of the area of Britain at any one time. Whilst 
they made him notorious and unpopular, a household 
bogeyman, they also succeeded in totally eradicating 
rabies from the country - something for which Long 
deserves the gratitude of succeeding generations. Before 
1Memories, 
pp. 122-3. Unfortunately, these letters do 
not appear to have survived. 
2The 
anti-rabies campaign was not easily forgotten, and 
for the remainder of Long's political career cartoonists 
and satirists made great play with the subject. A good 
example of this is to bb found ija the political humour 
of late 1906 dealing with Long's reopening of the controversy 
surrounding the appointment of Sir Anthony MacDonnell as 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Irish Office. Punch of 
12 Sept. 1906 carried a full page cartoon of Long holding 
a muzzle, attached to which a label read, 'Muzzle? Muzzle? 
Seems a familiar notion: ' And a supplement given away 
with the Weekly Freeman, Nalional Press and Irish kZriculturist 
of 22 Sept. 1906 developed the theme further with a cartoon 
printed in three colours, Long being represented as an orange 
dog. Wyndham says to Balfour, 'Quick! Get the muzzle on. ' 
To which Balfour replies, 'I am afraid of the owner. You 
know Orange Billy has him n'ow. ' Even when Long visited the 
United States in 1912 he was greeted by the New York press 
as 'The Muzzler' and 'The Foe of the Mad Dog'. 
12 
1897, when muzzling was introduced, there had been an 
average of ten deaths per annum from rabies; in 1899, 
for the first time, there were none, and the disease 
was officially declared extinct. Why were Long's attempts 
to eradicate the rabid dog met with such hostility? It 
would be simplistic to suggest that the answer lies in 
the Englishman's traditional love of dogs, although this 
no doubt played its part. A more realistic explanation 
centres on the very originality of his policy. The 
British public had not by 1895, when the anti-rabies 
campaign begun, - the muzzling orders were in force for 
only two years beginning in 1897 - become accustomed to 
regulations and government controls on the sort of scale 
that Long proposed. Nor was it believed that such a 
disease could be extirpated by the stringent enforcement 
of a few sensible rules; the whole suggestion that rabies 
could be stamped out by prevention and isolation, rather - 
than by treatment, was ia novel idea. Long also had to 
battle against a cabinet which was at best indifferent, 
at worst downright hostile. Joseph Chamberlain poured 
scorn on the idea, Salisbury was apathetic, thinking the 
attempt more trouble than it was worth. But Long stuck 
to his policy. By the turn of the century there was no 
rabies in Britain. 
' 
After the so-called 'khaki election' of`1900, at 
1Longts 
papers on his campaign against rabies do not 
appear to have survived, although his later comments in 
1919 on the subject can be found in W. L. P., WRO 947/586. 
13 
which he had fought and won Bristol South for the 
Conservatives, Long returned to the Local Government 
Board, this time as its President. It was during this 
period of his career that Long first showed his willing- 
ness to depart from standard Tory doctrines when circum- 
stances demanded a new approach. In an attempt to tackle 
the problem of rising unemployment he suggested in 1904 
that the government should make cash advances at special 
low interest rates to selected areas where unemployment 
was particularly high. Balfour was horrified at the 
proposal and quickly warned Long of the 'dangerous 
extensions which this new principle may have in hands 
less firm. ' 
1 
On Boxing Day Long replied with a strong 
argument in favour of an unorthodox approach. 
2 
And in 
1905 he was responsible for the Unemployed Workmen Act, 
intended to relieve unemployment in urban areas; he 
also gave his firm support to the appointment of a 
Poor-Law commission, little realising that Balfour would 
i 
seize on the commission as a means to avoid any further 
action. Long was far ahead of his cabinet colleagues 
C 
on the issue, but entrenched opposition forced the 
abandonment of his scheme -a sgieme which, amongst other 
things, included provision for the paying of wages from 
local rates to the unemployed. He was attacked by his 
own party for desertion of Tory principles; he was 
vilified by wealthy London boroughs, anxious that their 
1Balfour to Long, copy, 23 Dec. 1904, B. P., Add. MS 49776. 
2Long to Balfour, 26 Dec. 1904, ibid. 
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rates should not be used to subsidise the unemployed 
of poorer boroughs; and Conservative interests outside 
parliament castigated the proposals as a dangerous 
concession to socialism. 
1 Long wanted to commit the 
State both to the maintenance of the unemployed and to 
the provision of temporary work, and the fact that he 
could advocate such policies shows that he could be 
progressive and far-sighted. As he commented from his 
retirement, 'I am bound to confess that my policy did 
not find favour in any quarter. Among my own friends 
it was regarded as being too much akin to socialism.... 
The prosecution of the plan was ultimately abandoned. '2 
Long also became increasingly interested"in this - 
period in military affairs. He was always well informed 
on the state of the Army and Navy, and his papers abound 
with correspondence from serving officers. He naturally 
took a keen interest in the Wiltshire yeomanry, which he - 
commanded between 18981and 1906, and it is perhaps 
f 
surprising that he turned down the Admiralty when first 
offered it in 1905.3 
Yet, for all his love of sport and things military, 
- _____________ 
1Long's 
attitude to the problem of the Poor Law and 
unemployment in 1904-5 has been considered in the following, 
to which I am indebted: John Brown, 'The Appointment of 
the 1905 Poor Law Commission', Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical Research 42 (1969); K. D. Brown, 'The Appointment 
of the 1905 Poor Law Commission -a Rejoinder', ibid., 44 
(1971); John Brown, 'The Poor Law Commission and the 1905 




private secretary, J. S. Sandars, maintained 
that Long had wanted the Admiralty but had been 'thwarted 
by the vehement opposition of the First Sea Lord, Sir John 
Fisher.... ' J. S. Sandars C Privy Councillo] , Studies of Yesterday (London, 1928), p. 59. 
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Long was not a healthy man. He was short of stature, 
but with an athletic figure which he maintained even into 
old age, and he suffered from premature baldness. Through- 
out his adult life he wore a full moustache, and as a 
young man his thinning hair - even as an undergraduate 
Long's premature baldness was readily apparent - gave an 
impression of greater maturity. His career was plagued 
by bouts of illness. As he got older he suffered from 
neuralgia and in his last years he was the victim of 
arthritis of the spine. Despite the fact that his 
health was never good - even as a boy he had had frequent 
spells of illness - he was often described as the fittest 
man in the House. His ruddy countenance belied a frail 
constitution, and he deliberately fostered the image of 
a healthy, rugged squire. Contemporary reports, except 
in his last years, rarely made reference to his illnesses, 
except to report the bare facts of his longer absences. 
On the contrary, he was, portrayed as the epitome of health 
and vigour. Only his closest family and friends knew the 
utter falsehood of the newspaper reports, of which the 
following, written shortly before his fiftieth birthday, 
is typical: 7 
It is not merely that peace of mind, based apparently 
on*sound digestion, shines perpetually in Mr. Long's 
regular, finely cut features, but his complexion 
suggests countless cold baths and unlimited exercise 
in the fresh air.... He ... has an excellent voice, 
perfect elocution, a clear head, and a tenacious memory. 
l 
1The Wiltshire Chronicle, 7 May 1904. 
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Like so many politicians, Longs health was declining 
by the time he achieved senior rank; his years in high 
office were precisely those when his health was at its 
worst. T. P. O'Connor was closer to the truth when he 
observed in an obituary that, 
Behind the healthy ruddiness of the complexion and 
the taut, alert and apparently robust figure, certain 
weaknesses revealed themselves. He had months of 
suffering and for the last years of his life some- 
thing like constant discomfort.... 
1 
So, too, there was something bogus about Long's 
emphasis of his connections with rural Wiltshire. 
Although he liked to be regarded as the champion of 
local interests, he was never particularly concerned 
to represent a local constituency. In fact, he 
represented a Wiltshire constituency for only twelve 
of the forty-one years he sat in the Commons; from 
1893 until 1921 he sat, for urban constituencies - 
Bristol, Dublin, Liverpool and Westminster. And in 
2 
1900 he angled for the nomination at St. George's, 
t 
Hanover Square, before accepting Bristol South, which 
------- ---- -- - 
1The Daily Telegraph (late edition), 27 Sept. 1924. 
2Long 
represented the following constituencies: Wiltshire 
North, 1880-85; Wiltshire East (Devizes), 1885-92; West 
Derby division of Liverpool, 1893-1900; Bristol South, 
1900-06; Dublin County South, 1906-10; The Strand, 1910-18; 
St. George's, Westminster, 1918-21. 
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was at least a West Country seat. 
l Family ties with 
Wiltshire provided a natural entry into politics for 
Long, but Wiltshire played little part in sustaining 
his career. 
Commonly regarded as the representative of the 
agricultural wing of the party, Long nonetheless had 
numerous business interests, and much of his income 
came not from land but from investments. He held a 
number of directorships during his political career 
and was certainly no stranger to the kind of hard- 
headed, commercial Conservatism represented by men 
like Bonar Law and Beaverbrook. 
The truth is, for all his play-acting as the spokesman - 
of local interests and old-fashioned rural Conservatism, 
Long was never very interested in local politics and 
preferred to sit for an urban constituency. He found 
constituency work time consuming and tedious; he had no 
qualms about taking a totally safe seat with which he had 
no connections, and when in 1910 he managed to secure the 
nomination for the Strand he was more than grateful, 
vacating his Irish seat without a second thought. As 
far as he was concerned, the safer the seat the better) 
1See 
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach to Long, 19 Aug. 1900, L. P., 
Add. MS. 62408. Long only'left Liverpool in 1900 because 
of a dispute with his local party organisation during the 
previous year. Archibald Salvidge had conducted a campaign 
in Liverpool to 'put down the growing lawlessness amongst 
Protestant clergy' and suppress various 'Romanist practices' 
in Church of England services. Long would have nothing to do 
with the campaign and refused to support the Church Discipline 
Bill which had received the backing of the Conservative 
Workingmen's Association, of which the up and coming Salvidge 
was chairman. The Bill was thrown out by an overwhelming 
majority in May 1899, but Long was forced to quit West Derby 
at the next election. See Stanley Salvidge, Salvidge_of 
1i 
.I QQý 
(London, 1934), pp. 29-38. 
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Walter Long was essentially a career politician, and 







A HARD CHIEF SECRETARY, 1905 
On 12 March 1905 Long was appointed Chief Secretary 
for Ireland. Three days later he was sworn of the Irish 
Privy Council. The appointment was the 'denouement' of 
the devolution crisis which had threatened the collapse 
of Balfour's government and the overthrow of traditional 
Unionist policy in Ireland. 
1 
It marked the effective end 
of the career of George Wyndham and the emergence of Long 
as a major force within the Conservative party. The 
devolution proposals to which the Under-Secretary, Sir - 
Anthony MacDonnell, had lent his support stopped far short 
of home rule and were, indeed, considerably more moderate 
than the scheme - the Government of Ireland Bill - which 
Long was himself to pilot through the House of Commons 
just fifteen -years lat9r. For the moment, however, there 
could be no reform of Irish government. The Conservative 
party was in no mood, to brook concessions; Irish Unionists 
were suspicious. The appointment of the new Chief 
Secretary symbolised a return td the stark dividing line 
between the Union on the one hand and home rule on the other. 
2 
Long was well aware that, his attacks on George Wyndham and 
1For 
a full account of the crisis see F. S. L. Lyons, 'The 
Unionist Party and the Devolution Crisis of 1904-05', Irish 
Historical Studies 6 (1948); Blanche Dugdale, 'The Wyndham- 
MacDonnell imbroglio, 1902-06', quarterly Review, Jan. 1932. 
2F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland Since theFamine (London, 1971), 
------ ----- ---- p. 218. 
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devolution would be interpreted by many as a crude 
manoeuvre to secure the Irish Office for himself, although 
Sir Edward Carson could have had the job for the asking, 
for Long was only offered the post after Carson had turned 
it down. l Nonetheless, he asked Balfour, when announcing 
the appointment, to stress his reluctance to leave the 
Local Government Board, 
2 
and he made it plain that he was 
willing to work with MacDonnell. He believed that he 
could afford to be magnanimous to MacDonnell, who had, 
after all, brought about the fall of Wyndham and Long's 
own promotion. This was something to be grateful for. 
It seemed unlikely that MacDonnell would cause further 
trouble, at least for the time being, but Long was soon 
to have cause to regret his magnanimity, for MacDonnell 
was to prove an incorrigible nuisance. The appointment 
of the new Chief Secretary was also tacit recognition by 
Balfour of the support which Long commanded on the back- - 
benches. By abandoning; Wyndham, his friend and colleague, 
11 
Balfour had for the moment beaten off attacks on his own 
leadership. 
One of Long's first priorities was to regain the 
confidence of Irish Unionists wh6 had been led by the 
devolution crisis to suspect that the Conservative party 
was no longer their natural, ally. It is a measure of his 
success as Chief Secretary that he was able to win the 
trust of Irish Unionists, both north and south, before 
1H. Montgomery Hyde, Carson (London, 1953), p. 209. 
2See Long to Sandars, 12 Mar. 1905, B. P., Add. MS. 49776. 
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leaving office a mere ten months later. He retained this 
trust for many years, so that Ireland became a strong 
base for the support which he enjoyed within the 
Conservative party. To southern Irish Unionists in 
particular, he became the main bulwark in the fight 
against home rule. By masquerading as an Irish Unionist 
himself, he quickly won acceptance, making political 
capital out of his family's Irish connections from 1905 
onwards. In his speeches he claimed to be half Irish and 
his middle name, derived from the family property at 
Humewood, County Wicklow, proved a great asset. 
' It is 
no doubt significant that he seems to have made no effort 
to trace his Irish ancestry before becoming Chief Secretary. - 
But in 1905 he suddenly became very interested in his 
Irish genealogy. And when his enquiries proved successful 
he found himself obliged to be less than frank about some 
of his Irish connections. His great grandfather, for 
example, did not fit refidily into the Unionist image 
which he sought to cultivate: William Hoare Hume, a 
member of the Irish Iouse of Commons, had voted consist- 
ently against the Union in 1799-1800. Even more embarr- 
assing, his father - Long's great-great grandfather - had 
been killed in mysterious circumstances during the Rising 
of 1798. But these blemishes were conveniently overlooked 
1The Humes were a branch of the Scotch house from which 
the Earls of Home, Dunbar and Marchmont sprang. A certain 
Thomas Hume accompanied the Duke of Ormonde to Ireland, 
where he acquired considerable wealth and property which 
was bequeathed to his descendants. The Humes had for 
generations been prominent members of the Irish parliament. 
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and Long proved very adept at blowing the Irish trumpet 
to the tune of his own rising political fortunes. 
' 
By the beginning of the twentieth century Ireland was 
grossly over-represented, and any scheme of redistribution 
as a reflection of population would involve the loss of 
anything up to forty Irish seats. This meant that 
franchise reform was inevitably bound up with home rule. 
2 
That the Conservatives should have attempted to tackle 
redistribution in 1905 is hardly surprising - Long and 
others had been pushing for a Bill for years. Success 
could have kept the party in office through the winter 
and would certainly have reduced Irish Nationalist 
strength in the next parliament, thus making home rule 
less likely. From Long's point of view an independent 
Liberal government was much to be preferred to a Liberal 
government tied to Nationalist votes. On 11 July the 
government published its redistribution scheme, to be - 
submitted to the House a week later. Presented by 
Gerald Balfour, now President of the Local Government 
Board, the scheme would have deprived Ireland of twenty- 
two seats had it not been defeated on a technicality. 
3 
1Papers 
relating to Long's interest in 1905 in his Irish 
genealogy can be found in L. P., Add. MS. 62409. 
2For 
a discussion of the, implications of redistribution 
for the Irish Nationalists and the Liberals see Neal Blewett, 
'The Franchise in the United Kingdom, 1885-1918', Past and 
Present 32 (1965). 
3The 
proposals were presented to the House in the form of 
resolutions, the government intending that they should be 
debated together as one measure. Irish Nationalist opposition 
was a foregone conclusion, but the Liberals, knowing that 
they could always fall back on Irish support whenever denied 
an overall majority, decided to oppose the measure as well. 
On 17 July the new Speaker, J. W. Lowther, announced that tt 
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Although Long was prepared to work with Sir Anthony 
MacDonnell, he was not prepared to allow the Under- 
Secretary the same independence as Wyndham had been. 
MacDonnell would be kept on, but he must be put firmly 
in his place. The trouble was, MacDonnell would not 
give in easily, and acrimony between the two men marked 
virtually the whole of Long's tenure of the Irish Office. 
He did not want to lay himself open to the charge of 
conceding to the baying of the Irish Unionists by 
securing MacDonnell's removal from office - to be a 
strong Chief Secretary he needed to appear independent 
and impartial. To throw MacDonnell over would look like 
cowardice, so Long chose instead to face his critics and 
at the same time force MacDonnell to accept a subordinate 
position. But MacDonnell insisted that he had been 
appointed on the express condition that he be given 
'adequate opportunities of influencing the policy and 
acts of the Irish Gover1ment. "1 He was adamant that he 
r 
had been granted special powers on his appointment, that 
they were essential to his job, and that to relinquish 
them was out of the question. 
2 Long promptly abnegated 
Redistribution Resolution should be divided into a number of 
separate parts, on each of which there should be a discussion 
in Committee of the whole House. Opponents of the scheme were 
thus given an opportunity to attack the measure on various 
points of detail. Balfour promptly stated that the government 
would withdraw the Resolution and proceed with a Bill in the 
next session. The dissolution in December and its sequel, the 
Liberal landslide of January 1906, put an end to the 
Conservatives' plans. Ireland remained over-represented, and 
five years later, in 1910, the Liberals became the benefic- 
iaries of this long-standing electoral anomaly. 
1MacDonnell to Long, 16 Mar. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 947/68. 
2Ibid. 
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MacDonnell. 's so-called special powers. In doing so he 
implicitly abnegated the policy of his-predecessor in 
office. To force MacDonnell to accept a subordinate 
role was effectively to force the cabinet to turn its 
back on Wyndham's Irish policy. Long knew that his 
position was immensely strong - Balfour could hardly 
afford to lose another Chief Secretary - and that he 
could count on cabinet backing. 
The Ulster Unionists had predictably taken a firm stand 
against MacDonnell, demanding his removal as a standing 
menace to Unionist interests. Long recognised that 
Wyndham had indeed allowed MacDonnell 'freedom of 
executive action within the limits of policy laid down' 
and condemned his predecessor for 'undue latitude'. 
' But 
he would not part with MacDonnell and risk misrepresentation 
in Ireland. Replying to a parliamentary question, Long 
made it clear on 11 April that MacDonnell would henceforth 
be treated as a subordinate. All Irish affairs, Long 
asserted, would now be under his own personal control and 
subject to his own personal approval. If this involved a 
change in the running of the Irish Office, then there 
would be a change. 
2 This was an%explicit public repud- 
iation of his predecessor's regime. MacDonnell stayed, 
but he was on a tight rein., 
Long had a very poor opinion of Wyndham's administration 
1Cabinet 
memorandum by Long, 1 Apr. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
71. 
2144 
Parl. Deb. ser. 4 cols. 1278-9. 
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and later told Balfour that on taking office he had 
discovered that 'in the administration of the Land Act; 
in the action of the police; in the enforcement of the 
law and the adoption of measures generally for the 
protection of ... individuals, a policy had been in 
operation which was at direct variance with the cardinal 
principles of the Unionist Party. '1 But whilst Long saw 
himself as the defender of those cardinal principles, 
MacDonnell did not. Within days of repudiating Wyndham's 
regime in the Commons Long took clear steps to check 
MacDonnell's capacity for independent action. On 19 April 
he issued an instruction requiring that all files be 
submitted for his consideration as a matter of course and 
he told MacDonnell to make no decisions whatsoever, even 
on small matters-, without prior consultation. 
2 MacDonnell 
had no choice but to submit, but he never really accepted 
Long's authority. He remained a rebel in the Unionist 
camp, quiescent but sm quld. ering. 
Trouble soon arose over the administration of the Land 
Act. Wyndham had be. en in the habit of treating some 
sales as special cases, but Long would have none of this. 
Shortly before resigning, Wyndham had asked the Estates 
Commissioners to treat the sale of Lord Rossmore's 
property as a priority. Long cancelled this direction. 
MacDonnell challenged him with the audacious remark that 
1Long 
to Balfour, copy, 20 Sept. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 947/61. 
2See Long to MacDonnell, copy, 19 Apr. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 
947/70. 
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it was not 'desirable ... to interfere with Mr Wyndham's 
orders', 
1 but Long insisted that the Land Act was 
henceforth to be administered with total impartiality, 
telling the Under-Secretary that in future 'every case 
must be taken in order of priority. '2 
There was further bad feeling between the two men over 
Long's refusal to countenance MacDonnell's proposal that 
a certain John Fitzgibbon be appointed as a paid negot- 
iator-to the Irish Land Commission. Apart from being a 
member of the United Irish League, Fitzgibbon had for 
years been a prominent local leader of agrarian agitation 
and had several convictions for crimes associated with 
intimidation. Yet MacDonnell insisted that Fitzgibbon 
was a suitable appointee. The strongly worded letter3 
with which Long dismissed the proposal as ridiculous 
cannot have helped to improve an already difficult 
working relationship. 
By the autumn Long had decided that MacDonnell was 
intolerable and would have to go. He very much regretted 
that he had not got rid of the Under-Secretary in March, 
when it would have been easy to do so. He had made the 
mistake of believing that Wyndhat's weakness had been 
responsible for MacDonnell's independence and he had 
1MacDonnell to Long, 6 June 1905, W. L. P., WRO 947/97. 
2Long to MacDonnell, copy, 7 June 1905, ibid. 
3See Long to MacDonnell, copy, 1 June 1905. W. L. P., WRO 
947/99. 
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assumed that a strong Chief Secretary could easily 
control his subordinates. He had learnt otherwise. 
MacDonnell proved an outspoken nuisance whose views on 
Irish policy invariably conflicted with his own and who 
followed instructions with the greatest reluctance. He 
began to look for a post with which MacDonnell could be 
bought off, confiding to Balfour that: 'The great majority 
of our friends ... would be glad if he could be got rid 
of.... It would be a splendid solution from the Irish 
point of view.... '1 
In November Long happened to ask for the monthly report 
of the Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary 
(R. I. C. ) for November 1903. He discovered that the original - 
report had been suppressed and that the original covering 
notes furnished by MacDonnell had disappeared. It looked 
as if MacDonnell had concealed the true facts about crime 
in Ireland and told the Inspector-General that the report 
was highly exaggerated ßnd therefore unacceptable. The 
Inspector-General had then meekly rewritten the report. 
To Long, it looked ap if MacDonnell, in order to have a 
better chance of securing approval for his incipient 
devolution plans, had deliberately misrepresented the 
level of crime in the country. 
2 Not surprisingly, Long 
was furious; he was now more determined than ever to be 
rid of the Under-Secretary. 
Later in the month a vacancy on the India Council seemed 
1Long 
to Balfour, 19 Oct. 1905, B. P., Add. MS. 49776. 
2Papers 
relating to this incident are in W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
104. 
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to provide the ideal opportunity. Long was now so 
annoyed with MacDonnell that he was ready to dismiss 
him out of hand, but Balfour would not hear of it: 'I 
do not quite see how you are to dismiss him as an 
official because people spread stories alleging his 
complicity with the enemy. '1 MacDonnell therefore had 
to be persuaded to relinquish office, for to dismiss 
him was tantamount to admitting that the accusations of 
his enemies were true. And the enemies would then turn 
on the Chief Secretary who had allowed him to remain in 
office. Long employed every argument he could think of 
to persuade MacDonnell to resign, but it was all to no 
avail, and only the Liberal victory of January 1906 put 
an end to his dilemma. MacDonnell was not yet ready to 
quit Ireland: he was ready with another devolution 
scheme for the new Chief Secretary, James Bryce, within 
less than two months of Long leaving office. 
The retention of MacDpnnell's services in March 1905, 
then, was clearly a mistake. MacDonnell could have been 
dismissed at the same time as Wyndham resigned. This 
C 
would have blackened Wyndham's reputation still further, 
but it would have satisfied Irish Unionists and boosted 
Long's popularity. In his desire to be fair and impartial 
Long encumbered himself with an Under-Secretary who was 
1Balfour to Long, 20 Nov. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 947/63. 
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to oppose almost every aspect of his policy. 
1 
In his autobiography Long claimed that his working 
relationship with MacDonnell, 'the great civil servant', 
had been very good. 
2 Nothing could be further from the 
truth. The working relationship between the two men 
was ill-tempered and argumentative. Long was determined 
to achieve the upper hand, MacDonnell was determined to 
maintain some degree of independence. The two men stood 
for opposing policies and opposing principles; and 
MacDonnell hampered Long's actions whenever he could. 
In a sincere attempt in March 1905 to be fair to 
MacDonnell, Long ensured that his Irish policy would be 
challenged at every turn. He should have condemned 
MacDonnell publicly, as he condemned Wyndham publicly. 
Long also experienced difficulty in working with the 
Lord Lieutenant, Lord Dudley. Disagreements over policy 
came to a head at the end of July over the issue of a 
patronage appointment, and Long played on the knowledge 
that Balfour could not afford to lose another Chief 
Secretary to insist on getting his own way. The real 
t 
problem was that Dudley disagreed with Long on policy. 
1Long told Austen Chamberlain in the autumn of 1906, 
when MacDonnell was again causing trouble over Irish policy, 
that to have sacked MacDonnell in March 1905 might have 
been expedient but would also have been unjust. He had 
found that the Under-Secretary had acted in accordance 
with Wyndham's instructions 'in everything he did'. 
Wyndham was therefore the villain, not MacDonnell. See 








arguing that prosecutions for intimidation were useless, 
as they merely drove the trouble underground, and that 
the grass-lands in Ireland ought to be divided to ease 
the demand for land purchase. 
1 On 30 July Long used 
the threat of resignation to force Balfour to assert 
the precedence of the Chief Secretary. Long's telegram 
was blunt: 'Position ... is really becoming grotesque.... 
Woul-d beg that distinct reply may be sent ... and decisive 
reply by Prime Minister will either produce resignation 
... or give me authority. '2 
In these circumstances, Balfour had no choice but to 
issue a statement of support for Long, and on 15 August 
he told Dudley that Long's view must prevail in all 
matters of policy. Long could not resist rubbing salt 
into the wounds by commenting to Balfour a few days 
later that the instructions to Dudley represented 'a model 
letter and ought to be preserved as a State Paper. '3 This 
was no idle controversy i over precedence: 
Long took a 
I 
stand because he would brook no interference with his own 
administration. As he told Jack Sandars, Dudley 'has the 
t 
most extraordinary notions, ... disagrees entirely with 
my policy, disapproves my appointments ... but as it is 
he goes on out of loyalty to his Chief. '4 When, on 23 
August, Balfour tried to restore calm between the two men, 
5 
'See Dudley to Long, 17 Aug. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 947/65. 
2See Long to Balfour, 31 July 1905, B. P., Add. MS. 49776; 
Long's copy telegram is dated 15 Aug. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 
947/65. 
3Long 
to Balfour, 21 Aug. 1905, B. P., Add. MS. 49776. 
4Long 
to Sandars, 21 Aug. 1905, ibid. 
K 
'Balfour to Long, 23 Aug. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 947/65. 
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Long merely remarked that Dudley was 'a very bad coll- 
eague in government. '1 The plain fact was, Long found 
Dudley impossible to work with and would have liked 
Balfour to force his resignation. 
2 In other words, 
Long's working relationship with both his Under-Secretary 
and the Lord Lieutenant was extremely poor. Both men 
were opposed to the traditional interpretation of Unionism 
to which Long adhered and both men made his task as Chief 
Secretary more difficult by questioning his every decision. 
One of his decisions was to withdraw government subsidies 
granted for the teaching of the Irish language. This was 
an issue charged with emotion for Irish Nationalists. 
Long had to move with the greatest caution if he wished 
to avoid provoking agitation on the score of being 
niggardly and anti-Irish. He therefore proposed to placate 
nationalist outrage by undertaking not to abolish the 
subsidy outright but to transfer the money to other 
educational purposes, cplculating that incipient agitation 
would collapse if the government made a significant 
' 
improvement in the number of teachers in small schools. 
Long's difficulty lay in persuading the Treasury to 
substitute the appointment of mo'e teachers for the 
teaching of the Irish language, instead of simply saving 
the money outright. The whole point of the exercise, as 
far as Long was concerned, was to undermine the rising 
tide of nationalism. The resurrection of the Irish 
'Long 
to Balfour, 25 Aug. 1905, B. P., Add. MS. 49776. 
2See Long to Sandars, 25 Aug. 1905, ibid. 
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language gave credibility to the doctrine that the Irish 
were a separate people. This was a contention that Long 
refused to accept: the Irish language was an antiquated 
tongue which made no contribution to literature and 
maintained an illusion of separatism which it was the 
government's business to dispel. The Treasury was 
sympathetic and acquiesced in Long's demands towards 
the end of October. 
1 Once again, however, Liberal 
victory and the fall of Balfour's government put an end 
to Long's policy before it had got off the ground. 
His administration of the 1903 Land Act was more 
successful, although he was consistently hampered by 
a shortage of government funds. Long was firmly in 
favour of transferring as much land as possible to Irish 
tenants, believing that land purchase offered a sure 
means to undermine nationalist support. As long as 
there was no favouritism and no corruption, he believed 
that nationalism would, wither and die once the Irish 
found themselves in possession of the land. The Treasury, 
though, was not prepared to promise unlimited amöunts of 
cash or stock to be provided or issued for applications 
which might come in the future.? Long soon found-him- 
self with a Land Act whose provisions he wanted to make 
use"of, but no money to do, so. The total amount provided 
by the Treasury was soon many millions short of the 
1See Sir E. W. Hamilton, permanent Financial Secretary 
to the Treasury, to Long, 23 Oct. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
94. 
2Memorandum 
regarding a conference at the Treasury on 
27 July 1905 and forwarded to Long on 29 July 1905, W. L. P., 
WRO 947/101. 
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applications,, giving Long's enemies the opportunity to 
say that he, and the government of which he was a member, 
no longer believed in land purchase. 
By November the Irish Times was moved to comment that 
the Chief Secretary had totally failed to 'give an 
impetus to the now almost stagnant business of land 
purchase. '1 But this was not Long's fault: the original 
estimates on which the Act had been based had proved 
wholly insufficient and sales had come to a standstill 
only because the Treasury could not find the necessary 
money. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1905 Long 
considered amending the Act so that landowners might be 
obliged to receive part payment in stock. He was very 
worried that landlords and tenants would become restless 
in cases where sale and purchase prices had been agreed, 
but nothing could be done for lack of finance. 
Unfortunately for Long, the Landowners' Convention - 
was vehemently opposed to part payment in stock: the i 
4W 
Wyndham Act clearly stated that the Land Commission 
would meet the full purchase price of all estates in 
cash. And Long could not afford to upset the landlords. 
The root of the trouble was simple: Wyndham's Act'had 
been much more successful than the government of the 
day had anticipated. Long tried to speed up purchases 
by offering the landlords a moiety in cash, but their 
vigorous opposition, coupled with that of the Nationalists 
in parliament made his position increasingly difficult. 
'Irish Times, 14 Nov. 1905. 
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The landlords wanted it both ways: they wanted to 
expedite sales of their estates and they wanted full 
and immediate payment in cash. With applications under 
the Land Act running way ahead of estimates on which 
the financial provisions had been based, the two aims 
were quite irreconcilable, and Long's objective of 
effecting vast changes of ownership of land in Ireland 
without upsetting the landlords was frustrated by 
Treasury constraints. 
Even so, land purchases went steadily through during 
his period as Chief Secretary. Priority was not given 
to particular Irish landlords who happened to be 
supporters of the government, as it had been in Wyndham's 
day, nor was intimidation or crime ignored for the sake 
of a quiet life. If more money had been forthcoming 
then Long would have ensured that more purchases took 
place. He received much criticism for shortcomings 
which were not of his making and which he was powerless 
i` 
to put right; he received little praise for administering 
the Land Act with total impartiality. On the contrary, 
the landlords frequently made his life difficult by 
refusing to see that shortage ofimoney was the overriding 
factor. 
Balfour had promoted Long in March 1905 because he had 
no choice; he had also supported Long against Lord Dudley 
because he had no choice. Such a state of affairs hardly 
encouraged good working relations, and the enmity between 
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the two men which was to culminate in Balfour's 
resignation in 1911 and Long's bid for the party leader- 
ship finds its origin in this period. Long knew that 
Balfour privately supported Wyndham and he knew that he, 
Long, was tolerated rather than trusted. When Balfour 
began in the autumn of 1905 to consider an early general 
election, Long emerged as the focus of opposition within 
the party. There were, /two reasons for this: he recognised 
that the Unionist party would be defeated throughout the 
country; and he feared that he would be forced to leave 
Ireland before his policy had had time to take a firm hold. 
As early as September Long told the prime minister that a 
general election would be a 'debacle' for Conservatives 
from which they would not recover for years. 
1 Almost 
alone amongst the party leadership Long predicted not 
only that the Liberals would win, - this was widely 
expected - but also that their victory would be over- 
whelming. His analysis, of the party's prospects was 
quite sound: 
Could there be a worse time than this Autumn?... our 
organisations are only beginning to recover from the 
shock of the fiscal bombshells... No human being out- 
side the Cabinet would understand the need to dissolve, 
all would be furious.... I can see no reason for a 
Dissolution.... I am convinced we shall be hopelessly 
beaten... 2 
As rumours of an impending general election intensified 
iSee Long to Balfour. 6 Sept. 1905, B. P., Add. MS. 49776. 
2Long to Balfour, 11 Sept. 1905, ibid. 
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Long received numerous letters from party supporters 
deprecating a dissolution. His advice was based on a 
much surer grasp of party feeling than Balfour possessed, 
a fact which became all too obvious with the Liberals' 
landslide victory in January 1906. 
Irish Unionists naturally feared that Long's departure 
would herald the return of devolution proposals in one 
form or another. His contention that Balfour should hang 
on at least until the spring, if only for the sake of 
Ireland, was based on the opinions of a considerable 
number of the government's own supporters; he opposed 
Balfour in the sure knowledge that he had the backing 
of Unionists throughout Ireland. But Balfour would not 
be swayed, nor did he recognise the immense damage that 
electoral humiliation would do to his own prestige within 
the party. On 30 November Long issued a final warning, 
commenting that 'resignation now means disaster to Ireland 
and ruin to the Unionist cause. '1 Four days later Balfour 
resigned and the election campaign began. 
Long also had a pe'sonal reason to be annoyed: his 
own seat, Bristol South, was far from safe. The constit- 
uency contained the business cen'tre of the city as*well 
as an industrial population of miners, dockers, brewery 
and tobacco workers for wham tariff reform and 'food 
taxes' was the major issue. 
2 Long campaigned vigorously 
1Long to Balfour, copy, 30 Nov. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 947/62. 
2Henry Pelling, Social Geography of British Electionsi 
1885-1910 (London, 1967), p. 146. 
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to retain this marginal seat, although he was persistently 
embarrassed by press allegations, which were quite true, 
that he intended taking a safe Irish seat in the event 
of losing Bristol. On 13 December he addressed a meeting 
at the Parochial Hall, Knowle; 
1 the next day he addressed 
his constituents at the Ford Memorial Hall, Bedminster; 
2 
and on 19 December he spoke yet again. In all of these 
3 
speeches Long stressed the importance of guarding against 
home rule, dealing only perfunctorily with tariff reform. 
He carefully avoided offering any explanation for the 
government's resignation and said very little about 
future policy on any issue save Ireland. He was well 
received and suffered only minimal heckling, but his 
defeat must have come as no surprise. As a percentage 
of the total poll Long's vote slumped from 53 in 1900 to 
less than 40 in January 1906.4 Given the unpopularity 
of the government and the nature of the constituency, 
this was a respectable result. Long gratefully accepted 
the offer of Dublin County (South), thus cementing his 
ties with Irish Unionism. He was never again to represent 
a constituency in his own part of the country. 
Between March and December 1905 Long gained a reputation 
as a hard Chief Secretary. To what extent was such a 
For a report of Long's speech see The Bristol Times and 
Mirror, 14 Dec. 1905. - -ý 
2 For a report of Long's speech see ibid., 15 Dec. 1905. 
3For 
a report of Long's speech see ibid., 20 Dec. 1905. 
4Pelling, Social Geography, p. 144. 
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reputation deserved? It was certainly true that firm 
imposition of the law was the hallmark"of Long's tenure 
of the Irish Office and it was this policy which endeared 
him to Irish Unionists. By the end of his administration 
lawlessness was declining, as Irish landlords were the 
first to point out. The following are typical of many 
letters which Long received during November and December. 
Lord Drogheda wrote: 
Owing to the firm manner in which law and order has 
been maintained since your appointment, parts of the 
country which appeared to be getting quite out of 
hand have quieted down.... There has been a good 
harvest, and rents are being cheerfully paid in most 
places - In my own case the rent collection has, so 
far, been better than for many years. 
' 
And Lord Clonbrock testified that ? the firmness and justice 
of your policy has had a most marked effect.... '2 
The Conservative press in Britain, too, was enthusiastic. 
The Outlook, under the äuspices of J. L. Garvin, praised 
Long for extricating the 'Unionist administration from a 
morass of weakness ahd intrigue' and attributed his 
success to 'quiet firmness and discernment in the choice 
and management of men. From the moment when he commenced 
to rescue Irish administration ... he has shown an 
excellence of judgement, a 'cool grasp of fact and a power 
of work which mark him out for a conspicuous place in the 
1Drogheda 
to Long, 3 Nov. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 947/116. 
2Clonbrock to Long, 3 Nov. 1905, ibid. 
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Unionist party of the future. '1 And The_Times of 13 
December published a eulogistic appraisal, commenting 
that Long would be remembered for 'the wonderful 
improvement which less than a year of his firm and just 
administration has effected in the state of Ireland. ' 
But Long had not really been as firm or., as hard as 
these panegyrics would suggest. He had presided over 
a small increase in the strength of the R. I. C. 
2 
and he 
had administered the Land Act as generously as the 
Treasury would permit, yet in practice he had done 
nothing to combat the rising tide of nationalism within 
Ireland itself. He had spent considerable time studying 
the activities of various nationalist groups, yet he was 
almost lenient when dealing with sedition, proscribing 
only six meetings of the United Irish League during his 
term of office. 
3 All that he had done as Chief Secretary 
was to ensure that criminals were brought to justice 
whenever possible. Heirefused to turn a blind eye to 
11 
nationalist lawlessness,. but he equally made no attempt 
to suppress nationalist opinions or activities, except 
in the case of the Irish language subsidy. To this 
extent, his reputation was undeserved. 
Long also gained the reputation in 1905 of being a 
difficult man to work with. This was largely the result 
of his disputes with MacDonnell and Lord Dudley, disputes 
'The Outlook, 9 Dec. 1905. 
2 Long's papers relating to the R. I. C. in 1905 can be 
found in W. L. P., WRO 947/106. 
3A list of meetings proscribed by Long can be found 
in W. L. P., WRO 947/109. 
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which were more of policy than of personality. Long 
had taken over an administration which had taken a step 
in the direction of devolution and the desertion of the 
very 'raison d'etre' of the Unionist party. In these 
circumstances, it was hardly surprising that there 
should have been some friction. 
Nevertheless, Long could be, and sometimes was, obdurate 
over venial matters. An example of this is to be found 
in the dispute which he conducted with the Treasury over 
the matter of expenses relating to the Chief Secretary's 
Lodge in Phoenix Park, Dublin. The glassware and 
crockery at the Lodge had not been provided from Treasury 
revenues but at the personal expense of the occupants 
of the official residence, the practice being that each 
outgoing Chief Secretary had the articles valued and 
his successor then paid for them. Long did, in fact, 
pay Wyndham in October for the items. ' His objection 
to the system was that'as the items decreased in value 
at each subsequent valuation he would stand to lose. 
The pettiness of Long's objections can be gleaned from 
the inventory and valuation of the articles handed over 
to James Bryce in December 1905: 2 even after including 
the fee for making the valuation Long actually lost 
something under one pound. Yet he argued the issue with 
1See Long's receipt, 16 Oct. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 947/113. 
2See 'Inventory and Valuation of Utensils, Glass etc. 
at Chief Secretary's Lodge, Phoenix Park', 27 Mar. 1905, 
and subsequently of 28 Dec. 1905, ihid.. 
i 
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the Treasury for months and spent hours preparing 
memoranda in defence of his objections-, despite the 
fact that the system had proved perfectly satisfactory 
to all of his predecessors in office. 
1 
He also objected to an arrangement, regarding the 
produce of the Lodge garden, which had been agreed in 
1896 and which his predecessors had again found perfectly 
satisfactory. In return for fruit, vegetables and 
flowers to be used as he wished, Long was expected as 
Chief Secretary to contribute to the wages of labourers 
employed in the grounds of the Lodge. He complained 
heatedly to the Treasury to have the arrangement changed, 
and he was evidently tardy in paying the labourers in 
accordance with the existing agreement, for the Board 
of Public Works in Dublin informed him in June that the 
head gardener was understandably annoyed at being 
personally out of pocket for more than eight pounds in 
respect of wages which had been paid to a labourer ij 
employed solely on cultivating produce for the Chief 
Secretary's use. 
2 Anxious for reimbursement and wary 
of approaching Long directly, the head gardener had 
complained to the Board. Long paid up in the end, -but 
it was only after carping bitterly to the Treasury and 
causing embarrassment both to his head gardener and to 
the Irish Board of Public Works. It was always one 
1Copies 
of Long's letters and memoranda to the Treasury 
on this issue can be found in his papers, ibid. 
2See Henry Williams, secretary to the Irish Board of 
Public Works, to Long, 19 June 1905, ibid. 
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of Long's weaknesses to persist in a futile argument 
and to make a fuss over petty and unimportant issues 
once he had taken up a cause. Those who taxed him with 
petulance and small-mindedness often had justification. 
By December 1905, then, Long had established his 
position as a leading figure within the Conservative 
party and as a possible focus for discontent at Balfour's 
leadership. It mattered little that his reputation as 
a hard, uncompromising Chief Secretary was belied by 
the fact that he had done nothing to check the spread of 
nationalism, except to lock up its more rowdy spokesmen. 
He could count on the support of Irish Unionists, an 
important group within the party. Indeed, on 30 November 
he had been presented with an Address, signed by forty- 
eight leading Unionist figures in Ireland - Catholic and 
Protestant peers, large landowners and influential 
Dublin businessmen - requesting him to continue in 
parliament to watch over Irish interests, for there was 
i 
'no one to whom Irish Unionists 
can look for guidance and 
leadership with more confidence. '1 Ireland had become 
for Long a powerbase'over which Balfour had little 
influence. i 
The Liberal victory of January 1906 actually bolstered 
Long's prestige withjn the party, for it proved that his 
political prescience had been sound, Balfour's unsound. 
As Long had told Jack Sandars in October, electoral 
1The Address was forwarded to Long on 30 Nov. 1905 by 
Sir Rowland Blennerhassett. See W. L. P., WRO 947/117. 
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defeat would be 'a hopeless reverse for wh. the P. M. wd. 
be blamed. '1 Many Conservatives had expected defeat; few 
had expected such total disaster. Long's knowledge of 
the poor state of the party's organisation and of the 
unpopularity of tariff reform had enabled him to fore- 
see an overwhelming Liberal victory. He tried to warn 
Balfour of the folly of an early dissolution, and when 
his advice went unheeded and events proved him right he 
made no secret of his annoyance and frustration. Within 
Conservative circles he made it clear that he had a low 
opinion of Balfour's capacities as a leader. To Lady. 
Londonderry, for example, he reported on 22 December 
that Balfour's speeches were not those of a 'fighting 
man who wants to win.... I am sick ... and terribly 
disillusioned - confidence, once destroyed, does not 
easily rise again. '2 He realised only too well that 
tariff reform lost votes. Already, he was marked out 
as a possible challenger for the party leadership, the 
i 
candidate of all those not to be counted amongst 
Chamberlain's followers. When the Conservative party 
went into opposition in the new parliament of 1906 
Long was in a strong position. ; Apart from Joseph 
Chamberlain, Long was the only person to whom the mal- 
contents could turn for guidance and leadership. 
1Long to Sandars, 16 Oct. 1905, S. P., MS. Eng. Hist. 
c. 749, fos. 154-5. 




PARTY LEADER, BUT NOT QUITE, 1906-1914 
In his autobiography Long explained away the Conservative 
defeat of January 1906 by blaming the party's misfortunes 
on the 'Chinese coolie' agitation. 'The charge had gone 
home', he wrote, 'and the belief was firmly entertained 
by the electors that there was danger of the reintroduction 
of slavery. The people rose, almost as a man, in their 
steadfast determination to put a stop to anything of the 
kind. " This splendid nonsense avoided disclosure of 
his real assessment. At the time, he was firmly of the 
opinion that Balfour's weak leadership wedded to a 
policy of 'food taxes' had condemned the party to 
electoral humiliation. 




hostility to the tariff reform campaign was 
always grounded in the belief that 'food taxes' were an 
electoral liability. He had had early experience of 
this as the young MP for Wiltshire East (Devizes), ' a 
seat which he lost ii 1892. On 12 May 1892 Lord Salisbury, 
addressing a conference at Hastings of the National Union 
of Conservative Associations, had spoken of the damage 
to British trade being done by fdreign protective tariffs, 
and he hinted that Britain might be forced to retaliate 
with its own tariffs, thus raising the spectre of 'dear 
bread'. Long attributed his defeat in Devizes to this 
speech, an opinion which he made clear to Aretas Akers-Douglas 
in a letter dated 11 July lb92. The defeat, he wrote, 'was 
a bad blow for me and quite unexpected till last week when 
they produced their dear bread cry and quoted Lord S's 
Hastings speech: there is no doubt I owe my defeat entirely 
to that speech: the labourers are an ignorant lot and 
swallowed it whole.... Of course I feel this jib as it 
is severing a very old connection - but it can't be helped. ' 
This letter is published in full in 3rd Viscount Chilston, 
Chief Whip, The Political Life and Times of_Aretas Akers- 
Douglas, 1st Viscount Chilston (London, 1961), p. 242. Long 
regarded 'food taxes' in this light for the remainder of 
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up with Balfour's leadership, and many thought that the 
best course would be to replace Balfour with Joseph 
Chamberlain. On 31 January, for example, Edward Saunderson 
told Austen Chamberlain that his father would be the best 
candidate and that Long was 'absolutely at one' with this 
view -a most unlikely description of Long's attitude. 
1 
In the new parliament Long became a natural focus for 
many of those who were dissatisfied with Balfour's 
performance; and in the six months following the election 
he was bombarded with letters imploring him either to 
insist on decisive leadership from Balfour or seize the 
leadership himself. 2 Even Joseph Chamberlain, it seems, 
his political career, and this early defeat in Devizes no 
doubt contributed to the strength of his feeling against 
the tariff reform crusade. Indeed, he took the defeat - 
by the narrow margin of only 138 votes - very badly, 
accusing his successful opponent, in the columns of The 
Times, of misrepresenting Conservative policy. The 
victor, though little known at the time, was Long's close 
neighbour from Monkton Farleigh, Charles Hobhouse, a 
future Liberal cabinet. minister. Long's essentially 
pragmatic attitude towards tariff reform is well illus- 
trated by a conversation recorded by Sir Almeric Fitzroy 
on 16 June 1903: '... I said to Walter Long, "You are an 
adherent of Chamberlain, are you not? " "Yes", he replied, 
"more or less. " "I suppose", was my rejoinder, "by that 
you mean that the test of his case lies in its applic- 
ability? " "Yes", he said, "that is why I used the words 
more or less. " ' See Sir Almeric Fitzroy, Memoirs, 2 Vols. 
(London, n. d. [1925? ] ), 1,138. iLong's parliamentary 
secretary, William Bull, recorded a similar conversation 
over two years later: 'I thought he was in favour of 
retaliation and possible protection - He said it was the 
duty of the Conservative Party to stay in power. If 
therefore the country did not want retaliation we had 
better drop it for the present.... ' Bull's diary, 13 Oct. 
1905, Bu. P., 3/12. 
1See Saunderson to Austen Chamberlain, 31 Jan. 1906, 
A. C. P., AC 7/2/4. 
any of these letters can be found in L. P., Add. MS. 
62410. 
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contemplated replacing Balfour with Long after the 
electoral catastrophe. At a Liberal Unionist meeting 
in January Chamberlain first aired the suggestion, but 
it gained little ground amongst the senior men of both 
wings of the party as Lord Lansdowne, apparently, 
'immediately jumped on the proposal and nothing more 
came of it. ' This, at least, was the story told over 
five years later by Pike Pease, who had been present at 
the Liberal Unionist meeting, to Robert Sanders, the 
Conservative Member for Bridgwater from 1910 to 1923.1 
The story has a certain plausibility. It is well known 
that Chamberlain was dissatisfied with Balfour's perform- 
ance and at least toyed with the idea of making a challenge 
for the leadership himself. Knowing both that his age 
was against him and that as a Liberal Unionist he could 
never be acceptable to the bulk of the party, Chamberlain 
may well have regarded Long, who was, after all, committed 
in principle to tariff deform, as an ideal candidate. As 
i 
yet there was no animosity between Long and Austen 
Chamberlain - this bßgan only in 1907 with the ca1paign 
against the Unionist free traders. 
On 2 February 1906 Balfour din'ed at Prince's Gardens 
with the two Chamberlains, and Joseph called for a party 
meeting to deeide between the rival fiscal programmes. 
Balfour, he suggested, should relinquish the party lead- 
ership to Long in the event of a victory for tariff reform. 
2 
1Diary 
of Sir Robert Sanders (Lord Bayford), Research 
Dept., Conservative and Unionist Central Office, entry 
for 5 Aug. 1911. This source is hereafter cited as 
Sanders diary. 
2 Max Egremont, Balfour, A Life of Arthur James Balfour 
--------------------------- (London, 1980), p. 208. 
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Lord Northcliffe, too, seems to have played a character- 
istically shady role in the intrigue, for sometime early 
in February he summoned Sir William Bull, 
1 
Long's 
private parliamentary secretary, and gave him so-called 
'conclusive proof' that the Chamberlain faction, fed up 
with Balfour's vacillation, was ready and willing to 
follow Long. On the basis of this 'proof' Bull advised 
Long to make an immediate challenge for the leadership 
as the only an acceptable to both wings of the party: 
'You see, after all if B. 
[Balfour] 
will not lead and 
C. 
r 
hamberlainl will not lead who is there but you?... 
the introduction of your name is a spontaneous, unengin- 
eered growth.... '2 Pease's story is further confirmed 
1Sir 
William Bull was Conservative MP for Hammersmith 
and a leading figure amongst Long's backbench supporters. 
Head of the firm of Bull and Bull Solicitors, of Lincoln's 
Inn and Hammersmith, he was for many years Long's closest 
political confidant. He was also chairman of J. W. Singer 
and Sons of Frome, Somerset, a post which gave him a 
commercial interest in-Long's part of the country. He 
was knighted in 1906 an4 was particularly useful to Long 
when it came to 'inspiring' favotirable newspaper articles. 
For example, during the cabinet struggle in the autumn of 
1905 as to whether the government should stay in office 
or fight an election= Long had exploited Bull's contacts 
with-the editors to promote his view that Balfour should 
carry on. Bull's diary reveals the extent to which Long 
was able to manipulate the Tory press. A typical entry 
reads: 'I went onto see Buckle.:.. He quite fell in 
with my views and I sketched the leader. In the meantime 
I had got on to George Armstrong and arranged a leader in 
the "Globe". Then I went to Charles Watney of the "Daily 
Mail" - They only have one leader and that was already 
in 
type but I shall arrange for him to see Long.... ' Bull's 
diary, 7 Nov. 1905, Bu. P., 3/12. Long did not exactly 
have a 'tame' press, but he was certainly able to place 
articles when the occasion demanded. Bull put his own 
knighthood down to the 'fortune of circumstance that I 
am able to write readable leaders late at night. ' Bull's 
diary, 11 Dec. 1905, ibid. 
2Bull to Long, 5 Feb. 1906, L. P., Add. MS. 62409. Bull 




by a letter which J. L. Garvin, a keen admirer of 
Chamberlain, wrote to Leo Maxse on 4 February: 
A united party will not follow Joe, and he never was 
wiser than in refusing to lead. I am perfectly certain 
that at least a score of nominal tariff reformers ... 
will rat to Balfour if there is a split - if Long is 
the man he ought to be the game is our own, but the 
sentimental reaction prematurely created in Balfour's 
favour is dangerous. 1 
But Long was not the man to march to Chamberlain's 
tune, and he paid no attention to Bull's promptings, 
content to leave the leadership contest for another day. 
Bull worked assiduously in pushing Long forward and in 
stirring the backbenchers against Balfour despite the 
fact that Long would not intrigue openly. 
2 Nonetheless, 
the episode shows not only incipient dissatisfaction 
with Balfour's leadership, but also that Long was in 
many quarters regarded as his most probable successor 
as early as 1906. The' so-calle& 'Valentine letters'. 
published on 14 February, put a temporary end to the 
speculations over the leadership: Balfour gave a general 
endorsement to the principle of tariff reform in return 
for a unanimous vote of confidence. Chamberlain professed 
himself satisfied; Long waited in the wings, nominally 
a tariff reformer and a loyal supporter of Balfour - as 
1Garvin to Maxse, 4 Feb. 1906, quoted in Egremont, 
Balfour, p. 208. 
2Bull 
recorded that he had 'manoeuvred a little with a 
view to placing Long on the throne but am slightly 
doubtful about his temper. ' Bull's diary, 1 July 1906, 
'Retrospect for the first half of 1906', Bu. P., 3/13. 
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well as his most likely replacement. 
At the same time, Long took a keen interest in the 
affairs of The Outlook, whose editor, J. L. Garvin, had 
been a strong supporter of his Irish policy. He was 
therefore anxious that both Garvin and Edward Grigg, the 
assistant editor, would remain at their desks despite 
differences with the paper's owner, C. S. Goldman. 
Negotiating through his secretary, Long had succeeded 
by the autumn in inducing Lord Iveagh to buy the paper 
for Walter Guiness. With Garvin secure as editor, Long 
believed he would have a friendly paper with which to 
assist his own political ambitions, but the arrangement 
was completely disrupted in November when Walter Guinness 
refused to keep Garvin on, so that, ultimately, Long's 
circumspect negotiations brought no personal gain. Garvin 
went off to begin his famous association with The_Observer 
and Long promptly abandoned his interest in The Outlook. 
' 
The reopening of the 1ispute over the precise nature of 
Sir Anthony MacDonnell's appointment was Long's first 
major attempt to challenge Balfour's authority within 
t 
the party. Knowing that he could count on the support 
of Irish Unionists, Long naturally chose an issue connected 
with Irish government. On 29 August 1906 Long addressed 
a meeting of the Irish Unionist Alliance in Dublin. After 
condemning home rule he went on to refute the suggestion 
that the only reason that he had allowed MacDonnell to 
1This 
paragraph is based on Alfred M. Gollin, "The Observer" 
and J. LL_Garvin 
(London, 1960), pp. 15-16. 
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stay in office when he had been Chief Secretary was that 
Balfour had been wary of 'certain correspondence or 
letters which were said to be in the possession of certain 
people'1 and he challenged his critics to make these 
supposedly compromising letters public. Whilst defending 
his own administration in 1905 he deliberately raised 
doubts over the general course of Conservative policy in 
Ireland: 'I believe there is ... abundant reason for 
many Irish Unionists to ask in tones of bitter indig- 
nation, ... why, when the Unionist flag was flying, were 
principles adopted which were not consonant with Unionist 
principles? '2 
Long was seeking not merely to condemn Wyndham's tenure _ 
of the Irish Office in order to justify his own: he was 
in part responding to the overtures of Balfour's critics. 
He could hardly condemn Wyndham without at the same time 
condemning Balfour. Long chose to issue his denunciations 
at a full meeting of the I. U. A. in the knowledge that he 
would receive maximum publicity, and his speech was reported 
prominently in the newspapers of 30 August. The Irish Times 
commented that the speech was 'among the greatest of his 
services to Ireland. '3 What it neglected to point out was 







was also among the greatest of his services 
ng's speech, The Times, 30 Aug. 1906. 
Fanning, 'The Unionist Party and Ireland, 
Historical Studies, 15 (1966), p. 153. 
30 Aug. 1906. 
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to the furtherance of his own political career. 
MacDonnell, irritated by Long's accusations, promptly 
wrote an open letter, 
' thus enabling Long to carry on 
the argument in public. Wyndham, too, played into Long's 
hands by requesting an explanation for the speech, 
2 
receiving instead a damning indictment of his Irish 
administration. Long castigated Wyndham for ever accepting 
MacDonnell as a colleague and accused him bluntly of making 
3 
no effort to maintain the law. In the newspapers, Long 
denied all of MacDonnell's claims and stated that in 1905 
he had arrived at a clear understanding with Sir Anthony 
of his role in Irish affairs, an understanding which 
1MacDonnell's letter was published in The Times, 31 Aug. 
1906. 
2See Wyndham to Long, 30 Aug. 1906, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
126/15. 
3Long 
to Wyndham, copy, 2 Sept. 1906, ibid. John Biggs- 
Davison in his George Wyndhami_A_Study_in_Toryism (London, 
1951), pp. 176-7. glosses over the differences between Long 
and Wyndham in barely a paragraph and cites Long's warm 
tribute to Wyndham in Mbmories, written nearly twenty years 
later, as evidence of the relationship between the two men. 
Nor do J. W. Mackail and Guy Wyndham, The Life and Letters 
of George Wyndham, 2 Vols. (London, 1924), publish any of 
Wyndham's letters to. -Long relating to the controversy. 
For 
some reason best known to himself, Long-made light in his 
autobiography of every 'disagreement and difference in 
which he had ever engaged duringyhis political career - 
Sir Charles Petrie, Long's biographer, described Memories, 
somewhat euphemistically, as 'a model of discretion'. 
Consequently, the descriptions in Memories cannot be taken 
as evidence of the personality, policies or achievements 
of any of Long's contemporaries. George Wyndham is no 
exception to this rule. Long's letters make it abundantly 
clear that he regarded Wyndham's tenure of the Irish Office 
as a betrayal of the Irish policies on which the very 
existence of the Unionist party was based. 
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MacDonnell had accepted. 
1 
He knew full well that Wyndham 
had conferred special powers on MacDonhell and that he 
had never whilst in office clarified the position 
satisfactorily. But he could hardly admit this in 1906. 
Long had inherited MacDonnell from Wyndham and he had 
been forced to put up with him, but finding himself out 
of office a year later, with MacDonnell now the darling 
of Liberal policy in Ireland, Long found it convenient 
to paint a picture which was somewhat blurred at the 
edges. MacDonnell must have rued the day he decided to 
enter into a public controversy with Long and to conduct 
it in the columns of the newspapers, for Long's open 
letters did the Under-Secretary little good, especially 
as civil servants were expected to refrain from indulging 
in public argument. 
Balfour soon perceived that Long's attacks on Wyndham 
were an inevitable challenge to his own authority. On 
5 September he attempted to sidetrack Long into attacking 
OW 
not his own party over the terms of MacDonnell's appoint- 
ment, but the Liberals over the precise nature of its 
continuation. He attempted to dismiss the issue out of 
hand: 'I find it very difficult%to understand what all 
the row is about, or what it is wants clearing up.... 
In any case, it seems to me, to have lost all interest 
and importance... 12 Long, however, was determined to 
enhance his own status as the paladin of Unionism, and by 
1Long's letters were published in The Ti-mes, 31 Aug., 
1 Sept., and 4 Sept. 1906. ---ý-ý 
2Balfour to Long, 5 Sept. 1906, L. P., Add. MS. 62403. 
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the end of the month he had enlisted the support of 
Austen Chamberlain, who promised to insist that Balfour 
must repudiate all suggestions that the party had ever 
ýl toyed with home rule 'whether called devolution or not. 
There was a kind of tacit agreement between the two men: 
Chamberlain would defer to Long's views on Ireland if 
Long would in turn accept Chamberlain's on tariff reform. 
Chamberlain accordingly wrote to Lord Lansdowne on 
26 September expressing his support for Long's campaign 
and emphasising the foolhardiness of allowing Balfour 
'to sacrifice himself and his power for good to shield 
Wyndham. '2 Emerging triumphant from his newspaper 
campaign, Long hoped to force Balfour to publish all the 
correspondence relating to MacDonnell's appointment, 
correspondence which would certainly damage Wyndham and 
possibly embarrass Balfour. From Long's point of view, 
the greater the embarrassment to Balfour, the greater 
the vindication of his own position. He wanted to force 
Balfour to make an unequivocal declaration of the party's 
Irish policy, a declaration which would confirm him as 
the champion of traditional Unionism and boost his 
popularity with Balfour's detrac%ors. 
On 27 September Chamberlain agreed that 'as regards 
Wyndham he must fight his qwn battle', thus encouraging 
3 
Long to tell Balfour that he expected a clear policy 
1Chamberlain to Long, 27 Sept. 1906, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
126/2. 
2Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 
AC 7/4/4. 
copy, 26 Sept. 1906, A. C. P., 
'Chamberlain to Long, 27 Sept. 1906, loc. cit. 
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statement denouncing Wyndham. 
l 
Not surprisingly, Balfour 
refused even to consider publishing the controversial 
correspondence, and, as he had repeatedly dissociated 
himself from schemes of devolution, he was not prepared 
to blacken Wyndham's reputation still further. 
2 Realising 
that Balfour was prepared to stand his ground, Chamberlain 
suddenly lost his inclination for a fight, and on 
5 October he changed his tune by announcing to Long that 
'it is natural we should save Wyndham as much as possible. '3 
Lansdowne, too, hoped that Long might be persuaded to 
abandon his attacks, but on 7 October Long still intended 
4 
to make a fight of it, telling Lady Londonderry: 'I am 
in the middle of a long correspondence with Arthur - his 
weakness is heartbreaking, he cares for nothing except 
---------- - -------- - ----- - ---------------- ---------- 
1Long to Balfour, copy, 2 Oct. 1906, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
126/1. 
2Balfour to Long, 3 Oct. 1906, ibid. - 
3Chamberlain to Long', 5 Oct. 1906, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
126/2. Chamberlain seers to have changed his tune after 
receiving a letter from Gerald Balfour, dated 2 Oct. 1906. 
Gerald Balfour raised the rather embarrassing difficulty 
that Lansdowne had been shown a draft of the original 
devolution proposalss If this became known, Long's 
contention that nobody in the cabinet, save Wyndham, had 
tampered with devolution would look very doubtful, and 
the party would inevitably be supjected to further. attacks 
from Irish Unionists. Chamberlain does not seem to have 
passed Gerald Balfour's information on to Long. Public- 
ation of the controversial letters might have led to 
its disclosure, which could have made Long look rather 
foolish. See Gerald Balfour to Chamberlain, 2 Oct. 1906, 
A. C. P., AC 7/4/10. 
4See Lansdowne to Long, 3 Oct. 1906, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
126/6. 
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saving G. W. I am quite determined ... nothing will 
change me.... I shall take my own course and I shall 
speak out. ' 
1 
But he was not as determined as he made 
out. After a letter from Chamberlain on the following 
day, 2 pleading that he reconsider his position in the 
interests of party unity, Long reluctantly conceded that 
Balfour was not to be moved. By 10 October Long had no 
choice but to 'agree to anything whether I like it or 
not provided it does not give away our friends'3 and a 
week later he was reduced to issuing idle threats to 
Jack Sandars. 4 The dispute died down, Balfour avoided 
publication, and a shaky party unity was restored. 
The controversy in 1906 over the Wyndham-MacDonnell - 
correspondence has generally been interpreted as an 
attempt by Long to cement his leadership of the Irish 
Unionist cause. 
5 This was part of Long's intention: as 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 7 Oct. 1906, L. L. P., D/Lo/C 
666(5). ', 
2Chamberlain to Long, 8 Oct. 1906, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
126/2. Balfour's clearly expressed annoyance no doubt 
contributed to Chamberlain's sudden desire to bring the 
dispute to an end. Balfour expostulated: 'I think it 
is perfectly outrageous that I ... should be suspected 
of tampering with Home Rule upon, evidence on which. you 
would not hang a cat. ' Balfour 'to Chamberlain, 8 Oct. 
1906, A. C. P., AC 7/4/16. 
3Long to Chamberlain, 10 Oct. 1906, A. C. P., AC 7/4/22. 
4Long 
wrote to Sandars: 'I gather ... that G. W. is to be upheld in everything, &I can't help wondering what 
the Chief would say if asked by our people what he thinks 
of G. W. 's administration.... I am sometimes inclined to 
think it would be a good thing if I left front bench & 
sat behind. ' Long to Sandars, 17 Oct. 1906, S. P., MS. 
Eng. Hist. c. 752, fos. 107-10. 
5See, for example, Fanning, op. cit., p. 154. 
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he argued to Balfour, there had never been 'any clear 
indication whether G. W. 's policy or mine was accepted 
by the leaders.... 
" But it was not Long's only reason 
for causing so much trouble. His own appointment as 
Chief Secretary had, after all, been a reassertion of 
traditional Unionism and a telling abnegation of the 
policies, especially devolution, with which Wyndham had 
been branded. His support from Irish'Unionists was 
already strong; he did not need to resuscitate an old 
issue in order to secure his position. Rather, Long 
was showing to all those who were discontent with Balfour 
that he, Long, was prepared to stand up and issue a 
public challenge, that he was prepared to threaten party 
unity in order to secure policies which he believed in, 
and that he expected firm, decisive leadership. 
Moreover, Wyndham invited Long's animadversions by 
continued flirtation with devolution schemes and by assoc- 
iation with their two principal sponsors, MacDonnell and 
Dunraven. Early in the new parliament, on 19 February, 
Wilfred Scawen Blunt, poet, politician and fervent 
all 
devotee of Ireland's cause, recorded in his diary: 
George's own relations with Long are curious.... They 
are still quite cordial ... but George has told him 
that during the coming session he means to take his 
own line about Ireland, and that Long must answer for 
himself if the late Government there is attacked. He 
[i. 
e. Wyndham tells me in great confidence that he 
1Long to Balfour, copy, 2 Oct. 1906, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
126/1. 
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has received indirect overtures recently from O'Brien. 
... Also Dunraven has made him advances, and yesterday 
he had met Sir Anthony MacDonnell, and talked with him 
on the most friendly terms.... All this encourages 
him to take a line of his own about Ireland. 
1 
Clearly, Long had good grounds for his suspicions. 
Long's stand in 1906 certainly annoyed and irritated 
his colleagues amongst the party leadership; it also 
appealed to a rank and file increasingly disillusioned 
with that leadership. And it cemented Long's reputation 
not just with Irish Unionists, but with all those 
members of the party seeking an alternative, other than 
the rigours of tariff reform offered by the Chamberlain 
camp, to the subtleties and prevarications of Balfour's 
leadership. For six months the party malcontents had 
encouraged Long to take a stand against Balfour. His 
behaviour in the autumn of 1906 was partly a response 
to that encouragement.: 
The general election if 1906 had left the depleted ranks 
of the Conservative party divided and mutually hostile. 
It has been estimates} that the party, after it had settled 
down in the Commons, was almost exactly cut in two between 
the extreme tariff reformers, or whole-hoggers, and their 
opponents, the Balfourites and free-fooders, although all 
such estimates are necessarily open to doubt. 
2 
Long was 
1Wilfred Scawen Blunt, My_Diaries, Being_a Personal 
Narrative of Events, 1888_1911,2 Vols. (London, 1919-20), 
2,131. 
2 There can be no unequivocal analysis of the strength of 
each faction, and the numbers of each group will vary from 
year to year. One obvious problem of measurement is that 
a member could, out of loyalty to Balfour, be a Balfourite 
for the sake of party unity, yet still prefer to go the 
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one of the occupants of what has aptly been described 
as a 'halfway house, imprecisely located, but whose 
doors were open to all moderate men. '1 Long called 
himself a tariff reformer but he was always a moderate 
and detested the activities of the more extreme groups 
within the party, especially those of the 'Confederacy', 
a secret society pledged to purge the party of free 
traders. He saw no reason why free traders like the 
Cecils should be persecuted, an attitude which in 1907 
brought him into bitter conflict with Austen Chamberlain 
and his followers, and almost from the moment that Bonar 
Law became an important figure in the party Long clashed 
with him. Remarks from Bonar Law in February that Long's 
-- - --------- - ----------- 
whole hog. Long is an excellent case in point. He supported 
tariff reform, even food taxes, in principle, but can 
certainly not be counted with the Chamberlainites. He was 
sympathetic towards the free-fooders and tried to help them 
to remain in the party, but he cannot satisfactorily be 
counted as one of their number. This leaves the Balfourites, _ 
yet Long was consistently one of Balfour's most strident 
critics. In which campt then, does one classify him? 
Neal Blewett, 'Free Fooaers, Balfourites, Whole Hoggers: 
Factionalism within the Unionist Party, 1906-10', Historical 
Journal 11 (1968), p. 96, estimates the party's strength in 
the Commons at whole-hoggers 79, Balfourites 49, and free- 
fooders 31. It is, however, unlikely that the Unionist 
free traders could have counted on the loyal support of 
31 MPs. If they had been as strong as this they would not 
have been so easily defeated. Historians must agree to 
differ as to the precise numbers making up each faction. 
R. C. K. Ensor, for example, in his EnglandZ_1870_1214 (Oxford, 
1936), p. 386, put the Chamberlainites as high as 109 and 
the free traders as low as 11. The problem is compounded 
by Balfour's own ambiguity on the issue, making it impossible 
to lay down precise guidelines for purposes of classification. 
A standard Liberal joke at the time was the offer of £100 
to anybody who could prove that Balfour was 'a Free Trader, 
Protectionist, neither or both. ' 
1Blewett, 'Free Fooders, Balfourites, Whole Hoggers', 
p. 101. 
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approach to fiscal reform was spineless brought a swift 
response: 'The propriety of my conduct in the matter 
cannot I think be doubted.... this is the second state- 
went of a most insulting character which you have made 
about me recently. ' 
Long received countless appeals from free fooders 
throughout 1907 to take up their cause, and his oppos- 
ition to tariff reform witch-hunts at constituency 
level led him by the end of the year to threaten Balfour 
with open rebellion. On 12 June Lord Hugh Cecil asked 
Long to put pressure on Balfour to issue a statement 
condemning the behaviour of the Norwood constituency 
party, a statement which could act as a warning to the 
tariff reformers and guarantee that sitting members 
would not become 'mere gramophones echoing the party 
songs. '2 Long did his best and took a leading role in 
attempts to arrive at individual reconciliation, 
3 but 
Balfour's reluctance to; take a firm line gave him little 
11 
chance of success, and by the end of September he was 
plainly considering yhether he should challenge Balfour: 
There seems ... to be no real confidence and trust in 
the Party, they are like a pack of ... hounds, each 
hunting his own particualr quarry and looking to his 
own master and paying, -no attention to the Hunt servants 
or to each other. It is simply deplorable: the feeling 
1Long to Bonar Law, 20 Feb. 1907, B. L. P., 18/3/31. 
2Lord Hugh Cecil to Long, 12 June 1907, W. L. P., WRO 
947/444. 
3Richard A. Rempel, Unionists Divided (Newton Abbot, 
1972), pp. 181-2. -- ~-- ---- 
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against A. J. B. has increased.... I have come across 
... plain treachery among 
the advanced section of the 
Tariff Reformers. 
' 
The appeals of the malcontents were beginning, once 
again, to take effect. On 24 September Lord Salisbury 
wrote: 'I suppose if anything can at anytime be done 
it must be by you and others likeminded. '2 And on the 
same day Long confirmed to Lady Londonderry that 'We 
badly want a Disraeli just now in my opinion. '3 
What really annoyed Long, however, was Chamberlain's 
attempt in October to stop him speaking in favour of 
Abel Smith, a recalcitrant free-fooder whom Chamberlain 
wanted to ostracise. He told Chamberlain that the 
tariff reformers' campaign of ostracism was misguided, 
likely to lead only to further electoral defeats: 'I 
cannot admit that men like A. H. S. ought to be ostra- 
cised ... nor do I 
believe in any form of ostracism as 
calculated ... to help our cause.... Your policy risks iF 
the loss of staunch Unionists and ... of some Unionist 
seats.... 
'` Long was much more annoyed than this polite, 
t 
if blunt, refusal suggests. The idea that Chamberlain 
should presume to interfere with; his speeches Long- 
found intolerable, and on 7 November he told Balfour 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 13 Sept. 1907, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(13). 
2Salisbury to Long, 24 Sept. 1907, L. P., Add. MS. 62411. 
3Long to Lady Londonderry, 24 Sept. 1907, L. L. P, 
D/Lo/C 666(16). 
4Long to Chamberlain, copy, n. d., but written in reply 
to Chamberlain's letter of 31 Oct. 1907, L. P., Add. MS. 
62405. 
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that steps ought to be taken to keep Chamberlain in 
line: 'I am not a touchy person, and I have no silly 
notions about my position ... but there are some things 
I will only stand from my leader ... and I think there 
ought to be some discipline and order in these things. 1l 
This at least brought a reply from Jack Sandars that it 
was quite in order for him to speak in favour of Abel 
Smith, 2 but Long wanted a clear condemnation of Chamberlain's 
tactics from Balfour, and on 10 November he told Balfour 
he wanted a coherent policy declared on which the whole 
party could stand, failing which he threatened trouble 
from the backbenches: 
As I have said before I am convinced what the country 
needs is a strong fighting speech ... going for TR but 
not in such a way as to enable the extremists to say 
they have "got you" and for Social Reform, and saying 
"here is my Standard, Come or go to the devil, and I 
will go on without you.... " I will stand a good deal 
to serve you ... but i1f there is not some change ... 
I can serve equally well and far more comfortably to 
myself, outside of your "Ex-Cabinet". 
3 
C 
Even so, this threat of orchestrating trouble from the 
1Long to Balfour, 7 Nov. 1907, B. P., Add. MS. 49776. 
2Sandars to Long, 9 Nov. 1907, L. P., Add. MS. 62412. 
3Long to Balfour, copy, 10 Nov. 1907, ibid.; Long 
supplemented this letter with an appeal to Sandars in 
which he remarked that 'Arthur's extraordinary weakness 
towards A. C. has not only to my certain knowledge caused 
immense annoyance on our own side, but it is the cause 
of much curious and unpleasant talk among Radicals of 
eminence. ' See Long to Sandars, 10 Nov. 1907, S. P., 
MS. Eng. Hist. c. 754, fos. 109-10. 
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backbenches still brought nothing from Balfour, and by 
24 November Long was reduced to complaining privately 
that 'Austen is an ass and will ruin the Party if he is 
not stopped, the only person who can stop him is A. J. B. 
and he won't! 
" In other words, Long knew that he did 
not have enough support to lead an effective rebellion. 
He could split the party but he could not secure victory 
for his policy without Balfour's co-operation. All he 
could do was threaten Balfour - if the threats were 
ignored he could do nothing about it. 
2 
It was for this reason that Long appealed to Bonar Law 
at the beginning of December, hoping that Chamberlain's 
lieutenant would prove more amenable to his arguments. 
In a skilfully worded memorandum Long argued that free 
trade MPs should not be persecuted, as the party needed 
every MP it could get, and, anyway, tariff reform would 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 24 Nov. 1907, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(25). Long w. s by now extremely irritated at 
Chamberlain's behaviour. On the'day before he had observed 
of Chamberlain's letters that 'the patronising style and 
the ignorance are really extraordinary. The former we 
must put up with I suppose to please the Chief but it is 
not leasant.... A. knows nothing of the ordinary Squire, 
he 1. e. the squire loves Protection, but he loves a 
gentleman much more. ' Long to Sandars, 23 Nov. 19Q7, S. P., 
MS. Eng. Hist. c. 754, fos. 149-5ý. 
2In 
a letter to Selborne Long expressed the opinion that 
what was doing the party the most damage amongst the elect- 
orate was not the policy of tariff reform itself but $the 
conviction that there is a 'division in our ranks, and that 
the Chief is not determined enough in making his colleagues 
identify themselves with the policy which he has laid down. 
You know his temperament as well as I do: You know how 
incapable he is of doing anything disagreeable to anyone: 
You know how much he will put up with rather than say 
unpleasant things.... He knows my views, but he thinks I 
am too severe in my methods. ' Long to Selborne, 25 Nov. 
1907, E. S. P.. MS. Selborne 73/57-68. 
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not win a general election in the foreseeable future. 
For Long, tariff reform was a long term goal, a policy 
objective for which both the party and the country must 
be prepared by persuasion and propaganda over a period 
of several years. It was not something which could be 
achieved after a short fight. 
1 But this argument cut 
no more ice with Bonar Law than with Chamberlain, and 
the party's next leader issued the uncompromising reply 
that 'I am absolutely convinced that the Party cannot 
possibly be kept with even a semblance of unity except 
on a definite Tariff Reform basis. '2 
Faced with this kind of obduracy, Long turned once 
more to Balfour, this time with an explicit threat that 
he would bid for the leadership himself. Addressing 
himself to Jack Sandars, almost as if to avoid the 
accusation of deliberate disloyalty, Long wrote on 
5 December: 
Does he mean to go on till he sees somebody firm eno' 
in the saddle to enable him to make his bow and does 
he not care who that somebody is? Does he desire that 
we should all sit silent?... I think in fairness we 
ought to know.... I can plainly see that if this is 
his policy the time must come, and fairly soon, when 
some of us will have to cut ourselves adrift. I have 
always hoped that this would never be my fate but I 
begin to fear it will.... The most loyal fall away 
1Memorandum by Long, n. d., but enclosed with letter of 
1 Dec. 1907, B. L. P., 18/3/49. 
2Bonar Law to Long, copy, 3 Dec. 1907, ibid., 18/8/5. 
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when they realise that the disloyal find as much favour 
as they. 
l 
The message was clear: either Balfour must make up his 
mind to go, in which case he must say so soon, or he 
must lay down a clear policy acceptable to both wings of 
the party. Failure to do so would provoke a split, a 
split which Long might himself precipitate. 
Long seems to have been encouraged by Lord Selborne to 
push Balfour into taking a stand. Writing from South 
Africa, Selborne's advice was plain: 'I suggest that 
you force A. J. B. into stiffening his back, even at the 
risk of being unpleasant to somebody.... I confess it 
seems pure madness that ... Unionists should 
be still 
quarelling and not concentrated. '2 So strongly did 
Selborne feel that he reiterated the point in a second 
letter written the same day: 'I want to emphasise the 
fact that, if I were at home with you, I should take 
the strongest possible btand against ostracism; that I 
should endeavour to do my utmost in conjunction with my 
old colleagues to stiffen A. J. B.... '3 But Selborne was 
not at home and Long had to wage the battle alone. 
Christmas came and went, and Balfour was still trying 
to dodge the issue, causing Long to remark that 'the 
A 
1Long to Sandars, copy, 5 Dec. 1907, L. P., Add. MS. 
62412. 




Country and the Party may go to the d -l! It is all 
quite plain to scores of us, but the Chief is blind! 
" 
Realising that his threats were getting nowhere, Long 
made one last plea on 29 December, urging Balfour to 
Let ... re-union become possible: 
it is not ... so 
long as Austen, Bonar Law and others practice (sic) a 
totally different policy.... I am sure if something 
is not done soon there will be an even worse smash ... 
than there has been yet. Look at all the evidence ... 
rank ... disloyalty, Austen dictating to me for whom 
I 
shall or shall not speak, Bonar Law openly stating that 
he would rather lose 20 Unionist seats than have Hugh 
[Ceci] 
... back in the House! 
2 
This attitude was no more successful, for Balfour merely 
replied that 'nobody has ever yet suggested ... a means 
by which a Candidate who declines to accept the Party 
Programme in its entirety is to be safe from difficulty 
in his constituency. '3 Balfour was clearly more willing 
to upset Long and lose the free traders than he was ready 
to challenge Chamberlain. 
Long was forced totconcede that the decisions of the 
local constituency organisations could not be much altered 
by pressure from party leaders. 'Already on 4 January he 
had warned Lord Robert Cecil that 'my power is very slight. 14 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 28 Dec. 1907, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(32). 
2Long to Balfour, 29 Dec. 1907, B. P., Add. MS. 49776. 
3Balfour 
to Long, 9 Jan. 1908, W. L. P., WRO 947/444. 
4Long to Lord Robert Cecil, 4 Jan. 1908, Cecil of Chelwood 
papers (British Library), Add. MS. 51072. 
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And on 18 January he admitted that 'the Constituencies 
in an ever increasing degree are determined to have 
Tariff Reform candidates and with this, it is quite clear, 
no leader can interfere.... '1 He knew that to defend the 
Unionist free traders who refused to accept the official 
Birmingham policy was to wage a futile struggle: 
I am afraid it does no good for one or two of us to 
denounce proscription on the platform - it only makes 
those who are determined to drive out Free Traders 
more bitter and more persistent in their policy. I 
wish with all my heart we could secure a truce, as I 
think the present state of things is deplorable. 
2 
Gradually, Long's attempts at defending the free traders 
petered out: he was fighting a losing battle and he knew 
it. By April 1908 Lord Robert Cecil pointed out with 
some justification that 'from Arthur we have had nothing. 
And yet he pretends and perhaps believes that he wishes 
to keep the U. F. T. s in. the Party. '3 The free traders 
were doomed within the 
konservative party; Long abandoned 
their cause only when he recognised that this was an 
inevitable fact. C 
It has been remarked that in practice Long 'could do 
nothing and would do very little, but his professions of 
sympathy prevented the realities of their situation from 
being clearly understood by'the Unionist Free Traders. t4 
1Long to Lord Robert Cecil, 18 Jan. 1908, ibid. 
2Long to Lord Robert Cecil, 23 Jan. 1908, ibid. 
3Lord Robert Cecil to Long, 18 Apr. 1908, W. L. P., WRO 
947/444- 
4 Alan Sykes, Tariff Reform inBritish Politicsi_19 12 
(Oxford, 1979), p. 173. -- -ý 
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This is perfectly true, but Long was quite sincere in 
his desire to help the free traders. He used his 
influence as best he could, stressing his own tariff 
reform credentials in the hope that such an approach 
would encourage Balfour and others to take a moderate 
line. He was certainly not playing a double game of 
trying to keep in with all sides. Long genuinely 
deplored both the ruthlessness of the tariff reformers 
and the way in which the free traders were steadily 
being beaten into submission. When Lord Robert Cecil 
lost his seat at the first general election of 1910 
Long wrote: 'Personally I profoundly deplore the fact 
that you will not be amongst us. I hope this terrible 
blunder will soon be repaired S... 11 
The dispute split the party into two separate camps, 
and the intense animosity between Chamberlain and Long 
which was to mark the leadership contest of 1911 stems 
from this controversy. ; Long never forgave Chamberlain 
for foisting a divisive policy on the party and for 
persecuting anybody iho dared to challenge it, especially 
as he blamed tariff reform for the defeat of 1906. His 
opinion of Balfour's leadership plumped still further, 
and he refrained from open revolt only because he knew 
that the tariff reformers would'break away from the party 
if he made any overt move. He pressed Balfour as hard as 
he could, but he knew that, to be effective, condemnation 
1Long to Lord Robert Cecil, 31 Jan. 1910, Cecil of 
Chelwood papers, Add. MS. 51072. Cecil had to wait nearly 
two years to get back into the House. 
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of Chamberlain and his methods had to come from Balfour. 
He had no desire to divide the party still further, the 
very thing for which he denigrated the tariff reformers, 
but it was impossible for him to defend the free-fooders 
without inviting a charge of being difficult and divisive 
himself. He hoped all along that threats would be enough; 
he never seriously intended to leave the opposition front 
bench. 
A serious attack of neuritis later in 1908 forced Long 
to take a break from political work and early in 1909 he 
took a trip to South Africa on his doctor's orders, 
returning to find the battle over Lloyd George's budget 
proposals in full swing. 
' The immediate reaction of the 
Conservative leadership had been hesitant, as Balfour and 
Lansdowne were reluctant to commit themselves to an 
i 
attack which might lose votes and which might have to be 
ignominiously abandoned. During the summer both men 
t 
played only a secondary role in the agitation against 
the budget and during the month of June neither appeared 
on the public platform. 
2 
It was against this background 
that on 14 June Long formed the Budget Protest League, 
3 
intended to rouse public opinion. The inactivity of the 
1Long left Rood Ashton on 16 January and did not return 
home until June. 
2Neal Blewett, The Peers, the Partiesand the People: 
The British General Elections of 1910 (London, 1972), pp. 73- 
3See letter by Long, The Times, 14 June 1909. 
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two leaders convinced Long that he must personally over- 
see the party's response if the opportunity of encouraging 
opposition and agitation in the country was not to be 
missed. Although keenly supported by a considerable 
section of the Lords and by the City1 the League was 
designed to stimulate popular agitation and to dissociate 
opposition to the budget from the charge that hostility 
to Lloyd George's proposals was motivated solely by a 
privileged class seeking protection for its own vested 
interests. The League was an extension of the party 
organisation rather than a separate pressure group, and 
it was merged with the party for the elections of 1910,2 
having been officially wound up by Long at a dinner at 
the Ritz hotel on 9 December 1909.3 
Its main achievement was to provoke and sustain an 
acrimonious debate with the tariff reformers, for Long 
deliberately ordered his speakers and writers to ignore - 
the subject of fiscal reform altogether. 
4 Less than a 
fortnight after its formation the Liberals responded 
with their own Budget League, and, with Winston Churchill 
as president, a vigorous campaign was mounted in the 
1Blewett, The Peers, the Parties. the People, p. 77. 
2Ibid., 
p. 330, n. 5. 
3 Reproductions of the best known posters produced by 
the League may be found in 'The Work of the Budget Protest 
League, A Memento of its Six Months Activities', 18 Dec. 
1909, Bu. P., 3/20. 
4Gollin, "Observer" and Garvin, p. 102; Sykes, Tariff 
Reform in British Politics, p. 202. 
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constituencies in support of Lloyd George's proposals, 
thus undermining Long's efforts to encourage popular 
opposition. None of Long's speakers could match Churchill's 
brilliant oratory, and the Liberal campaign had a verve 
and impact which the Budget Protest League totally lacked. 
Indeed, some of Long's speakers even suffered the humil- 
iation of having their resolutions defeated at their own 
meetings. 
l 
The Unionist leadership decided to reject the budget 
sometime in August or September 1909, despite the fact 
that it was fully recognised that the party could not 
hope to win an election on the issue. 
2 Long's agitation 
in the country had fallen flat; the cause of rejection - 
was decidedly unpopular. Yet Balfour and Lansdowne 
1Annual Register, 1909, p. 186. One of the reasons for 
the much greater success of the Liberals' counter-organisation: 
the Budget League, was that Lloyd George, displaying early 
evidence of his lack of scruple in the raising of political 
funds, traded in honours in return for sizable donations. 
J. C. Horsfall, for example, received a baronetcy in return 
for a 'contribution' of £15,000. The Liberal Budget League 
therefore had adequate funds for its campaign of meetings 
and propaganda. See Bruce K. Murray, The People's Budget 
1909-10 (Oxford, 1980), pp. 203-4. Long realised only too 
well that the impact of his own League was substantially 
vitiated by its failure to provide first class speakers. In 
a draft letter amongst his papers Long pointed out-that 
whilst 'Asquith, Lloyd George and Winston Churchill have 
their hands fairly full ... in Parliament they are able to find time to address whole series of meetings in the country. 
We must ... take a leaf out of their book. ' See draft letter by Long, n. d., but clearly1written sometime in the summer 
or autumn of 1909, W. L. P., WRO 947/428. 
2For 
a discussion of the factors influencing Balfour and 
Lansdowne in favour of rejection see Murray, The People's 
Budget, pp. 209-23. 
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believed that they had little option but to fight and 
hoped that-an early general election, by forcing the 
Liberals to rely on Irish Nationalist votes if they 
wished to remain in government, would make it much easier 
for the Conservatives to return to office at a later date. 
In the words of a recent historian of the budget conflict, 
rejection was 'necessary in order to avert humiliation and 
to maintain the fighting spirit of the party, and it was 
expedient in that they 
C he Conservative leader ý believed 
they would stand more of a fighting chance in the long run 
than if the Budget was allowed to pass the Lords unscathed. ' 
Long had realised very early that the Liberals were 
itching for a chance to confront the Lords. Discussing 
the Education Bill with Balfour in 1906. Long had made it 
clear that the government should not be provoked and the 
Lords' veto exercised with restraint. He had never been 
in favour of disruption of the government's business by 
means of the Conservatives' built-in majority in the Lords, 
2 
nor was he ever an intransigent advocate of maintaining 
the existing structure of the upper House. He realised 
41 
only too well that reform of the Lords was inseparably 
linked to the home rule question; and he favoured some 
reform precisely so that home rule would not be restored 
to the realm of-practical politics. Long wanted the 
Conservative party to accept, indeed to sponsor, limited 
1Ibid., 
p. 221. 
2See, for example, Long's letter and memorandum to 
Balfour, 9 July 1906, W. L. P., WRO 947/458. 
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reform in the hope that the government would be prepared 
to make concessions in order to avoid confrontation and 
that the Lords could thus retain enough power to prevent 
home rule. 
Long acted as chairman of two meetings of Conservative 
MPs, held on 3 March and 8 March 1910 and called to 
consider the extent and method of reform which the party 
should approve. Although there was little unanimity on 
the subject Long believed it crucial that the leadership 
produce a working scheme. 
1 
He had clear and far-sighted 
views, insisting that reform was both politically 
necessary and objectively justifiable, recommending that 
'an opportunity should be given for the indirect election 
of representatives of various interests, and that there 
should be a considerable extension of the life peerage. '2 
He was not in favour of complete abandonment of the 
hereditary principle but some reform had to be accepted, 
otherwise the party wouad have no chance at the next 
election. He put it bluntly: 'I think we must admit 
the necessity for reform. In other words, our Candidates 
must have a definite, clear, and popular scheme to put 
to the electorate. '3 The trouble was, Long could find 
no agreement for any suggestion. 'The real difficulty, ' 
he told-Lord Selborne, 'is-that nobody's mind is made up 
as to what he wants. All are clamouring for reform but 
'Memorandum by Long, 9 Mar. 1910, W. L. P., WRO 947/447. 
2Memorandum by Long, 3 Mar. 1910, ibid. 
31bid. 
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nobody seems to know what is the precise reform which 
he likes, except of course the Socialists and Nationalists 
whose idea of reform is destruction. '1 
Long was being pragmatic and looking for a middle way: 
the party could not endorse the creation of a wholly 
popular body, but to insist on full maintenance of the 
hereditary principle and full power of veto was to invite 
trouble. Better, then, to argue that whilst the hered- 
itary principle should not lightly be abolished, the 
Conservative party nevertheless recognised that the Lords 
could only have real power if responsive to public 
opinion. This was a policy of classic Conservatism: Long 
recognised that some reform was inevitable, and it was 
therefore judicious to sponsor a scheme of mild reform 
rather than wait to be pushed into accepting Liberal 
legislation which would open the door to home rule. As 
he argued to his colleagues, it is better 'to fail on 
the side of moderation; than to expose our position. '2 
This attitude was maintained by Long throughout 1910 
and during the stru&gle over the Parliament Bill in the 
following year. He had little hope that a settlement 
would emerge from the constitutional conference, and at 
a meeting of Conservative ex-cabinet ministers held at 
Lansdowne House on 8 November 1910 he was amongst those 
who argued that further negotiations with the government 
1Long to Selborne, 31 Mar. 1910, E. S. P., MS. Selborne 
74/15-16. 
2Memorandum by Long, 3 Mar. 1910, loc. cit. 
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were pointless. After more than three hours of discussion 
the meeting decided that the government's home rule 
proposals represented an insurmountable barrier to a 
continued dialogue. 
1 
Later that day Balfour told the 
government that the Conservatives could continue only on 
the understanding that home rule and other major constit- 
utional changes would be placed beyond the increased 
powers of the Commons. In other words, the Unionists 
were prepared to surrender their built-in majority veto 
in the upper House on all issues save Irish home rule. 
Asquith refused the offer -a very considerable concession 
from the Conservatives' point of view - and the constit- 
utional conference broke up on 10 November after twenty- 
two sittings. 
2 
When Long failed to convince his colleagues that the 
Conservatives should produce their own scheme he argued, 
reluctantly, for accepthnce of the Parliament Bill. The 
two electoral defeats of 1910 convinced him that the 
party could not win on the issue, therefore it was 
senseless to fight a losing battle. Once again, 
he was 
thinking of Ireland. Calculating that the government 
would win anyway, Long considered home rule by far'the 
greater evil. If there was a third dissolution the 
Liberals would get another five years. Either way, the 
'Austen Chamberlain, Politics from Inside (London, 1936), 
p. 295. 
2 For a discussion of the reasons behind the break-up of 
the conference see Corinne Comstock Weston, 'The Liberal 
leadership and the Lords' veto, 1907-101, Historical 
Journal 11 (1968). 
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government would have complete command for a minimum of 
four years - ample time in which to pass home rule. On 
the other hand, if the Parliament Bill passed, the 
government could be expected to produce its Home Rule 
Bill early in the next session. Long then expected a 
swift reaction against the Liberals, a reaction which 
the Conservatives could use to unseat the government 
within the two years allowed by the Lords' suspensory 
veto. This reasoning had the advantage that at least 
it gave the party a chance and time, whereas to persist 
in the struggle against the Parliament Bill meant sure 
defeat and overwhelming humiliation. 
Whilst there was even the slightest chance that the 
Bill might be defeated, Long urged opposition. As soon 
as it became clear that the Liberals would invoke the 
powers of the monarch if necessary he argued strongly 
for acceptance. Rumours that Asquith had obtained the 
King's assent to a massive creation of peers compounded 
Long's fears: home rule was becoming a real possibility. 
Although doubting the wisdom of continued resistance, he 
stuck to the official party line until well into the 
summer. When, for example, Lord; Willoughby de Broke 
organised a luncheon party at the end of May with the 
intention of destroying the as yet. inchoate movement in 
favour of acquiescence, Long delivered a bitter speech 
against the Bill, 'emphatic in his advice to fight the 
iniquitous measure to the bitter end. '1 But from mid-June 
1Lord Willoughby de Broke, 
-The 
Passing Years (London, 
1924), p. 281. -- ---- - 
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onwards he fought hard for acceptance, a fact which 
understandably invited charges of treachery from those 
who refused to acknowledge the futility of continuing a 
fight which had already been lost. For Long, the 
Parliament Bill had become an ineluctable fact of 
political life. 
Long played a major role in persuading Lansdowne to 
advise the Tory peers to acquiesce. On 22 June 1911 he 
laid his case, in strictest confidence, before Lansdowne 
and in the following weeks he badgered Lansdowne end- 
lessly on the theme of the idiocy of the 'last-ditch 
stand. '1 On 2 July J. L. Garvin began an attack in 
The Observer on the policy of surrender, and a week 
later the campaign culminated in an open attack not just 
on the policy of conciliation but on the party leaders 
themselves. 
2 As an adherent of the 'diehard' faction, 
Austen Chamberlain was, of course, excluded from the 
trenchant ferocity of Garvin's prose. Not surprisingly, 
i' 
Long was extremely angry, regarding Garvin's attitude as 
reckless and foolhardy. He decided to intervene kith a 
direct appeal to Waldorf Astor to have the tone of 
Garvin's leading articles altere1, an appeal which. 
prompted Garvin to ask Jack Sandars bluntly of the extent 
to which Long was influencing. the Unionist press. Sandars 
1Long's 
papers contain letters and memoranda on this 
subject, all written in strictest confidence, to Lansdowne 
dated 22 June, 9 July, 18 July, 30 July and 2 Aug. 1911, 
W. L. P., WRO 947/448/7. 
2See The Observer, 9 July 1911. 
a 
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would give no answer, thereby implying that Balfour 
fully approved of Long's efforts to silence their most 
vociferous critic. This incident led Garvin to take up 
an attitude of implacable hostility towards Long and his 
next article was quite clearly intended to encourage a 
rebellion against the Unionist leadership. The campaign 
begun in The Observer on 2 July was the first public 
manifestation of the movement which was soon to be known 
as 'Balfour Must Go. '1 Needless to say, Garvin's old 
admiration for Long was quite forgotten and he became a 
keen supporter of Chamberlain in the leadership contest 
in November. From the summer of 1911 onwards Long always 
resented the influence which Garvin enjoyed in Conservative 
circles. 
2 
Lansdowne was at first reluctant to heed Long's advice, 
telling him on 12 July that whilst he hoped to avoid any 
actual creation of peers he preferred for the moment to 
continue tto send down . our amendments. 13 Even as late as 
Of - 
1This 
account of Garvin's attitude is based on Gollin, 
"Observer" and Garvj, pp. 332-7, although Professor 
Gollin wrongly claims that Long abruptly abandoned the 
'no surrender' camp in July 1911. In fact, he had been 
unhappy about continued resistance for some months-and he 
had certainly made up his mind to stand out for acceptance 
by mid-June. His first letter to Lansdowne advising 
acquiescence was written on 22 June and on 17 June Long 
had written to Sir William Bull: 'Creation of Peers or 
an Election means I believe the passing of H. R., one man 
one vote, State land Bill, Welsh Church & half a dozen 
other things & in 1916 where shall we be?... once H. R. 
Bill is out we can fight Gov. &I believe in two years 
bring them to their knees. ' Long to Bull, 17 June 1911, 
Bu. P., 4/3 
2See, for example, Long to Lady Londonderry, 7 June 1912, 
L. L. P., D/Lo/C 666(205)., in which Long complained that 
Garvin 'is not trusted by the best men in our Party. ' 
3Lansdowne 
to Long, 12 July 1911, W. L. P., WRO 947/448/7. 
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May Lansdowne had hoped that the government might be 
persuaded to drop their Bill in return-for the Lords' 
participation in their own reform. On 8 May Lansdowne 
had introduced a Reform Bill into the upper House - 
precisely the kind of measure which Long had advocated 
over a year earlier. 
' But by now it was too late, and 
the Bill was a non-starter owing to the government's 
announcement that the Parliament Bill would stand and 
would apply to'any upper House, whether reformed or not. 
At the end of July Lansdowne denied emphatically that 
he was contemplating surrender, 
2but, 
gradually, his 
tune changed. Long meanwhile ostentatiously dissociated 
himself from the 'diehards', regarding the existence of 
a committee of opposition under Lord Halsbury as a 
divisive nuisance. 
3 He discussed the question with 
------- -------- 
1For 
a discussion of Lansdowne's Bill see M. S. Campisano, 
'The Unionists and the Constitution, 1906-11', Oxford, 
B. Litt., 1977, pp. 129-31. The Bill proposed a House of 
about 350 members: 100: would be chosen by the hereditary 
peers from amongst themselves, büt to be eligible for 
selection each candidate would have to have held some 
responsible office of state; 120 would be elected, by an 
electoral college of; MPs voting on a regional basis; 100 
would be chosen by the government of the day, in proportion 
to party representation in the Commons; and there would be 
16 law lords and 7 spiritual peers. 
2Lansdowne to Long, 28 July 1911, W. L. P., WRO 947/448/7. 
3Long 
recognised only too well that the 'diehard' campaign 
was more than just a last-ditch stand against the Parliament 
Bill. It was a direct challenge to the leadership. As 
St. Loe Strachey of The Spectator observed on 1 August: 
'The struggle is whether the will of Lansdowne and Balfour 
is to prevail or the will of Austen Chamberlain.... If in 
the long run the will of Austen Chamberlain and F. E. Smith 
prevails and prevails in a way which will strike the public 
imagination, Lansdowne and Balfour ... will virtually be deposed.... The Chamberlain tradition ... is that you must 
give no quarter in politics, and that the spoils are to the 
victors, and these tactics will very soon be put into oper- 
ation. ' St. Loe Strachey to Curzon, 1 Aug. 1911, C. P., MSS. 
Eur. F. 112/89/59-61. 
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numerous party supporters, both in and out of parliament, 
and wrote to many leading Conservative peers to express 
his views. His influence in persuading the Lords to 
follow Lansdowne's advice and abstain in the vote for 
the Bill was considerable. Lord Curzon was the only 
other leading Unionist figure to put so much effort into 
persuading the party to take the pragmatic course of 
judicious surrender. 
' Necessity demanded that tactics 
be placed before principle. 
The Parliament Bill brought Chamberlain and Long once 
again into conflict, for Chamberlain steadfastly refused 
to abandon all-out resistance. In a speech in August 
Long made an indirect attack on Chamberlain by saying 
that the behaviour of the Halsbury Club was both misguided 
1Curzon did more than any other peer to support Lansdowne. 
He organised letters and telegrams to ascertain voting 
intentions and personally canvassed all the doubtfuls. At 
the height of the crisis a small committee met at his 
house everyday, with Lansdowne in constant attendance, and 
when the vote on 10 August went against the 'diehards' 
Curzon naturally came in for a good deal of abuse from 
those who could see the policy of acquiescence only in 
terms of betrayal. Recent research indicates, however, 
that it was Lord Newton, and not Curzon, who persuaded a 
sufficient number of Tory peers to vote with the government 
to enable the Bill to pass. It would also appear that 
Lansdowne, despite his assertionp that he wanted Conservative 
peers to abstain, rather than lend support to the Bill, both 
encouraged and approved of Newton's efforts to recruit 'a 
covert band of Unionist peers to vote for the government. ' 
Curzon himself did not vote for the Bill, but abstained, as 
did Newton, although successfully persuading over twenty of 
his colleagues to vote with the government. Technically, 
therefore, it was neither Lansdowne nor Curzon who took the 
decisive step to avoid a mass creation of peers, but Lord 
Newton, 'a then little-known and now largely forgotten 
Conservative peer. ' Without Newton's help the efforts of 
Lansdowne, Curzon, Balfour and Long might have come to 
nothing. See David Southern, 'Lord Newton, the Conservative 
Peers and the Parliament Act of 1911', English Historical 
Review 96 (1981). 
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and offensive. 
1 Relations between the two men can only 
be described as mutually hostile, and-in view of the 
forthcoming leadership contest, tainted as it was to be 
by intense animosity between the two principal contenders, 
Chamberlain's private comments on Long are of some 
interest: 'I expect he is jealous, but he is a queer 
mixture. He is hot-headed, often wrong in opinion, a 
bad counsellor ... and the nucleus around which grumblers 
gather. '2 Long had much to grumble about: Chamberlain 
and the Halsbury Club threatened tc 
leave it with no defence against a 
was now inevitable. Chamberlain's 
reform as the single burning issue 
coupled with his futile defence of 
filled Long with horror. 
split the party and 
home rule Bill which 
insistence on tariff 
of Unionist politics, 
a doomed principle, 
It is curious that Long was so often accused of being a 
bad counsellor by his contemporaries, a charge frequently 
repeated by historians, although it has little basis in 
fact. For years he insisted that the party would never 
win an election whilst its programme included 'fo'od C 
taxes'. And he was right. He was equally right over 
the Parliament Bill. It was Chamberlain, paradoxically 
Long's accuser, who was the bad counsellor. It was always 
Chamberlain's weakness that he could never move with the 
political tide, as in his refusal to desert Lloyd George 
1Sir Charles Petrie, The Life and Letters ofthe_Right 
Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, 2 Vols. TLondon, 1939), 1, 
289-7. 
2Quoted ibid., 1,289. 
81 
in 1922. He displayed the same obduracy in 1911. To 
fight home rule the party had to be united, but Chamberlain, 
both by joining the 'diehards' and by refusing to comp- 
romise on tariff reform, was destroying its unity. To 
acquiesce in the Parliament Bill was at least to safe- 
guard the Union for two years, during which time the 
government might fall out with the Nationalists or home 
rule be dropped for some other reason. Long's policy 
was sound, Chamberlain's politically inept. 
Apart from home rule and the controversy over the _ 
Parliament Bill, Long involved himself in three major 
policy areas in the years immediately preceding Balfourts 
retirement as party leader. These were land reform, 
tariff reform and party organisation, and in each case 
his views were determined by the overriding desire to i 
ji 
see a Conservative government in office. During 1910 
he took up the question of land reform, advocating that 
there should be a rapid increase in the number of 
'yeomen and peasant' proprietor. In 1905 he had 
opposed Jesse Collings Is Land Purchase Bill. Now he 
changed his mind and argued that official party policy 
I 
should embrace some scheme of state-assisted purchase. 
Again, his policy was one of classic Conservatism: he 
recognised that a system of land monopoly sustained by 
82 
a small number of landlords invited attack and it was 
therefore good sense to promote reform before the Liberals 
had time to implement their own legislation. Timely 
concessions were to be preferred to radical reform later 
on. He saw the creation of a large number of smallholdings 
by the Conservative party as the only effective way to 
challenge the appeal of Liberal social policy and he 
suggested that the provisions of the Wyndham Land Act 
should be made to apply throughout the whole of the 
United Kingdom. 
1 
Long's advocacy of land purchase by state credit was 
not wholly disinterested: in 1910-11 he was selling a 
portion of his own estate and would undoubtedly have 
found matters much easier if the sitting tenants had had 
the kind of facilities which the state was already 
providing in Ireland. By the spring of 1911 Long had 
sold nearly four thousand acres of his Wiltshire estates, 
most of the land being purchased by existing tenants. It 
was in both his private and political interest to endorse 
land purchase. In 1905 it had not been, and in 1905 he 
had neither objected to the unfairness of a land policy 
which operated only in Ireland nbr grasped Collings's 
proposals as an aegis with which to stem the rising tide 
of socialism. Long corresponded frequently with Collings 
on the subject and Balfour's reluctance to lend his support 
1Long's 
views on Unionist policy for land reform can be 
found in W. L. P., WRO 947/438. 
83 
to any definite plan contributed to the growing dissat- 
isfaction within the party. Collings tried to use Long 
as the tool with which to gain acceptance for his 
schemes, a role which Long willingly took up in his 
desire to make the party attractive to the electorate. 
Collings frequently complained of the resentment against 
Balfour which was felt by party supporters with agricult- 
ural interests, 
1 
and Balfour's failure to endorse land 
reform as official Unionist policy intensified Long's 
frustration at the party's failure to win power in 1910. 
But it was tariff reform which was Long's real bugbear; 
he worked hard to have 'food taxes' dropped. He was 
convinced that the party could oust the Liberal government 
once tariff reform had been abandoned as a major policy 
issue, and his hostility to Austen Chamberlain had much 
to do with his belief that Chamberlain was responsible 
for keeping the party in opposition. On 27 May 1910 Long 
observed to Lady Londonderry that 'the Conservative Party 
as a separate political unit is being slowly bled to 
death - the state of things is very serious - the dis- 
content immense. '2 The electoral defeat of January had 
reinforced his opinions and for ithe remainder of the year 
he made no secret of his view that 'food taxes' must be 
put into cold storage. 
On 29 November 1910 Long took the chair at a meeting 
1See Collings to Long, 2 Apr., 8 Apr., 8 July, 22 July, 
and 7 Sept. 1910, ibid. 
2Long to Lady Londonderry, 27 May 1910, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(120). 
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at the Albert Hall. The meeting had been called to 
announce a kind of half-way house, a policy which Long 
could support but which the tariff reformers could not 
reject. He opened the proceedings with pious declarations 
of party loyalty, declaiming with assured disingenuousness 
that Balfour had behind him 'a party absolutely united, 
confident and enthusiastic. 
" Balfour then announced 
that 'I have not the least objection to submitting the 
principles of Tariff Reform to the Referendum. '2 The 
'quid pro quo' was to be the application of the same test 
to home rule. 
3 The announcement was a clear victory for 
Long, despite the fact that he later made a fuss at 
1The Times, 30 Nov. 1910. 
2Ibid. 
31t has been pointed out by Neal Blewett, The Peers, 
the Parties, the People, pp. 188 and 447, n. 88, that 
Balfour did not make his pledge contingent on a reciprocal 
pledge from the Liberals to submit home rule to a refer- 
endum. Those of Balfour's colleagues who believed that 
the party would never win a general election with tariff 
reform in its programmei did not interpret the pledge as 
conditional and Long was not alone in seeing the speech 
as a rejection of the extreme position taken up by the 
tariff reform organisation based in Birmingham, the 
Chamberlain strongho: 2d. As Neal Blewett has remarked, 
the notion of a conditional pledge 'amounted to little 
more than a debating trick, for the Liberals would never 
have agreed. ' (Ibid., p. 186). ; 'Nevertheless, Balfour's 
speech was immediately interpreted not only as a rejection 
of the tariff reformers' position but as an invitation to 
the Liberals to submit home rule to a plebiscite, an 
interpretation which he did nothing to contradict or 
qualify, thus allowing Chatberlain to argue that Asquith's 
failure to respond rendered the pledge null and void. The 
different interpretations of this speech at which Long 
and Chamberlain arrived merely served to exacerbate the 
tensions within the party, the exact opposite of what 
Balfour had intended. 
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Balfour's failure to consult him in advance: it removed 
the stigma of 'food taxes' from the forthcoming election; 
it challenged the supremacy of Chamberlain and the tariff 
reformers; and it embarrassed the Liberals by raising the 
question of the extent to which home rule depended on 
popular sanction. The declaration had the added advantage 
that the tariff reformers could not condemn it in 
principle without accepting the accusation that they 
wished to foist policies on a recalcitrant electorate. 
Lord Ridley, chairman of the Tariff Reform League, acqui- 
esced reluctantly, as did Chamberlain, whilst Bonar Law 
contented himself with saying that he could not remain 
in parliament if fiscal reform were to be dropped from 
Unionist policy. Long was naturally very pleased; but 
his pleasure was short-lived. 
' 
When the Conservatives were defeated in December for 
the second time in the same year, Long became anxious 
that the referendum pledge would soon be forgotten. Within 
a month of the Albert Hall declaration he was again 
attacking Balfour's weak leadership, insisting that a 
referendum on tariff reform should become official party 
policy and that Balfour should sick to this line. Long 
commended J. L. Garvin's view that 'dissension upon any 
vital question and recantation upon the Referendum would 
be assuredly destructive', 
2 
and he was convinced, as were 
1See Long to Lord Atkinson, copy, 29 Dec. 1910, W. L. P., 
WRO 947/445/2, for an example of Long's insistence that 
referendum was by far the best way of dealing with tariff 
reform. 
2The Observer, 18 Dec. 1910. 
86 
Lansdowne and Lord Derby, 
1 
that Balfourfs pledge had 
enabled the party to hang on to many seats which otherwise 
would have been lost. Chamberlain, on the other hand, 
sent a memorandum to Balfour and Lansdowne on 9 December 
arguing that the referendum proposal had done the party 
no good whatsoever and should be promptly forgotten. 
2 
And he followed this up with the observation that the 
Albert Hall pledge had only enabled the party to gain 
'half a dozen well-known names' 
'chance of winning hundreds'. 
3 
at the cost of losing the 
Chamberlain refused to 
accept either that the pledge had improved the party's 
appeal during the election or that it had the support of 
all the leaders other than himself. 
Long became very worried by that section of the party 
which, in the aftermath of the election, argued that the 
idea of a plebiscite should be dropped. On 19 December 
F. E. Smith asserted in The Times that tariff reform should 
not be subjected to 'aniexceptional disability', an 
r 
assertion which provoked Long into writing a strong memo- 
randum to Balfour a few days later. 'The abandonment of 
Referendum as applied to a Tariff Bill, ' he told his 
leader, 'would be disastrous, itwould expose us to the 
charge that we had only produced the plan as an Election 
dodge, and I consider our hpnour, would be involved. 14 But 
'Lansdowne to Long, 19 Dec. 1910, W. L. P., WRO 947/445/8; 
Derby to Long, 4 Jan. 1911, W. L. P., WRO 947/445/10. 
2Chamberlain to Lansdowne, copy, 9 Dec. 1910, and accom- 
panying memorandum dated 5 Dec. 1910, A. C. P., AC 8/7/6. 
3Chamberlain to Lansdowne, copy, 18 Dec. 1910, ibid. 
4'Memorandum to Mr Balfour' by Long, 22 Dec. 1910, W. L. P., 
WRO 947/445/3. 
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there was more than just honour involved, as Long well 
knew. The referendum pledge had given-him a victory over 
Chamberlain. Now the tariff reformers seemed to be 
gaining the upper hand again within the party. On 
Christmas Eve he reported: 'The revolt ... against 
Referendum for Tariffs is very strong and bitter, if 
A. J. B. and Lansdowne underestimate its importance and do 
nothing very great ... evils follow, they are active and 
determined, if we are apathetic and weak there can be 
but one result viz, a big split. '1 And he tried hard to 
enlist Lansdowne's support to persuade Balfour to crush 
the revolt. 
2 
It was all something of a vicious circle: a plebiscite 
on tariff reform presupposed a Conservative government 
in office, but the Conservatives would not succeed in winning 
power without first uniting on a basic policy to put 
before the electorate, and they could no more unite on a 
referendum for tariff reform than they could on tariff i 
reform itself. Long did not see'this and he felt badly 
let down when Balfour refused to endorse a referendum as 
C 
party policy. For a while he seemed to have got the 
better of"-the tariff reformers, And it was not surprising 
that he became very bitter towards Balfour, especially as 
Chamberlain's views seemed to carry more weight than his 
own. He was particularly annoyed that Balfour had not 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 24 Dec. 1910, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(137). 
2Correspondence between Long and Lansdowne on this 
subject can be found in W. L. P., WRO 947/445/8. 
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consulted him in advance over the referendum pledge, but 
had sent a special messenger to Chamberlain in Scotland. 
On 21 January he confided to Lady Londonderry: 
A. J. B. ... told us that he was very sorry he had 
not been able to consult us about Referendum etc. but 
that he had sent a special message to Edinburgh to 
consult Austen! This is more than I can stand.... I 
am not jealous or over sensitive but I object to being 
humbugged or made a fool of.... I ... can think of 
nothing but the older, the happier and the better days. 
l 
The referendum pledge, then, did nothing to satisfy Long 
or his followers. On the contrary, its initial promise 
served only to increase Long's annoyance when it was 
ultimately abandoned. By the beginning of 1911 he was 
a bitter critic of Balfour's leadership and an angry 
opponent of the Chamberlain faction. 
In the wake of the two electoral defeats of 1910 there 
was much recrimination, about the inadequacies of the party 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 21 Jan. 1911, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(140). From this letter it would appear that 
despite taking the chair at the Albert Hall meeting Long 
had no idea in advance what Balfour was going to say. 
Balfour's letter to Chamberlain, sent by special messenger 
to Scotland, is dated 28 Nov. 1910 and can be found in 
A. C. P., AC 8/7/1. Balfour knew 'very well that Chamberlain 
could not possibly reply before the speech the following 
day, so that Long's annoyance was to some extent unfounded. 
Chamberlain was no more consulted in advance about the 
referendum pledge than Long himself, and Long seems to 
have been irritated simply that Chamberlain should be 
singled out for special treatment. Unknown to Long, Balfour 
twice apologised to Chamberlain that the letter of 28 Nov. 
came so late. See Balfour to Chamberlain, 30 Nov. and 
13 Dec. 1910, A. C. P., AC 8/7/3 and 8/7/4 respectively. 
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organisation, so much so that Balfour was unable to beat 
off the demands for reform, and the appointment of a 
Unionist Organisation Committee (U. O. C. ) was announced 
on 1 February. Long played a major role in forcing 
Balfour to concede that reform was essential. He had 
been vexed over the party's organisation in the Commons 
for some time. In March 1910, for example, he had 
described the situation to Lord Selborne: 
Arthur is away ... but he has left nobody in charge. 
... Result is confusion and doubt, unnecessary and 
avoidable difficulties for us, & great opportunities 
for jeers and gibes on the part of the enemy, all of 
which spoils our fighting power and tends to dispirit 
our men.... I need not tell you I have no personal 
feeling, if A. had put Austen as Ex-Chancellor in 
command I would have gladly served under him ... but 
as things are there is chaos in the House while outside 
A. Hood and Jack Sandars do exactly as they like. It 
is demoralising and heart-breaking. 
1 
The chairmanship-of thetU. O. C. wgs given to Aretas Akers- 
Douglas, although Long had asked Balfour for the job on 
29 December 1910, e 
It was possibly because Long made such a nuisance of 
himself that Balfour gave the job to somebody else. Almost 
as soon as the election results were in, Long began to 
1Long to Selborne, dated merely March 1910, E. S. P., 
MS. Selborne 74/17-24. 
2Long to Balfour, copy, 29 Dec. 1910, W. L. P., WRO 
947/449/4. Long also wanted Hayes-Fisher appointed 
Chief Whip, having a week earlier described the party 
organisation to Balfour as 'either non-existent or deplor- 
able'. See memorandum by Long, 22 Dec. 1910, S. P., MS. 
Eng. Hist. c. 762, fos. 196-7. 
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orchestrate demands for organisational reform. On 
3 January he forwarded to Balfour a petition from the 
1900 Club deploring the party's organisation and demanding 
a committee, 
l 
and ten days later he attacked Balfour for 
failing to consult his senior colleagues frequently enough. 
2 
He deprecated the habit of allowing Acland-Hood, the Chief 
Whip, and Jack Sandars to organise Commons business, and 
complained to Balfour that 'I was treated with far more 
confidence by you when I was only an ex-Under Secretary 
than I have been during the years ... since ... 1906.13 
The U. O. C. presented its report in June 1911; 
4 Long 
served on the committee but he signed the report with 
some reluctance. This was for two reasons: he wanted 
the Conservative and Liberal Unionist organisations 
amalgamated immediately, not at some future date, and he 
wanted Balfour to promise, in advance of formal submission 
of the report, to follow the committee's recommendations. 
The appointment of Ar; thur Steel-Maitland as party 
chairman, also in June 1911, confirmed Balfour's indiff- 
erence to Longs opinions. Steel-Maitland sat for a 
Birmingham constituency and was acceptable to Chamberlain - 
a fact which almost guaranteed L6ng's hostility. 6n 1 June 
Long had written to Balfour in the strongest terms to 
advise against the appointnent. His main objections were 
1Long to Balfour, copy, 3 Jan. 1911, W. L. P., WRO 947/449/4- 
2 Memorandum by Long to Balfour, 13 Jan. 1911, ibid. 
31bid. 
4Report 
of the Unionist Organisation Committee, June 1911, 
W. L. P., WRO 947/450/16. 
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that Steel-Maitland was too junior and too much tainted 
by the Birmingham faction; and he pointed out that to 
give Steel-Maitland, who had been in the House for less 
than two years, the equivalent of cabinet rank would be 
bitterly resented by 'the older members. '1 Certainly, 
Long bitterly resented it. Anticipating trouble, Balfour 
only informed Long of the appointment just as he was 
about to catch a train for the West Country, thus denying 
him the chance of mounting any serious opposition. The 
appointment went ahead; Long gave in without a fuss, 
although privately he was furious: 
You know this last affair of A. J. B. 's is past all 
bearing: we never intended that , 
the 'Party Manager' 
should be of Cabinet rank.... I have come to the end 
oof my tether.... I believe he really wants to destroy 
the Conservative Party and hand us over tied and bound 
to Austen, this I won't stand.... I don't want to 
make a split, or cause trouble, but I can't and won't 
follow a man who is qapable of such conduct towards 
his friends. 2 
He was also disgruntcled at the way the party's parliam- 
entary opposition continued to be organised. Replying 
to Lord Balcarres, who had taken over as chief whip and 
who on 5 July had asked, at short notice, that Long take 
charge of opposing the Insurance Bill, he made his 
1Long to Balfour, 1 June 1911, S. P., MS. Eng. Hist. c. 763, 
fos. 85-9. 




I feel bound to tell you that ... this arrangement 
is most unsatisfactory ... there is a limit to 
everything! I am convinced that if we are to go on 
in the same happy go lucky fashion nothing but disaster 
can follow.... No notice, no proper division amongst 
different Front Bench men ... but a haphazard arrange- 
ment.... I really must point out ... because right 
is 
right and business is business, that I am next to 
Balfour, the senior Privy Councillor on our Bench, and 
.. e by many years his oldest colleague, and ... 
it is 
not a businesslike plan to ask me to be ready at any 
personal sacrifice ... whenever it is not convenient 
for Chamberlain to be there. 
1 
The tone of these letters speaks for itself: Long was 
thoroughly fed up with party organisation both in and 
out of the House. Time and time again he found his 
views ignored; Balfour had out-manoeuvred him over the 
appointment of Steel-Maitland; and nothing was being 
done to keep the Liberal Unionists in check. 
r 
Eventually, of course, organisational reforms were 
implemented, but they were too late to do Long any good. 
Longs work for the U. O. C. bore fruit under Bonar Law, 
not under Balfour as he had hopel, and it did nothing 
to assist his own bid for the leadership by undermining 
the Chamberl-ain stranglehold on the party organisation. 
Ever since 1906 the tariff reformers had exercised an 
increasing control over the constituency organisations 
1Long to Balcarres, copy, 6 July 1911, W. L. P., WRO 
947/449/59. 
93 
and the National Union, so much so that George Bowles, 
Lord Robert Cecil, J. Rutherford, F. W. Lambton and 
T. H. Sloan - all prominent free-fooders - had been 
unseated by the first election of 1910. By trying to 
reform the party's organisation, therefore, Long was 
taking a stand against the tariff reformers who had in 
only five years made a not unsuccessful attempt to ally 
the party's organisational structure, at both national 
and regional levels, with their cause. 
' 
Long has acquired the reputation of being a petulant, 
irascible man to work with, a constant irritation to 
Balfour in his last years as party leader. Certainly, 
Long could be outspoken, even rude, as his letters show, 
but there was considerable justification for his out- 
bursts. When he complained that 'really we know no more 
than do the outsiders'2 he had a point. To Long, it 
looked as if he and his followers were always expected 
to give in out of loyalty to the leader, whilst 
Chamberlain and the tariff reformers invariably had their 
own way. And Long was, as he pointed out to Balcarres, 
Balfour's most senior colleague. He naturally expected 
to be consulted and considered, rand he was naturally 
annoyed when he-was ignored or deceived. Balfour invited 
some of Long's sharper att4cks. by deferring too often, and 
1A full account of this process is given in Blewett, 
'Free Fooders, Balfourites, Whole Hoggers'; a good summary 
of party organisation in this period can be found in John 
Ramsden, The AEe_of Balfour and_BaldwinL_1902- 0 (New York, 
1978), pp. 45-62,68-72. 
2 Long to Balfour, 20 Jan. 1911, B. P., Add. MS. 49777; Long's 
copy is dated 21 Jan. 1911, W. L. P., WRO 947/449/4. 
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without any attempt at explanation, to what Long 
called 'the Birmingham gang'. 
Walter Long was not a particularly ambitious politician, 
but by the summer of 1911 he had determined to make a 
bid for the leadership of the Conservative party. This 
was brought about more by anger at Chamberlain's activities 
and frustration at Balfour's failure to lead with authority 
than by any driving ambition on his own part. Fortune 
seemed to favour him as the natural candidate, if only 
because there was no-one else. Balfour would clearly go 
soon: Chamberlain was a Liberal Unionist and unpopular 
with a large section of the party; Bonar Law seemed an 
unlikely contender; Carson had no following outside 
Ireland; F. E. Smith was too clever by half; and Alfred 
Lyttelton was always better at cricket than politics. It 
was not unreasonable, therefore, for Long to regard him- 
self as the party'stnext leader in the Commons. He was 
certainly regarded as such by a large body of MPs. If 
Long had been more ambitious he'would have challenged 
Balfour earlier, instead of waiting for Balfour to decide 
the timing of his own departure. As it was, it took 
three electoral defeats, the chasing out of the free 
traders, and Chamberlain's obdurate resistance to the 
Parliament Bill to persuade Long that, as Leo Maxse of 
95 
the National Review put it, 'Balfour Must Go'. 
Dissatisfaction with Balfour's leadership had begun 
years earlier, but it was accelerated and intensified by 
the struggle over the Parliament Bill. At the end of 
July 1911 Long pressed Balfour 'earnestly to mark his 
disapproval [of the 'diehard' campaign] ... by a public 
statement declaring the lead of the opposition in the 
House of Commons in favour of Walter Long. '1 Feelings 
against the party's two leaders - Balfour and Lansdowne - 
were running high and although Long had supported acqui- 
escence in the Parliament Bill he somehow managed to 
avoid the stigma of defeat and to dissociate himself 
from the leadership. He did nothing to appear publicly 
to oppose Balfour and he refused to be goaded into a 
precipitate atteippt to unseat his leader, preferring to 
allow persistent criticism to force Balfour's hand. Even 
at this late stage Long would have supported Balfour if 
he had chosen to take'a firm stand against his detractors. 
Ij 
Long's criticism was always that Balfour's leadership was 
effete and vacillating instead of assertive and decisive. 
C 
As he told Lord St. Aldwyn on 2 August: 'I am urging 
A. J. B. to take prompt and decisive action, ... we are 
doing nothing and A. J. B. 's followers will drift away from 
J. S. Sandars, 'A diary of the events and transactions 
in connection with the passage of the Parliament Bill of 
1911 through the house of Lords', B. P., Add. MS. 49767; 
Peter Fraser, 'The Unionist Debacle of 1911 and Balfour's 
Retirement', Journal of Modern Histom 35 (1963), p. 358. 
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him if prompt steps are not taken. t1 Balfour's failure 
to take decisive action was always at the heart of Long's 
criticisms. The groundswell of opinion against Balfour 
inevitably became an important ingredient in his own bid 
for the leaderts place. As his friend Sir Harry Samuel 
put it; 'there seems ... to be a call both 
for a strong 
leader and a strong policy and you seem ... to be the 
only man who can secure both. '2 
At the end of September Long increased the pressure on 
Balfour by sending him what Jack Sandars later described 
as an 'impertinent letter' demanding a 'radical change 
in policy? -without which 'Mr Balfour's leadership would 
be a disaster to himself and the party as a whole .... '3 
Balfour felt Long's criticisms keenly, a fact which no 
doubt influenced him in favour of Chamberlain, and he 
observed to Balcarres that Long had in effect issued 
'a bold and brutal invitation to retire. '4 It is therefore -- 
not surprising that Balfour thought that the leadership 
should go to Chamberlain in the' Commons, Curzon in the 
Lords, remarking that Long was 'too discursive, too quick- 
tempered, too changeable, and too complimentary. The 
compliments which he pays to his opponents are the only 
features of his speeches I ever recall. '5 But Balfour had 
1Long to St. Aldwyn, copy, 2 Aug. 1911, W. L. P., WRO 
947/448/29. 
2Samuel to Long, 11 Sept. 1911, ibid., 448/37. 
3J. S. Sandars, 'A note on the events leading to Mr. 
Balfour's resignation', B. P., Add. MS. 49767; Fraser, 
op. cit., p. 361. 
4Blanche E. C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, 2 Vols. 




cause to remember rather more 
for his complaints managed to 
protestations of loyalty, ac 
demands, suggestions, helpful 
letter which Sandars regarded 
all these elements and ran to 
true that you are Leader and, 
than just Longts complaints, 
combine vague threats with 
urious compound of pleadings, 
advice and rudeness. The 
as impertinent contained 
eight pages: 'It is quite 
on the principle of "j'y suis, 
j'y reste" you can retain the position; but this would surely 
involve disaster to the Party, and ... to the country. 
'1 
Long's main worry was that the revolt against Balfour 
would place Chamberlain, who he regarded as lacking in 
judgement and sense, in power. As he told Lady Londonderry 
on 3 October: 'There will be a revolt and A. C. 's friends 
will win. I should not care, should indeed be very glad 
1Long to Balfour, copy, 29 Sept. 1911, L. P., Add. MS. 62403. 
The original of this letter, interestingly, is not amongst 
Balfour's papers but amongst those of Jack Sandars and can be 
found in S. P., MS. Eng. Hist. c. 764, fos. 128-37. Sandars 
was even more annoyed by the letter than Balfour, copying 
out extracts in his ownihand and noting after three weeks 
that it was 'even more offensive'on reading it again. ' See 
ibid. fos. 113-6,126-7. Sandars showed either the full 
letter or extracts edited by himself to selected colleagues 
as an example of Long's perfidy. Viscount Chilston (Akers- 
Douglas) remarked, 'I cannot think how the writer could have 
sent it. It is brutal and cruel and I join with you in 
saying I can never forget or forgive it. ' Chilston to 
Sandars, 14 Nov. 1911, ibid. fos. 140-1. Long was well aware 
that the letter gave offence and he evidently felt some 
remorse, for in Jan. 1913 he apologised to Balfour: 'I know 
I am guilty', Long wrote, 'of an unpardonable act in saying 
what I did during those difficult times in 1911.... As long 
as I live I shall profoundly regret that I failed my leader 
at a most critical moment. ' This letter, dated 20 Jan. 1913, 
can be found in B. P., Add. MS. 49777. Lord Balcarres was 
convinced that Long's letter played an important part in 
encouraging Balfour to resign. In Balcarres's words it 
'confirmed and amplified his deductions more than anything 
else put together. ' Memorandum by Balcarres, 2 Oct. 1911, 
John Vincent, ed., The Crawford Papers: The Journals of 
David Lindsay, ttwenty-seventh Earl ofCrawford and tenth 
Earl ofBalcarresi 1871-1940Z_durinrthe_years 
_1892to 
190 
(to be published by Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 228. 
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if I thought he would do the job, but he couldn't, of this 
I am sure. No judgement, no prevision, e. g. Parliament 
Bill. '1 By the middle of the month Long was very worried. 
With the rumour of Balfour's impending resignation and, 
more ominously, of Chamberlain's likely succession, he 
tried to get Balfour to issue a public denial. 
2 
A few 
days later he was adamant that he would fight Chamberlain, 
reporting on 21 October that 'neither Carson nor I have 
any idea of standing down. '3 Chamberlain, too, was worried, 
as he did not regard the autumn of 1911 as a propitious 
moment to choose a new leader, and he tried to ignore the 
'Balfour Must Go' movement by pretending that it was 
solely Long's 'most offensive defences' of the leader which 
deceived people into believing that there was any real 
feeling against Balfour. ` 
Just as Long and his followers were vehemently opposed to 
Chamberlain because they believed that he lacked the qualities 
of a leader, so the Chamberlain camp were hostile to Long on 
the grounds that he could not do the job properly. Neither 
side had any respect for the capacities of the other; both 
believed that their man alone was suitable. 
5 
The opinion of 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 3 Oct. 1911, L. L. P., D/Lo/C 
666(165). 
2Long to Balfour, copies, 18 Oct., 19 Oct. 1911, L. P., 
Add. MS. 62403. 
3Long to Lady Londonderry, 21 Oct. 1911, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(163). 
4Chamberlain, 
Politics fron Inside, p. 362. 
5Balcarres 
recorded in his diary on 25 Oct. 1911: '... for 
my part I can only look to Austen Chamberlain. Walter Long 
is hopeless, impossible.... Bonar Law won't do.... Wyndham 
is too flighty, Alfred Lyttelton too sentimental, F. E. Smith 
too inexperienced, Harry Chaplin fifty years too old - and 
so forth. ' The Crawford Papers, P. 237. 
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Alfred Lyttelton, expressed to Chamberlain in a conver- 
sation which the latter duly recorded, was widely shared 
by Long's enemies: 
Walter Long couldn't do it, it would kill him. We 
all know Walter's good qualities and "if he could 
always have three drives off the tee, he might do very 
well, for his third shot was generally a good one, but 
the first two went here and there and all over the 
place". 
1 
Even before Chamberlain knew that Balfour's impending 
resignation was more than a rumour, he was making it plain 
to other leading party figures that he had no intention 
of ever serving under Long. He told Lyttelton that 
he would never defer to Long's opinions as he had on 
so many occasions to Balfour's. 
2 This was, in effect, 
a clear statement from Chamberlain that Long's elevation 
to the leadership would split the party. It gave Long -- 
little chance of success. Chamberlain was unusually 
percipient in realising early on' that Bonar Law was a 
serious candidate, aCfact which might lead to the frus- 
tration of his own chances but which could be used to 
guarantee Long's failure. On 5 November Chamberlain 
wrote: 
I cannot find that there is anyone in our councils 
who thinks that Long himself will do, but he will 
throw all his weight into the scale against me and 
might get Bonar Law chosen. Sandars says that he and 
'Chamberlain, Politics from Inside, p. 372. 
2 Ibid., pp. 372-3. 
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Balcarres had never supposed that Law would allow his 
name to be put forward. I think they are mistaken 
and that Law would allow it and like it if he thought 
there was a chance of his being chosen. 
1 
Relations between Long and Chamberlain had now reached 
their nadir, but Chamberlain's account of Long's behav- 
iour, written in the midst of what he later called a 
crisis in his political fortunes, was inevitably distorted 
by disappointment at his own failure, a fact which he 
later admitted freely. 
2 
Lord Derby made the somewhat foolish suggestion that 
Balfour should appoint a second-in-command in lieu of 
resigning, as if this would somehow heal the breach 
between the two factions. 
3 Balcarres was meanwhile busy 
trying to fix matters well in advance of Balfour's 
announcement, but he found Long decidedly unhelpful, 
reporting to Sandars late on 7 November: 'I telephoned 
to Walter Long, suggesting that ... Shadow Cabinet MPs 
shd meet tomorrow evening at 5 
ýo consider procedure & 
issue instructions. I was met by a resolute 'non' 
possumus' 1.4 Chamberlain made it clear to his rival 
that he envisaged that neither of them would emergz 
triumphant. He told Long bluntly: 'If we divide the 
1Ibid., 
pp. 380-1.2Ibid., pp. 381-2. 
3Derby to Balfour, 5 Nov. 1911, quoted Randolph S. 
Churchill, Lord Derby, King of Lancashire (London, 1959), 
pp. 151-2. - 
4Note from Balcarres to Sandars, 7 Nov. 1911, marked 
11.30 p. m., S. P., MS. Eng. Hist. c. 764, fo. 152. 
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Party too equally, I think that very possibly it will 
be felt that your friends and mine will more easily 
unite in support of some third person than accept either 
of us by a narrow margin of votes. 'l The feeling in 
the Commons had definitely moved against Balfour. As 
Sir William Bull had noticed in the summer: 
Balfour is by far and away the most brilliant debater 
and Parliamentarian in the House of Commons. He 
towers over Asquith, Lloyd George and everybody else 
but he is the worst leader we ever had and he is getting 
worse.... He lets Jack Sandars ... keep people from 
him and rule in his place. 
... He does not lead. He is like a sleepy lion who 
has to be poked up to roar occasionally. 
There is a growing feeling that though Walter Long 
has none of his brilliancy he would make a better 
leader. 2 
Discussing the matter of the succession with Balcarres, 
Chamberlain 'snorted': at the 'idea of Long's loyalty who 
... had been the centr¢ of every coterie of grumblers 
for the last five years. j3 Chamberlain made no bones 
about his opinions: ` 'I had no confidence in Long 's 
judgement and shared the opinion ... that Long's 
leadership would be a brief but disastrous fiasco. t4 
Long's opinion of Chamberlain's abilities was exactly 
1Chamberlain, 
Politics from Inside, p. 385. 
2Bullts diary, 16 July 1911, Bu. P., 4/4. 
3Chamberlain, 





On 8 November Balfour announced his intention to 
resign. The consolidation of the Halsbury Club, stubbornly 
resentful over its defeat on the Parliament Bill, and the 
'Balfour Must Go' campaign mounted by Leo Maxse had 
confirmed Balfour's intention to step down. Bull had 
already been busy on Long's behalf, having reached the 
conclusion that the contest would be extremely close: 
Gerald Arbuthnot [Long's private secretary] rang me up 
last night and today I saw him. Balfour is going to 
resign this afternoon.... We are going to run, Walter 
Long. We ran through a list of his friends & Austen 
Chamberlain's friends: - (a) Staunch 
(b) Doubtful 
(c) Neutral - Curiously enough each class is very level. 
The Neutrals could carry either way. 
l 
Although Long had known that Balfour's departure could 
not be far off he had gone through the motions of 
appearing loyal to Balfour up until the very last moment. 
Just the week before he had taken part in organising a 
meeting to discuss the best way of strengthening 13alfour's 
2 
position. It was also on 8, November that Long was 
' 
rude to Chamberlain as the two men arrived simultaneously 
at the House. So worried was J. L. Garvin that Bonar Law's 
candidature would play into Long's hands that he spent 
1Bull's diary, 8 Nov. 1911, Bu. P., 4/4. 
2Petrie, Austen Chamberlain, 1,296. 
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two hours late that evening trying unsuccessfully to 
persuade Bonar Law to stand down. 
1 Balcarres, too, was 
worried, for there was strong feeling in the party in 
favour of deciding the issue by secret ballot, and he 
calculated that if such a procedure was to be adopted 
Long would emerge the winner. 
2 On the following day, 
Thursday 9 November, Balcarres was alarmed to find that 
'the lobbying for W. L. is terrific.... Bonar Law is 
determined to stand, Carson not to stand. '3 
Long now wrote an 'insurance' letter to Chamberlain, 
refuting some of the statements attributed to him and 
offering to serve loyally if Chamberlain won the contest. 
4 
As Chamberlain subsequently pointed out, Long did not post 
the letter until after he had heard Chamberlain's suggestion 
that both men should stand down. Long could hardly allow 
it to be said that he had refused in advance to accept 
whatever decision the party might arrive at. 
In his autobiography Long claimed the initiative in 
r 
suggesting the withdrawal of the two major candidates, 
5 
and his biographer, Sir Charles Petrie, simply followed 
this account, 
6 
with Long solemnly declaring to his guests 
1Garvin to Chamberlain, dated merely Thursday (i. e. 9 Nov. 
1911), A. C. P., AC 9/4/24. 
2Balcarres to Sandars, 8 
, 
Nov. 1911, S. P., MS. Eng. Hist. 
c. 764, fos. 153-4. 
3Note by Balcarres, 9 Nov. 1911, ibid., fo. 175. 
4This letter is quoted in Chamberlain, Politics from 
Inside, p. 397. The original can be found in A. C. P., 
AC 9 4/35. It is dated 9 Nov. 1911, and scrawled across 
the top of it, in Long's hand, are the words 'Written last 




Charles Petrie, Walter Long_and His Times (London, 
1936), p. 172. 
- -- -- 
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at his London house, 'I have determined to retire if 
Chamberlain will do so also, and then Bonar Law can be 
unanimously elected as leader of the Unionist Party. ' 
Long then supposedly turned to Sir Harry Samuel with the 
peremptory command, 'Harry, you've got to see to this 
for me, ' To which the dutiful Sir Harry replied, 'I'll 
be damned if I will. ' This colourful account is, of 
course, pure fiction, for it was Chamberlain who suggested 
that both men should withdraw. 
1 Long agreed, reluctantly, 
and half expecting a trick: 'I have had an awful 4 days 
... I may have been deceived. There may yet be a row. 
All this is possible. '2 
When he wrote to Chamberlain on 9 November offering to 
serve under him, Long knew full well that neither man 
was to be the next leader. He agreed to stand down not 
only as a means to avoid splitting the party, but because 
he believed he might have another chance within a matter 
of months. On 10 Novem i 
ber he offered his support to 
11 
Bonar Law: 'I am thankful you have consented to stand. 
... Remember it is not a fight between individuals ... 
and neither side will give way now, and after an election 
much soreness would remain. t3 But there was also an 
'There 
are, however, two pieces of contemporary evidence 
to support Long's account in claiming the initiative. In a 
letter to Balfour, dated 19 Nov. 1911, Sir Harry Chaplin 
reported that the original suggestion to retire had come 
from Long. On the envelope of this letter Sandars scribbled 
the words 'A gross travesty of the facts'. See B. P., Add. 
MS. 49772. But Bull's diary entry for 10 Nov. 1911 contains 
the following sentence: 'Walter Long has told Austen if he 
stands down, 'he will - Austen has consented and the outsider 
romps home. ' Bu. P., 4/4. As both men claimed the initiative 
in later years, the question must remain in some doubt. 
2Long to Lady Londonderry, 10 Nov. 1911, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(171). 
3Long to Bonar Law, 10 Nov. 1911, B. L. P., 24/1/3. 
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element of personal calculation in Longs withdrawal, 
as he confided to Lady Londonderry on 11 November: 'I 
have reliable information - if A. C. or I are elected we 
are to be broken in 6 months. Between you and me I 
believe this fate must overtake the first man. I don't 
want to be the one! '1 In other words, Long thought 
Bonar Law might prove a caretaker who could last only a 
few months, by which time the party would be prepared 
to unite behind one of the principal contenders. There 
was a certain plausibility in this: Bonar Law hardly 
looked in November 1911 like a man who could unite the 
warring factions and maintain his own leadership for 
some twelve years. Quite simply, Long underrated Bonar 
Law's chances and believed that in the end the party 
would have to choose either himself or Chamberlain. 
Long's support was impressive: he could count on the 
Irish Unionists, a large group of backbenchers and what- 
ever influence Londondorry House might bring to bear. 
The 1900 Club supported him and there was strong backbench 
feeling against Chapberlain, mainly on the grounds of 
his disloyalty to Balfour over the Parliament Bill. Long's 
principal supporters included Sir William Bull, Sir Harry 
Samuel, Charles Bathurst, Ian Malcolm, Lord Helmsley and 
Lord Charles Beresford. But Chamberlain had the support 
of, the party managers, especially Balcarres, as well as 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 11 Nov. 1911, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(172). 
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that of the tariff reformers and the Halsbury Club. 
Robert Sanders recorded: 
Bal. himself was much against Walter Long & more or 
less against Bonar Law. He expressed the opinion that 
Bonar Law was lazy and not forthcoming enough. Walter 
Long was very angry because he said the Whips' room 
was working against him and that Pike 
[Pease was 
saying that Long's health would not stand the strain. 
' 
Bull noted on 9 November that 'Long is clearly more of 
a favourite than Austen although the latter has all the 
Whips behind him. 12 
The candidature of Bonar Law looked at first like a 
fillip to Long's chances, for few of Longs supporters 
would go readily into the Bonar Law camp whilst many of 
Chamberlain's would. This fear was expressed directly 
to Bonar Law in the hope that he could be persuaded to 
withdraw, which he nearly did. 
3 Chamberlain's decision 
to withdraw on conditio in 
that Long did likewise is 
understandable: it was better to have the tariff reformer 
and businessman Bonar Law than to risk Long. But'why did 
Long agree? Was it simply that he believed that Bonar 
, 
Law's leadership would be shortM ved? His position, after 
all, looked strong. 
' If the contest was to be decided on 
a single ballot then he looked set to win; and if Law was 
1Sanders diary, 12 Nov. 1911. 
2Bull's diary, 9 Nov. 1911, Bu. P., 4/4. 
3Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister (London, 1955), 
pp. 79-81. 
4The betting in the Carlton Club before news of Long's 
decision to stand down had been six to four in Long's 
favour. Balcarres's Notes, 9 Nov. 1911, The Crawford 
Papers, p. 244. -- -- - 
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to be defeated on a first vote, then Long would revert 
to the position as it had stood before Bonar Law's 
candidature. Was his concurrence in Chamberlain's plan 
therefore a political blunder? Long was aware that he 
could not command unanimous support, that he had made 
bitter enemies, and that his opponents would not allow 
mere loyalty to the leader to outbid policies to which 
they were firmly wedded. If Long had not concurred and 
had insisted on continuing the fight he ran the risk of 
being charged with splitting the party. For Long, Peel 
and 1846 was always the great blot on the party's history. 
He knew that Chamberlain could add fuel to the fires of 
discontent by making his offer public, thereby suggesting 
that Long had risked party unity for his own political 
career even when an honourable way out had been proposed. 
Long thus knew that he had no hope of being an effective 
leader, not because he necessarily lacked the capacity,. 
but because Chamberlain, would ensure that he was not 
given a chance. Long had no choice but to concur. The 
fact that he rated Bonar Law so poorly merely served to 
make the decision easier. 
And so, the Carlton Club meeting of 13 November gas 
fixed in advance. Long played his part well by describing 
Bonar Law as 'not only a great deal bigger in political 
stature than I am, but a man to whom we can look with 
absolute confidence. 
" Long then proposed Bonar Law, 
1Transcript 
of the proceedings of the Carlton Club 
meeting of 13 Nov. 1911, W. L. P., WRO 947/451. 
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Chamberlain seconded the proposal, and Bonar Law was 
unanimously chosen. Discussion was ably stifled by 
Harry Chaplin acting as chairman for the occasion. 
Robert Sanders, who was present at the meeting, recorded 
a vivid account of the day's events in his diary: 
The Carlton Club meeting on Monday went off quite 
admirably. Harry Chaplin in the Chair a very great 
success.... Walter Long proposed Bonar Law. His 
speech was one of the best things I ever heard. Manly 
and rather touching. The country gentleman at his 
very best.... Austen followed.... When Austen sat 
down Chaplin suggested that he had better put the 
question at once & on getting an affirmative shout 
did so. A clear way of stifling discussion and few 
men could have done it better. Motion carried unanim- 
ously. Bonar Law then sent for. All got up to cheer 
him except Banbury who remained seated. His speech 
struck me as feeblest of the day.... It was ... a 
curious feature that while Walter Long was speaking of 
the decision almost as the Swan Song of the Country 
Gentleman, he and Chaplin ... cut far the finest 
figures in the proceedings. ' 
At the House Bonar Law ... came into the Whips' Room 
in the course of the afternoon and seemed rather to be 
asking for orders from Austen. He struck me as rather 
shy and awkward.... The only dissentient note that I 
heard was one of regret that Austen had not retired in 
favour of Walter Long as being the older man. On the 
other hand I think the LU clique are a little sore. 
l 
So ended Long's hopes of leading the Conservative party 
'Sanders diary, 15 Nov. 1911. Lord Balcarres, too, 
described Long's reception as 'tremendous' and recorded that he ? made the best speech of his life. ' The Crawford 
Papers, pp. 249-50. - 
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and possibly becoming prime minister. In the end he had 
proved a dependable party man. Unlike Peel and Gladstone 
before him, Lloyd George and MacDonald afterwards, each 
of whom split his respective party in the interests of, 
or despite, political ambitions, Long chose unity and 
conciliation. If it had come to a straight fight Long 
would probably have won, although his majority would 
clearly have been slender. His problem was that his 
support came from the mass of the party rather than from 
its leaders. Amongst the party as a whole he was much 
more popular than either Chamberlain or Bonar Law, 
although the canvass conducted by Long's most energetic 
supporters which concluded that he could expect to win 
by a majority of at least seventy1 was decidedly over- 
optimistic. Nonetheless, opinion inside the party 
expected him to win, and the opinion of his younger 
brother, Colonel R. G. W. Chaloner, is by no means wholly 
inaccurate: 'If it had been fought out W would have won 
by a large majority (as one of A. C. ts leading supporters 
admitted to me afterwards). t2 C 
And Edward Goulding, who assisted Max Aitken in the bid 
to push Bonar Law forward, was Clearly of the opinion 
that Long would win in a straight fight. As J. L. Garvin 
had reported to Waldorf Astor on 10 November, Goulding 
1Petrie, Walter_Long, p. 171. 
2Chaloner to Charlotte Ethel Martin (Long's sister), 
14 Nov. 1911, W. L. P., WRO 947/452. Colonel Chaloner was 
Long's half-brother. He dropped the surname Long and 
took Chaloner by royal licence in 1888. In 1917 he became 
Baron Gisborough. 
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'acknowledged that Long seemed to be developing strength 
enough to beat both Austen and Bonar. Walter's victory 
seemed certain. 1l On the following day Goulding had 
sent Garvin a detailed analysis of the strength of the 
various factions, concluding that Long could count on a 
good majority. As a prominent backbencher, Goulding, 
Unionist MP for Worcester and a committed tariff reformer, 
was in a position to gauge the strenth of feeling in 
favour of Long. Although a firm supporter of Austen 
Chamberlain, he promoted Bonar Law precisely because he 
recognised that Chamberlain would not win in a straight 
fight. And it was for this reason that Garvin, already 
privy to the arrangement between Chamberlain and Long, 
did not carry an article in The_Observer of 12 November 
strongly backing Chamberlain, as had been expected, but 
discoursed at length on the necessity for unity under 
Bonar Law. Sir William Bull, who conducted the canvass 
on Long's behalf, remained convinced that Long would 
have won easily in a two-cornered fight. The temptation 
of office seems to have been employed to bring Bull into I 
line behind Bonar Law. At the end of 1911 Bull wrote: 
I backed Walter Long for the leadership. He would 
have beaten Austen Chamberlain by 2 to 1 if it had 
come to a fight but I am. glad Bonar has got it, he is 
better than both the others. Goulding - the intriguer 
who put him there - says he must have a chat with me as 
1Garvin to Astor, 10 Nov. 1911, quoted Gollin, "Observer" 
and Garvin, p. 359. 
111 
he thinks I deserve to be in the next Government. 
' 
The size of the majority is questionable, but in a 
straight fight Long would have carried the prize. His 
disappointment was considerable and for some weeks he 
contemplated retiring from politics altogether, telling 
Lady Londonderry on New Year's Day that 'for my own part 
I wish with all my heart I had never entered Parliament 
or could see my way to getting out of it now. '2 
Long's disillusionment was as much a matter of policy 
as of personality. He realised that by agreeing to 
accept Bonar Law he was implicitly acquiescing in the 
rejection of his own views in favour of the policies of 
the Birmingham men, for Law's views on tariff reform were 
so close to Chamberlain's as to make no difference. Law 
was clearly on the side of the businessmen. He had already 
established for himself a reputation as an outspoken 
tariff reformer, and Long knew that there was little 
chance that he would spbnsor the, sort of 'go-slow' fiscal 
reforms needed to win a general election. Nor did Bonar 
Law much care for th-b traditional landed element of the 
party which Long represented. Chamberlain's withdrawal, 
on the other hand, carried no implicit depreciation in 
the fiscal policies for which he had so long agitated. 
Bonar Law was a compromise' candidate only in the sense 
that he would not split the party. In policy terms he 
- -------- - ---- 
1Bull's diary, 'Summary of the Second Half of 1911', 
Bu. P., 4/4. 




was a partisan of Chamberlain's, an opponent of Long's.. 
And Long's supporters accepted him only because he was 
not tainted with the traditions of Liberal Unionism and 
because he was regarded as an objective authority on 
economic questions. Chamberlain was seen as prejudiced 
and tendentious. Bonar Law was an unknown quantity. But 
Long knew that Law had at least one foot in the Birmingham 
camp, and the two men had hardly got on well in the past. 
Historians have tended to regard Long's candidature for 
the leadership as something of a joke and have often 
asserted that Long could never have done the job. This 
is because they have followed the opinions of the party 
managers instead of looking at the capacities of Long 
himself. And the party managers were biased. Balcarres' 
notorious advice to Chamberlain that he should allow 
Long to win since Long would make such a mess of things 
inside a year that Chamberlain would be bound to succeed 




too, - 'I confess I wonder that our Party did not plump 
for Long. He would Pave been more immaculately useless 
and genteelly incompetent than anything in sight'2 - is as 
prejudiced as it is witty. Long' had not made a mess of 
any office which he had held or of any election which he 
had fought. To take him at face value as a slow-minded 
Tory squire, an anachronistic throwback to another age, 
1Lansdowne, 
at least, thought that Balcarres' remark was 
disgraceful. On 11 Nov. he told Chamberlain that to have 
accepted Long's leadership in the belief that tit was not 
likely to succeed, and that while it lasted the pear would 
have been ripening for you, would have been quite unworthy. ' 
Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 11 Nov. 1911, A. C. P., AC 9/4/31. 
2Quoted A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (London, 1972), p. 70. 
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was to underestimate his talents. Any man who could 
rise from the relative obscurity of the Local Government 
Board to command a good half of the parliamentary party 
in less than seven years was not to be taken lightly. 
Long had sat in parliament since 1880; he had represented 
a number of quite different constituencies; he had proved 
a good departmental man, a good administrator and a sound 
policy maker; and he had made a marked success of the 
one important cabinet post, the Irish Office, he had so 
far been given. 
In the right circumstances, there is no reason to 
suppose that Long could not have made a competent and 
successful leader. As for the imputation of plain 
stupidity, of lack of intellectual power, this was often 
exaggerated and would not, anyway, have necessarily 
hindered him. Balfour's intellectual powers were consid- 
erable, yet they hardly helped him as party leader. Long 
believed in straightfo1ward dealing and plain talking. 
His blunt style, his practicality, his flexibility on 
all issues save Ireland, his pragmatism, his ability to 
rally the backbenches - these were qualities which would 
have stood the party in good stdad. To say that Long 
had 'constantly worked against Balfour, criticising him 
freely ... and using his party positions as independent 
bases against the leader'1 is to paint only half a 
picture. It is, of course, true that Long criticised 
1Ramsden, Age of Balfour and Baldwin, p. 95. 
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Balfour both directly and to his colleagues. But in 
this he was only expressing criticisms rife in the 
party, and Balfour's feeble leadership often both invited 
and justified the attacks. Balfour enjoys the distinction 
of having led his party to three electoral defeats in the 
space of five years. Long never allowed his supporters 
to prompt him too far and he was always ready to fall into 
line whenever a clear policy was forthcoming. What Long 
really found intolerable was Balfour's subtle prevaric- 
ations and inveterate reluctance to let the party know 
where he stood. 
' 
Certainly, Long's standing amongst 
backbenchers allied to his support from Irish Unionists 
provided a strong and semi-independent powerbase, but 
unlike Chamberlain he never used his position to foist 
on the party policies which would not win elections, nor 
did he seek to ostracise, let alone expel, those who 
disagreed with him. 
Several of Long's contemporaries were of the opinion 
1Long 
always placed great emphasis on the value. of strong 
leadership. Indeed,; -he regarded it as the crucial ingredient 
necessary for Conservative success. Ironically, he had 
been firmly of the opinion that Balfour should be appointed 
party leader in the Commons on the grounds that Balfour 
would prove the most decisive candidate. On 14 Oct. 1891 
Long had written: 'I cannot say how important I think it 
is that Arthur should be made Leader - he is the man for 
the post in every way - we want not only a man with his 
ability, courage and determination, but also one who will 
inspire our Party all through the country with courage and 
awake their sentiment. All this and more Arthur can do.... 
If any man now living can lead us to victory and keep us 
together that man is Arthur.... ' This letter, which was 
written to Aretas Akers-Douglas, is published in full in 
Chilston, Chief Whip, pp. 222-3. 
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that he was capricious, yet he was capricious only in 
the sense that he could be flexible, as in the case of 
the Parliament Bill. And flexibility in politics is an 
advantage, not a disadvantage. Long was equally accomp- 
lished at being captious and intransigent when the 
situation demanded. It is certainly true to say that he 
could be difficult to work with: if he cared deeply 
about an issue he would argue his beliefs passionately, 
sometimes with considerable intemperance. For Long, 
politics revolved around certain cardinal principles, 
and these he would defend to the utmost, often with a 
vehemence which his colleagues mistook for plain bad 
temper. The only reason for which Long might not have 
been able to do the work of party leader was failing 
health. By 1911 he was already suffering from the poor 
health which was to dog him until his death thirteen 
years later. Even so, he was to prove during the war 
years that he could still work long, hard hours, and he 
was to remain a minister for almost as long as Bonar Law, 
whom he was to outlive by just a few months. All in all, 
r 
there is no reason to suppose that Long, if elected or 
chosen in 1911, might not have made at least as successful 
a leader as Bonar Law. 
The leadership contest of November 1911 was a turning 
point in the career of Walter Long. It marked the 
frustration of his ambition, the destruction of his hopes. 
The years since 1905 had taken him a long way down the 
-. 9 
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road to the leadership, but he had stumbled at the last 
hurdle, pipped at the post by a 'drab, pawky, chronically 
pessimistic'1 Glasgow businessman of whom he had scarcely 
heard a decade before. After 1911 he became more progress- 
ive, more flexible, more ready to insist on policies which 
he believed in, less concerned to safeguard his own 
standing in the party. His ambition did not exactly 
peter out; it simply took another course. This left 
Bonar Law in a very dangerous position. 
Within a few weeks of his defeat Long had shaken off 
his depression and returned to work. As before, his 
main object was to return the Conservatives to power, and 
he once again took up the question of land reform, to 
cover both rural and urban areas, as a means to win the 
party the electoral support which it so patently lacked. 
He became more and more convinced that land purchase 
was the only policy which could turn the voters away from 
opposition policies, such as old age pensions, which not 
only conferred direct benefits but also carried enormous 
emotional appeal. Long wanted to produce a Conservative 
land policy more attractive than that of the Liberals. 
In June 1912 he appointed, on behalf of the party, a 
committee to consider the matter and a report was duly 
1This description of Bonar Law is by Arthur Lee. See 
Alan Clark, ed., A_Good Innings: The Private Papers of 
Viscount Lee of Fareham (London, 1974), p. 119. 
--d 
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presented on 1 August - this committee seems to have 
been unofficial and is ample evidence of Long's desire 
to devise an extensive Unionist land policy. Although 
the report was broadly in sympathy with an extension of 
land ownership being undertaken by the next Conservative 
government, it did not, much to Long's annoyance, recommend 
ownership by smallholders as a valid policy in itself or 
as a 'panacea for decaying agriculture. '1 The committee 
did, however, recommend a minimum agricultural wage fixed 
by statute2 and a system of 'graduated bounties on home 
grown wheat. '3 These proposals were not taken up. 
During the following year an official committee, headed 
by Lord Salisbury, was charged with considering Unionist - 
agricultural policy and its report was ready by 12 August 
1913. It was much less enthusiastic about a legislative 
minimum wage and it did not suggest any clear policy. 
4 
Long found the committee's findings very disappointing 
and told a friend that, they had been 'advanced by people 
I 
who have no practical knowledge or experience of the 
land question and who really ... are out for votes and 
nothing else.... I cannot imagine anything more cruel 
than to make agricultural labourers the playthings*of 
politicians. '5 He certainly wanted to use land reform to 
1Land Committee's recommendations, forwarded to Long 
on 1 Aug. 1912, W. L. P., WRO 947/439. 
2Ibid., 
p. 6.3Ibid., p. 8. 
4Sykes, Tariff Reform in British Politics, p. 278. 
5Long to Howard Frank (of Knight, Frank and Rutley, 
London estate agents), copy, 19 Nov. 1913, W. L. P., WRO 
947/439. 
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win votes, but only if the promises made to smallholders 
had some substance and carried real advantage. He main- 
tained this line up until the outbreak of war. 
Bonar Law would not endorse a statutory minimum wage 
because he knew that the issue was too divisive: his 
difficulty was to steer a course between those Unionists 
who wanted to trump Lloyd George with a radical land 
policy and those who would contemplate no interference 
with the rights of the employer. The party could not 
afford to alienate the farmers -a fact which Long 
pointed out repeatedly. 
' By November 1913 Bonar Law was 
prepared to commit himself only to an enquiry into low 
agricultural wages. Anxious not to upset the farmers - 
or threaten party unity on the matter, Long readily 
accepted this 'via media', and six months later he was 
still prepared to argue that on the question of statutory 
wages the party dare go no further than an enquiry. 
2 
On 25 November 1913 Long used the opportunity afforded 
by the annual dinner of the Melksham Agricultural Society 
to publicise his views in a thinly disguised condemnation 
of both his own party and the government: 'We ... are in 
some danger of becoming the victims of aspiring policicians 
who think that they can gain votes by producing ambitious 
programmes of land reform.! 
3 This was an attempt to cast 
1See, for example, Long to Bonar Law, 31 Oct. 1913, B. L. P., 
30/3/77, in which Long emphasised the danger of 'alarming 
the landowners and farmers who are the backbone of our party. ' 
2See 
memorandum by Long, 6 May 1914, ibid., 32/3/13. 
3Report 
of Long's speech, The Times, 26 Nov. 1913. 
J 
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doubt on Lloyd George's credentials as a land reformer. 
He stressed that he supported land reform but objected 
to Liberal policy on the ground that agricultural workers 
would never become the actual owners of the land they 
cultivated, remaining the perpetual tenants of the state 
and liable constantly to interference from an army of 
government officials, 
' 
for the Liberals proposed extensive 
powers for the Board of Agriculture. On Saturday after- 
noon, 17 January 1914, Long delivered a speech at the 
Holloway Empire in which he outlined Conservative policy 
on land reform. Lloyd George had spoken on the subject 
at the same venue just ten days earlier, so that by 
putting Long up to advocate a non-partisan policy which 
appeared to have all the merits which the Liberals' 
scheme lacked the Conservatives were able to ridicule 
Lloyd George and refute the allegation that they were 
not a party of constructive reform. 
2 Long was easily 
able to show that Lloyd, George's speech had been full of 
misrepresentations and inaccuracies, and he received 
much favourable comment in the press. 
3 
t 
Coming from a Conservative politician and landlord often 
lIbid. 
2The 
meeting passed a resolution designed to embarrass 
the government: ? That recognising ... the necessity for Parliament dealing immediately and effectively with 
questions relating to Housing and Land: - This meeting calls 
upon the Government to propose legislation on these matters 
in the next session ... or to give place to the Unionist 
party which has long been prepared with a practical Housing 
and Land Policy. ' Programme of Holloway Empire meeting, 
17 Jan. 1914, Bu. P., 4/9. 
3See The Observer, 18 Jan. 1914; The Times, Iht_Standard, 
Daily Express, Pall Mall Gazette, 19 Jan. 1914. 
120 
thought of as the personification of squirarchy, Long's 
ideas were ambitious and far-sighted: he argued for 
continuity of tenure for industrial tenants in large 
towns, compensation for improvements carried out by 
tenants, and protection from 'unreasonable' clauses in 
all leases. To ensure that the provisions would be 
enforced in a non-partisan manner, he suggested the 
appointment of a tribunal which would be wholly indep- 
endent of government and parliament. Personally, Long 
would have liked to go much further - something along 
the lines of his unofficial committee's recommendations 
of August 1912. That he did not was due to recognition 
thä; t a large section of the party would not swallow 
extensive land reform, still less would the farmers and 
landowners on whom he depended for much of his own 
political support. But his views hardly square with the 
usual portrayal of Long as an old-fashioned Tory squire. 
He had recognised thatiland reform should be sponsored 
by the Conservative party from 1909 onwards, but his 
views had fallen on deaf ears, for neither Balfour nor 
Bonar Law was very interested in the question. By 1914 
the Liberals had made all the political capital out of 
land reform that there was, and it was Lloyd George who 
ultimately took the credit, which Long would have had 
accrue to the Conservative party. 
By the time of Bonar Law's elevation to the leadership 
the free traders in the party had been well and truly 
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beaten. But there were many moderates left, Long fore- 
most amongst them. As far as these people were concerned 
the leadership was not a safe haven from the Birmingham 
faction but a rock of fiscal dogma on which party unity 
might be dashed and electoral hopes cast to the winds. 
Many MPs thought that to continue to emphasise tariff 
reform as the primary electoral issue was foolish and 
they looked to Long as the main focus of possible opposition 
to the new leader. In the period between Balfour's 
departure and Law's reluctant renunciation of 'food 
taxes' Long became both the protector and leading advocate 
of all those moderates who wanted a change in the party's 
tariff reform platform. Bonar Law always had to act in 
the knowledge that Long was a potential rebel who could 
probably command majority support amongst the backbenchers. 
The possibility of Long as party leader was by no means 
totally dispelled by the events of November 1911. 
Just as Long had pressed Balfour to drop 'food taxes', 
so he pressed Bonar Law, always assuring him that he was 
a committed tariff reformer in principle. Promising not 
to make trouble, Long told his new leader on 27 May 1912 
that I... tho' I regret we can't' emancipate ourselves 
from what I regard as an unnecessary burden ... I shall 
not raise the question again. After all it is with me"a 
matter of tactics, not principle. '1 True to his word, 
Long made no trouble for several months, but it was more 
1Long to Bonar Law, 27 May 1912, B. L. P., 26/3/41. 
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the result of circumstance than of any new-found 
deference towards his leader: in June he was off work 
from illness and from 8 August until 19 October he was 
in Canada campaigning against home rule. When Long 
returned home discontent in the party was again mounting 
and he quickly emerged once more as a major challenge 
to the leadership. 
In April the shadow cabinet had decided that 'food taxes' 
must remain part of the Conservatives' programme; on 
14 November Lansdowne announced, appropriately at the 
Albert Hall, that there would be no plebiscite on tariff 
reform, although the referendum pledge had to all intents 
and purposes been dead and buried since Balfour had 
refused to endorse its continued existence in January 
1911. Now it was officially dead. Bonar Law and 
Lansdowne would not go back on the position they had 
adopted. Long knew this. He also knew that party feeling 
was so strong that Law might be forced to resign. Yet he 
trod very warily and was careful not to appear to put 
himself at the head of any movement to unseat Bonar Law. 
t 
The maintenance and development of Conservative support 
in the North West was especially' important, as Lanbashire 
seemed to hold the key to the winning of a working 
majority. And it was precisely in this part of the 
country that 'food taxes' were likely to do the most 
damage, a point which Long's correspondents made again 
and again in their efforts to persuade him to lead a 
rebellion. He deliberately adopted an ambiguous position, 
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making it clear that he regarded 'food taxes' as a 
severe handicap yet at the same time protesting loyalty 
to Bonar Law. If there was a party split, as looked 
very likely by the end of 1912, Long did not want to 
be labelled as its engineer. When, for example, his 
friend, Sir Harry Samuel. asked for advice as to what 
line to adopt, he made his private views explicit yet 
stressed that they must remain confidential as he was 
'a most loyal supporter of Mr Bonar Law. 'l 
In other words, Long was trying to have it both ways, 
but his friends and supporters in the party knew very 
well that he detested 'food taxes' and 'the prevailing 
and by no means unfounded conviction that attempts are 
being made to force a policy down the throats of men 
who are sincerely opposed to it. '2 For a while, it 
looked as if his private conviction a year before that 
Bonar Law would not last long would be proved right. 
Nor had his opinion of 
I 
Chamberlain changed much. Although 
the two men had attempted to patch up their animosity 
towards one anothere by fostering relations of rather 
punctilious courtesy, feelings of suspicion and bitterness 
were too deeply rooted to die quickly. On 18 December 
Chamberlain complained directly of 'mischief makers' and 
attempts 'to divide the Party between your friends and 
mine. '3 He received little sympathy from Long who, on 
1Long to Samuel, copy, 30 Dec. 1912, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
446/16. 
2Long to Lady Londonderry, 14 Dec. 1912, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(227). 
3Chamberlain to Long, 18 Dec. 1912, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
446/4. 
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the following day, confided his opinion of Chamberlain 
to H. A. Gwynne of the Morning_Post: Chamberlain and 
the Birmingham men, he said, were having things too 
much their own way. 
The opinion is growing ... that our policy and 
tactics 
are dictated from Birmingham ... the Conservative party 
will not have this ... there ought to be at least some 
little understanding that both sides are to abate some 
of their keenest desires. So far, and during all these 
years, it has been ourselves - the majority - the 
Conservative party - who have been called upon to 
subordinate their views to the views of the minority. 
l 
He continued to sit on the fence, the focus of anti-tariff 
reform sentiment, yet committed in principle to 'food 
taxes' and a loyal supporter of Bonar Law. 
He did not need to do more. Lansdowne's abrogation 
of the referendum pledge, the by-election defeat at 
Bolton on 23 November, Bonar Law's Ashton-under-Lyne 
speech on 16 December,; Northcliffe's anti-'stomach taxes' 
campaign in The Times and Daily_Mail, the Lancashire 
Conservatives' revolt led by Lord Derby - all looked 
set to force Bonar Law's resignation without any help 
from Long. He did not believe that Law would win through. 
As he told Lady Londonderry on Christmas Eve, 'B. L. ... 
seems so doubtful ... and to feel his position acutely. 
F. E. never consulted him as to his last two speeches and 
1Long to Gwynne, copy, 19 Dec. 1912, ibid., 446/28. Lord 
Balcarres had recorded in his diary on 21 Oct. 1912 that 
Bonar Law is 'always afraid of an explosion between Austen 
and Walter Long. Whatever the former says is immediately 
pronounced ridiculous and 'I never heard such a proposal' - 00 Walter is tre s difficile, and B. L. suffers during these 
recurrent crises. ' The_Crawford_Papers, p. 281. 
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... the party 
do not care to be lectured.... I am 
afraid B. L. is very much wedded to these accursed taxes. *1 
On Christmas Day Derby wrote to say that he intended to 
stand firm and would not 'be browbeaten by the foodtaxers 
any moret, 
2 information which naturally encouraged Long 
to take a firmer line himself. On New Year's Day he 
tried to force the pace by observing to Bonar Law that, 
'as an old Food Taxer, one who firmly believes in Imperial 
Preference and who thinks Food Taxes are just, I am 
convinced that as a matter of practical politics we shall 
not be able to impose them, 13 and on the following day 
he drove the point home by insisting that tariff reform 
would lose the party the next election, as it had lost 
the last three. 'Food taxes' must be dropped, he argued, 
unless the Conservatives fought and won a second election 
with tariff reform as a specific issue. 
4 
Bonar Law now knew that Long might not continue to 
avoid an open rebellion indefinitely, and these two 
i 
letters must have played a part in persuading Law to 
give in. Carson's initiative in drawing up a formal 
memorial requesting, on behalf of all Unionist members - 
except those on the front bench '- Bonar Law and Lansdowne 
to remain at their posts provided a much needed way out. 
Longs position was immensgly strong. A quiet and 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 24 Dec. 1912, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(230). 
2Derby to Long, 25 Dec. 1912, quoted Churchill, Lord 
Derby, pp. 176-7. 
3Long to John Baird (Bonar Law's PPS), copy, 1 Jan. 1913, 
W. L. P., WRO 947/446/41. 
4Long to Bonar Law, copy, 2 Jan. 1913, ibid., 446/37. 
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informal canvass of Unionist MPs had been held in 
December and had shown an enormous majority in favour 
of abandoning 'food taxes' and reverting to Balfour's 
policy of deciding the issue by plebiscite. 
' Long was 
absolutely sure of his ground when he told Bonar Law 
that 'food taxes' must go. Resignation was Law's only 
alternative and this was clearly what Long expected. Up 
to this point Bonar Law had refused all compromise; his 
acceptance of Carson's memorial represented a surrender 
on his part, for he agreed that 'food taxes' must be the 
subject of a second election. A shaky party unity was 
restored. Long had won a policy victory without laying 
himself open to a charge of disloyalty. Not surprisingly, 
he was very pleased with the result, commenting on 10 
January that, 'I get many letters showering praise on 
A. C. for his behaviour, and I hear F. E. has been saying 
there are too many leaders and too much talking! It is 
all very amusing. 12 
Once Bonar Law had conceded Long fell swiftly into 
line and up until the outbreak of war in August 1914 he 
gave his leader little. trouble over policy, except in 
the case of Ireland and the methods to be adopted in face 
of the government's home rule Bill. He regarded Bonar 
Law's decision as Chamberlain's just deserts, and provided 
the decision stood he was prepared to leave well alone. 
1See Sir Samuel Scott to Long, 19 Dec. 1912, and 
G. R. Lane Fox to Long, 22 Dec. 1912, ibid., 446/15 and 
446/17 respectively. 
2Long to Lady Londonderry, 10 Jan. 1913, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(234). 
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For as long as Bonar Law remained sound on Ireland, he 
was happy. At the end of June 1913 he put before Bonar 
Law a number of proposals for Conservative policy. They 
were sent confidentially: he told nobody else of his 
plans, deliberately leaving the way clear for Law to 
take up the proposals as if they were his own. Long's 
memorandum of 27 June1 shows how wrong it is to regard 
him as an opponent of change or an enemy of far-reaching 
policies. Amongst other things he argued that official 
party policy should include extensive land reform, 
housing with state aid, Redistribution, and an amended 
Insurance Act to bring the Friendly Societies within 
the scheme. Significantly, there was no mention of 
tariff reform. This hardly squares with the view that 
'Walter Long represented the best tradition of what Lord 
Salisbury once described as "pure Squire conservatism". '2 
It is, on the contrary, evidence of the kind of vote- 
catching policies to w1ich Long would have committed 
the Unionist party had he been leader. 
But why did Long pail to take a firmer stand against 
Bonar Law during the winter of 1912-13 when the discontent 
over 'food taxes' could have bedn used to secure another 
change in the leadership as well as a change in policy? 
1Memorandum by Long to Bonar Law, 27 June 1913, B. L. P., 
29/5/57. Long's insistence that advocacy of social reform 
would win votes had already been vindicated by the favourable 
reaction which had greeted Unionist sponsorship of the 
Houses for the Working Classes Bill. Introduced and 
supported by the Conservatives, the measure had received a 
second reading without a division on 18 Apr. 1913. The 
Observer of 20 Apr. had commented warmly on the 'sincere 
social passion of the Unionist speakers' and on Long's 
'scathing exposure' of the inadequacies of Liberal housing 
policy. 
2 Blake, yIlkII4ýIl_PrL 
_M Ilýý#ýL p. 
73. 
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Long had, after all, withdrawn in November 1911 partly 
because he believed that Bonar Law would soon be forced 
out. Why, then, did he leave the running to his supporters 
and not assume the leadership of the rebellion himself? 
The answer is that his health was particularly bad - some 
sort of blood poisoning which kept him in bed for days 
at a time - precisely during the period when the discontent 
was at its height. And illness does not make a man 
especially pugnacious. He had been fighting against 
Chamberlain and the domination of tariff reform on and 
off for six years, and he was beginning to. tire of the 
party's internecine squabbles, so much so that it seems 
he even contemplated retiring from politics. In a fit 
of depression he told Lansdowne on 9 January 1913: 
I have had 33 years of the House, 27 of which have 
been spent on the Front Bench and I confess to being 
very tired, and I should be thankful to settle down 
quietly here and look on for the remainder of my time. 
... I am rather low 
'about myself, this vile poison 
has made what my Dr. calls "a malevolent reappearance", 
and between this and the microbe which is weakly 
t 
injected to fight it I feel rather a wreck. I get my 
bad nights, one of the usual symptoms I am told, but 
rather a wearisome one. 
l 
Another reason was Long's genuine concern for the 
welfare of the party, and once 'food taxes' had been 
ditched he was quick to offer Bonar Law assurances of 




1 By keeping one foot in each camp Long 
could jump either way in the event of a party split or 
another victory for the tariff reformers. His patience 
placed him in a very strong position, for if Bonar Law 
resigned he could emerge as his successor in a way that 
had not been possible the previous year. In order to 
make the most of this opportunity, should it arise, it 
was essential that he could not be charged with plotting 
against Bonar Law. It was for this reason that he 
studiously avoided the promptings of his supporters, 
preferring instead to keep a low profile whilst events 
developed. There was always the distinct possibility 
that Bonar Law would resign. If so, Chamberlain would 
hardly be in the running, because if the party would 
not have Law and 'food taxes' it would not have Chamberlain 
either. Carson or F. E. Smith would never command the 
loyalty of enough backbenchers, and that left just Long. 
And the fact that he had kept a foot in both camps could 
have helped to restore unity. He would certainly have 
been acceptable to the free-fooders, to advocates of a it 
'go-slow' policy on fiscal reform, and to the Irish 
Unionists; it was just possible that the tariff rerormers 
would accept him rather than break the party. Long was, 
after all, committed in pri, nciple to fiscal reform and 
imperial preference, even to 'food taxes'. He took care 
1Long to Bonar Law, 8 Jan. and 9 Jan. 1913, B. L. P., 
28/2/3l and 28/2/40 respectively. 
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to say so frequently. He was only insisting that the 
Conservatives must win an election first. Electoral 
victory was the pre-requisite of tariff reform, and not 
the other way round as Chamberlain liked to argue. But 
this was hardly the same as saying that tariff reform 
could never be party policy and that 'food taxes' should 
never be considered. The tariff reformers had waited 
since 1903. It was not, therefore, impossible that, 
having tried one leader and lost him in barely a year, 
they might be prepared to wait a bit longer. 
Long could not, of course, foresee that Carson would 
come up with a 'via media' or that Bonar Law would 
compromise. As it was, Law did not seek a compromise 
solution on his own initiative. Longs calculations 
were sound: it was reasonable to suppose that Bonar Law 
might resign and that he, Long, might emerge as leader, 
more by default and lack of any other candidate than by 
unanimous choice. If so, he was ready. He would not 
grasp at the leadership a second time, but if it was to 
fall to him he made sure that he had not taken action 
C 
which made its acceptance impossible. Waldorf Astor was 
by no means alone in January 191x3 in being firmly öf the 
opinion that Long would undoubtedly replace Bonar Law. 
1 
Long was quite happy to see Law abandon 'food taxes' and 
stay on as leader; he was also ready and waiting if Law 
had decided to resign. His letter to Lansdowne suggesting 
1Gollin, "Observer" and Garvin, p. 382. 
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that he might retire altogether from politics was written, 
it should be noticed, after Bonar Law had conceded and 
therefore after Long knew that there was absolutely no 
chance of his becoming leader. Whilst the fight over 
'food taxes' was on he gave no indication that he was 
fed up with politics, despite his illness. In a sense, 
Bonar Law outmanoeuvred Long in the leadership contest 
twice, once by persisting against all the odds in an 
unlikely candidature, and once by sticking to an intran- 
sigent line, then suddenly renouncing it at the last 
moment. For all his outspokenness, Long proved a good 
party man in the years between 1906 and 1914. He was 








THE UNION AND NOTHING BUT THE UNION, 1906-1914 
Of all leading politicians in the years before the 
outbreak of war in 1914, Walter Long enjoys a reputation 
as the most consistently hostile to any compromise over 
Irish home rule. He supported the most bellicose expressions 
of Irish Unionism; he channelled money to assist the arming 
of the Ulster Volunteers; he threatened to mount a party 
rebellion if Bonar Law agreed to a compromise solution 
with the Liberals; and, as a prominent member of His 
Majesty's opposition, he courted civil war and treason. 
Yet he did not believe that there would be civil war in 
Ireland. And he did not believe that Asquith could 
possibly succeed in passing a Home Rule Bill. 
His opposition was based throughout on the premise 
that the Liberals could. be turned out of office, that 
i 
home rule could be defeated in parliament, without recourse 
to the use of force in Ulster, and that the constitution 
t 
of Great Britain, as represented by the Union of 1800, 
could be upheld and maintained by a determined Conservative 
party. His intransigence was based simply on the premise 
that obduracy and steadfast, determination were, politically, 
the best tactics with which to defeat the Liberals. The 
threat of violence was a useful expression of this obduracy, 
nothing more. What mattered above all else was to keep the 
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Conservative party united around a policy of unyielding 
hostility to all forms of home rule, and to prevent 
Bonar Law wavering in response to Asquith's offers of 
compromise. 
Unionist defeat at the general election of January 
1906 put an end to Long's official connections with 
Ireland for more than a decade, but personal defeat at 
Bristol South helped to strengthen his ties with Irish 
Unionism, for it obliged him to accept the offer of 
Dublin County (South), one of only two constituencies 
in Ireland, outside Ulster, which Conservatives could 
hope to hold. 
1 When Edward Saunderson, the leader of 
the Irish Unionists, died in 1906 Long slipped easily 
into his place - as an Englishman sitting for an Irish 
constituency and as an px-Chief Secretary Long was 
perfectly fitted to maintain close contacts between 
Conservative interests in both countries. By assoc- 
2 
iating Irish Unionism with protection of the landed 
interest and defence of the Empire Long could count on 
a high level of support from the Conservative party at 
Westminster, especially asithe issue was simple, clear-cut 
1Long 
captured Dublin County (South) on 19 Jan. 1906 
from the Nationalists, defeating his opponent by well over 
1,000 votes in a straight fight. The Unionists would have 
won the seat in 1900 had it not been for the fact that their 
vote was split between two candidates, thus allowing the 
Nationalist, John Mooney, a victory. 
2Lyons, IrelaitdSince the Famine, p. 297. 
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and carried considerable emotional appeal - all qualities 
which the policy of tariff reform lacked. Long hoped 
that Irish Unionism might unite and strengthen the party 
where tariff reform divided and enervated it. 
Indeed, the Conservative party was peculiarly susceptible 
to Southern Unionist pressure, even more so than to the 
demands of the Ulstermen. To begin with, Irish Unionists 
were well represented amongst the group of thirty or so 
leaders who determined party policy. Lords Lansdowne, 
Londonderry, Devonshire, Midleton and Ashbourne, for 
example, were all large Irish landowners with an influential 
voice in Conservative counsels. There was a natural 
sympathy between landed British Conservatives and their 
Irish counterparts, a sympathy which is symbolised by 
Long's own unique position. Under Long's leadership 
Irish Unionism became for the Conservative party a defence 





Long had been greatly assisted in his work as Chief 
Secretary by his principal private secretary, J. J. Taylor, 
a staunch Unionist animated by intense dislike of Sir 
Anthony MacDonell and deep distrust of Liberal intentions 
towards Ireland. Knowing full well that Taylor would not 
willingly fall in with any Liberal schemes of devolution, 
Long tried to trick James Bryce, his successor at the 
-- ---- - -- - ---------- 
1The 
attraction of the Irish Unionist cause for the 
Conservative party has been more fully considered in the 
following, to which I am indebted: P. J. Buckland, 'The 
Southern Irish Unionists, the Irish Question, and British 
Politics, 1906-14', Irish Historical Studies 15 (1967). 
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Irish Office, 
1 into taking Taylor on as a private 
secretary. This would have given Long access to the 
very heart of Bryce's administration, for Taylor was 
quite ready to break confidence with his Liberal masters 
in pursuit of the Unionist cause. But Bryce was not to 
be duped, choosing instead an English civil servant who 
had had no previous dealings with Long. 
2 Nonetheless, 
Taylor remained at Dublin Castle and proved very useful 
in supplying Long with inside information, continuing to 
regard Long as his 'Chief' for many months to come. 
3 
Shortly before leaving office Long had been approached 
by members of the Dublin Stock Exchange who objected to 
the way in which investments under the 1903 Land Act were 
always made by Chancery brokers. Business was being lost 
and the Dublin stockbrokers hoped that Long would try to 
remedy their grievance. On 9 December 1905 Long had told 
the Dublin brokers that he had 'the fullest sympathy with 
... claims so ably and moderately placed 
before me. '4 But 
it was not until Taylor pressed the stockbrokers' case and 
told him that 'Mr. Bryce has written on the file . 
'.. that 
C 
he will do nothing's that Long decided to take up the 
1James Bryce was appointed Chief Secretary for Ireland 
on 14 Dec. 1905. 
2See Bryce to Long, 12 Dec., 23 Dec., and 24 Dec. 1905" 
L. P., Add. MS. 62409. 
3Taylor 
wrote to Sir William Bull on 13 Dec. 1905: 'No 
Chief Secy. has ever captured the affection of officials 
and people as he did during his brief reign. ' See Bu. P. ' 3/12. 
4Long to C. A. Pim, Honorary Secretary to the Dublin Stock 
Exchange, copy, 9 Dec. 1905, W. L. P., WRO 947/86. 
5Covering 
note from Taylor to G. A. Arbuthnot, Long 's 
private secretary, n. d., but written sometime early in 1906 
when Taylor forwarded the relevant documents to Long, ibid. 
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issue. With Taylor's assistance Long was able to 
associate himself publicly with the Dublin brokers and 
use the association to oppose the new Chief Secretary's 
policy. Long's case had objective merits which Bryce 
could not hope to counter, for a small number of govern- 
ment brokers had been given a virtual monopoly over the 
investment of very large sums. The issue also helped 
Long to secure his place as the rising star of Irish 
Unionism -a majority of the members of the Dublin Stock 
Exchange were of Unionist persuasion and many individual 
members were influential within Long's new constituency. 
In the first three months of 1906 alone Tailor provided 
Long with information concerning recruiting levels of the _ 
R. I. C., 
1 
government policy regarding a grant for Wicklow 
Harbour and line extensions to the Cavan and Leitrim 
Railway, 2 and proposed higher educational policy, 
3 
as 
well as forwarding a large quantity of Irish Office papers 
which he thought Long might find useful when preparing 
parliamentary questions. 
There was clearly no love lost between Taylor and James 
Bryce, a fact which may have had something to do with 
Taylor's relegation to the finance division of the'Irish 
government, a post where he had little opportunity to 
influence Liberal policy. By the middle of February 1906 
'See W. L. P., WRO 947/106. 
2See ibid., WRO 947/90. 
3See ibid., WRO 947/94. 
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he was complaining bitterly to his old Chief: 
I am attached to the Finance Division, but have 
absolutely nothing to do. I have not had 10 minutes 
work to do since I was sent there -a nice commentary 
on Anthony's 
[MacDonnellts] 
complaints ... last year 
that the Department was overworked and undermanned. 
' 
Probably, Taylor was deliberately given no work because 
Bryce and MacDonnell realised that he could not be 
trusted to keep sensitive information to himself. 
Even so, Taylor was able to provide Long with wide- 
ranging information concerning Bryce's policies and 
decisions. To take but one example, early in 1906 
Taylor told Long that the Treasury, on Bryce's recomm- 
endation, had refused to sanction salary increases for 
either the President of Queen's College, Belfast, or of 
Queen's College, Cork - increases which Long had himself 
put forward in 1905. In the normal course of events the 
decision would not be trade known until the estimates for 
1906-7 were published, but by giving him advance notice 
Taylor enabled Long to have an apposite and embarrassing 
question ready immediately the decision was announced. 
Although Taylor remained at DiIblin Castle until 1920 
his habit of confiding government business to Long seems 
to have petered out after 4 few months, and Bryce was 
the only Chief Secretary to suffer from Taylor's 
systematic and deliberate disclosures. Taylor certainly 
1Taylor to W. R. K. Mainwaring, Long's private secretary, 
14 Feb. 1906, ibid., WRO 947/89. 
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helped Long to establish his position as leader of the 
Irish Unionists, but, once secure, Long troubled the 
over-zealous official no more, although he never forgot 
Taylor's services and did his utmost to further the 
civil servant's career. 
' 
The autumn of 1906 was taken up with Long's ruthless 
campaign to expose the Irish policies of Wyndham and 
MacDonnell, a campaign which further enhanced his 
reputation as the champion of Irish Unionism and showed 
$alfour that Ireland could not be quietly pushed to 
one side. Long resented Chamberlain's claim that tariff 
reform was the major issue and believed that the arguments 
surrounding fiscal reform not only weakened the party's 
-------- ----- - ----------------- -- 
1Long kept in touch with Taylor for many years. When, 
in Sept. 1916, the post of Asst. Under-Secretary looked 
like becoming vacant, Taylor wrote confidentially to 
Long to ask for a recommendation (see Taylor to Long, 
6 Sept. 1916, W. L. P. WRO 947/394). Long duly wrote to 
the Lord Lieutenant recommending a promotion for the 'able, 
experienced, loyal and hard-working' Taylor (see Long to 
Lord Wimbourne, copy, 7; Sept. 1916, ibid. ). In the event, 
Taylor had to wait until 1918 fob the job. When in 1920 
it was decided to clear Dublin Castle of certain officials, 
so as to prepare for the smooth administration of-the 
Government of Irelan4 Bill, of which Long was then in 
charge, Taylor was designated for early retirement. Having 
served in the Castle since 1883 he felt hard done by, 
regarding Long's change of heart. over home rule as, a 
betrayal of his life's work. Although quite at odds with 
Long's sponsorship of the Government of Ireland Bill, 
Taylor appealed to his old 'Chief' for special treatment, 
hoping to get a compensation payment of £6,000. Long did 
everything in his power to 'get it for him, bombarding the 
Treasury with letters arguing Taylor's case. This led to 
a breach between Long and Sir Warren Fisher, the permanent 
head of the Treasury (for terse correspondence between the 
two men concerning Taylor's claims see W. L. P., WRO 947/369/1). 
In the end Long had to drop his demands and Taylor had to 
make do with the £3,000 originally offered. So ended the 
career of J. J. Taylor. 
139 
electoral appeal but also detracted from the much more 
important home rule question. He also resented the fact 
that Chamberlain possessed in the Tariff Reform League 
and Liberal Unionist organisation a semi-independent 
powerbase which sapped at Balfour's authority as leader. 
Long therefore decided to set up his own semi-independent 
organisation as a means to steal some of the limelight 
from the tariff reform campaign and to strengthen the 
position of Irish Unionists within the party. 
Long first began to sound out possible supporters late 
in 1906. He was received hesitantly at first, mainly 
on the grounds that he was arrogating to himself and t. o 
his own organisation a policy which was, after all, 
supposed to be the party's 'raison d'etre'. As the Duke of 
Devonshire pointed out on 9 November: 
The party which was in office till this year and is 
now in opposition calls itself the Unionist party and 
presumably exists fort the defence of the Union - It 
has funds and an organisation, and has been able with- 
out any special organisation to defeat two attacks by 
Mr. Gladstone on the Union - Why can it not be trusted 
to do so again? If as I fear is the case, the Unionist 
party is now weaker than it was on either of those 
i 
occasions, is there any use in proclaiming the fact ...? 
i 
Long wanted Devonshire to be the titular head of the new 
organisation, but Devonshire would have no truck with 
1Devonshire to Long, 9 Nov. 1906, L. P., Add. MS. 62410. 
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the scheme, writing bluntly that 'I do not care to be 
the figurehead of a political organisation in which I 
should take no active part. 'l 
The organisation, calling itself the Union Defence 
League (U. D. L. ), was eventually launched under Long's 
chairmanship in 1907 with the intention of inculcating 
electors at constituency level with the imminent threat 
to the Union posed by the Liberal government. Long was 
by now devoting a very considerable part of his time to 
Ireland: on 16 January Austen Chamberlain observed to 
Lord Ridley that 'Walter Long is ... more and more 
engrossed ... by the Irish question, which for him ... 
overshadows all others. '2 The League's first meetings 
were held in February and Long directed its earliest 
activities against the government's Irish Council Bill, 
speaking against the measure at meetings held throughout 
the early summer of 1907. The withdrawal of the bill by 
the government, however, owed much more to the hostility 
of the Irish Nationalists in parliament than to the 
opposition of the U. D. L. Indeed, the initial impact of 
the U. D. L. was slight and Long often found that his speakers 
were turned away by local party organisations on the ground 
that anti-home rule propaganda would not win by-elections. 
At one point he became so annoyed by this that he complained 
to Balfour in the hope that local parties might be pressed 
- ------ -- - ------------------ - 
1Devonshire to Long, 26 Nov. 1906, ibid. 
2Chamberlain to Ridley, 16 Jan. 1907, quoted Petrie, 
Austen Chamberlain, 1,204. 
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into giving the U. D. L. workers a hearing. 
1 
Throughout 1907 Long protested vociferously that 
Augustine Birrell, who succeeded James Bryce as Chief 
Secretary in January, presided over a flaccid and incom- 
petent Irish government. In the Commons he assumed the 
role of the Unionists' chief spokesman on all Irish 
matters. By the end of the year he was thoroughly 
disheartened, fearing that Birrell's placid urbanity 
and studied inactivity would invite a nationalist rising. 
To Lady Londonderry he wrote on 20 November: 
News from Ireland is deplorable.... The people, 
quick to see when the arm of Government is feeble, do 
as they like, cattle driving is becoming a new national 
sport. The police are helpless, they are not properly 
backed up by Government.... Magistrates and juries 
will not convict ... things will go from bad to worse 
and we shall have a rebellion in the country. 
2 
A fortnight later Long. reported to Bonar Law, still a 
relative newcomer to Tory politics: 
Ireland is gradually slipping into a state of anarchy 
and complete lawlessness, and people in this country 
are getting tired of the everlasting Irish question; 
and if we do not take care we shall have a semi-rebellion 
in Ireland, and the Union will be allowed to go through 
the boredom of our people. 
3 
Yet Long could do little to detract fron the tariff reform 
'See Long to Balfour, 17 July 1908, B. P., Add. MS. 49777. 
2Long to Lady Londonderry, 20 Nov. 1907, L. L. P., 
D/Lo/C 666(22). 
14 'Long to Bonar Law, copy, 5 Dec. 1907, L. P., Add. MS. 
62404. 
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struggle going on within the party, still less to force 
Birrell to take a firmer line. 
1 The U. D. L., justly 
described as a 'rather ineffectual symbol of Irish 
Unionist anxieties', 
2 
continued to campaign in the face 
of stubborn indifference amongst English voters, and 
Long's semi-independent powerbase never achieved the 
same strength or influence as the Chamberlain organisation 
centred on Birmingham. Only after the introduction of 
the third Home Rule Bill in 1912 did the U. D. L. come 
into its own as a centrepiece of Unionist opposition to 
the Liberals' Irish policy. Meanwhile, Long continued 
to raise subscriptions and kept the organisation in good 
working order, but it achieved nothing of significance. 
It has already been remarked that there was a good 
degree of political calculation in Long's repeated 
emphasis of his connections with Ireland. Nowhere can 
the shallowness of Long's claim to be an Irishman at 
heart be better demonstrated than in his attempts to 
return to an English constituency as soon as possible. 
Again and again in the years between 1906 and 1914 Long C 
identified himself in his speeches with the interests 
of Irish Unionists, particularly'those of the south, yet, 
privately, he detested his enforced sojourn as an Irish 
-------------- 
1Long 
was perhaps the most vociferous critic of Augustine 
Birrell on the Unionist side. Patricia Jalland, in 'A Liberal 
Chief Secretary and the Irish Question: Augustine Birrell, 
1907-1914', Historical Journal 19 (1976), has demonstrated 
that, contrary to his reputation for lackadaisical ineff- 
iency, Birrell's tenure of the Irish Office, at least up until 
1912, was notable for its successes rather than its failures. 
In 1908 Birrell settled the long-standing problem of the Irish 
universities and in 1909 he was responsible for further land 
reform. 
2Fanning, 'The Unionist party and Ireland', p. 151. 
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MP. He found repeated visits to Dublin an irritating 
interference with his parliamentary routine and his 
weekends at Rood Ashton, and he began looking for a safe 
English seat almost immediately, planning his move to the 
Strand from as early as 1907. There was certainly some 
truth in Lloyd George's jibe that Long was no more than 
'an amiable Wiltshire Orangeman'. 
1 By April 1908 Long 
had heard privately that he would be nominated for the 
Strand if he so wished; he promptly informed Acland-Hood 
that he was ready to give up the chairmanship of the 
Irish Unionists and intended to accept the invitation. 
2 
The party managers wanted Long to stay where he was, but 
he would not entertain the idea of relinquishing the 
opportunity of a safe London seat in order to continue 
as the Irish Unionist leader. The alacrity and determ- 
ination with which Long accepted the invitation shows 
that he had taken Dublin County (South) only because he 
had lost his Bristol constituency, not because of any 
desire to ally himself more closely with Irish Unionism. 
By June 1908 the matter was settled; Long was to move as 
3 
soon as a general election permitted. 
------------------------ 
1Report 
of a speech by Lloyd George at Wellington Hall, 
Belfast, 8 Feb. 1907, L. G. P., B/5/1/6. 
2Long to Acland Hood, copy, 10 Apr. 1908, L. P., Add. MS. 
62h13. 
3The 
move was, not surprisingly, engineered by Sir William 
Bull in London. Bull first tried to get Acland Hood's 
endorsement, but the chief whip was 'dead against it' and 
asserted that Long 'must stick to the Ulstermen' (Bull's 
diary, 6 Apr. 1908, Bu. P., 3/17). The move was deliberately 
intended to further Long's career -a safe London seat would 
protect him from electoral misfortune and strengthen his 
position within the party. As one of his private secretaries, 
Gerald Arbuthnot, put it, 'It would be the biggest service 
at this point in his career that anyone could render him. ' 
(Arbuthnot to Bull, 9 Apr. 1908, ibid. ). Bull's influence as 
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Long realised only too well that Ireland's fate hung 
upon the reform of the House of Lords. Until the 1909 
Budget and the Parliament Bill brought home rule out of 
the political closet once again he could do little save 
keep the U. D. L. in fighting order and reiterate at every 
opportunity his determination to maintain the Union at 
all costs. Consequently, the period between the burying 
of the dispute at the end of 1906 over Sir Anthony 
MacDonnellts appointment and the first election of 1910 
represents something of a lull before the storm. But once 
home rule was restored to the realm of practical politics 
Long took up the Unionist cause with a vengeance, and 
until the outbreak of war in August 1914 made even the 
Irish problem shrink to relative insignificance defeat of 
home rule became the single most important aim of his 
political life. 
The first election of 1910 enabled Long to move to the 
Strand, one of the safest Conservative constituencies in 
the country. The seat contained a high proportion of non- 
resident electors and so demanded the minimum of constit- 
uency work. It had been the property of the Smith family, 
W. H. Smith, founder of the firm of newsagents of the same 
name, holding it until his demise in 1891, when it had 
chairman of the London Unionist MPs was decisive, and Long 
was duly offered the seat. He intended that the London 
MPs should become a part of his powerbase within the party: 
'If the London MPs are properly organised and led they ought 
to be a real force in making this country's history' (Long 
to Bull, 10 Apr. 1908, ibid. ). As Bull confided to his 
diary, 'I have put Long in as the candidate for the Strand 
in spite of the opposition of the Whips - They do not guess 
how much I have had to do with it. ' (Bull's diary, 5 July 
1908, ibid. ). 
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passed to his son. 'No Liberal candidate ever secured 
as much as one third of the poll' in the quarter century 
before Long came to the constituency. In January 1910 
he received nearly seventy-five per cent of the votes 
cast, a proportion which was increased still further in 
the general election of December 1910.1 Here, at least, 
Long was on safe territory and able to devote much more 
of his time to fighting home rule in parliament. 
Although no longer an Irish Unionist MP Long continued 
for some months to lead the group in the Commons side by 
side with Sir Edward Carson. On 22 February he told the 
House: 
I believe ... the Government are 
trying to do two things 
which are inconsistent.... They are trying to work a 
revolution, and they are trying to play the part of 
constitutional ministers.... We ... stand for a definite 
principle. I may say ... that we are as resolutely deter- 
mined today as ever we were to resist by all means in our 
power any attempts to. grant ... Home Rule.... It must do 
immense mischief to Ireland, and it must do irremediable 
2 
mischief to the United Kingdom. 
t 
But agitation against home rule was still a low-key affair, 
for the Conservative party spentimost of 1910 sorting out 
its attitude to the Parliament Bill and wrangling over 
the place of tariff reform in its electoral platform. 
According to a memorandum by John Redmond, dated 23 June 
------- ---------------- 
I 
1Pelling, Social Geography, pp. 30,35-6. 
214 H. C. Deb. ser. 5 cols. 142-5. 
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1910, Long requested an informal meeting to discuss 'the 
possibility of settling a Home Rule scheme, to be adopted 
by consent. '1 As this is the only piece of evidence to 
suggest that Long ever considered accepting home rule 
as early as 1910 its accuracy must be called into question. 
Most probably, Redmond was either misinformed about, or 
misinterpreted, Long's intentions. Clearly, if such a 
meeting ever took place nothing came of it. 
In November Long formally vacated his position as 
chairman of the Irish Unionists2 in parliament and began 
to think about organising a long-term strategy against 
home rule, both in the Commons and in the English constit- 
uencies. He hoped that the Irish question would overshadow 
the tariff reform campaign, pushing Austen Chamberlain 
into the background and uniting the Conservative party 
around this one single issue. Long regarded Balfour's 
Albert Hall pledge of 29 November 1910 as a first step 
in the party's move away from fiscal reform as the domin- 
ating issue - it was for this reason that he was so annoyed 
by Balfour's refusal to uphold the pledge. As Long 
t 
confided to Professor A. V. Dicey, it would be a good thing 
to forget tariff reform altogethq"r, for 
... as we are confronted by these two great National 






1Quoted in Denis Gwynn, The-Lifeof John Redmond (London, 
1932). p. 182. --- 
2 Long's letter of resignation is dated 8 Nov. 1910 and 
can be found in L. P., Add. MS. 62415; although Long did not 
formally vacate his position as chairman of the Irish Unionists 
until November, Sir Edward Carson appears to have been offered 
and to have accepted the leadership of the group as early as 
February. See : Hyde, Carson, p. 258; A. T. Q. Stewart, Edward 
Carson (Dublin, =981), pp. 70-1. 
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and the passing of a Home Rule Bill - every politician 
ought to give prominence to these two questions, and 
make it perfectly clear that everything else for the 
present is in abeyance as compared with them. 
l 
From 1910 onwards Dicey and Long corresponded regularly 
on the subject of Irish home rule. Dicey, the Unionists' 
foremost authority on constitutional law, found in Long 
a practical spokesman for his own unbending views and 
in turn provided Long with intellectual analysis of 
the constitutional and legal niceties of the problem. 
2 
The acceptance by the Lords on 10 August 1911 of the 
Parliament Bill was the signal for an intensification of 
the U. D. L. 's campaign against home rule. Only the 
Lords' two year veto now stood between nationalist Ireland 
3 
and the achievement of home rule. In the meantime, Long 
1Long to Dicey, copy, 24 Nov. 1910, L. P., Add. MS. 62406. 
2For 
a consideration of Dicey's attitude to home rule see -- 
Hugh Tulloch, 'A. V. Dicey and the Irish Question, 1870-1922', 
The Irish Jurist 15 (1980). For Dicey's own closely argued 
objections to Irish autonomy see his Eng land's_Case_Against 
Home Rule (London, 1886). 
3Patricia Jalland, The Liberals and Ireland: The Ulster 
Question inBritish=Politics to 191 
_4 
(Brighton, 1980), 
pp. 27-8, has argued, on the basis of party strength in 
the House of Commons after the election of Dec. 1910, that 
the Liberals were not dependent., on Irish votes, a-myth 
which, she asserts, was largely created by Unionist prop- 
aganda. The strength of the parties was as follows: 272 
Liberals, 272 Conservatives, of which 17 were Irish Unionists, 
84 Irish Nationalists and 42 Labour. Dr Jalland suggests 
that if all Irish members are omitted from the calculation 
the Liberals had a majority of seventeen over the Unionists, 
a majority which could be topped up on occasion as a result 
of the Liberal alliance with Labour. It therefore follows, 
in Dr Jalland's view, that the Liberals could have governed 
without Irish Nationalist support. The trouble with this 
argument, however, is that it fails to take account of the 
fact that the Nationalists held a balance of power and were 
thus able to turn out a government of either party at their 
whim. Liberal dependence on Irish votes was the consequence 
of Redmond's unique power to destroy the government by voting 
against it - an unlikely contingency perhaps, but one which 
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determined to turn the Liberals out of office and to 
restore a strong Irish administration to Dublin Castle. 
On 6 April the U. D. L. had concluded an agreement at 
Londonderry House with the Irish Unionist MPs and the 
Unionists Associations of Ireland Joint Committee. Apart 
from placing up to eighty platform speakers at Long's 
disposal, this agreement gave the U. D. L. the sole right 
to campaign in England, Wales and Scotland, to act as a 
Bureau of Information for Conservative MPs, and to appeal 
for funds outside Ireland. 
' 
From the end of 1911 onwards, 
in accordance with the terms of the Londonderry House 
Agreement, the U. D. L. mounted a vigorous propaganda attack 
on the government, on home rule, and on the Irish 
Nationalists at Westminster. 
The campaign was conducted with considerable skill and 
innovation. There was a travelling exhibition of photo- 
graphs of outrages in Ireland, laying particular emphasis 
on arson, intimidation pd cattle-maiming, and there was 
a poster campaign in all the towns where Redmond spoke, 
usually drawing attention to his more truculent and 
ambiguous pronouncements. So-called 'representative 
----------------------- 
Asquith could ill afford to overlook. And by 1914, of 
course, the Unionists outnumbered the Liberals in the 
House. As Lord Balcarres noted on 24 Feb. 1910: 'The 
fact is that the little group of ten independent nationalists 
is able to sway the whole Redmondite faction, which in turn 
by combining with us can evict the government tomorrow. ' 
Balcarres's diary, The_Crawford Papers, p. 146. For a detailed 
discussion of the arrangements between the Liberals and the 
Irish Nationalists after the first election of 1910 see 
Ronan Fanning, 'The Irish Policy of Asquith's Government and 
the Cabinet Crisis of 1910' in Art Cosgrave and Donal 
McCartney, eds., Studies in Irish History (Dublin, 1979). 
1Memorandum 
of the Londonderry House Agreement, 6 Apr. 1911, 
Patrick Buckland, ed., Irish -, nionismL_188ý_1,225 (H. M. S. O. 






Irish farmers' were brought across to take the platform 
throughout England and to recount their experiences as 
the victims of boycott and nationalist intolerance. 
1 By 
1912 the U. D. L. had motor vans equipped with projectors 
to tour the countryside offering free slide shows of the 
case against home rule. 
2 These shows naturally attracted 
large crowds and even Asquith paid reluctant tribute to 
the U. D. L. campaign when he complained in the Commons 
that the home rule 'bogey' was 'placarded on almost every 
wall in every constituency. '3 Long never really under- 
stood that only in Ulster was there any inveterate feeling 
on which English politicians could rely, for he hoped 
that a campaign in the English constituencies could be 
used to turn public opinion against the Liberal government. 
In practice, the typical English voter viewed home rule 
with a marked degree of indifference. 
The government intended to introduce their Home Rule 
Bill before Easter 1912!. In the event, it was not brought 
in until after the recess, thus enabling the Conservatives 
to hold a massive devonstration at Belfast even before 
parliament had seen the measure. On aster Tuesday, 
9 April 1912, the Conservative phrty gave notice of its 
intention to play the orange card for all it was worth: at 




organisation seems to have been the first to use 
this adventurous form of propaganda. See Patrick Buckland, 
Irish Unionism: Two: Ulster Unionism and theOrigins_of 
Northern Ireland, 
_1886-1922 
(Dublin, 1973), p. 76. 
329 H. C. Deb. ser. 5 col. 815 (7 Aug. 1911). 
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took place a 'solemn occasion, no less than the wedding 
of Protestant Ulster with the Conservative and Unionist 
party, represented by Bonar Law and seventy English, 
Scottish and Welsh MPs. '1 Although not looking to the 
exclusion of Ulster as a possible solution, Long 
nonetheless recognised the value of Ulster's position 
in the attack on home rule and he associated himself 
closely with the Protestant cause. Consequently, he 
was one of the principal dignitaries at Balmoral where, 
together with Bonar Law, Edward Carson and Lord Londonderry, 
he took the salute from 100,000 Ulster Volunteers. 
2 Long 
made the somewhat provocative boast that if the government 
dared to 'put Lord Londonderry and Sir Edward Carson in 
the dock they will have to find one large enough to hold 
the whole Unionist party. '3 From April 1912 onwards the 
Conservative party was committed to defend Ulster come 
what may, a commitment which was reaffirmed in the summer 
at another great demonstration against home rule, this 
time at Blenheim Palace. It was at this second demon- 
stration that Bonar Law issued his famous challenge to 
the conventions of parliamentary democracy: 'I can 
imagine no length of resistance'to which Ulster can go 
in which I should not be prepared to support them ... '4 
By June the Bill had reaphed the committee stage. Long 
had spoken on the first and second readings, studiously 
-------- -------- 
1A. T. Q. Stewart, The UlsterCrisisi_Resistance to Home 
---------- Rule, 1912-1914 (London, 1967), p. 54. 
2 Hyde, Carson, p. 311. 
3George Dangerfield, The Strange DeathofLiberal England 
(London, 1935), p. 90. 
`Blake, Unknown Prime Minister, p. 129. 
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avoiding all explicit threats of violence in Ulster. On 
11 June Agar-Robartes, the Liberal Member for the 
St. Austell division of Cornwall, offered a first comp- 
romise by moving an amendment to exclude from the Bill 
the counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down and Londonderry. 
Many Conservatives were for acceptance, if only because 
not to accept appeared unreasonable, but Long could 
countenance no abandonment of Unionists in other parts 
of Ireland. By the time the party met at Londonderry 
House to consider its attitude to the amendment Long 
had already made his own position clear. On 4 June he 
told Bonar Law that 'as an Englishman I cannot assent to 
H. R. in any form ... 11 And three days later he had 
written: 'If we waver and try "clever" tactics we 
shall disgust our friends and seriously weaken our own 
position ... '2 Bonar Law thus knew that he risked 
alienating Long if the proffered compromise was accepted. 
As party leader he wasiagain and again to find his 
freedom to accept Ulster's exclusion as a compromise 
solution circumscribed by Long's defence of the loyalist 
population throughout Ireland, but as the amendment had 
little chance of succeeding, and to reject it outright 
might have given an appearance of dismissing a possible 
peaceful solution, the opposition leaders decided to 
accept Agar-Robartes's proposal. For the sake of unity, 
Long agreed to toe the party line, conceding that 
------- --- --------- ---------- ---- 
I 
1Long to Bonar Law, 4 June 1912, B. L. P., 26/4/7. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 7 June 1912, ibid., 26/4/12. 
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acceptance was good politics if nothing else. 
The defeat of the amendment, on 18 June, was entirely 
expected; it was also a victory for the view that the 
Southern Unionists must not be sacrificed. Opposition 
support for the Agar-Robartes amendment was not, as has 
recently been suggested, 'the point at which the British 
Unionists tacitly conceded the principle of Hone Rule, by 
concentrating on Ulster. 
" The Conservative party 
supported the amendment as a matter of tactics, knowing 
full well that it could not succeed. Unity of support 
for a compromise based on Ulster exclusion - and only a 
four county Ulster at that - was forthcoming only because 
the compromise could not possibly succeed. Tactically, 
the Unionists could use the amendment to drive a wedge 
between the more conciliatory Liberal MPs and their 
Nationalist allies; but to pass the Commons the amendment 
would have required a massive Liberal backbench revolt 
which was clearly not of the cards. With the defeat of 
the amendment a foregone conclusion, the Unionists had 
much to gain by supporting it, nothing to lose. They 
created the impression of, supporting a compromise with- 
out actually doing so, and they 'forced Asquith to make 
plain his government's hostility to any reasonable 
settlement for Ulster. Thq charge of foolhardy intran- 
sigence now rebounded against the government. Conservative 
endorsement of the Agar-Robartes amendment, then, was a 
1Jalland, The Liberals and Ireland, p. 9I. 
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purely tactical device, not a breach of faith with the 
Southern Unionists. 
Whilst the Ulster leaders spent the late summer laying 
plans for the binding oath of resistance to home rule 
which was to become known as the Ulster Covenant, Long 
decided to take the campaign to the Empire. Between 
8 August and 19 October 1912 he took the by now sophis- 
ticated and well-organised anti-home rule propaganda to 
Canada, accompanied by his wife and two friends, Sir 
George Armstrong and Major A. C. Morrison-Bell. It was 
Morrison-Bell, Conservative MP for Honiton, who organ- 
ised the trip and made all the arrangements for Long's 
speaking tour. He was a good choice, having spent six 
years in Canada, during which time he had travelled -- 
extensively and made coptacts. throughout the country. 
l 
Long's intention was to provoke disquiet over home 
rule amongst the governments and peoples of the Dominions. 
Shortly before he set sail at Liverpool on the "Adriatic", 
Long told the newspapers that he'saw himself as an* 
'Imperial Missionary', 2 and the tour was designed to 
discredit the Home Rule Bi], l by playing on the theme of 
'Draft 
of an unpublished autobiography by Sir A. C. 
Morrison-Bell, 'A Journey with Maps, A Back-Bencher's 
Story' (House of Lords Record Office, Hist. Coll. 193), 
Chap. 5, p. 1. 
2Daily Telegraph, 9 Aug. 1912. 
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imperial fragmentation. As The Times pointed out: 
It only needs a little more knowledge and consideration 
of the actual facts to make the Home Rule Bill even 
more discredited in Canada than even in England.... 
It is a difficult and delicate matter to carry what 
may appear to be only our domestic politics into the 
Dominions. 
1 
Long arrived in Winnipeg on 26 August and gave his first 
speech on Canadian soil the following day at the Manitoba 
Hall. Predictably enough, the speech centred on the 
argument that home rule would loosen the bonds of Empire 
and appealed to the 'Citizens of the Empire' to 'look 
forward with confidence and a willingness to share its 
burdens. '2 
The tour took Long from coast to coast, with speeches, 
all more or less the same in content and all on the same 
theme, in all the major cities, some to invited audiences, 
some to mass meetings. i 
In many places he was the guest 
r 
of the local Canada Club, giving his speeches at luncheon 
meetings held in his honour. This gave rise to some 
criticism, for it was an unwritten rule of the clubs that 
political questions would not bei discussed in a partisan 
spirit by guests. 
3 
The tour was carefully stage-managed 
------- - ------- - ----------- ------- 
1The Times, 12 Aug. 1912. 
2WinnipeeTelegram, 28 Aug. 1912. 
3The Victoria_Dai Times of 14 Sept. 1912, for example, 
accused Long of having 'flagrantly violated this tradition' 
during an address at the Canada Club of Vancouver on the 
previous day. Morrison-Bell evidently had reservations 
about the demagogic tone of many of Long's speeches, for 
he later wrote: 'One of the difficulties I had with Mr. Long 
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to culminate in two speeches delivered in Toronto on 
27 September, the day before the signing of the Ulster 
Covenant in Belfast. In this way, Long's speeches were 
guaranteed pride of place in the Canadian newspapers on 
the 28th and then the activities of the Ulstermen would 
take the headlines over the next few days. 
On the eve of 'Ulster Day' Long addressed two meetings 
in Toronto, one at the Massey Hall and one at the Victoria 
Hall; he received an ovation at both venues. The emotions 
of the crowd were deliberately whipped up to a frenzy for 
the benefit of the attending reporters. Thousands of 
Union Jacks had been distributed in advance amongst the 
audience, and a party of Orangemen demonstrated in Long's 
support outside both meetings, regaling the audience with 
a noisy rendition of "Protestant Boys" played by their 
fife and drum bands. As on other occasions, Long's 
speeches focused on the theme of Empire unity, and he 
came close to endorsing, the threatened use of force in 
Ireland: 
No man contemplate's the prospect of armed resistance 
with more regret than I should feel, but I am here to 
say I know what Ulster believe1 to be its duty, and 
for my part I think Ulster is right in its determination 
was to steer him off the political meetings he was being 
asked to address.... I knew ... that if a British Ex-Cabinet Minister began making political speeches it would cause an 
awful shindy in the Dominion.... Mr. Long was boiling to let 
fly, which is just what the Orangemen wanted.... What the 
authorities at Ottawa thought of it, I don't know. ' Morrison- 
Bell, 'A Back-Bencher's Story', Chap. 12, pp. 3-4. 
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never to sell its birthright. 
l 
A resolution condemning the Home Rule Bill was unanim- 
ously passed at the end of each meeting amidst much 
cheering and shouting. Long recorded in his diary that 
the occasion was 'one of the most-successful demonstrations 
... ever witnessed', 
2 
and he described the scene to Lady 
Londonderry as 'one never to be forgotten. The whole 
audience rose and cheered for a long time and everybody 
waved small Union jacks in the air, it was a most moving 
spectacle. '3 The event served as an imperial publicity 
stunt on Ulster's behalf, exploiting Dominion fears 
over dismemberment of the Empire. Interestingly, Long 
made no mention of the cause of the Southern Irish 
Unionists. 
And so, after several more meetings of the same kind, 
the tour ended, with Long returning on the "Celtic", 
amongst whose passengers, by a strange coincidence, was 
William Redmond. At just after eight o'clock on the 
evening of 19 October Long set foot once more in England, 
disembarking at Prince's landing stage, Liverpool, where 
he described his tour to waiting reporters as 'Splendid, 
the very best in the world, and I never felt fitter in 
my life. 14 Altogether, he had travelled nearly 14,000 
----------------- -------------------- 
1Toronto_Daily_News, 28 Sept. 1912. 
2Long's diary, 27 Sept. 1912, W. L. P., WRO 947/473. 
3Long to Lady Londonderry, 29 Sept. 1912, L. L. P., D/Lo/ 
C 666(216). 
4Morning_Post, 19 Oct. 1912. 
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miles; the 'Imperial Mission' had been a marked success. 
Long returned to a House of Commons where tempers were 
already running high. On 13 November Sir William Bull 
called Asquith a 'traitor', refused to withdraw the 
expression, and stalked out of the chamber to cries 
of 'Civil war, Civil war'. 
1 
When the House reassembled 
an hour later Ronald McNeill, an intemperate Ulster 
Unionist, added to the breakdown in legislative discip- 
line by hurling a copy of the orders at Winston Churchill. 
Things quietened down over the Christmas recess and early 
in the new year the Bill went to the Lords. As expected, 
the Lords threw it out by an overwhelming majority at the 
end of January, and for a while the initiative passed 
from parliament to the Ulstermen, who laid careful plans 
for the setting up of at provisional government and 
organised military resistance. In Britain the U. D. L. 
campaign ground inexorably on. 
Long's hopes lay still in a general election. On 
12 March 1913 he made a blisterifig attack on the gövern- 
went in the Commons: 
You know as well as we that you dare not risk submitting 
your Bill to the country, because you know that the sane 
fate would overtake it that overtook both its predecessors. 
'Bull 
was feted as a hero for his parliamentary asperity 
when, that evening, he attended a Unionist reception given 
by Lord and Lady Farquhar at the Royal Opera House. The 
reception marked the beginning of the Conservative party's 
annual conference. 
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... the Home 
Rule Bill ... gravely imperils the Union 
... and yet you 
decline to let ... the people ... 
approve or disapprove of your action. You deny to 
our people the most elementary rights of citizenship, 
and ... you have 
done nothing to heal sores or to 
bring together combatants. You have done all in your 
power to add to bitterness and ... you have brought 
nothing but opposition and enmity.... I believe, as 
firmly as I have ever believed anything in my life, 
that if the Government, blind to facts and deaf to 
arguments, persist in their mistaken course, the result 
will be disastrous to the country, and shame ... and 
humiliation for themselves. 
' 
By the early summer the Ulster Volunteer Force had been 
drilled and Lord Willoughby de Broke had set up a 
'British League for the Support of Ulster and the Union' 
to rival Long's own U. D. L. Long kept his own organisation 
separate and continued to lay emphasis on defence of the 
Union rather than special treatment for Ulster. He was 
convinced by what had happened to both of Gladstone's 
Home Rule Bills that th`e Union could be preserved if 
Asquith could only be forced to a dissolution. 
But the King, understandably worried at the prospect 
of civil war, now took a hand, and Asquith found himself 
"r ' 
obliged to sound out the opposition as to the lines of 
possible compromise. During the autumn tentative 
discussions between the parties took place, and it soon 
emerged that Bonar Law and Carson were quite ready to play 
off exclusion of Ulster against home rule for the rest of 
----------------------- 
150 H. C. Deb. ser. 5 cols. 255-66. 
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Ireland. But Long would have none of this. On 3 October 
Lord Lansdowne expressed fears that the Conservative 
party was beginning to appear intolerant and unreasonable 
over home rule. He thought that if the government 
offered the exclusion of Ulster, continued opposition 
would seem obstructive and lose any support in the 
country which the U. D. L. campaign might have won. 
l 
This possibility did not worry Long. He believed that 
the party's best course was simple. It was safe to bet 
that Asquith would not concede exclusion for Ulster with 
no time limit and no other qualfications; it was also 
safe to bet that Ulster would not, without coercion, 
accept less. The party, therefore, merely had to state 
these as its minimum terms, thus bringing all conver- 
sations with the government to an end and ensuring that, 
if a general election followed, there could be no accus- 
ations of obstruction. Long believed that Bonar Law 
should explicitly stater the minimum terms he would 
accept, making sure that they would be unacceptable to 
the government, and ptick to them. The party could not 
then be represented as unreasonable - its terms would be 
public knowledge. Nor would its chances of electoral 
victory be jeopardised. Asquith would be faced with two 
stark alternatives: eithez to concede a dissolution or 
to use the Army to force home rule on a recalcitrant 
Ulster. Long believed that the prime minister's nerve 
1See Lansdowne to Long, 3 Oct. 1913, L. P., Add. MS. 
62403. 
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would break, that he would choose an election before 
ordering the Army into Ulster, and that the Conservatives 
would return to power on a wave of anti-home rule hysteria. 
It is this line of thinking which explains Long's 
intransigence throughout the crisis, 
' 
and to prevent 
Bonar Law from acquiescing in Liberal overtures he was 
quite prepared to threaten the unity of the party. On 
5 October Long told Bonar Law bluntly: 'Personally I do 
not believe in a Conference, except after an Election, or 
on condition that Bill is withdrawn. '2 When Bonar Law 
met Asquith on 14 October at Sir Max Aitken's country 
house at Cherkley, near Leatherhead, he knew that he 
could accept no compromise without taking on the form- 
idable section of the party on whose support Long could 
rely. Just as Liberal dependence on Redmond's votes in 
parliament made it impossible for Asquith to offer 
permanent exclusion of a nine, or even a six, county 
Ulster, so Bonar Law coild offer 
i 
no more than his party 
would accept. Long also made the point that even if a 
satisfactory conpromj-se involving Ulster exclusion could 
be reached between. the two main parties, Redmond would 
promptly turn the government out'of office, leaving the 
home rule problem no nearer solution. By talking to the 
Liberals Bonar Law ran the, risk of splitting his own party 
when there was not even the remotest possibility that the 
-------- ------------ 
1A 
clear exposition of this line of thought can be found 
in a letter which Long wrote to Lord Lansdowne on 29 May 
1914, a copy of which can be found in L. P., Add. MS. 62403. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 5 Oct. 1913, B. L. P., 30/3/7. 
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crisis could be resolved. 
The two party leaders met again on 6 November, but the 
discussions made no headway. On the following day Long 
hinted at the possibility of trouble on the backbenches 
by saying that the result of any compromise 'would be 
absolutely fatal to our Party'. 
l Although making the 
usual protestations of loyalty, Long bombarded Bonar Law 
with strong letters deprecating any suggestion of retreat. 
By 9 November the threat to party unity was unequivocal: 
I can't hide from myself the fact that if we come to 
any arrangement with the Gov. we shall run grave risks 
of splitting, even of smashing our Party.... The 
general view seems to be "Give no quarter and drive 
them out".... I feel myself that ... if this Gov. try 
to go on we ought to make business in the House 
impossible and so drive them to the country. 
2 
Long's greatest worry was that Bonar Law would be brow- 
beaten by the Governmept into accepting a compromise 
which was not in the pakty's best interests. This worry 
was naturally exaggerated by the fact that he was not 
involved personally in the discussions. As Lord Crawford, 
who had resigned as Unionist chief whip and succeeded to 
the Lords on the death of his father earlier in the year, 
explained to Lady Wantage: 
0 
Our party is distrustful of the negotiating capacity 
of our leaders - that is really the basis of our 
nervousness - and I am not surprised.... Our mandarins 
1Long to Bonar Law, 7 Nov. 1913, B. L. P., 30/4/11 (Long 's 
underlining). 
2Long to Bonar Law, 9 Nov. 1913, ibid., 30/4/18. 
I 
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from one cause or another do not appreciate the immense 
value of the perspective obtained by an informed and 
unfettered conference of allies ... 
1 
To what extent was Bonar Law's response determined by 
anxiety over Long's potential opposition? There can be 
no doubt that the Conservative leader was worried by the 
prospect of backbench discontent, possibly led by Long. 
1886 was a date no party leader could forget. Already, 
on 7 November Bonar Law had felt obliged to tell Long 
that he hoped personally that 'the Nationalists will 
not agree'' to the exclusion of a six county Ulster, and 
2 
on the 8th he reassured Long that 'so far we are committed 
to nothing, and every step must be taken with the utmost 
caution. '3 Long would be satisfied with nothing less 
than a refusal by Bonar Law and Lansdowne to talk to the 
Liberal leaders at all. He realised only too well that 
his strongest card in swaying the two Conservative leaders 
from readiness to negotiate was the implicit threat of 
i 
i 
leading a revolt along the lines of Joseph Chamberlain's 
revolt against Gladstone on the occasion of the first 
Home Rule Bill. His letters could leave Bonar Law in no 
doubt that he was at least contegplating rebellion. A 
memorandum of 20 November 1913 is typical: any compromise, 
Long promised, would be 
followed by a schism, even greater and more deep-seated 
- ---------- -- ----------- 
1Crawford to Lady Wantage, 12 Dec. 1913, The Crawford 
Papers, p. 320.2Bonar 
Law to Long, copy, 7 Nov. 1913, B. L. P., 33/6/94. 
3Bonar Law to Long, copy, 8 Nov. 1913, ibid., 33/6/96. 
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than that which occurred at the time of the passing 
of the Parliament Act... I think the facts - and I 
believe them to be facts - ought to be in our minds 
before any decision is arrived at.... I believe ... 
the Government and the Nationalists have flouted and 
insulted Ulster .... the only thing to do is to 
fight them in parliament and out, to make their 
government of the country an impossibility, and to 
compel them to face the electors ... 
1 
This memorandum brought a swift reaction, for on the 
next day Bonar Law wrote to reassure Long that there 
would be full consultation before any decision and that 
he entirely concurred in the views expressed. 
2 
By meeting Asquith for the last time on 10 December 
Bonar Law was simply going through the motions. The 
victim of his own weak-leadership and Long's powerbase 
within the party, Bonar Law was in no position to accept 
any compromise, even if Asquith had been able to offer 
one. Severely hampered in his freedom of manoeuvre, 
Z 
Bonar Law could neither offer no'r accept concession. He 
ran the risk of civil war in Ireland not because he wanted 
to for the sake of Ulster, but because he had to for the 
sake of party unity. 
It was still not impossible that Long might take the 
party leadership for himself; his support amongst the 
party rank and file remained intact, and steadfast 
opposition to home rule was guaranteed the support of a 
large group of Tory MPs. As well as risking party unity 
1Memorandum by Long, 20 Nov. 1913, B. L. P., 30/4/46; L. P., 
Add. MS. 62416. 
2See Bonar Law to Long, copy, 21 Nov. 1913, B. L. P., 
33/6/99. 
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by talking to the government, Bonar Law also risked his 
own precarious position. Long would only very reluctantly 
have accepted permanent exclusion of Ulster as the answer. 
This was for him a 'clumsy expedient at the best', for he 
had no desire at this stage to abandon the Loyalists in 
the south in the interests of an overall settlement. 
' 
By the end of the year Long was trying to push Bonar 
Law into making a final break with the idea of compromise. 
Instead, he proposed that Bonar Law should issue a clear 
ultimatum to the government that negotiations could only 
proceed if Asquith abnegated all intention of forcing 
the Home Rule Bill through parliament at the end of the 
Lords' two year delaying period. Unless Law could secure 
such an undertaking, Long argued, the party should 
entertain no further thoughts of compromise. 
2 Needless 
to say, Long proposed that an ultimatum be issued knowing 
full well that it had not the slightest chance of being 
accepted by the Liberals. Rather, it would put an end 
once and for all to the talk of a negotiated settlement 
involving both partiies. Clearly, the negotiations could 
get nowhere: Asquith was held in check by his pledges 
to Redmond, Bonar Law by his own' followers, and the talks 
petered out early in January 1914. With undisguised 
pleasure, Long told his leader on 13 January: 'I heard 
today indirectly that you are to announce on the 15th the 
- ------------- 
1Memorandum by Long, 20 Nov. 1913, B. L. P., 30/4/46; L. P., 
Add. MS. 62416. 
2Memorandum by Long, 31 Dec. 1913, B. L. P., 31/1/68. 
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breakdown of the negotiations. I confess I am very 
glad. '1 And so, at Bristol, on 15 January, Bonar Law 
announced that the negotiations had collapsed. 
The home rule crisis now looked set to erupt in 
violence. Not without reason had Lord Lansdowne greeted 
the new year with the remark, 'I don't like the looks of 
1914 a bit! '2 Many Unionists, encouraged by Bonar Law's 
reiterated pledges to support Ulster, began to talk of 
using armed force to defeat the Bill. Already, the 
'British League for the Support of Ulster and the Union' 
had enrolled 10,000 =embers 'mostly for the purpose of 
going over to Ulster to join the volunteers if it came 
to actual fighting', 
3 
and Lord Milner was expressing an 
interest in doing something more at home. On 6 January 
Lord Willoughby de Broke, always a passionate enthusiast 
for the extreme course in any political question, wrote 
to Milner to ask for his support. The letter makes the 
League's position quite clear: 4The object of this 
League is to ... arm all Unionists on this side of the 
water who wish to fight with the-Ulstermen 00014 In 
----------------------- - 
1Long to Bonar Law, 13 Jan. 1914. B. L. P., 31/2/37. 
2Lansdowne to Long, 30 Dec. 1913, W. L. P., WRO 947/441. 
3Stewart, The Ulster Crisis, p. 132. 
4Willoughby de Broke to Milner, 6 Jan. 1914, M. P., MS. 
Eng. Hist. c. 689, fos. 2-4. 
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response to a letter from Leo Amery on 10 January Milner 
had taken up the idea of adapting the Ulster Covenant 
to British circumstances by persuading leading men to 
sign a pledge of loyalty to the Union, a pledge which 
soon became known as the British Covenant. 
Meanwhile, the Conservative party was considering the 
possibility of amending the annual Army Act so as to 
prevent British forces being used to implement home rule 
in Ulster, an extreme course which, Long and his supporters 
argued, was fully justified by the Liberals' repeated 
abuse of the constitution. 
1 After much heated debate the 
party decided to drop this line of attack as it could 
not in itself solve the crisis and was at best a delaying 
tactic. 
By February Milner's plans for a British Covenant were 
well advanced, but he lacked an organisation capable of 
appealing to British public opinion. The 'British League -- 
for the Support of Ulster and the Union', with offices 
' 
at 25 Ryder Street, St. James's, could provide such an 
organisation and Milner's original plan was to subvert 
Willoughby de Broke's League for his own purposes. Leo 
Amery had adumbrated the plan to'Lord Robert Cecil on 
16 January: 
The general scheme is that Willoughby de Broke's 
committee should be strengthened and transformed by 
the accession of a number of influential people and 
proceed to devote itself to the organisation of this 
1See Long to Bonar Law, 6 Feb. 1914, B. L. P., 31/3/17. 
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matter, using its 450 agents for that purpose and for 
the time being relegating its more martial aspect to 
the background. 
1 
The original intention was to launch the Covenant at the 
Albert Hall at the beginning of February and to have the 
collection of signatures completed by the beginning of 
April at the latest, thus presenting Asquith with a huge 
protest before the Home Rule Bill could be passed. 
But Lord Willoughby de Broke was a dangerous political 
ally, lacking credibility in the higher echelons of the 
Conservative party and burdened by a reputation for poor 
judgement and fatuous pronouncements. The U. D. L., on the 
other hand, was ideal for Milnerts purpose: it had 
several years campaigning experience in the English 
constituencies, it had offices in central London and 
generous funds, and through Long it had access to the 
very heart of Westminster politics. The decision to use 
Long's organisation rather than Willoughby de Broke's 
forced Milner to set his timetable back by a month or 
I 
more. 
The idea of a British Covenant was mooted to the U. D. L. 
on 19 February, with the result that a sub-committee, 
under Long's chairmanship, was appointed to initiate the 
movement. 
2 To sign the pledge meant a personal commit- 
went to participate in actual fighting against the armed 
- ------ - ------ 
1Amery to Lord Robert Cecil, 16 Jan. 1914, Cecil of 
Cheiwood papers, Add. MS. 51072; see also The Leo Amery 
Diaries: Volume One: 1896-1929 (London, 1980), entries for 
12 and 13 Jan. 1914 in which Amery gives details of early 
approaches to Willoughby de Broke's League. 
2See Memories, pp. 201-6, for Long's own account of his 
involvement with the British Covenant. 
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forces of the Crown should the Home Rule Bill be imposed 
on Ulster. Each signatory was required solemnly to 
declare that he would take any step 'to prevent the armed 
forces ... being used to deprive the people of Ulster of 
their rights as citizens of the United Kingdom. 
" Many 
sympathisers disliked this unequivocal commitment to 
armed force, and Milner received countless refusals. 
2 
Amongst those who did sign many expressed misgivings 
as to the wisdom of including such a commitment in the 
oath. Even as staunch a Unionist as A. V. Dicey told 
Milner of 'the difficulty ... wh. I should personally 
feel as to subscribing towards resistance by arms' and 
urged that the wording be changed so as to avoid any 
declaration which was 'equivalent to rebellion. '3 
There were, however, plenty of eminent men who had no 
such qualms about signing a declaration of intended 
rebellion: Henry Wace, the Dean of Canterbury, subscribed 
readily enough, 
4 
as did; the Archdeacon of Ely, William 
Cunningham, a right-wing intellectual of some stature 
------ - ------------------------- I. 
1Copies 
of the British Covenant, many duly signed, can 
be found in M. P., MS. Eng. Hist. c. 689. 
2Many 
of Milner's closest supporters pointed out the 
folly of alienating leading men who, though sympathetic 
to the cause, could countenance no commitment to armed 
force. When Lord Robert Cecil refused to sign unless the 
wording was changed Leo Amery suggested abandoning the 
contentious final paragraph in favour of: '... if the 
Bill is forced through Parliament without the assent of 
the people I shall hold myself free to take (or justified 
in taking) any action which may be effective to prevent 
the coercion of Ulster. ' (See Anery to Cecil, 23 Jan. 1914, 
Cecil of Chelwood papers, Add. MS. 51072. ) Rather than 
water down the Covenant, Milner preferred to accept the 
refusals. 
3Dicey to Milner, 1 Mar. 1914, M. P., MS. Eng. Hist. c. 689, 
fos. 103-4 
4Ibid., fos. 119-21. 
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whose studies of economics and politics turned on the 
weighty objective of strengthening and preserving the 
nation-state as the loftiest expression of historical 
evolution. 
' 
Long's attitude to the British Covenant was cautious: 
he was pleased to allow Milner to use the offices of the 
U. D. L. at 25 Victoria Street, Westminster, and he took an 
active part in soliciting support, but he did not sign 
the pledge himself. Harold Cox, the editor of the 
Edinburgh Review, was approached by Long but refused to 
sign because of the controversial final paragraph threat- 
ening direct action against the Army. 
2 
And Archibald 
Salvidge of Liverpool, whose name appeared in the press 
amongst the original signatories, only signed in response 
to a request by Long. 
3 The incipient League of British 
Covenanters even received a donation of £1,000 fron Long 
on 24 February. 
4 Yet Long did not lend his name to a 
declaration which appeared in the Morning Post on 27 
February pledging the new League to fight side by side 
with the Ulstermen. cNor 
did he let his name appear amongst 
the signatories to the Covenant. He still did not believe 
that there would be any fighting'in Ulster and he still 
hoped to force the government to the polls. Anxious not 
1Bernard Semmel, Imperialism andSocial Reform (London, 
1960), p. 188. --- 
2 See Cox to Long, 21 Feb. 1914, M. P., MS. Milner dep. 
41, fos. 12-3. 
3See Long to Milner, 24 Feb. 1914, ibid., MS. Eng. Hist. 




to turn his back on a parliamentary solution, Long 
would not lend his name publicly to a declaration of 
intended force, but he would assist, even encourage, 
others to do so. 
The British Covenant appeared in the newspapers on 
3 March. Not one of the appended signatures belonged 
to a member of the House of Commons. Even Leo Amery, 
Conservative MP for South Birmingham and Milner's chief 
lieutenant, kept his name out of the headlines. Professor 
Dicey, regretting the good sense of Conservative MPs, 
greeted publication in characteristically dramatic style: 
'Every Unionist', Dicey told Milner, 
ought ... whether 
in Parliament or out of Parliament, 
to sign, and to sign quickly. The absence of any name 
will assuredly be noted. The Unionists who do not sign 
will be counted and treated as dissenting.... Each and 
all and every man should be induced to rally round this 
appeal.... I am sure it is now or never for the Union. 
l 
But Milner's insistence on including in the pledge a 
threat to challenge the British Army by force made it 
C 
impossible for Unionist politicians to sign. An unnecessary 
trenchancy in the choice of phrasing thus ensured that the 
British Covenant was denied the overt public support of 
its most influential sympathisers, the Conservative front 
bench. 
The initial response was promising and on 6 March Long 
1Dicey to Milner, 3 Mar. 1914, ibid., MS. Milner dep. 
41, fo. 31. 
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reported to Sir Edward Carson that 
... public opinion is now really aroused in the country. 
There is evidence of this in the rush to sign the 
Covenant - we are really almost overpowered. I believe 
people realise now, as they have never done before, the 
gross injustice to the Unionists of Ireland, are indig- 
nant at the proposed betrayal, and will support us in 
our action. 
1 
Yet the extent to which Long still expected a political 
solution is evident from his concluding remark: 'My own 
conviction is that if no arrangement is arrived at, the 
Government will try to force their Bill through, and they 
will find their position in the House of Commons impossible. '2 
Towards the end of the month he took a hand in soliciting 
press support for the Ulstermen's cause. At a luncheon 
given by George Gibbs, Conservative MP for Bristol West, 
Long and Milner met the editors of all the leading London Tory 
papers, except The Times, and managed to get a unanimous 
i 
pledge of support for any action' which Carson might feel 
obliged to take. On 25 March the same unanimity was 
expressed at another luncheon given by Gibbs to the lobby 
correspondent S. 
3 
Encouraged by the initial success of the Covenant, Milner 
----------------------------- 
'Long to Carson, 6 Mar. 1914, quoted in Ian Colvin, 
The Life of Lord_Carson, 3 Vols. (London, 1932-36), 2,290-1. 
2Ibid. 
3See Long to Carson, 26 Mar. 1914, quoted ibid., pp. 
352-3. George Gibbs was prominent amongst Long's backbench 
supporters. He was married to Long's eldest daughter, 
Victoria, and sat for Bristol West from 1906 to 1928. He 
later became a Conservative chief whip in the Commons and 
had a brief spell in 1917 as Long's P. P. S. at the Colonial 
Office. In 1928 he was created Baron Wraxall. 
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and Long decided to put the League of British Covenanters 
on a more permanent footing, and at a meeting held on 7 
April at Caxton Hall, Westminster, Long was elected 
chairman, Milner vice-chairman. Although the U. D. L. 
became increasingly involved in the League's affairs, 
Long kept it running as a separate and distinct organ- 
isation. Because of his position as chairman of both 
organisations and because of Milner's dependence on U. D. L. 
goodwill, Long enjoyed general control over the admin- 
istration of the Covenant. Philip Cambray, the U. D. L. 's 
energetic secretary, was also placed in charge of the 
League's business, thus cementing Long's control. 
It fell to the U. D. L. to collect signatures, sending 
out certificates and keeping a record of all the names 
and addresses, and local committees of Covenanters were 
set up wherever there was enough support. Long hoped to 
get at least one person to act as a representative in 
each locality. These representatives were known as 
'correspondents' - their function being to correspond with 
Long in London on all matters relating to the Covenant in 
C 
their particular area and to obtain further signatures. 
From May onwards the League produced a monthly journal. 
Written in popular style and known as The Covenanter, it 
contained contributions from Rudyard Kipling and Leo 
Amery, as well as more pedestrian pieces from Milner, 
Carson and Long. Local 'correspondents' were responsible 
for distribution and for increasing circulation; they were 
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also expected to organise local appeals to assist the 
funding of the Ulster Volunteers. 
1 
By the end of July, 
when the campaign was closed down, U. D. L. headquarters 
had received the signatures of some 831,000 men and 
well over 500,000 women. 
2 
Thus, the U. D. L. moved in 1914 much closer than ever 
before towards support of Ulster Unionism as something 
quite separate from Irish Unionism. Its propaganda 
campaign had previously been directed against any form 
of home rule. Now it tapped the strength of Carson's 
crusade to attack the Liberals where they were weakest. 
But Long was still sensitive to the predicament of the 
Southern loyalists. In the councils of the Conservative 
party he still insisted on 'no compromise', even if 
Ulster could be safeguarded. Long's sympathy with Ulster's 
cause was, in any case, genuine; but satisfactory exclusion 
of Ulster was not his main objective. Bonar Law and 
Carson gradually moved traditional Unionism away from the 
defence of all Ireland towards the defence of just Ulster. 
Long did not agree with this policy. Instead, he'seized 
C 
upon the Ulster campaign as the best weapon which could 
be trained at home rule for any part of Ireland. 
There is nothing to suggest that the British Covenant 
altered Asquith's course in, the slightest - the Curragh 
-------- --------------- ----------- 
1A 
copy of the League's circular letter explaining its 
organisational structure to prospective 'correspondents' 
can be found in M. P., MS. Milner dep. 41, fos. 268-9. It 
is undated and is signed by both Long and Milner. 
2Memories, 
p. 203; Stewart, The UlsterCrisis, p. 135, 
gives the total figure as 'nearly two million'. 
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'mutiny' and the Larne gun-running had a much greater 
influence on the government - and despite the fierceness 
of their tone it is difficult to take the Covenanters at 
their word. The picture of Professor Dicey and like- 
minded dons, together with Rudyard Kipling and Sir Edward 
Elgar, taking themselves across to Ulster to assist in 
the shooting down of British soldiers acting on the 
instructions of the lawfully elected government is a 
fanciful one indeed. As an expression of the intensity 
of feeling which the home rule controversy aroused the 
British Covenant is significant. But as a practical step 
to defeat the Bill it was irrelevant. 
In a sense there was something very conventional about 
the British Covenant. It was Willoughby de Broke and his 
followers who were the real extremists over the question 
of resistance to home rule. They, after all, were 
engaged in the recruitment, training and arming of men 
for the express purpose; of challenging the Army in Ulster. 
The Covenant, by comparison, was merely a rhetorical 
declaration, a petition of protest rather than a plan of 
action. By first of all subverting Willoughby de Broke's 
League, then deserting it and stYealing the limelight 
from its more martial aspect, the Covenanters brought 
opposition to home rule back within the accepted traditions 
of organised protest. A gesture of defiance, however 
strongly worded, might be tolerated; the mustering of a 
private army by a highly volatile fanatic went beyond the 
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accepted confines of political conduct. Whilst Willoughby 
de Broke took deliberate steps to make the use of force 
in Ulster a real possibility, Milner and Long used the 
Covenant as a prop with which to sustain the political 
pressure which the Conservative party was exerting on 
the government. 
' 
The real struggle was fought out not in the Ulster 
crusade of Sir Edward Carson, nor in the rhetoric of the 
various anti-home rule campaigns in which Long played 
such an important part, but amongst the politicians at 
Westminster. The British Covenant, U. D. L. propaganda, 
Carson's exhibitions of mass hysteria in Ulster, the 
pretend soldiering of the Ulster Volunteers, the adventures 
of the gun-runners - all provide no more than a colourful 
and melodramatic backcloth to the manoeuvres of Britain's 
leading politicians. 
On 9 March Asquith announced his 'final' concession: _ 
the Protestant counties of Ulster would be allowed to 
decide by plebiscite to exclude themselves from the Act's 
jurisdiction, but only for six years. Bonar Law dismissed 
C 
the offer out of hand. Five days later Winston Churchill 
'In fact, even the idea of a British Covenant was decid- 
edly unoriginal. Not only did it draw on the Ulster 
Covenant, but Willoughby de Broke's 'League for the Support 
of Ulster and the Union' had already initiated its own 
'Call for Service' a full six weeks before Milner began to 
take an interest. The government, it had asserted, 'have it 
in their power to save our King and Country from this 
supreme calamity by advising His Majesty to dissolve 
Parliament.... But if they do proceed ... then we call on 
all our able-bodied fellow-countrymen ... to enrol themselves 
and prepare to reinforce the ranks of the men who are going 
to risk their lives for the integrity of the Empire.... ' 
MorninrPost, 18 Nov. 1913. 
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made his deliberately provocative speech at Bradford 
about 'worse things than bloodshed even on an extended 
scale'. Then, on 18 March 1914, the cabinet made its 
biggest mistake so far: it ordered troops to move to 
reinforce arms depots in Ulster, so precipitating what 
has come to be known as the Curragh 'mutiny'. By the 
morning of the 21st the newspapers were full of the 
story, and on the next day Asquith confided to Venetia 
Stanley that any order to march would result in a strike 
by 'about half the officers in the Army - the Navy is 
more uncertain. '1 Long believed that establishing the 
existence of a government plot to coerce Ulster 
mattered little. What really mattered was for the 
Conservative party to use the episode to embarrass the 
government, portray Asquith as devious and deceitful, 
and frighten the electors. He egged Bonar Law on to 
take the strongest line and make the most of the oppor- 
tunity provided by thei'gallant Gough', describing the 
01 
affair as '... the most wonderful combination of circum- 
stances and coincidences that has ever been told, even 
in fiction. '2 Long was well content with Bonar Law's 
exploitation of the matter in th'e House of Commons. 
3 
By 
the end of the month Asquith had managed to restore a 
semblance of stability by taking over the War Office 
himself, but he was completely unable to come to any 
-------------------------------------- 
1H. H. Asquith, Letters toVenetia Stanley, ed. Michael 
and Eleanor Brock (Oxford, 1982), p. 59. 
2Memorandum by Long, 27 Mar. 1914, B. L. P., 39/2/22. 
3See Long to Bonar Law, 23 Mar., 22 Apr., and 26 Apr. 1914, 
ibid., 32/1/53,32/2/50 and 32/2/55 respectively. 
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arrangement with Bonar Law, for the Conservative party 
was now officially committed to the policy of insisting 
on permanent exclusion for Ulster as a minimum starting 
point for further negotiations. 
Pressure on Asquith to find a solution was increased 
by the success of the Larne gun-running on the night 
of 24 to 25 April. The Ulster Volunteers now had over 
24,000 rifles with which to play at soldiers. There can 
be little doubt that money for the purchase of some of 
these rifles was channelled through the U. D. L. and the 
League of British Covenanters. Milner and Long both had 
tens of thousands of pounds at their disposal for 
fighting home rule, and neither man made any secret of 
his support for the arming of the Ulstermen. 
l Their 
reasons, however, were rather different: Long viewed 
the rifles solely as a deterrent, Milner conceived that 
they might actually be used. The fact that Ulster was 
now armed, and organised i 
to fight, effectively precluded 
I 
coercion as a government option -a point which leading 
Unionist politicians like Long and Bonar Law grasped 
readily. 
Long knew that the party wouldYwish to hold out for 
--- -------- -- 
1Waldorf Astor, for example, gave Milner £30,000; Lord 
Rothschild, Lord Iveagh and the Duke of Bedford subscribed 
£10,000 each; and at the end of March Rudyard Kipling 
donated £30,000. Donations of such large sums are adequate 
testimony to the seriousness with which such men regarded 
the issue. See A. M. Gollin, Proconsul inPolitics, 
_a 
Study 
of Lord Milner (London, 1964), p. 188; Sir John Evelyn 
Wrench, Alfrede Lord Milner (London, 1958), p. 287. 
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the 'clean cut' - the automatic and permanent exclusion 
of nine counties - even if Carson was prepared to take 
a six county Ulster. He also knew that the Nationalists 
could never accept the 'clean cut' as a fair price to pay 
for home rule in the remainder of Ireland. This, Long 
reasoned, would leave Asquith with only one option, to 
fight a general election on the issue. All the 
Conservative party had to do was stand firm; soon it 
would have the chance of returning to office. It is 
this line of reasoning which explains the fact that when 
Asquith met Carson and Bonar Law on 5 May and agreed to 
a separate Amending Bill to exclude Ulster, the party 
was less than satisfied. Many Tory MPs agreed with Long 
that there was no need to abandon the Unionists in the 
twenty-six counties and that the government was beaten; 
Asquith was offering exclusion for Ulster only because 
he was in a corner. Bonar Law was in an unenviable -- 
position, threatened from all sides from within his own 
party. Long's potential factiousness was merely the 
most menacing of the threats to unity emanating from 
Bonar Law's own front bench, from the backbenches, and 
from the House of Lords. ' 
i 
When Lord Willoughby de Broke had announced the formation 
of the 'League for the Support of Ulster and the Union' in 
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the London newspapers on 27 March 1913 he had received 
the support of one hundred peers and one hundred and 
twenty MPs. 
l Many of these peers later became the 
nucleus of a 'diehard' movement in the Lords which would 
countenance no compromise over home rule. By late 1913 
some of the Tory peers were becoming particularly 
obstructive. Never a man to subordinate his political 
passions to the rigours of party discipline, Willoughby 
de Broke set about organising resistance in the upper 
House. The 'diehard' movement of 1911 was speedily 
resurrected, and early in 1914 he decided to arrange for 
a 'no compromise' pledge to be signed by the Tory peers. 
Lord Ampthill was all for the suggestion and agreed 
readily on k January, writing of compromise as a policy 
both 'fatuous and fatal'. 
2 On the following day, the 
Earl of Stanhope, firmly in favour of canvassing 'our 
brother peers', redrafted Willoughby de Broke's proposed 
letter. 3 Lord Milner was invited to join the new 
'diehard' committee, but declined, writing to say that 
he would attend meetings as a 'sympathetic outsider' only. 
4 
Lord Leconfield was a keen supporter from the start, 
commenting that the party's official leaders were riot to 
be trusted 'a yard', and by the end of the month Lords 
-------------- ------ ---------------- 
1Stewart, The UlsterCrisis, p. 73. 
2Ampthill to Willoughby de Broke, 4 Jan. 1914, W. B. P., 
WB/7/1. 
3Stanhope to Willoughby de Broke, 5 Jan. 1914, ibid., 
WB/7/2. 
4Milner to Willoughby de Broke, 8 Jan. 1914, ibid., 
WB/7/3. 
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Peel and Saltoun had added their names to the campaign. 
l 
Willoughby de Broke, Arran, Stanhope and Ampthill 
circulated their letter on 4 February 1914. It invited 
all members of the upper House, including the bishops, 
to pledge themselves to oppose any compromise at least 
until a general election. The letter argued that 
dissolution was an option that Asquith must use if he 
wished to avoid the stigma of provoking civil war, that 
to accept exclusion of Ulster was to accept home rule in 
principle, and that for any Unionist peer to acquiesce 
in a Home Rule Bill before a general election would be 
an act of betrayal. 
2 The four peers' initiative clearly 
frightened the Conservative party leadership, for on the 
following day there was a secret meeting at Lansdowne 
House to discuss the situation. Bonar Law, Lansdowne, 
Long, Chamberlain, Carson and Londonderry all attended, 
as did a number of other prominent men in the party, and 
the meeting lasted near3y two hours. Later that day, 5 
February, Lord Lansdowne told Willoughby de Broke that 
the party leaders had agreed to move an Irish amendment 
3 
to the Address. Stanhope wrote gleefully to his 
confederate: 'Whoo-hoop: Really the 4th party has done 
pretty well for a first attempt. '4 
Accordingly, when parliament reassembled on 10 February 
--- -- ------- - ----------------- - --- 
1Leconfield to Willoughby de Broke, 12 Jan., Peel to 
Willoughby de Broke, 15 Jan., Saltoun to Willoughby de 
Broke, 16 Jan. 1914, ibid., WB/7/6,8, and 10 respectively. 
2For 
a copy of the letter see ibid., WB/8/5. 
3Lansdowne to Willoughby de Broke, 5 Feb. 1914, ibid., 
WB/8/10. 
4Stanhope to Willoughby de Broke, 5 Feb. 1914, ibid., 
WB/8/12. 
182 
Long followed the King's speech by moving an amendment 
to compel the government to submit home rule to an 
election. Although the amendment was defeated the 
following day, Asquith nonetheless indicated that he 
would shortly put forward proposals which the government 
hoped would lead to an agreement over Ulster. Long, in 
common with other Unionists, interpreted this as a minor 
victory: it looked as if Asquith, tacitly at least, had 
conceded that Ulster would ultimately have to be given 
special treatment, whatever the views of Redmond and the 
Nationalists. The response to the four peers' circular 
letter was mostly favourable. By the end of the month 
Willoughby de Broke had received unequivocal promises 
of support from more than thirty 'diehards' and many 
others expressed sympathy but were reluctant to take an 
independent line. 
l That Long had moved an amendment to 
the Address was in itself a direct concession to the - 
'diehards'. Haunted byithe memory of the way in which 
the Halsbury Club had mutinied against Balfour in 1911, 
Bonar Law preferred to assuage 'diehard' sensibilities 
by permitting a useless gesture of defiance. 
There was also considerable unease amongst backbench 
MPs. Sir William Bull presided over the weekly dinner 
'Between 6 and 25 Feb. 1914 the following peers all 
promised unequivocal support against any compromise: 
Abingdon, Bagot, Bathurst, Beaufort, Bessborough, Cairns, 
Calthorpe, Camden, Camoys, Clonbrock, Colville, Coventry, 
Dunally, Erne, Hill, Iveagh, Kensington, Kenyon, Lanesborough, 
Lauderdale, Lilford, Lovelace, Massy, Monck, Newcastle, 
Northumberland, St. John of Bletsoe, Sandwich, Scarborough, 
Sherborne, Sinclair, Somerset, Templemore, Vivian. Replies 
to the circular letter can be found in W. B. P., WB/8/13-93. 
183 
held at the Commons, and on Monday 16 February Long was 
the guest of honour. A large number of MPs expressed 
misgivings at Bonar Law's readiness to compromise, mis- 
givings which were echoed by Bull from the chair. 
Afterwards, Bull handed Bonar Law a note signed by the 
Tory backbenchers to the effect that they were extremely 
dissatisfied with the course which their leader was 
pursuing. On the next day Bull confidently told Bonar 
Law that he could easily get another '50 or 60 signatures 
if you require them. ' The extent of the dissaffection 
is plain from Bull's letter: 
I want you to believe that all the men are absolutely 
loyal to you ... but on the other hand they do feel 
that Asquith is absolutely unreliable and that he is 
merely playing with us. 
There was a plot on hand "to make Government impossible" 
on the opening day of the Session and but for the fact 
that you put up Walter Long, I believe it would have 
l 
been carried out. 
t 
Even more ominous were the views expressed by many of 
the party's most trusted and senior men. Lord Selborne 
was of the opinion that 'Asquith did not mean business 
and was only trying to create an atmosphere of compromise 
like that created by the King's death in 1910 with a view 
to profiting by it at our expense. '2 In May 1914 he 
remarked percipiently that 'whether the party splits or 
---- -- - -------------- - -- - --- 
1Bull to Bonar Law, copy, 17 Feb. 1914, Bu. P., 4/9. 
2Selborne to Chamberlain, 9 Jan. 1914, A. C. P., AC 11/1/81. 
184 
not depends I think entirely on the manner in which we 
make ourselves a party to any arrangements for the 
avoidance of civil war. 1 
1 Selborne wrote a strong letter 
to Lord Lansdowne on 1 May, requesting that its contents 
be shown to Bonar Law: 
We should remain true to the principles for which we 
have contended throughout, opposition to Home Rule and 
the constitutional right of the electors to decide the 
question.... If the party thinks that we have given 
way on either of these principles I am very much 
afraid of the consequences. 
2 
And Leo Amery expressed the same widespread view when he 
told Austen Chamberlain, also early in May 1914, that 
the real danger to the party was posed by the prospect 
of Asquith 
... simply excluding 
Ulster and leaving an utterly 
unworkable and separatist Bill for the rest of Ireland. 
... I doubt really 
if anything arises except the one 
question when can we get them 'out. And this can now 
only arise at the point where they have to make the 
attempt to coerce Jlster. I don't believe they can 
do it.... That will be their deathblow. 
3 
v 
And what of Chamberlain's opinion? As in so many 
things during his political career, Chamberlain thought 
that the solution was to be found in his father's old 
policies, namely alteration of the Act of Union so as to 
1Selborne to Chamberlain, 1 May 1914, ibid., AC 11/1/86. 
2Selborne to Lansdowne, copy, 1 May 1914, ibid., AC 
11/1/87. 
3Amery to Chamberlain, 4 May 1914, ibid., AC 11/1/2. 
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set up provincial councils for the constituent parts of 
the United Kingdom. Adamant that he was not a 'funker 
or a scuttler' and that the Union was 'sacrosanct', 
Chamberlain, like Milner, wanted to move away from 
'conservatism in the narrow sense' to federalism as the 
saviour of the Empire. The fact that federalism had no 
more appeal for the Irish Nationalists than the Union 
hardly entered into his calculations. Chamberlain 
supported negotiations with the government only because 
of the danger that 'the House of Commons and the_Army 
will break ... '1 Already convinced of the merits of 
federalism, he was hardly a fervent supporter of Bonar 
Law's line. 
Lord Robert Cecil was in favour of an inter-party 
conference only because he believed there was no like- 
lihood of agreement, thus forcing the government to 
back down, 
2 
and even Lord Lansdowne admitted privately 
to having reservations. i As early as October 1913 he had 
confided to Chamberlain: 
C 
To my mind ... the recent course of events has lately 
brought more and not less anxiety. So long as we were 
fighting for a general election we were on solid ground, 
but from the moment that the venue was changed and we 
began to talk about the exclusion of Ulster, we found 
ourselves in a quagmire.... I have always dreaded the 
entanglements of a conference ... the Ulster red herring 
is being dragged backwards and forwards across the track. 
3 
- ---- -- -- - -------------- - ------------- 
1Chamberlain to Willoughby de Broke, 23 Nov. 1913, W. B. P., 
WB/6/9 (Chamberlain's underlining). 
2Cecil to Willoughby de Broke, 18 Sept. 1913, ibid., 
WB/6/3. 
i 'Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 31 Oct. 1913, A. C. P., AC 11/1/47. 
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In other words, Bonar Law was very much out on his own 
in his desire to construct a compromise around exclusion 
of Ulster. Willoughby de Broke and the 'diehards' were 
expected to be obstreperous, their opposition a foregone 
conclusion. But even amongst the party's leading men 
Bonar Law was isolated. He had the support of Carson, 
but Carson's interests were not necessarily those of the 
Conservative party. Long was for forcing a general 
election, even by pushing Asquith to the brink of civil 
war; Chamberlain had put his faith in federalism and 
had no enthusiasm for Bonar Law's course; Lansdowne 
followed reluctantly. By May 1914, then, Bonar Law was 
struggling desperately to perform a complicated balancing 
act: he had to get the best terms for Ulster, and he had 




Long was amongst those who were not satisfied with 
Asquith's concession, on 5 May 1914, of an Amending Bill 
to exclude Ulster. Yet he was nrot in favour of Willoughby 
de Broke's 'diehard' campaign: he remembered only too 
well the trouble caused by, the 'diehards' in 1910-11. 
What he did not want to see, any more than he wanted to 
compromise with Asquith, was a resurrection of the cry 
'No Parley, No Negotiation, Fight to the Death'. This 
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attitude might, at first sight, appear contradictory, 
and Long might be expected to have supported the 'diehard' 
campaign as its aspirations matched his own almost exactly. 
On the contrary, he believed that the party could win a 
general election on the home rule issue - provided that 
Asquith was not given the chance of fighting on the old 
slogan of 'Peers versus People'. 
To permit 'diehard' intransigence over Ireland to 
become a major issue was to invite Asquith to use the 
same tactics as he had used over the budget of 1909 and 
its corollary, the Parliament Act. Although Long was 
naturally sympathetic towards the principles behind 
'diehard' resistance in the Lords, he would have nothing 
to do with the movement. He believed that Willoughby de 
Broke and his fellow rebels would in the long run do 
both the party and the Union more harm than good. 
Asquith must be given no opportunity to damage the 
Conservative vote in aforthcoming general election. 
' 
As Long insisted to Bonar Law in June: 'The House of 
Lords must not fall into the trap and enable Coalition 
r [i. 
e. Liberals and Irish Nationalists] to say they have 
killed conciliation - an absurd but 
Jdangerous 
cry. '2 
On 23 June the government made good its offer by 
introducing an Amending Bill in the Lords to allow 
Ulster to opt out for six years after a county referendum. 
The 'diehards' interpreted it as a sign that Asquith 
---- - -------------- - -------- -- -- ------------ 
1See Long to Bonar Law, 28 May 1914, B. L. P., 32/3/36. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 29 June 1914, ibid., 32/4/31. 
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lacked the will to impose home rule in the face of 
determined Unionist opposition. Some, like the Earl of 
Arran, wanted to throw the Bill out and so avoid having 
to 'acknowledge the principle of Home Rule and split 
the Unionist party in the country.... In dealing with 
rascals, the plain straightforward course is the best 
tactics. '1 Most could see only that to acquiesce meant 
to connive at home rule for the rest of Ireland and to 
give the government a settlement which it could not 
otherwise force through. 
2 
It has been seen that Long consistently placed his 
hopes in forcing a general election. The same hopes 
determined his attitude to the Amending Bill. He was 
opposed to the Lords taking a stand and regarded 'diehard' 
threats as unrealistic nonsense. His strategy was based 
on the precedent set in 1846 by the repeal of the Corn 
Laws. Peel had carried free trade with the aid of Whig 
votes at a moment when the Tory Protectionists were 
i 
powerless to resist, yet they turned him out of office a 
week later. Long hoped for a repeat performance:. the 
Lords should accept the Amending Bill, insisting on the 
exclusion of Ulster with no time'limit. If Asquith 
----------------------------------- 
1Arran to Willoughby de Broke, 22 May 1914, W. B. P., 
WB/lo/l0.0 
2Lord Raglan expressed the view of many 'diehards' when 
he commented that the 'govt. who cant get Home Rule 
through are manoeuvring us into this position of ourselves 
giving Home Rule which they are unable to do. We the 
Unionist party will do this thing thereby giving them another 
lease of life ... ' 
(sic) Raglan to Willoughby de Broke, 
5 July 1914, ibid., WB710/l4. 
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accepted such a Bill, Redmond would be guaranteed to 
vote against it, so that the Liberals would depend on 
Conservative votes. And once Asquith had accepted the 
Amending Bill, Redmond and the Conservatives would unite 
on some minor question to turn him out and force an 
election. 
1 
Such hopes, however, depended upon the erroneous 
assumption that Redmond would be foolish enough to turn 
the Liberals out. In the end, the Tory peers amended 
the Bill so that exclusion might be permanent and in 
this form the Bill passed its third reading on 14 July 
and was sent down to the Commons; but it did not force 
Asquith to a general election. Already the fight was 
lost, for the Home Rule Bill had passed the Commons on 
25 May by 351 votes to 274.2 All that remained to be 
seen was whether or no the threat of civil war in Ulster 
was real. Was Carson bluffing and would the Conseravtive 
party play the 'orange card' now that its hand had been 
i 
called? 
With the seemingly ineluctable approach of home rule 
entering its final stages, Long began to reassess the 
position. Always a pragmatist, 
4e reluctantly conceded 
that the Union could not be saved, that some form of home 
-------------- 
1Memorandum by Long, 26 June 1914, L. P., Add. MS. 62417. 
2The Home Rule Bill passed under the provisions of the 
Parli"a ment Act (see 63 H. C. Deb. ser. 5 cols. 88-93). It 
awaited only the royal assent to become law. Henceforth, 
the Conservative party was fighting either about the terms 
of an Amending Bill, which carried the implicit acceptance 
of a compromise solution, or for a general election. Short 
of repeal, defeat of home rule in its entirety was no 
longer possible. 
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rule had now become inevitable. Historians, knowing 
that Long did not begin publicly to espouse a federal 
solution until 1918, have assumed that he was opposed to 
the idea until well into the war. Indeed, Long has been 
described as 'an inveterate foe of the federal scheme 
before the war. '' This is not correct. It is true that 
Long had no natural sympathy for the federal option. 
His priority was always to defeat home rule, but once he 
realised that this might not be possible he grasped at 
federalism as the next best thing. As early as 29 
December 1913, for example, he had told Bonar Law: 
Every day brings me fresh and reliable evidence of 
the fact that our Party are getting increasingly 
anxious. They believe, and I agree with them, that 
no possible compromise, save perhaps real Federalism, 
will endure ... 
2 
In the early days of the struggle, when he hoped to 
defeat home rule outright, Long was extremely hostile 
to federalism - in 1910 he had greeted the breakup of 
the constitutional conference with a manifesto, issued 
under the guidance of Carson, deprecating federal home 
rule and reaffirming the conviction that Britain 'must 
remain a Union governed by one Parliament. '3 But from 
the moment that Long realispd, late in 1913, that it 
might not be possible to preserve the Union, he regarded 
----- - ------ - --------- -- 
1John Kendle, 'Federalism and the Irish Problem in 19181, 
History 56 (1971), p. 212. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 29 Dec. 1913, B. L. P., 31/1/62. 
3Colvin, LifeofCarson, 2,49; Hyde, Carson, p. 281. 
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federalism as a second-line defence. His views changed 
as the political situation changed. 
' 
A memorandum written for Lord Lansdowne on 27 June 
1914 displays Long as coming boldly to terms with the 
new situation created by the passing of the Home Rule 
Bill. This memorandum looks forward to the Irish policy 
which Long was to advocate during and after the war. 
Anticipating the developments of later years, he called 
for the appointment of a convention to find a solution: 
First the appointment of a strong Convention ... is 
essential to deal satisfactorily with the ... Government 
of Ireland.... the Irish question must be settled, ... 
some form of devolution is necessary, and ... there must 
be an alternative to the Irish policy of the Government 
- in other words we cannot continue uninterruptedly on 
the old lines. Only quite lately I have believed we 
could resume the Government of Ireland without much 
difficulty, but the time has, I think, gone. The 
Government, by their folly, have rendered it impossible, 
and some change is, 
'in 
my opinion, necessary, 
2 
The importance of this memorandum, as a statement of 
Long's views on the naintenance of the Union, cannot be 
over-emphasised. It evidences Long advocating an Irish 
convention and accepting some form of home rule as early 
as the summer of 1914 and thus represents a major change 
1For 
a discussion of the federalist movement and Ireland 
before 1914 see John Kendle, 'The Round Table Movement and 
"Home Rule All Round", Historical Journal 11 (1968). The 
Liberal advocates of 'Home Rule All Round' have been 
considered in Patricia Jalland, 'United Kingdom devolution, 
1910-14: political panacea or tactical diversion? ', English 
Historical Review 94 (1979). 
2Memorandum 
by Long, 27 June 191, L. P., Add. MS. 62403. 
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of attitude on the Irish question. 
A few days later, on 2 July, Bonar Law and Carson told 
Lord Murray that if the government agreed to permanent 
exclusion of four complete Ulster counties and parts of 
Fermanagh and Tyrone, the Conservative party would accept 
home rule for the remainder of Ireland. Lord Murray 
interpreted this as meaning that Bonar Law was ready to 
force a settlement on his party. More probably, Bonar 
Law made the offer in an effort to appear reasonable, 
knowing full well that Redmond would never agree. Despite 
his memorandum of 27 June, Long was still intent on 
forcing a general election and putting a Conservative 
government into office. The Conservatives might then 
call an Irish convention to draw up a satisfactory solution, 
rather than just restoring the Union and appointing a strong 
Chief Secretary, as Long had originally planned. His 
reluctant acceptance of home rule did not mean that he now 
wanted to come to some jarrangement with the Liberals. It 
J, 
meant simply that he now recognised that the Conservatives 
would have to sponsoj some scheme of home rule after 
winning an election. 
Long was very worried when he "learnt that Bonar haw had 
agreed to an inter-party conference on the Home Rule Bill. 
He was not consulted in advance and he was not invited to 
attend. As the advocate of 'no compromise' for so many 
years and as the one Unionist leader conspicuous for his 
dislike of any settlement with the government, it was 
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hardly surprising that he was not invited. Lord Crawford 
has left an account of the hostile reception afforded by 
the party to Bonar Law's decision. Bonar Law, Crawford 
confided to his diary on 17 July, 
... seems 
to assume that the position of Tyrone is 
the only outstanding problem. And moreover it would 
appear that Carson takes the same view. Is this 
conceivable? What about our Unionists in Fermanagh, 
and the Covenanters in Donegal and Cavan? What becomes 
of Carson's bellicose speeches a week old, and of the 
strong attitude taken up by the whole party and the 
press in support of the Lords' decision to exclude the 
whole of Ulster? I can already hear the cry of those 
who say they are betrayed, who will break out into 
violent invective against Carson, against England, and 
perhaps against the King too.... I cannot guess, I am 
at a loss to account for this decision to enter a conf- 
erence having decided in advance to vote against the 
conviction of the whole party. 
... I fear the worst: another 
terrible split, a 
fresh change of leaders, a dissolution while we are 
in the throes of internal disp1te, another long period 
under the harrow. The outlook is hateful. 
l 
Even after Bonar Law had agreed to participate, Long 
tried to change the decision. Writing to Lansdowne on 
19 July, he argued that the 
... Conference will 
be ijery unpopular with all our 
friends.... Is it too late for you to ask for an 
audience with H. M.? Our men do not believe in the 
reality of any arrangement save the Clean Cut. They 
-------- - ------------------- -- 
1Crawford's diary, 17 July 1914, TheCrawford_Papers, 
pp. 339-40. --- ---- 
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say "The Party has supported Ulster with votes, speeches 
and money and should not now at the last moment be 
sacrificed. The Government are in a hole, must face 
Civil War or an Election, therefore will choose the 
latter unless we give in. If we stand firm there can 
be no settlement. Conference cannot last more than one 
day. " Do let me implore you to save the party from 
disruption "1 
Long was fully alive to the imminence of civil war and 
as anxious as any man to avoid it, but he still believed 
that Asquith would back down and that no solution could 
come from talks with the government. His priority was 
still to force a general election at all costs, for he 
believed that only with a Conservative government in power 
could the settlement of Ireland be reconciled with the 
dictates of party. Nor did he trust Bonar Law to stand 
up to the combined cajolery of Asquith, Carson and 
Redmond. For Long, Asquith must be turned out and then 
the Irish problem dealt with, not the other way round. 
In the event, the Buckingham Palace Conference lasted 
not for one day, as Long had predicted, but for three, 
between 21 and 24 July. Bonar Law knew that he faced a 
revolt in his own party if he settled for anything-less 
than the 'clean cut'. Asquith described the proceedings 
as 'amicable in tone' but 'desperately fruitless in 
result' and confessed that he had 'rarely felt more 
hopeless in any practical affair: an impasse, with 
-- ------------ 
1Long to Lansdowne, copy, 19 July 1914, L. P., Add. MS. 
62418. 
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unspeakable consequences, upon a matter which to English 
eyes seems inconceivably small, and to Irish eyes 
immeasurably big. ' 
1 The problem of defining the area 
to be excluded proved intractable and the conference 
broke up without even discussing the time limit. Once 
again, Bonar Law'had merely been going through the 
motions of negotiation. As Leo Amery recorded on 25 
July: 
I have never seen a scene of such anger in our Lobby 
as there was when the Conference was first announced, 
and it was only when assurances spread round that 
there was no likelihood of anything coming of it that 
feeling was in the least mollified. 
As it is we are now in a splendid position to say 
that for the sake of peace we have explored a certain 
path to the utmost and found it led nowhere... 
2 
At the same time as the party leaders were trying to 
hammer out a solution at Buckingham Palace, Long was 
busy planning the launch of an TJ ster currency in the 
event of a provisional government being set up. The 
evidence is very sketchy, but there can be no doubt that 
Long was involved in a conspiracy to provide financial 
backing for a provincial government. He regarded this 
action as fully justified by the Liberals' refusal to 
submit home rule to an election. In July Long and Milner 
consulted Moreton Frewen, a journalist, economist and 
------- -------- 
'Asquith, Letters to Venetia Stanley, p. 109. 
2Amery to Neville Chamberlain, 25 July 1914, Amery_Diaries: 
Volume One, p. 101. 
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failed businessman who was a personal friend of Long's 
and had special knowledge of currency problems. 
1 
Plans 
were laid to issue certificates for five, ten and twenty 
shilling notes to act as an Ulster currency. 
2 Moreton 
Frewen managed to get hold of a 'Clearing House Certificate', 
which had been used in place of normal currency in the 
United States in 1907 during the New York bank crisis, as 
an example to be copied in Ulster. Long's role would be 
to provide a gold reserve of £100,000 to secure conversion. 
It was planned that he would do this either by subscription 
or, more simply, by exchanging the 'certificates' in 
friendly quarters for gold or other legal tenders. This 
was the closest that Long came to breaking the law. As 
1Moreton Frewen is perhaps best described as an Anglo- 
American gentleman adventurer. A somewhat absurd figure, 
he had numerous business interests in the United States and 
was well connected socially in British governing circles. 
He was an uncle of Winston Churchill and his niece married 
Sir Edward Carson. On the Irish question, he was a strong 
advocate of federalism:. See Alan J. Ward, 'Frewen's Anglo- 
American Campaign for Ftederalism,, 1910-1921', Irish Historical 
Studies 15 (1967). A biographical study conveys a vivid 
picture of this colourful character: see Allen Andrews, 
The Splendid Pauper (London, 1968). Long had alsö been 
involved in March 1932 in helping Frewen to raise funds for 
a federal campaign in support of William O'Brien in Ireland. 
He acted as an intermediary for an anonymous 'American 
friend' who donated £500 towards; saving O'Brien's paper, 
the Cork Free Press. Most probably, Long was prepared to 
help O'B_rien only in the hope of splitting the Irish party, 
or at least weakening Redmond's position. Nonetheless, it 
is perhaps significant that Long was prepared to involve 
himself, as early as 1912, 'in secret negotiations to raise 
money to be used to push for a federal solution in Ireland. 
It is also interesting to note that when Frewen sought to 
circulate his federal ideas amongst leading Unionists in 
August 1911 he chose to do so through Long. 
2See 
also Gollin, "Observer'! 
_and_Garvin, p. 
421, and 
idem, Proconsul inPolitics, pp. 218-9. 
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the provisional government never came into existence, 
the scheme was never tested. 
' 
The tension was increased with the nationalist gun- 
running at Howth, near Dublin, on Sunday 26 July, when 
the Army opened fire in Bachelor's Walk, killing three 
people. On the following Thursday, 30 July 1914, Asquith 
intended to proceed with the Amending Bill in the Commons, 
but the lights were already going out all over Europe and 
a much bigger crisis led to the Bill's timely abandonment. 
2 
The Irish question was again put into cold storage, although 
not without further party controversy. 
3 The truth of Lord 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
1See Frewen to Long, 16 July; Frewen to Milner, 19 July; 
Frewen to Long, 22 July and 25 July 1914, M. P., MS. Milner 
dep. 349, fos. 187-91. 
2After the Home Rule Bill passed on 26 May there was a 
parliamentary lull, pending the introduction of the promised 
Amending Bill. This provided only for four county exclusion, 
an offer already dismissed by Bonar Law earlier in the year. 
It received a first reading on 23 June and a second reading 
during the first week of July. It was then, predictably, 
mutilated by the Lords on 8 July; the opposition amendments 
gave permanent exclusi n to nine counties - the 'clean cut'. 
When the Buckingham Palace Confdrence failed on 24 July 
" Asquith announced that the Commons would proceed with 
the 
Amending Bill on the 28th. This was postponed and then 
prevented by the European crisis. 
3Despite the exigencies of war and the contentiousness of 
the Irish issue, the government proceeded with home rule, 
which was placed on the statute hook later in the y. ear amidst 
further scenes of parliamentary uproar, so emphasising the 
Liberals' embittered relations with the Unionist party. The 
idea that the home rule controversy was quietly abandoned 
in August 1914 in 'the national interest' has recently been 
challenged by Patricia Jalland and John Stubbs in 'The Irish 
Question after the outbreak of war in 1914: some unfinished 
party business', English Historical Review 96 (1981). The 
Conservative leaders seriously considered making a last-ditch 
stand against the bill by using the powers of the Lords as a 
constitutional obstruction. A parliamentary filibuster was 
also considered. As on so many occasions, the party leaders 
were divided: Long, Chamberlain, Carson, Selborne and Lord 
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Randolph Churchill's famous quip - 'Ulster will fight 
and Ulster will be right' - remained to be demonstrated. 
Five days later, Britain was at war. 
It has long been recognised that the outbreak of 
European war in August 1914 averted a possible civil 
war in Ulster and saved Britain's last Liberal government 
from a political disaster over home rule. What has 
received less attention is the fact that the war saved 
Bonar Law from his own supporters. Ever since Lord 
Salisbury had handed over the mantle of leadership to 
his erudite nephew, Arthur Balfour, the Conservative 
party had been at odds with itself on almost every major 
issue. It had been divided over tariff reform, Irish 
policy, reform of the House of Lords, acceptance of the 
-- --- ----------------- --- - -- 
Robert Cecil were for obsruction, Bonar Law, Lansdowne, 
Balfour and Curzon advised acceptance. In the end, Bonar 
Law's view prevailed, and the party contented itself with 
a mass withdrawal from the Commons on 15 September. Asquith 
described this ostentatious but futile gesture of protest 
as 'a lot of prosaic and for the most part middle-aged 
gentlemen trying to look like early French revolutionists ... 
(The Earl of Oxford and Asquith, YMemories andReflections, 
2 Vols. (London, 1928), 2,33. Asquith misdated the episode 
as 14 Sept. 1914). See also John Stubbs, 'The Impact of the 
Great War on the Conservative party', in Gillian Peele and 
Chris Cook, eds., The Politics of Reappraisal. 1918-19.29 
(London and Basingstoke, 1975), pp. 17-19. The Home Rule 
Bill received the royal assent on 18 September (66 H. C. Deb. 
ser. 5 col. 1017), Asquith having announced that its operation 
would be suspended for the duration. Lord Crawford summed up 
the feelings of many Unionists when he recorded in his diary 
that 'Asquith has behaved like a cardsharper and should never 
be received into a gentleman's house again. ' Crawford's 
diary, 16 Sept. 1914, . TheCrawford_Papers, p. 343. 
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Parliament Bill, the selection of a new leader in 1911, 
and it was equally divided in its attitude to the Home 
Rule Bill. 
Bonar Law was the victim of his own lack of authority 
and personal following. Law's biographer has pointed out 
that the negotiations into which he entered with Asquith 
show that he was at least prepared to consider a compromise 
solution and that by comparison Long was an intransigent 
extremist. 
1 But Bonar Law entered into the negotiations 
knowing that he could not possibly allow them to succeed: 
he had to give the appearance of seeking a compromise, but 
in order to stave off the attacks of the 'no compromise' 
faction he had also to eschew compromise. He walked a 
tightrope between civil war on the one hand and a party 
split on the other. Given the opportunity, Bonar Law 
would have accepted Ulster exclusion. His own followers 
helped to ensure that he was not given the opportunity. 
For Long, there could be no compromise: the Union 
must be defended until its defence was no longer prac- 
ticable. Everything which he did and said during'the 
c 
home rule crisis indicates that special treatment for 
Ulster would not have satisfied hin, and he clearly 
resented the way in which Carson gradually usurped his 
role as the party's leading spokeanan on Irish affairs 
and in so doing emphasised Ulster Unionism at the expense 
of Irish Unionism. The Union was a sacred political 
1Blake, Unknown Prime Minister, pp. 166-71. 
200 
principle to Long; he abandoned it only when home rule 
became an ineluctable fact. 
It has been observed that Long was tas ardent as Lord 
Milner' in this period in his advocacy of an uncompro- 
mising and violent opposition to home rule. 
l Only half 
of this statement is correct: Long was the advocate of 
an uncompromising, but not of a violent, oppotition to 
home rule. He never accepted the use of force with the 
same readiness as Milner, and in his speeches he took 
care to distance himself from any explicit threats of 
violence. His speech on the first reading of the 
Government of Ireland Bill on 16 April 1912 contained 
no threats, though he concluded with a pledge to Irish 
Unionists to stand firm; 
2 his speech on the Bill's 
second reading, on 30 April 1912, raised the spectre of 
conflict in Ulster, but promised only that the Conservative 
party would give unfailing support to Ulster's cause. 
3 
Long always picked his words carefully: 'I am not 
saying whether the Ulstermen are right or wrong; if I 
were an Ulsterman, and believed as the Ulstermen o 
believe ... I should resist Home Rule by every means in 
my power. '4 These are the carefully phrased and qualified 
remarks of the politician, not the words of the impetuous 
advocate of violence. Long differed from Bonar Law and 
1Gollin, Proconsul In Politics, p. 194, n. 1. 
237 H. C. Deb. ser. 5 cols. 194-211. 
3Ibid., 
cols. 1722-43. 
439 H. C. Deb. ser. 5 col. 790. 
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other Unionist leaders only in his assessment of 
parliamentary tactics. Unlike Milner, Long believed 
throughout that home rule could and would be defeated 
at the polls. The agitation in Ulster he regarded as 
lending assistance to that goal, not as something valuable 
in itself or likely to lead to any sort of settlement. 
To turn the Liberals out of office by the ordinary means 
of a general election was, Long believed, the only sure 
way to defeat home rule. Hence the propaganda campaign 
of the U. D. L. was designed to put the English electorate 
on the side of the Unionists. In the end the British 
electorate would save the Union. Meanwhile, the Conservative 
party had to push Asquith to the very edge of the political 
precipice. 
It must be said, however, that Long had very little 
hard evidence on which to base his contention that a 
general election would return the Conservatives to office. __ 
By the end of May 1914 the Asquith government, elected 
in December 1910, had lost sixteen seats at by-elections, 
all of them to candidates calling themselves either 
t 
Conservative or Unionist. The government losses occurred 
with a remarkable evenness and regularity- the Liberals 
lost four seats in 1911, five in 1912, three in 1913, and 
four in 1914 - which does not suggest that the growing 
intensity of the home rule crisis was much of a factor in 
domestic elections. It was always Long's mistake to 
believe that the British electorate could be swayed in its 
2 02 
voting intentions by the imminence of home rule. The 
Conservative party had lost only one seat to the 
government1 but holding on to their existing seats was 
hardly an indication of forthcoming triumph. If anything, 
the Conservative results in 1914 were less promising than 
those of the previous year. 
2 If the by-elections of 
1913-14 indicated anything for the Conservative party it 
was that the Unionist vote was holding steady at about 
The succession of the Marquess of Hamilton as the 3rd 
Duke of Abercorn necessitated a contest for Londonderry 
City. The by-election, held on 30 Jan. 1913, resulted 
in a Liberal victory by 2,699 votes to 2,642. This defeat, 
albeit by the narrowest of margins, was a serious blow to 
the Conservative party, for it seriously damaged the 
argument that Ulster contained a clear Unionist majority: 
Ulster Unionist MPs were now outnumbered by seventeen to 
sixteen. For the Liberals to win a by-election in the 
very heart of Ulster was naturally a tremendous fillip 
to their home rule campaign. 
2In 1913 there were twenty-three by-elections, beginning 
with Flint District on 21 January and ending with Lanarkshire 
South on 12 December. The Conservatives took three seats, 
but, as already mentioned, lost Londonderry City. At 
Cambridgeshire East they won a convincing majority on 16 
May; at Reading on 8 November they followed this with 
another convincing victory; whilst at Lanarkshire South on 
12 December they managed to take the seat by just 251 votes. 
In 1914 there were twenty-four by-elections, seventeen of 
which were held before the outbreak of war. The pattern 
was again similar. The Conservatives took four seats from 
the government and lost none, but their majorities were on 
two occasions very slender. At Pethnal Green S. W. on 19 
February Charles Masterman, the hew Chancellor of the Duchy 
of Lancaster, was defeated by a mere twenty votes; at Leith 
District, exactly a week later, the Conservatives again 
scraped home, this time by only sixteen votes; at Derbyshire 
County N. E. on 20 May the Conservatives won by a rather more 
respectable 314 votes; and three days later at Ipswich the 
displaced Charles Masterman was again defeated, on this 
occasion by well over 500 votes. The above figures are taken from J. Vincent and M. Stenton, McCalmont's Parliamentar" 
Poll Book, 
_ 
British Election_Results, 1832-1918 (Brighton, 
1971). --------- - --- 
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its 1910 level, with perhaps small gains being made 
here and there. As for the prospects for victory at an 
early general election, these were less certain, a view 
which Bonar Law conceded privately to Lansdowne when he 
remarked in September 1913 that even if the party 
succeeded in forcing Asquith to a dissolution 'we are 
not certain of winning, and even if we do win, there will 
be I think the certainty of lawlessness in Ireland on the 
other side ... '1 
The conviction of many leading Conservatives that they 
would gain an outright majority was merely a reflection 
of the frustration which they felt at their own inabilty 
to defeat home rule within the framework of the existing 
House of Commons. Tne most intractable electoral problem 
for the Conservatives stemmed from the fact that Ireland 
was so grossly over-represented. Asquith had lost his 
overall majority in 1910, and government by-election 
losses had further emphasised his dependence on an Irish 
f 
party which held the balance of power only because the 
thorny problem of redistribution had been allowed'to 
r 
drift. By August 1914 there were only 260 Liberals in 
the House of Commons, whereas the Conservatives numbered 
288, a remarkable recovery from the 'debacle' of January 
1906. The Liberal government held office only because it 
had the dubious backing of eighty-four Irish Nationalists, 
topped up on occasion by the additional votes of the 
-------- ------------ -------- - -- 
1Bonar Law to Lansdowne, 24 Sept. 1913, B. L. P., 33/5/59. 
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thirty-eight Labour members. It was bitterness and 
irritation at this parliamentary alignment which led 
Conservative politicians to issue such strident condemnation 
of the 'corrupt bargain' which the Liberals had struck, 
to flirt with extra-parliamentary activity, and yet 
somehow to believe that an election fought with the 
anomaly of Irish over-representation could be expected 
to produce an overall Unionist majority. There had 
certainly been a marked revival in Tory fortunes - and 
this during a period which has often been labelled 'the 
crisis of Conservatism' - but electoral triumph was by 
no means assured. 
Another, and no less important, factor influencing 
many leading Conservatives in favour of a general election 
in the summer of 1914 was the belief that it was better 
to fight on home rule than on tariff reform. With home 
rule there was a chance of victory, with tariff reform 
there was none. The Unionists' humiliation in January 
1906 had been largely the result of a widespread rejection 
of 'stomach taxes', a popular conviction that to return 
t 
Balfour to office meant to endure the 'small loaf' of 
tariff reform. Conservatives like Long therefore ' 
manoeuvred in 1914 for the opportunity of fighting a 
general election on their own terms. Tariff reform had, 
for the moment at least, been eclipsed by the Irish 
question, and the Conservative party was now committed 
in principle to a second electoral victory before 
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introducing 'food taxes'. The sustained anti-home rule 
rhetoric of the Unionist leaders had created at least an 
impression of party unity. Better, then, to fight a 
general election on the single issue of home rule with 
a united party than to wait until tariff reform again 
made a divisive and debilitating impact on the Unionists' 
ability to appeal to an electorate more worried over the 
price of its food than concerned at the fate of Irish 
Unionists. 
It is, of course, true that Long sanctioned and encouraged 
the use of extra-parliamentary action, but such action was 
intended only as a supplement to the fight at Westminster, 
a means to put pressure on the government and to force 
an appeal to the country. Long was no more an advocate 
of violence in Ulster than Bonar Law or Lansdowne or 
any other leading Conservative figure. He merely made 
the noises which leading Conservatives were expected to 
make. 
On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that if a 
provisional government had ever come into existence in 
Ulster Long would have dissociated himself from it or 
castigated the men of action who' had brought it about. 
He was too closely involved for that. Never a serious 
advocäte of armed resistance by the Ulstermen, Long 
nonetheless sailed very close to the wind, associating 
both publicly and privately with men like Carson, Craig 
and Milner, men who were in all probability prepared to 
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carry out their threats if put to the test. The truth 
of the matter was, the Conservative party could not 
afford to distance itself from men like Carson, Craig, 
Milner and Professor Dicey: its parliamentary opposition 
to home rule and its determination to uphold the Union 
depended for their credibility and impact on the threats 
of violence and disorder manifested outside parliament. 
Walter Long was an advocate of violence and 'no compromise' 
only in the sense that he believed such advocacy would 
oust the Liberals from power and bring about a Unionist 
government well before home rule reached the statute book 
and made the actual use of violence a real contingency. 
Home rule would succumb only to resolute political pressure, 
to 'unceasing, steadfast and carefully arranged opposition - 
not "rows" but real opposition thought out and organised 
and never to be remitted for an hour. '1 The threat of 
violence was part of a wider political strategy. The 
substance of violence was never a serious option. 
44 
It has often been asserted that the struggle over home 
rule in 1912-14 evidenced a general lowering of the tone 
of British political behaviour, a depreciation for which 
the Unionists were chiefly respo'hsible. It is also 
generally accepted that the Conservative party flouted 
the constitution, toyed with treason and led the country 
to the brink of civil war in its efforts to defeat home 
rule. In fact, the Ulster Volunteers needed no encouragement 
1Long to Bonar Law, copy, 28 May 1914, L. P., Add. MS. 
62404. 
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from the Conservative party, and the events of spring 
1914, including the British Covenant, were no more than 
an histrionic accompaniment to the politics of compromise. 
None of the Conservative leaders seriously entertained 
the idea of civil war. Bonar Law accepted home rule in 
return for Ulster exclusion, his only difficulty being 
to foist this unpopular solution on his party. Of the 
other Unionist leaders, Long was the most sedulously 
intransigent on the surface, but even he reluctantly 
conceded after May 1914 that home rule would have to 
be granted. 
At the outbreak of war the Home Rule Bill had been 
passed, its implementation delayed only by the formality 
of the royal assent and Asquith's commitment to an 
Amending Bill. The Ulster leaders had made it clear 
that six counties which guaranteed Protestant hegemony 
were to be preferred to the historic nine county province, 
so that the lines of partition were already drawn up. 
Home rule for the south was a 'fait accompli'. All that 
remained to be decided was not if, but when it shöuld 
C 




OPPOSITION AND THE ASQUITH COALITION, 
AUGUST 1914 - DECEMBER 1916 
When war broke out in August 1914 Long, like many 
other leading figures of the time, was somewhat surprised 
by the speed with which the international stormcloud had 
broken. He was not a well-travelled man - later in life 
he regretted that he had not travelled more widely 
1- 
and, 
apart from France and Switzerland, which he visited 
regularly, he had little first-hand knowledge of Europe. 
He professed a passionate commitment to the idea of 
Empire, but as to the intricacies of Austro-Serbian 
relations he readily deferred to the much greater know- 
ledge of Balfour and Lord Lansdowne. Anxious to abandon 
the political squabbles and tension of past months, Long 
was genuinely preparedrto back the government in a 
f 
patriotic struggle against the Central Powers. He began 
the war a firm adherent of the party truce. To Winston 
C 
Churchill, of all Liberal ministers the most detested by 
many Conservatives since his apostasy of 1904, Long wrote 
on 4 August: 
Let me say that I feel yöu have placed us all under a 
debt which we cannot easily repay. This is no time for 
sentiment but it is right you should know that we 






Long's first opportunity to assist the war effort came 
with the government's invitation to serve on the Committee 
on the Prevention and Relief of Distress, an offer which 
he gratefully accepted. By the end of September, however, 
after some seven weeks of tedious work, he was beginning 
to have doubts about the government's ability to prosecute 
the war vigorously, and he was looking for an opportunity 
to resign in the belief that he was being made a fool of 
by a cabinet which sought to silence potential opposition 
by encouraging participation without power. 
2 Nonetheless. 
Long persevered with this social work and was an active 
member of the Committee's successor, the National Relief 
Fund. 
The sudden enlistment of thousands of men revealed that 
a very large number had been living with women to whom 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
1Long to Churchill, 4; Aug. 1914, quoted in Martin Gilbert, 
Winston S. Chur hill VolumeThreei_1914_1916 (London, 1971), 
p. 32. This spirit of magnanimity did not prevent Long 
from playing a behind-the-scenes role in initiating a 
movement, ultimatelyesuccessful, to have Arthur Lee, the 
Conservative MP for Hampshire (Fareham), expelled from the 
Carlton Club over an indiscretion which indirectly involved 
Churchill. Lee had overheard Lord Charles Beresford make 
some pejorative remark referring'to the 'scandal' of retaining 
Prince Louis of Battenburg as First Sea Lord. Caring little 
for the rules of club confidentiality, Lee had reported the 
incident to Churchill, whereupon Beresford had been threatened 
with disciplinary action. The rules of club etiquette were 
invoked: Lee was invited to apologise. He stubbornly refused 
and was forced to offer his resignation, which was promptly 
accepted. See Private_PapersofLeeofFareham, pp. 134-6. 
Churchill had good reason to take issue with Beresford's 
indiscretions. Earlier in the yearteresford had described 
the First Lord of the Admiralty to a mass audience in Hyde 
Park as 'a Lilliput Napoleon, a man with an unbalanced mind, 
an egomaniac. ' Quoted in A. P. Ryan, Mutiny_at_the Curraýh 
(London, 1956), p. 164. --- 
2Cameron Hazlehurst, Politician satWar (London, 1971), 
ý. 156. 
---- -- -- --- 
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they were not married, and in many cases unmarried women 
with dependent children were left with no income as a 
result of a man volunteering for active service. The 
numbers involved came as a surprise to the authorities, 
and many politicians expressed the opinion that to pay 
state benefits to such women was somehow to condone their 
'immorality'. With the help of a rather diverse team 
comprising Lord Riddell of the News of the Wod, Mary 
McArthur of the Women's Trade Union League and William 
Wedgwood Benn, Liberal MP for Tower Hamlets (St. George's), 
Long persuaded the National Relief Fund to alter its 
regulations and so make a weekly grant to these women, 
l 
now classified as 'unmarried wives'. The decision 
naturally provoked a good deal of moral outrage and it 
fell to Long to interview the protesters. His attitude 
was later described by one of his colleagues: 
Since any soldier and every soldier was dear to his 
heart, naturally he warmly approved the decision about 
the unmarried wife. He thought it monstrous that it 
should be challenged by any narrow-minded person, and 
his anger became more vocal as the controversy developed. 
He presided over the sub-committee appointed to interview 
the malcontents, and for high rcomedy nothing in my 
experience beats some of the interviews with worthy 
ladies who arrived with strings of complaints and moral 
precepts. They were horrified at their reception ... 
2 
Long was the only leading Unionist politician to take an 
'Lord Riddell, War Diary (London, 1933), pp. 12-13. 
2Violet Markham, Return PassagesTheAutobiocraphy_o£ 
Violet Markham (London, 1953), P. -148. 
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interest in this question. 
He began to chafe at the bridle of restriction imposed 
by the party truce within a matter of weeks of the 
British declaration of war. As a man who had for so 
many years revelled in the cut and thrust of parliamentary 
politics Long found the burden of forced silence intolerable, 
and from September onwards he swiftly emerged as a focus 
of opposition both to the continuation of the Liberal 
government and to Bonar Law's tenuous grip on the loyalty 
of the Conservative backbenches. It was Churchill's 
personal intervention at Antwerp, intended to prevent 
Belgian withdrawal, which provided Long with his first 
target of attack. On 13 October a leader in the Morning 
Post, under the title 'The Antwerp Blunder', called on 
the cabinet 'to keep a tight hand on their impulsive 
colleague'. On the following day, and under the same 
heading, the Morning-Post published a letter from Long 
in which it was asserted that the government's policy 
had created 'a general and profound feeling of consternation. ' 
Thus, it was Long who was responsible, in the words of 
C 
Margot Asquith, for 'the first departure from the party 
truce'. 
' And a week later Long rhinted at further trouble 
to come when he told Sir Edward Carson that he did not 
'feel satisfied that we can sit silent when manifest and 
easily remedied blunders are being committed.... We are 
1Margot Asquithts diary, 30 Nov. 1914, quoted in Gilbert, 
ChurchillL Volume_Three, p. 180. See also ibid. pp. 125-9; 
Hazlehurst, Politicians at War, p. 192; and John 0. Stubbs, 
'The Conservative Party and the Politics of War, 1914-1916', 
Oxford, D. Phil., 1973, pp. 102-3. 
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now silent.... I, for one, am not prepared to sit down 
and see our men sacrificed. when things could easily be 
put right ... '1 But there was little he could do, save 
try to stir Bonar Law to take a firmer line. On 25 
November Long wrote to his leader: 
The procrastination of the Government is disatrous, 
and personally I regret ... that A. J. B. 's patriotism 
and devotion to duty have compelled him to join in 
their counsels, because in this as in evrything else 
their craven spirit will lead them to make free use of 
his name.... I wish you would see your way to press 
the Government, as their inaction is ... really very 
dangerous ... 
2 
Finding that his letter brought no response, Long 
decided to visit the Front and assess the situation for 
himself. He was quick to appreciate that the fighting 
would be protracted and bitter; there would be no easy 
victory before Christmas. On his return in mid-December 
Long prepared a memorandum for h, ts colleagues, calling 
for early reinforcements to the Army and containing a 
graphic description of his impressions. 
3 His observations, 
and his conversations with Sir John French at St. Omer, 
r' 
fuelled Long to press his colleagues more strongly and, in 
particular, to demand immediate reinforcements of 100,000 
men. He implored Bonar Lai to put the case resolutely to 
1Long to Carson, 21 Oct. 1914, quoted in Colvin, Life 
of Carson, 3,39. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 25 Nov. 1914, B. L. P., 35/3/66. 




but Bonar Law still hoped to avoid 
trouble, merely remarking that Long's memorandum was 
'interesting' and suggesting that he seek an interview 
with Kitchener at the War Office. 
2 Long dismissed this 
idea out of hand. Already, he had little faith in 
Kitchener's ability or competence: 
No use my seeing K., he wd. regard me as 'advocatus 
diaboli'.... If I have to see anybody it must be 
Asquith, but I am afraid he is not strong enough.... 
I don't suggest we should attempt to decide between 
French and K. ... but Gov. ought to ... support man in 
command. 
3 
Long found Lansdowne and Curzon - Curzon was now acting 
as the party's leader in the Lords - more accommodating, 
and two days before Christmas he was able to inform Bonar 
Law with undisguised pleasure that Curzon would push the 
question in the Upper House and that Lansdowne 'knows 
what I am about and approves my action. '4 Convinced 
that he had the backing of the party, Long then went on 
to demand that Bonar Law obtain from Asquith a clear 
C 
understanding that continued Unionist support for the 
government could only be given of certain conditions: 
Asquith must promise to provide the Conservative leaders 
with accurate and complete information, and he must state 
------------------------ 
1Long to Bonar Law, 16 Dec. 1914, B. L. P., 35/5/44. 
2Bonar Law to Long, copy, 17 Dec. 1914, ibid., 37/4/38. 
3Long to Bonar Law, 18 Dec. 1914, ibid., 35/5/47. 
4Long to Bonar Law, 23 Dec. 1914, ibid., 35/5/55. 
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in parliament that the government intended to give 
unqualified support to the Army in the field. 
' To Curzon 
Long emphasised that there 'is a good deal more to be 
said &I think it wd. be well if we could have some talk. 
The Gov. are a little too high-handed in their methods & 
there is a limit to our patience, or ought to be! '2 
With both Long in the Commons and Curzon in the Lords 
dissatisfied, Bonar Law was obliged to respond, especially 
as Lansdowne confirmed on Boxing Day that 'I do not think 
Walter will propose anything unreasonable. '3 It was 
gradually made clear to the government that Conservative 
support could neither be taken for granted nor received 
without concessions in return. 
Over the Christmas holiday Long also began to explore 
ways in which he could assist attacks on the government 
from outside parliament. On 1 January 1915 he wrote to 
Colonel Repington, the military correspondent of The Times, 
suggesting that they form a kind of secret partnership. 
4 
Repington was only too pleased to co-operate and undertook 
to provide Long with inside information and military 
expertise. From the beginning of 1915, therefore, Long 
5 
had access to military reports ahd assessments other than 
those provided through official channels. 
Not surprisingly, Longts, insistence on challenging the 
-- - ---- -- -------- 
1Memorandum by Long, 21 Dec. 1914, ibid., 35/5/55. 
2Long to Curzon, 23 Dec. 1914, C. P., MSS. Eur. F. 112/96. 
(Long's underlining). 
3Lansdowne to Bonar Law, 26 Dec. 1914, B. L. P., 35/5/58. 
4Long to Repington, copy, 1 Jan. 1915, L. P., Add. MS. 
62419. 
5Repington to Long, 2 Jan. 1915, ibid. 
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government, contrary to Bonar Law's desire for a quiet 
life, was deeply resented. Bonar Law was forced into 
the humiliating position of having to assure Long 
personally that as party leader he was ready to modify 
his opinions 'in regard to any question ... whenever it 
is possible. 
" Such an assurance from Bonar Law was 
tantamount to an admission that he could not lead the 
party without Long's support. He even accused Long out- 
right of adopting 'bullying methods', a suggestion which 
at least elicited a half-hearted apology. 
2 
Long's attacks continued throughout January, so much 
so that Bonar Law became seriously worried at the prospect 
of an independent revolt against the party truce from the 
backbenches, a revolt which would, of course, be fanned 
by Long. On the 27th Long presented his leader with a 
forthright memorandum demanding that 'our entire absence 
of responsibility for, or previous knowledge of, the 
Government's War Policy; be emphatically declared. 13 
Curzon, too, was dissatisfied with the opposition's role 
and supported Long by preparing a brilliantly worded 
t 




Law to Long, copy, 6 Jan. 1915, B. L. P., 37/5/1. 
2Long 
to Bonar Law, 6 Jan. 1915, ibid., 36/1/7. 
3Memorandum 
by Long, 27 San. 1915, L. P., Add. MS. 62419. 
4Memorandum 
by Curzon, n. d., but clearly written in support 
of Long's memorandum, B. L. P., 36/2/46. 'The Secretary of 
State for War', Curzon complained, 'reads us exiguous 
memoranda of platitudes known to everybody, is acclaimed by 
the Liberal press as having delivered an almost inspired 
oration and scored off his impertinent antagonists, he inter- 
polates a curt affirmative or negative to the solitary speech 
to which he deigns to listen, and he then marches out and 
leaves the rest of the debate to colleagues who either affect 
to know nothing or screen their silence behind his authority. ' 
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Long averred that 'it should be stated definitely that 
the Opposition does not desire - and ... is not prepared 
to assent to -a Coalition Government', 
l 
and pointed out 
that by agreeing not to contest 
Conservative party had deprived 
powerful weapon possessed by an 
political controversy. He felt 
influence he was able to exert 
war and concluded that 'all the 
by-elections the 
itself of the most 
opposition to influence 
keenly the lack of real 
over the conduct of the 
advantages of the party 
truce remain with the Government. '2 Bonar Law declared 
that there could be no half-way house between the existing 
policy of very limited criticism without responsibility 
and full coalition. In Bonar Law's view, Long was trying - 
to have it both ways by demanding more information and 
more influence, yet shrinking from any suggestion of 
coalition. With some justification, Law maintained that 
the criticisms of Long, Curzon and Lansdowne led inexorably 
to coalition. 
3 What Boriar Law could not do, however, was 
ignore these strictures on the government. 
The first tangible. outcone of this growing Conservative 
disaffection was the appointment of the Unionist Business 
Committee (U. B. C. ) under Long's chairmanship, an official 
opposition group designed to give party malcontents 'some 
means of influencing the government without breaking the 
party truce. '4 Bonar Law very probably chose Long to head 
----- - ------ ---- ------- 
1Memorandum by Long, 27 Jan. 1915, L. P., Add. MS. 62419. 
2Ibid. 
3Bonar Law to Curzon, 29 Jan, 1915, C. P., MSS. Eur. F. 
112/96. 
4Ramsden, AZe_oP_Balfour_andBaldwin, p. 112. 
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the U. B. C. in order to channel his potentially divisive 
energies into constructive criticism. There can be no 
doubt that Long had become a serious nuisance to Bonar 
Law by January 1915, and whilst he was not the obvious 
candidate for the chairmanship of a committee whose 
primary function was to advise on matters of commerce and 
industry, Law could hardly afford to give the job to 
somebody else. 
The U. B. C. was formed in response to an invitation 
circulated by Ernest Pollock and Basil Peto, and it held 
its first meeting on Wednesday 27 January at 4.30 p. m. 
in the offices of the Irish Unionist Alliance. Meetings 
were originally scheduled for Thursdays at 5 p. m. in the 
House of Commons, but this time was later varied consid- 
erably to suit members. 
1 Early members included a signif- 
scant number of Long's personal followers, in particular 
Sir William Bull, who acted as parliamentary secretary 
to the committee, Sir Tarry Samuel and Lord Charles Beresford. 
1 
It should, however, be noted that leading tariff reformers 
like Edward Goulding and Professor W. A. S. Hewins, both 
of whom were prominent in the Chamberlain wing of the 
party, joined at the committee'd inception. The group 
also included a future prime minister, Stanley Baldwin. 
2 
The minute book, giving details of the U. B. C. 's meetings 
between 27 Jan. 1915 and 29 Feb. 1916, can be found in the 
Hewins Papers, Sheffield University Library, Box 26. 
2The first meeting was attended by the following: Long, 
Bull, J. G. Butcher, Lord Charles Beresford, Sir Harry Samuel, 
Major Hamilton, Colonel A. J. Sykes, A. F. Bird, Stanley 
Baldwin, Evelyn Cecil, Sir Alexander Henderson, Professor 
Hewins, Ernest Pollock, Basil Peto, J. F. Hope, A. Hamersley, 
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Over the months the U. B. C. was attended by numerous 
other backbenchers besides those involved in its formation, 
and it grew steadily in size and influence until it 
included most of the Conservative MPs not on active 
service, 
' though attendance at general meetings never 
exceeded forty. 
2 The committee was not primarily a 
pressure group through which Long exerted influence on 
the government and on his own party leaders. Rather, it 
gathered information and criticised government policy 
with the full blessing of Bonar Law, and when Long 
asserted in the Daily_Telegraph on 3 February, in an 
article probably drafted by Sir William Bull, that the 
committee would feel free to criticise government conduct 
of the war Bonar Law did not dissent. Certainly, the 
chairmanship does seem, temporarily at least, to have 
acted as an anodyne to Long's irritation, and after 
January 1915 there was a noticeable abatement of the 
trenchant memoranda byrwhich Long gave expression to his 
political discontent. 
3 
Even so, Long's hostility towards the Liberal cabinet 
t 
S. Samuel, Edward Goulding, R. E. Prothero, J. F. Mason, 
W. MacCaw, Almeric Paget, George Cave, W. Hume-Williams, 
and A. Shirley Benn. See U. B. C. minute book, Hewins Papers, 
Box 26. The names of the founding members also appeared in 
the Morning Post on 3 Feb. 1915. The executive committee 
comprised Long, Bull, Pollock, Hewins, Cave, Hope, Paget, 
Peto and Samuel. There were five sub-committees, one each 
for the study of wartime contraband, aliens, industry, 
supplies and employment. 
1W. A. S. Hewins, The_Apologaof an Imperialist, 2 Vols. (London, 1929), 2,11-12. _ 
2Stubbs, 'Impact of the Great War on the Conservative 
Party', pp. 23-4. 
3Evidence 
on the activities of the U. B. C. is very sketchy. 
The best account is Stubbs, 'Conservative Party and the Politic 
of War', pp. 124-33 and 160-8, to which I am indebted. 
Dr Stubbs shows that the U. B. C., despite published claims to 
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continued. He was rather more generous to Kitchener in 
his autobigraphy, describing him as 'that splendid 
specimen of the British race', 'the right man in the 
right place', 
1 than in his private correspondence, which 
expressed clear vexation with the Secretary of State for 
War. To Lady Londonderry Long wrote on 18 March: 'What 
an awful list of casualties! It makes one heartsick. I 
can't imagine why K., himself a soldier, allows so many 
to die ... 12 His anxieties were naturally increased by 
the fact that his two sons, Toby, a career soldier, and 
Eric, were on active service abroad. 
It has been seen that Long was inimical to the idea 
of a wartime coalition. Yet in May 1915 he agreed to 
take office as President of the Local Government Board 
and to sit in a cabinet; in which Liberal ministers still 
--- ' ------------- 
the contrary by both Long and Hewins, did not initiate 
debate on the munitions question. Rather, the U. B. C. took 
up the munitions iss1e only in the latter half of March 1915, 
by which time the question was already one for public debate. 
Dr Stubbs has concluded that 'the basic reason for the 
emergence of the Unionist Business Committee was t6 provide 
the party leadership with a manageable escape valve for the 
more energetic and restless backbenchers who chafed under 
the restraints of what they considered to be a totally 
unnatural political situation. ' Long gave an account of the 
U. B. C. in Memories. but his autobiography is frequently 
inaccurate. Sir Charles Petrie simply followed this account 
in Walter Lonoand_his Times. Hewins published his own 
version in The Apologia of_an_Imperialist, Volume 2, and there 
is some manuscript material amongst his papers. Sir William 
Bull kept press cuttings and there is some manuscript material 
amongst the new collection of his papers at Churchill College, 
Cambridge (See Bu. P., 4/11-14). 
1Memories, 
p. 216. 
2Long to Lady Londonderry, 18 Mar. 1915, L. L. P., D/Lo/ 
C 666(264). 
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predominated. How did this come about? Fortunately 
for Bonar Law, Long was confined to bed at Rood Ashton 
when the political crisis erupted, so that his power to 
influence events was somewhat diminished. 
1 
Long's 
absence no doubt contributed to Bonar Law's readiness 
to come to an arrangement with Asquith. Law knew that 
Long was. against a coalition and might choose to make 
trouble; Long gave no comfort and would offer no assur- 
ance that he would abide by his leader's decision. On 
the contrary, he made it plain on 12 May that he would 
remain outside: 'I only want to say that I hope you 
won't worry about whom you take with you. I would gladly 
'stand down''. 
2 
In other words, Long tried to impress 
on Bonar Law that there was not the slightest chance of 
his joining, hoping that the implicit threat of opposition 
from the backbenches would deter Bonar Law from running 
the risk of a party split. 
Two days later Law trLed to undermine Long's opposition 
by appealing to his sense of loyalty and promising that 
` 
any coalition would Pe 'constituted in such a way that 
we could feel that we should really be able to exert an 
effective influence over the conyduct of the war. 13 Long 
promptly suggested that Bonar Law capitalise on the public 
clamour for some form of national government to force 
1Long 
was suffering from eczema. He was so ill that he 
was unable to contemplate travelling to London. 'I am a 
prisoner in bed', he told Bull, ' clothed in lint and 
bandages from knee to neck! A most infernal nuisance. ' 
Long to Bull, 10 May 1915, Bu. P., 4/11. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 12 May 1915, B. L. P., 37/2/19. 
3Bonar Law to Long, 14 May 1915, L. P., Add. MS. 62404. 
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Asquith to prosecute the war with greater vigour, for 
this was all the Tory backbenchers required. 
1 Yet Long 
had already realised that he was powerless to prevent 
coalition. Writing from Rood Ashton on 19 May, Long now 
argued that there must be no appearance of haste in 
doing a deal with Asquith and that 'the allocation of 
offices is of even more importance than the selection of 
men. t2 
By 19 May, then, Long was beginning to accept the idea 
of a wartime coalition, albeit reluctantly and only 
because, confined to bed, he was isolated and unable to 
mount serious opposition. He changed tack gradually, 
intent on getting the best possible terms for the 
Conservatives if he could not prevent coalition altogether. 
He insisted that there should be a fair distribution of 
cabinet posts and that there was no reason why Bonar Law 
should extricate the Liberals from a crisis of their own 
making. He wanted the War Office given to a member of 
the Commons, describing Kitchener's reign as 'nothing 
short of a scandal', 
3 
t 
and he would have liked Asquith 
replaced as prime minister. For Long, the Liberals were 
'unscrupulous' and 'dishonest'. iHe suggested displacing 
Kitchener by making him Commander-in-Chief Home Forces 
and allowing him to retain his seat in cabinet so as to 
safeguard his public popularity; Long also subscribed to 
1Long to Bonar Law, 15 May 1915, B. L. P., 117/1/9. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 19 May 1915, ibid., 117/1/11. 
31bid. 
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the almost universal execration amongst Unionists of 
R. B. Haldane, insisting that there could be no place in 
the new government for the Lord Chancellor. 
' 
Yet Long had still not committed himself unequivocally 
to coalition, for there was also the question of his own 
position to be considered. As he pointed out to Bonar 
Law, the problem was one of finding enough posts to go 
round: I... you may easily find yourself with more horses 
than you have vacant stalls. '2 His offer to stand down 
contained a clear hint that he might oppose the new 
ministry, despite protestations of personal loyalty to 
Bonar Law: 
Believe me I shall be neither hurt nor disappointed. 
If this new Gov. is not to have a new policy then of 
what use is it going to be? And to be really useful 
it must be not too big and thoroughly united. I am 
not at all sure that I could not be of more service to 
3 
you out of rather than inside the Gov. 
On the following day, 21 May, Lo'ng again beseeched his 
leader to take a tough line in the negotiations with 
Asquith .4 
Long's real attitude towards coalition is indicated by 7 
two confidential letters which he wrote on Saturday 22 May. 
To Lady Londonderry he confirmed that 'I don't like 
Coalition. I don't believe it will work in practice and 
IIbid. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 20 May 1915, 
31bid. 





I can't bear the idea of Englishmen sitting in Conference 
with these double-dyed traitors. '1 On the same day he 
despatched a most extraordinary, not to say devious, 
letter to Asquith in a vain attempt to influence him to 
stay on as Liberal prime minister. Long asserted mendac- 
iously that the majority of Conservatives were on the 
whole satisfied with Asquith's record as war leader, 
desiring only to witness firmer national leadership from 
the government, particuLcLrly over compulsory military 
service. 
2 So desperate was Long to avoid a coalition in 
which the Unionists would be the weaker partners that he 
was prepared to make a secret appeal to Asquith, a prime 
minister for whom he had neither respect nor admiration, 
to stay on. Just two days earlier Long had promised 
Bonar Law that he would abide by any decision which his 
leader might take. 
3 
He was, nonetheless, prudent enough 
to pledge himself to Asquith to support the government 
whatever the outcome ofithe negotiations, 
4 
realising that 
to attack the notion of coalition too forcibly might be 
to guarantee his ownrexclusion from the cabinet. 
Meanwhile, on that same Saturday, 22 May 1915, Bonar Law 
met the Liberal leaders to discuss the allocation of posts 
in the new government. Long's position was naturally a 
central topic for consideration. Frances Stevenson's 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 22 May 1915, L. L. P., D/Lo/ 
C 666(267). 
2Long to Asquith, copy, 22 May 1915, L. P., Add. MS. 62404. 
3Long to Bonar Law, 20 May 1915, B. L. P., 117/1/12. 
4Long to Asquith, copy, 22 May 1915, loc. cit. 
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account of the meeting, recorded two days later after a 
conversation with Lloyd George, reveals the sensitivity 
with which Bonar Law regarded his own position: 
The question ... came up of Mr. Walter Long. B. Law 
said there was a very strong feeling in the Tory party 
that he should become a. member of the new Cabinet & 
that there would be discord if he did not. Where, then, 
should he go? B. Law said he felt certain he would not 
accept a minor office.... Mr. Balfour then suggested 
that ... he 
(Balfour) would be quite satisfied with a 
nominal post in the Cabinet - say Lord President of the 
Council - which would leave the Admiralty free for Mr. A. 
Chamberlain, &a vacancy for Long. '0h no! ', said B. Law 
instantly. 'I could not have that. It would be putting 
him above me in status, which could not possibly be 
allowed! '1 
Even more illuminating is Maurice Bonham-Carter's account: 
B. L. ... was very frank about X 
[Long] 
, simply regarding 
him as a necessary evil being likely to cause more 
difficulties outside Ithan within the Cabinet.... 
X he 
says, though useless. in Counsel is the most popular 
man in the Tory party -a position he has gained by 
persistent cadgingtand lobbying. B. L. has no illusions 
about his own position in the party, frankly recognising 
that he is a compromise. 
2 
But what post was Long to be offered? That weekend was 
the Whitsun holiday weekend and Sir William Bull and his 
1Frances Stevenson's diary, 24 May 1915. A. J. P. Taylor, 
ed., Lloyd GeorgeZ A Diary by Frances Stevenson (London, 
1971), p. 54. - -- 
2 Bonham-Carter to Violet Asquith, n. d. but clearly written 
soon after the meeting of 22 May 1915, quoted in Violet 
Bonham-Carter, Winston Churchill As I Knew Him (London, 1965), 
p. 406. 
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wife stayed with Long at Rood Ashton. Long had been 
promised that Lord Edmund Talbot would travel down to 
keep him informed of developments, but Talbot had not 
turned up by Friday evening, so Long knew nothing of 
the discussions arranged for Saturday. Before leaving 
for Wiltshire Bull had been closely questioned by Bonar 
Law and Austen Chamberlain as to Long's condition. 
Failing to perceive the object of these solicitations, 
Bull remarked that Long was very ill and in great pain 
and discomfort. 
1 Thus, Bonar Law knew that Long would 
definitely be out of the way over the weekend. On 
Saturday Bull telephoned Asquith from Rood Ashton, but 
was unable to get hold of the prime minister. Much to 
Long's annoyance, that day's newspapers commented that 
his health was too bad to allow acceptance of anything 
other than a minor office. 
Early on Saturday evening Bull again telephoned London, 
managing this time to speak to Bonar Law. The negotiations 
with the Liberals had been concluded and Long's fate 
decided upon, but Bonar Law would say nothing. Instead, 
he declared that Talbot would be leaving Paddington for 
Rood Ashton first thing in the morning. 
2 
For Long and 
his guests, Saturday evening was passed in suspense. 
Talbat had been instructed, to try to buy Long off with 
the Board of Agriculture and to increase the offer to the 
- ----- --- - --- 
1Bull's diary, 26 May 1915 (relating to the events of 
21-25 May 1915), Bu. P., 4/11. 
2Ibid. 
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Local Government Board only if necessary. Bull's diary 
relates what happened next: 
I met Edmund Talbot at the Station. All I have to 
offer him is the Board of Agriculture said he - How 
do you think he will take it he asked me as we came 
back in the motor. 
I do not think he will look at it: - It was an office 
he created and occupied 20 years ago: - 
Shall you speak to him before lunch - There will be 
only 10 minutes I said - 
Yes said Edmund I had better get it over: - 
Long refused Agriculture - but finally accepted the 
Local Government Board. 
' 
Long accepted office against the advice of Bull, who 
wanted him to stay out and assume the leadership of the 
opposition in parliament, but, as Bull realised only too 
well, 'if you appeal to Long's patriotism you can do 
anything with him. '2 Money seems also to have been a 
factor. Lady Doreen's" reaction to Talbot's news is 
revealing: 'If we took Agriculture Walter would be £500 
a year to the bad because he would have to give up £2,500 
C 
worth of Director's fees. '3 But Long did not lightly 
abandon his claims to an important-office. As early as 
---------- - ---- 
1Ibid. 2Ibid. 
31bid. Certainly, Long's finances were in a parlous 
state at this time. A few months earlier he had confided 
to Bull: 'I am obliged to make heavy reductions, a great 
part of my income having failed, temporarily only I hope. ' 
See Long to Bull, 22 Feb-. 1915, Bu. P., 4/11. Bull believed 
that the higher salary of the Local Government Board was a 
factor of considerable importance. See Bull's diary, 
'Retrospect for the first half of 1915', Bu. P., 4/11. The 
Local Government Board carried a salary of £5,000 p. a., 
whereas the President of the Board of Agriculture received 
only £2,000 p. a. 
t 
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17 May Austen Chamberlain had suggested that Long would 
'really make an excellent Home Secretary', 
1 
and on 
Sunday afternoon Long pressed his claim, writing to 
Bonar Law that he would feel it 'acutely' if he did not 
receive a Secretaryship of State, even remarking pointedly 
that 'we know all about the leadership. '2 On the 
following day Long made a direct approach to Asquith 
with the clear intimation that he would like to be offered 
the Home Office. He stated plainly that although he would 
be pleased to join the government at the Local Government 
Board he felt 'obliged to consider what will be the view 
of those friends with whom I have worked for many years', 
especially as 'there is a widespread opinion that somebody 
else should try their hand' as Home Secretary. 
3 
In the event, Sir John Simon went to the Home Office 
and Long returned to the Local Government Board after an 
absence of just over ten years. If Long had managed to 
get the job which he wanted not only would he have been 
able to exercise considerable control over the war on the 
home front, but he would have occupied a much more senior 
post in the coalition than Bonar Law. Long would have 
been regarded as the foremost Unionist in the government 
-a very strong position from which to conduct business 
with the leaders of both pjLrties. 
Anxious to keep control of the war in the hands of his 
-Chamberlain to Bonar Law, 17 May 1915, B. L. P., 37/2/37. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 23 May 1915, ibid., 50/3/39. 
3Long to Asquith, 24 May 1915, A. P., MS. Asquith 16/165-8. 
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own followers, Asquith refused to give the Home Office 
to a Unionist, just as he refused to give the Exchequer 
to a Unionist. Sir John Simon was well known to hold 
views quite at odds with those of Long. Amongst other 
things, he was renowned as an opponent of military 
compulsion, whereas Long was its staunch champion. Simon's 
appointment was deliberately and delicately balanced 
against Long's at the Local Government Board, a department 
whose functions might overlap with the Home Office but 
which could never play such a decisive part in determining 
war policy. From Asquith's point of view, Long's appoint- 
ment was a skilful manoeuvre. Long had held the post 
before and his experience indicated that he would prove 
a more than capable wartime administrator. Asquith could 
not leave Long out altogether, otherwise he ran the risk 
that parliamentary opposition to the coalition would 
continue, despite Bonar Law's allegiance. And Long's 
shaky loyalty to Bonar-Law might at any time prove of 
value in helping Asquith to keep the Unionist leadership 
in check. From the & rime minister's point of view, then, 
Long's appointment was a judicious piece of political 
balancing, l 
And so, a semblance of political unity was restored. 
As Long told Sir Edward Carson on 25 May: 'I would support 
the D1 himself as P. M., with a Cabinet of his pet angels, 
if they would adopt compulsion all round and prosecute the 
For a discussion of Asquith's 'balancing operation' in 
May 1915 see Gollin, Proconsul in Politics, pp. 259-66. 
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war with vigour. 'l Certainly, Long made no secret of 
his view that there must be compulsion if the war was to 
be won. 
2 So far, the Tory backbenchers had been kept in 
the dark. Bonar Law and Lansdowne tried to explain their 
reasons for supporting a coalition at a party meeting 
held at the Carlton Club on 26 May. 
3 There was by no 
means unanimous support, with Lords Lovat and Willoughby 
de Broke openly denouncing the arrangement unless there 
was a firm guarantee of conscription. But the party was 
presented with a 'fait accompli'; it had little choice 
but to acquiesce in a decision which had been taken with- 
out either its knowledge or its approval. For once, Bonar 
Law had outmanoeuvred Long and the serried ranks of 
Conservative backbenchers, although he had in his turn 
been outmanoeuvred by the politically more adroit Asquith. 
The manner in which the coalition had been brought into 
being was hardly auspicious. Long was a reluctant convert. -- 
He had placed his sense of duty and patriotism above his 
4' 
inclination to secure real power both for himself and for 
his party. If he had been given a more important` office 
he might perhaps have been prepared to forget past differences 
As it was, he felt let down by Bonar Law, and it wäs not 
------------------------- 
1Long 
to Carson, 25 May 1915, quoted in Colvin, Life of 
Carson, 3,50-1. 
2Sir Robert Sanders recorded: 'I learnt ... from Edmund [Talbot, that the Unionist leaders went in without any 
guarantee as to National Service. But Walter Long said 
quite openly in conversation that of course we must have it; 
else we might as well try to make peace right away. ' Sanders 
diary, 13 Sept. 1915. 
3For 
an official account of the meeting see The Times, 
27 May 1915. See also Stubbs, 'Conservative Party and the 
Politics of War', pp. 201-4. 
I 
230 
long before he began to jib at the restraints imposed 
by his new-found responsibilities. Above all, he was 
bitter that Bonar Law had failed to assert the right of 
the Conservatives to a greater share of cabinet offices 
and greater influence in the day to day running of the 
war. He continually pressed Bonar Law to insist on 
being Leader of the House whenever Asquith was absent, 
instead of meekly accepting that the task would fall 
automatically to Lloyd George or McKenna. The situation, 
he maintained, was 'an unsatisfactory one, and we cannot 
wonder that it makes our friends seriously discontented 
and alarmed. '1 
Long's own view of the uneasy relations in the new - 
cabinet is apparent from. a letter which he wrote to Lady 
Londonderry on 29 May: 'The Cabinet went off quite well. 
No black eyes!... We are all agreed and will pull together 
whereas they have evidently been at sixes and sevens. None 
of them seem to know nothing: ' (sic)2 And Walter Runciman 
gave Charles Hobhouse the following description of the 
Unionists in cabinet: C 
Carson very adroit and resourceful; B. Law ineffective r 
and puny, and openly flouted by Curzon; Lansdowne most 
useful; Chamberlain insignificant and unsuggestive; Long, 
very quarrelsome; the P. M. on the defensive, very appre- 
hensive, and at last alive to the consequence of his 
---------------- 
1Memorandum by Long, n. d., probably June 1915, W. L. P., 
WRO 947/496. 
2Long to Lady Londonderry, 29 May 1915, L. L. P., D/Lo/ 
C 666(268). 
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slothfulness and timidity. 
' 
Long was, however, astute enough to offer repeated 
declarations of loyalty to Asquith, impressing upon the 
prime minister that he was 'prepared to support any 
policy if it is determined and consistent. '2 Immersed 
in his work at the Local Government Board and convinced 
that, for the moment at least, there was no alternative 
to Asquith, Long served for just over eighteen months 
under a prime minister whom for years he had done his 
best to remove from office and in a cabinet which contained 
3 
several of his most notable political enemies. 
Long was from the first doubtful as to the wisdom of 
the Dardanelles expedition, suspecting that Churchill was 
the victim of his own temerity. Writing to the prime 
minister, Long tried to introduce a note of caution: 'I, 
for one, hold strongly that before we finally decide what 
is to be the ultima tfe scope of ... operations we ought to 
consider the campaigns in Flanders and the Dardanelles 
together and take careful stock of our resources. t4 Long's 
1Hobhouse's diary, 22 June 1915, in Edward David, ed., 
Inside As uith's Cabinet: From the Diaries-of-Charles 
-------- - -- - ------------ Hobhouse London, 1977), p. 249. 
2Long to Asquith, copy, 18 July 1915, L. P., Add. MS. 62404. 
3Particularly 
unsuited to government in wartime in Long's 
opininion were McKenna, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir 
John Simon, the new Home Secretary, and Augustine Birrell, 
who retained the Irish Office. Kitchener's retention of the 
War Office was a major irritation. 
4Long to Asquith, copy, 19 June 1915, L. P., Add. MS. 62404. 
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anxiety was increased by the fact that his younger son, 
Eric, had been sent to Gallipoli, 
' 
and when news of the 
appalling casualty list came in he reacted angrily: 
... the Dardanelles is awful: now is the time to fix 
the responsibility, but there is a terrible burden on 
somebody's shoulders: we ... have only to realise the 
facts and press on with vigour tempered by discretion. 
2 
Always opposed to needless loss of life, Long never 
believed that the expedition could achieve results which 
, would in any way compensate for the cost in men and money. 
Nor was he prepared to throw more men away in a futile 
attempt to retrieve the situation. 
By August 1915 he was convinced that withdrawal was the 
only sensible option. In a memorandum circulated to his 
colleagues Long argued that 
... to strengthen our Forces in 
be able to relieve men worn out 
by fatigue is, in my opinion, ,t 
and I am opposed to anything of 
fight without losing lives, but 
the risks ... 
3 t 
the Dardanelles and to 
by fighting and exhausted 
o send men to their death, 
the kind. We cannot 
... we can ... minimise 
He did his best to persuade Bonair Law to take a stand in 
cabinet, telling his leader on 14 October that 'We must 
get out of Gallipoli. Now, is the chance and the moment. 14 
-- - ------------------ 
1See Long to Lady Londonderry, 5 June 1915, L. L. P., D/Lo/ 
C 666(269). 
2Long to Lady Londonderry, 23 June 1915, ibid., D/Lo/ 
C 666(271). 
3Memorandum by Long, dated 'August 1915', L. P., Add. MS. 
62420. 
4Long to Bonar Law, 14 Oct. 1915, B. L. P., 117/1/21. 
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Three days later he promised Sir Edward Carson that 
'nothing will induce me to give my sanction to sending 
more troops to share the fate of these gallant fellows 
who have been so ruthlessly sacrificed on the Peninsula. "l 
When Bonar Law finally decided to stand out for evacuation 
Long gave his wholehearted support, though he insisted 
that resignation would be a useless gesture. In the end, 
the Gallipoli campaign was abandoned; the last beach at 
Helles was evacuated on 8 January 1916. Churchill was 
disgraced, although when he resigned from the government 
in November 1915 Long wrote magnanimously: 'You have 
borne much misrepresentation with dignity and self-restraint 
&I am certain you will maintain this attitude to the end. 
I wish you the best of luck in your new role whatever it 
may be. ' The episode hardly strengthened Long's loyalty 
2 
to the coalition. 
Indeed, although Long's inclusion in Asquith's cabinet 
stifled his public opposition hg continued to believe that 
the government's prosecution of the war was feeble. He 
commented to Carsonrin August 1915 that 'it cannot be 
said that the Government have as yet made any supreme 
effort.... Nobody out of Bedlam would expect us in two 
months to clear up the mess made in the preceding nine 
months ... '3 He persisted'in the view that Bonar Law, 
and not Lloyd George, should be Leader of the House in 
- --- - -- - ---- - ------ 
1Long to Carson, copy, 17 Oct. 1915, L. P., Add. MS. 62420. 
2Long to Churchill, 14 Nov. 1915, quoted in Gilbert, 
Churchill, Volume Three, Companion (part II), p. 1263. 
3Long 
to Carson, 7 Aug. 1915, quoted in Colvin, Life of 
Carson, 3,70. 
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the event of Asquith's absence. Recognising that Law 
would never insist on the job for himself, Long made the 
request directly to Asquith in September, noting that 
there was 'strong feeling among the rank and file of our 
Party that the change ought to be made. '1 
He soon found not only that the Conservatives lacked 
power in the coalition but that they often lacked adequate 
information as well. Interestingly, he strongly dis- 
approved of the government's failure to keep the public 
properly informed and he deprecated the suppression of 
The Globe for a fortnight after the paper had, on 6 
November, asserted that Kitchener was on the point of 
resignation over Gallipoli. He could see no justification 
for curtailing public discussion or for withholding news, 
even bad news. Secrecy within government was particularly 
galling. On 19 October he expressed these grievances to 
Asquith: 
... I am convinced there is too much ... concealment 
both within and without the Cabinet and nothing but 
good can follow iftthere is greater frankness. Papers 
are withheld which ought to be circulated. This has 
certainly been the case at the Y 
W. O. in regard to_the 
Dardanelles ... and it frequently happens in Cabinet 
that reference is made to papers which have never reached 
many of the Members. The same thing applies in the 
2 
circulation of information to the House and the Public. 
1Long to Asquith, copy, 18 Sept. 1915, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
498. 
2Long to Asquith, copy, 19 Oct. 1915, ibid., WRO 947/497. 
235 
Just as Long had criticised both Balfour and Bonar Law 
for weak leadership, so he criticised Asquith for the 
policy of 'Wait and See'. He was far from reluctant to 
make his views known, and he bombarded the prime minister 
with unsolicited advice. His tone could be blunt, his 
prose mordant. The following, addressed to Maurice Bonham- 
Carter on 1 November 1915, is typical: 
It may be an impertinence to criticise but I risk it! 
-I have always thought the Prime Ministers did not 
command the Cabinets sufficiently.... He is master and 
the more he orders the better I believe things will go, 
especially at a time like this.... I believe Parliament 
and Country want more 'ordering'. 
1 
It cannot be said that Long ever gave his full support 
to Asquith; he was at best an uneasy partner in an uneasy 
coalition. December found him extremely irritated at the 
continuation of the Plural Voting Bill, a contentious 
measure which Long believed shoud be abandoned in the 
interests of coalition unity. lie understood Bonar Law's 
weak spots, for he frequently pointed out that 'the Party 
ought to have been consulted before we agreed to join 
Asquith and not afterwards? 
2 
- this was a sore point with 
Long for the rest of his career. Bonar Law was curtly 
informed that 'more leadership, control, and discipline' 
3 
were required. Unfair. distribution of patronage 
1Long to Bonham-Carter, 1 Nov. 1915, A. P., MS Asquith 15/ 
86-8 (Long's underlining). 




appointments, especially to Irish Unionists, was another 
frequently voiced complaint, and just before Christmas 
Long wrote officially to Bonar Law on the subject, 
formally requesting that his objections be brought to 
the attention of the prime minister. 
1 Apart from the 
major issue of confusion and muddle in the running of 
the war, symbolised by Kitchener's continued occupation 
of the War Office, the new year provided an assortment 
of trivial grievances, all of which hardened Long's 
attitude against Asquith as leader of a nation at war. 
2 
Clearly, he would continue to support Asquith only until 
such time as an alternative leader might emerge. 
The Local Government Board was a department with whose 
functions and conventions Long was thoroughly familiar; 
he had been its servant, in the capacity of both parliamentary 
'See Long to Bonar Law, two letters dated 20 Dec. 1915, one 
for Law only and ones to be passed to Asquith, B. L. P., 52/1/46. 
The fact that this second letter is to be found amongst Law's 
papers, and not amongst Asquith's, suggests that it never 
found its way to the prime minister. For Long's views on 
Irish Unionist attitudes to the coalition see W. L. P., WRO 947/271. 
2A 
memorandum dated 24 Jan. 1916 provides adequate testimony 
to Long's mounting irritation: he objected to the Honours 
List on the ground that Conservatives did not receive their due; he disliked the promotion of Leverton Harris to the 
Privy Council; he opposed the election of Admiral Sir Hedworth Meux at Portsmouth, insisting that a Unionist should have been given the seat - Meux had last contested a seat at Newcastle in 1900, when he had stood as a Liberal. Long's 
memorandum may be found in B. L. P., 52/2/46. 
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secretary and President, on two previous occasions. The 
appointment neither reflected Long's seniority nor 
satisfied his ambition. For the most part the work was 
administrative: it filled Long's time, but offered 
scant reward to a politician who had proved his adminis- 
trative competence over a decade earlier. 
There was, however, one area in which Long was able to 
exercise considerable influence over war policy. This 
was the question of conscription, 
1 
and here Long proved 
adept at tailoring government policy to the political 
dummy of the moment. He had been an advocate of compul- 
sory national service even in peacetime and it is hardly 
surprising that he pushed for 'Mobilization of the Nation' 
- Long always preferred this term, with its connotations 
of military and civilian service, to the more usual 
'conscription' or 'compulsion' - from the moment that war 
began. Regardless of the military situation Long believed 
that conscription was necessary mark of the government's 
commitment to fight the war to the end. He-also argued 
for compulsion on simple grounds of economy: it was 
------ - ------ -- ------ 
1There have been numerous studies of the battle over 
conscription during the First World War. Denis Hayes, 
Conscrintion_ Conflict (London, 1949), is useful, though 
now outdated. The Derby Scheme has been considered by 
Roy Douglas, 'Voluntary Enlistment in the First World War', 
Journal of Modern History 42 (1970), as well as by Randolph 
Churchill in Lord Derby Kiof Lancashire. John Rae, 
Con eand Politics (London, 1970), although concent- 
rating on the experience of the conscientious objector, gives 
a thorough account of the work of the Local Government Board, 
and Dr John Stubbs provides a comprehensive and scholarly 
account of the political genesis of the Military Service Acts 
in 'The Conservative Party and the Politics of War'. 
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cheaper to take single men than married men;. it was 
ludicrous to allow married men to enlist, obliging the 
government to pay separation allowances as well as 
gratuities and pensions in the event of death or injury, 
whilst single men stayed at home. 
But although Long was a keen supporter of conscription 
he was always aware that the ramifications of compulsion 
reached far beyond the mere supply of men for the military. 
It was for this reason that, as the member of Asquith's 
cabinet directly responsible for manpower, Long frequently 
allowed his own views to be overridden by political 
considerations. He took care to distance himself from 
the more extreme advocates of national service, namely 
Milner, Amery, F. S. Oliver and their supporters, regarding 
their approach as politically naive. 
The compulsionists in the cabinet were most strongly 
represented by the somewhat curious alliance of Long, 
Curzon and Lloyd George. Their1first victory was over 
the setting up of a register to enable the government to 
calculate the number of men who would be available in the 
future should conscription be decided upon. On 3 June 
1915 Long circulated a draft National Registration Bill. 
pressing his colleagues to agree on 'a atrong and simple 
scheme of mobilisation of the nation. '1 There was strong 
opposition in the cabinet, but as Long repeatedly emphasised 
that there were no military requirements whatsoever in the 
1Note by Long, 3 June 1915, P. R. O., CAB 37/129/8; David 
Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 6 Vols. (London, 1933-36), 2, 
716-7. -- 
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proposed legislation it was decided to proceed. - 
Long's 
Bill was placed before parliament on 5 July; it was 
carried by a large majority. By the end of the month 
the National Register had been set up, a first step on 
the road to conscription. 
Although Long reassured the prime minister on 18 July 
that he had no intention of orchestrating a campaign 
for conscription, 
1 he was far from satisfied and thought 
that the autumn would be a good time to announce a decision 
in favour of compulsion. Long was sure that opposition 
in the country would be a lot less vocal than amongst 
Liberal MPs. By August he had prepared a confidential 
cabinet memorandum in which he stated his views forcefully. 
After listing clearly all the arguments in favour of 
compulsion, Long's ratiocination concluded with the 
observation that 'voluntaryism fails when it places square 
pegs in round holes. '2 This memorandum was not circulated, -- 
on the advice of Lord Lansdowne, who pressed Asquith on 
the same subject that very day, 5 August, and who thought 
it wise to wait before making a fuss. 
3 Bonar Law, too, 
requested Long to hold his memorandum back, at least for 
the time being. 
4 This hesitati(n on Longts part stemmed 
not from any reluctance to rock the boat, but from the 
realisation that the House, of Commons might refuse to 
1See Long to Asquith, copy, 18 July 1915, L. P., Add. MS. 
62404. 
2Memorandum by Long, 5 Aug. 1915, W. L. P., WRO 947/497. 
3Lansdowne to Long, 5 Aug. 1915, ibid. 
4Bonar Law to Long, 6 Aug. 1915, ibid. 
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endorse compulsion unless and until the War Office 
declared that the voluntary system was not producing 
enough men. Arguments concerning the moral obligation 
of all citizens during wartime and the economic allocation 
of manpower might not on their own be sufficient, a fact 
which Long himself acknowledged a month later. 
1 He 
preferred to bide his time than to risk defeat. 
In tacit recognition of the pressure which Long and 
his fellow-compulsionists were exerting, Asquith appointed 
Lord Derby Director of Recruiting on 5 October. As Vice- 
President of the National Service League since 1904, 
Derby's appointment has justly been described as 'an 
exceedingly astute political move by Asquith; it spiked 
the public guns of the compulsionists for over two months. '2 
It also gave rise to the Derby Scheme, a canvas of all 
men of military age carried out during October and 
November 1915.3 But the compulsionists tried to force 
Asquith's hand, meeting at Curzon's house on 14 October 
1See Long to Curzon, copy, 19 Sept. 1915, ibid. ' 
2Stubbs, 'Conservative Party and the Politics of War', 
p. 248. 
3A 'Joint Recruiting Committee,. ', using the information 
collected by Long's National Register, asked every man 
between the ages of eighteen and forty-one, and resident in 
England, Wales or Scotland, to pledge himself to volunteer 
when called upon. They were divided into three groups 
according to age and maritdl status. Young, single men were 
to be the first to be asked to honour their pledge. Those 
men who took the pledge were known as 'attested men'. The 
Derby Scheme has been described as 'one of those shot-gun 
weddings between the fair maid of Liberal idealism and the 
ogre of Tory militarism ... for which Asquith's last ministry 
provided peculiarly efficient brokerage. ' Arthur Marwick, 
The Deluge: British Society and the First World War (London, 
1965), p. 77. -- -- - 
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to decide a joint strategy. 
l Faced with the threat of 
Unionist withdrawal from the government, probably 
supported by Churchill and Lloyd George, Asquith acceded 
to the compulsionists' demands: the Derby Scheme would 
be given six weeks, then there would be conscription. 
Nor did Long have much time for the proposal to raise 
more recruits by having the King make a personal appeal. 
This, he believed, was shirking the issue and could at 
best result in 'a temporary spurt which would lead to 
false conclusions ... '2 Long also pointed out to Lord 
Stamfordham, the King's principal private secretary, that 
George V risked making an appeal only to suffer the 
ignominy of failing to obtain the necessary men. 
By December compulsion had become the price which Asquith 
must pay if he wished to hold his cabinet together. Long 
was therefore placed in charge of a cabinet committee and 
instructed to draft a bill for the conscription of single -- 
men. On 28 December tIe cabinet approved the bill, with 
McKenna and Runciman immediately announcing their intention 
1Long 
certainly attended this meeting, as he explained 
his presence in a letter to Bonar Law dated 17 Oct. 1915, 
B. L. P., 51/4/18. See also Petrie. Walter Long, pp. 202-3; 
Winston Churchill, in The World 'Crisis, 6 Vols. (London, 
1923-31), 3,238, asserted that there were nine at the 
meeting, and John Stubbs, 'Conservative Party and the Politics 
of War', pp. 252-3, has concluded that eight of the nine were 
Long, Lloyd George, Curzon] Churchill, Bonar Law, Lansdowne, 
Selborne and Austen Chamberlain. The author admits that this 
identification is 'partly guesswork', and it is certainly 
curious that Long should have found it necessary three days 
later to explain his reasons for attending to Bonar Law if 
both men had been present. 
2Long to Stamfordham, copy, 15 Oct. 1915, W. L. P., WRO 
947/497. 
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to resign. Long wrote privately: 'We hear that Simon, 
McKenna and Runciman mean to resign, I don't believe it, 
but I don't care if the first two do, they would be no 
loss. I should be sorry for Runciman's loss, he is a 
very capable man ... 11 In the event, only Simon resigned, 
but Long still did not get the Home Office. 
Just three weeks after the cabinet committee's appoint- 
ment, on 5 January 1916, Long's Military Service Bill 
was presented to parliament. Much to Long's disappoint- 
ment the bill did not include Ireland, for Asquith 
preferred to upset his Conservative colleagues and the 
Irish Unionists than risk trouble in the Commons from 
the Nationalists and in Ireland from the Roman Catholic 
Church. It fell to Long to handle the bill in the House, 
a task which, it was almost universally agreed, he 
performed with rare parliamentary skill and tact. The 
Military Service Act, applying only to single men and 
containing provision for appeal by conscientious objectors, 
came into effect on 1 March. For Long, as for many in 
the Conservative par, 4y, it was not enough: it was a 
political compromise conceded by a prime minister who had 
no choice. The compulsionists 
would be satisfied only 
when a general scheme of military service had been put 
into operation. 
Yet Long was aware that conscription carried problems 
of its own, and he saw universal military service as only 
- ---- - --------- - --- - 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 29 Dec. 1915, L. L. P., D/Lo/ 
C 666(283). 
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a part of a thorough overhaul of the recruiting system. 
He recommended special re-engagement terms for men with 
previous service, a special 'fast promotion' scheme for 
officers of the regular Army, improved training facilities, 
and changes in personnel at the War Office. Above all, 
Long was worried that the introduction of conscription 
would encourage a spirit of amateurism in the Army. On 
3 February 1916 he told Asquith that whatever the exigencies 
of war the government could never be justified 'in sending 
out crowds of men whose only claim to be called soldiers 
is that they are dressed in khaki. '1 Moreover, 'to send 
soldiers who are unfit to lead is not only unjust to 
'2 them but is very little short of murder ... 
Pressure for general compulsion continued to build up 
on Asquith throughout the spring of 1916. By April the 
Army Council, at the behest of General Robertson, himself 
acting in collusion with Lloyd George, was prepared to -- 
state that universal conscription was now essential. Long, 
meanwhile, had rallied his backbench support, and on 9 
April he stated his demands to the prime minister: 
We must have more compulsion. We must take single men 
first. We must next take younger married men with 
smaller encumbrances. We must popularise the Army, do 
justice to officers of all kinds. We must give increased 
pay or a bonus to re-engaged men. 
3 
------ - ------- 
1Memorandum by Long, 3 Feb. 1916, A. P., MS Asquith 124/53-8. 
2Ibid. 
3Long to Asquith, 9 Apr. 1916, A. P., MS Asquith 30/11. 
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Long also believed that the root of the trouble lay with 
War Office methods of recruitment, as did Lord Derby. 
1 
Of Kitchener Long remarked: 'It is always the same with 
him, he won't wait and consider a question quietly and 
give a deliberate opinion about it, but jumps in with 
his "Yes" or "No" and so entirely destroys his authority 
in Cabinet.? 
2 
Convinced that he faced a party revolt fanned by Long, 
Bonar Law told Asquith that the government would have to 
proceed with general compulsion. The prime minister now 
had to contend with the opposition of the Army Council, 
Milner in the Lords, Carson, who had resigned from the 
government in November 1915, in the Commons, and Long, 
Lloyd George and Bonar Law in the cabinet. Despite these 
seemingly overwhelming odds Asquith managed to cobble 
together another compromise: compulsion would be adopted 
only if existing measures failed to provide 50,000 men 
by 27 May and 15,000 per week thereafter 
3 
i 
These proposals were discussed in a secret session of 
the Commons on 25 and 26 April, with Long acting as 
government spokesman on the second day. His heart was 
not in it: he made an unusually disastrous speech'. 
4 When, 
on the next day, he tried to introduce the government's 
For Derby's dissatisfaction with recruiting methods see 
Derby to Asquith, 13 Mar., 14 Mar., and 23 Mar. 1916, and 
Derby to Long, 26 Mar. and 27 Mar. 1916, W. L. P., WRO 947/497. 
2Long to French, copy, 20 Apr. 1916, ibid. 
3Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2,730-1; Stubbs, 'Conservative 
Party and the Politics of War', pp. 309-10. 
4See Austen Chamberlain to Mrs. Chamberlain, 26 Apr. 1916, 
A. C. P., AC 6/1/201. 
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proposals he was howled down by an extremely hostile 
opposition, led by Carson. Leo Amery condemned the 
measure as 'a most absurd, ramshackle Bill', 
1 
a description 
with which Long privately would have agreed. As government 
spokesman he found himself obliged to defend a position 
which he knew to be indefensible. He had both expected 
and hoped for serious parliamentary opposition, opposition 
which would force Asquith to give in. 
2 
After this parliamentary 'debacle' Long suggested that 
Asquith seriously consider reconstructing the government 
and calling it 'National'. 
3 Finally, on the 29th, Asquith 
accepted that he was beaten: the cabinet decided to 
introduce general conscription at the earliest possible 
date. It again fell to Long to take charge in the 
Commons, a task which he accepted readily. On 25 May 1916 
the second Military Service Act became law. For the first 
time since the days of Oliver Cromwell there was general 
military compulsion in {Britain«4 
Until Asquith's government fell in December 1916 it 
became Long's duty tto administer the legislation. By far 
- -------------- 
1Amery Diaries: Volume One, 271 Apr. 1916, p. 128'. 
2Austen Chamberlain reported to his wife that 'Asquith 
and Long regarded the battle as lost before the forces 
engaged ... ' See Austen Chamberlain to Mrs. Chamberlain, 
28 Apr. 1916, A. C. P., AC 6/1/204. 
3Long to Asquith, copy, 28 Apr. 1916, W. L. P., WRO 947/497. 
4Both 
sides during the English civil war practised impress- 
ment. After the Restoration of 1660 an obligation to serve 
in the Militia remained, but the actual numbers who served 
were determined by parish quotas and a system of ballots. 
The wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth century were all 
fought by volunteers. A detailed study of the passage of 
the two Military Service Bills through parliament can be 
found in John Rae, Conscience_and_Politics, pp. 22-52. 
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the most thorny problem was that of dealing with 
conscientious objectors. Long believed personally that 
all citizens were obliged to serve their country, 
militarily if the state so demanded, in time of war, but 
he was pragmatic enough to recognise that if Asquith was 
to retain the support of the Liberal backbenches, then 
the Military Service Act must contain provision for 
conscientious objection. Having accepted this necessity, 
Long did his best to deal with conscientious objectors 
with total impartiality and precisely within the terms 
of the Act. He was the recipient of much criticism 
directed against the partiality and prejudice of the 
local tribunals empowered to hear individual cases. Often 
he concluded that the tribunal's findings were not consis- 
tent with the wording of the Act, with the government's 
intentions, and even with the directions of the Local 
Government Board issued under his own authority. Some 
measure of Long's difficulties can be gleaned from the 
fact that on 27 March he felt it necessary to convene a 
conference of all appeal tribunal chairmen at which he 
stated categorically that absolute exemption could, 
under the terms of the Act, be granted on purely conscien- 
tious grounds. Yet some local tribunals continued to 
flout the law; Long dould do nothing about it. 
1 
A recent student of conscientious objection during the 
First World War has concluded that Long brought to the 




achievement was to establish by his own example an 
impartial and common sense approach to the discussions ...: 
it was characteristic of his attitude that when it was 
suggested that no one with strong anti-conscriptionist 
views should be appointed to the tribunals, he replied 
that in that case he would be compelled to bar anybody 
who held views in favour of compulsory military service. r 
Long's mistake, it has been suggested, was to put his 
faith in the good judgement of local bodies. 
2 After the 
war he regretted both that the government had allowed any 
exemptions and that local tribunals had been permitted 
to decide doubtful cases. 
3 
On 5 June 1916 the "Hampshire" was sunk and Lord 
Kitchener was drowned, the only British cabinet minister 
to perish during the war as a direct consequence of enemy 
action. This sudden tragedy raised the question of his 
replacement. Sir Max Aitken is supposed to have overheard 
the generals at the War Office planning to propose Long 
or 'some second rate politician who could be trusted not 




PP. 40-2.2lbic., pp. 44-5. 
3Memories, 
pp. 221-6. 
4Taylor, Beaverbrook, p. 97. This story, like most of 
Beaverbrook's from this period, seems to have originated 
with Bonar Law. On Christ'mas Day 1916 Lord Riddell recorded 
that Bonar Law recalled that it was Robertson's idea that 
Long would prove a weak Secretary of State for War. According 
to Riddell, Law promptly telephoned Asquith and threatened to 
resign if Long was given the job (see Riddell, W_ar_Diary, pp. 
234-5). A fuller version crops up over two years later in a 
conversation between Bonar Law and Riddell on 4 May 1919. 
Bonar Law said, 'I remember that when K. left, Robertson 
wanted to get someone plastic at the War Office whom he could 
handle as he liked. His idea was Walter Long. I telephoned 
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story is extraordinary, for whatever the generals thought 
of Long's talents as a politician they would have known 
very well that he was the last man to prove reluctant to 
assert himself. If the generals had been looking for a 
pliable Secretary of State, then Long would not have 
entered into their deliberations. Indeed, if the generals 
ever considered Long it is more likely that they did so 
in the knowledge that he would be an unfailing critic of 
Asquith's half-hearted measures, a capable administrator, 
and a determined advocate of all means deemed necessary 
to win the war. 
What is clear, however, is that Long was bitterly 
opposed to the suggestion that Lloyd George should have 
the War Office with plenary powers, and he urged Asquith 
- ------ - ------ --------- --------- --- 
to Asquith saying that I wished to see him. I told him 
that if he appointed Long I should resign. I said, "You 
must appoint L. G. He wants the job and you will have to 
give it to him. You had better do it with good grace.... 
If you stand in his way he will probably crush you. "' See 
Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary 
Conference and Afteri_1918-1.22I*'(London, 1933), p. 68. 
Obviously Bonar Law made the, same boast to Beaverbrook, but 
such decisiveness is not characteristic of Bonar Law, nor 
is it easy to imagine him addressing Asquith in such terms. 
Balfour was under the impression that Asquith was also 
considering Austen Chamberlain for the job, but that Law 
intervened on the ground that this would be a slight to 
himself (see Egremont, Balfour, 'p. 277). This is much more 
likely: Law was always very sensitive about his own position 
and on several occasions objected to some distinction being 
conferred on his Conservative colleagues on the ground that 
his own position as leader, would be compromised. It is 
possible that Asquith considered both Long and Chamberlain 
for the job - both, after all, had far more administrative 
experience than Bonar Law and both commanded a greater 
personal following in the Commons. But apart from Bonar 
Law's unlikely story, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Long was seriously considered for the War Office in June 
1916, nor does Beaverbrook's story about the generals, 
faithfully retold by his biographer, Mr A. J. P. Taylor, 
deserve much credence. 
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to take over himself, as he had done after the Curragh 
fiasco in 1914, with Lord Derby as his second in command. 
l 
He also wrote to Lord Stamfordham to say that Lloyd George's 
appointment would be 'disastrous'. 
2 In fact, unknown to 
Long, the appointment had already been settled, though 
Lloyd George was still bargaining for extensive powers, 
and on the very day that Long was deprecating the 
appointment to Stamfordham, Lloyd George formally rejected 
the post in a letter to Asquith. This, of course, was 
bluff, part of Lloyd George's strategy to attain greater 
powers. On the evening of 17 June Stamfordham duly 
reported to the King that Lloyd George's demands went 
beyond what 'a unanimous Cabinet would sanction'3 and in 
the end Lloyd George had to accept office without any of 
the additional powers which he wanted. The appointment 
was announced on 6 July. Margot Asquith wrote in her 
diary: 'We are out. '4 
c 
Longs role in the Asquith coalition was far from 
unimportant. He worked assiduou'sly and competently at 
the Local Government Board. He took a leading role in 
the battle for conscription, and when the battle was won 
1See Long to Asquith, copy, 10 June 1916, W. L. P., WRO 
947/497. 
2Churchill, Lord Derbý, p. 211. 
3Stamfordham to the ging, 17 June 1916, quoted ibid. 
4Margot Asquith, More Memories (London, 1933), p. 199. 
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he framed two Military Service Bills, both of which 
contained provisions for conscientious objection which were 
inimical to his own convictions. He then administered 
those provisions without bias or prejudice. J. C. C. Davidson, 
Bonar Law's private secretary and not usually an unqualified 
admirer-of Long, testified to the efficiency of-his work, - 
especially in the area of recruitment. At the end of 
April 1916 Davidson wrote privately to a friend: 
Mr. Long ... has combed 300,000 single men from 
various starred trades and has replaced them by 
married men. If he had not worked so energetically 
and loyally it is doubtful whether the Army requirements 
would have been reached. It is almost pathetic to think 
that he has really cut the feet from under his Unionist 
colleagues in this matter. 
1 
Long was also a valuable parliamentary asset to the 
government. His command over the Conservative backbenches 
was crucial to the continuation of Asquith's premiership. 
Disgruntled Tory MPs would have broken into open revolt 
at a word from Long. On only one occasion, the debates 
of 25-27 April over 
Cthe 
government's last-ditch proposals 
to avoid general compulsion, did Long lose the support 
of the Unionist backbenches. Yet here he was playing a 
parliamentary pantomime: he knew that if he could display 
to Asquith that Conservative Members were on the brink of 
--------- ---------------------------------- 
1Robert Rhodes James, Memoirs of a_Conservative: J. C. C_ 
Davidson! sMemoirs and PapersL_1910_27 (London, 1969). 
P. 40. 
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open revolt even when he, Long, addressed the House, 
then Asquith would have to concede. He managed the two 
Military Service Bills with considerable parliamentary 
finesse. John Dillon, again not one of Long's usual 
admirers, told the Commons on 20 January 1916 that he 
had 'never seen a Bill which might easily have led to 
passionate and heated debate, conducted with greater 
skill and in a more conciliatory manner ... '1 
Despite his earlier hostility to the idea of coalition, 
Long had come to accept that a broad-based government 
was essential for at least the duration of the war and 
possibly for some time afterwards. When, in April 1916, 
his old confidant, Lady Londonderry, criticised his 
participation in the government Long dashed off a 
petulant reply which shows just how much his attitude 
had changed from only a year earlier: 
I am sorry you should be so hostile to the Coalition, 
it is the only form df Gov. which can hope to finish 
the war. Forgive me for saying I should have thought 
you of all people would have appreciated the imtense 
difficulties and 
responsibilities 
of some of your old 
friends and been able to subordinate your personal 
animosities. 
2 
Yet Long's loyalty to Asquith could never be taken for 
granted: he remained a member of a government to which 
he felt no real allegiance. Some issues still rankled. 
--------------- 
178 H. C. Deb. ser. 5. col. 760. 
2Long to Lady Londonderry, 19 Apr. 1916, L. L. P., D/Lo/ 
C 666(266). 
2 52 
In may 1916 he was still trying to persuade Bonar Law 
to induce Asquith to make the balance of the parties in 
the cabinet more equal. He also professed a conversion 
to the merits of a small war cabinet, 
' 
and he constantly 
felt that the government was not taking as strong or as 
efficient a line in running the war as it should. But it 
was the government's proposed Irish policy in the after- 
math of the Easter Rising which both focused and inten- 
sified Long's barely concealed hostility towards Asquith's 
leadership. The-cabinet crisis over Ireland in the 
summer of 1916 forced Long out into the open as Asquith's 
leading detractor within the coalition, so that by 
December, when Lloyd George emerged as the man who could 
win the war, Long felt a sense of neither loyalty nor 
obligation towards Asquith. 
--------------- 






AN IRISH INTERLUDE, 1916 
On Easter Monday, 25 April 1916, the Irish Republic 
was proclaimed by a gang of nationalist martyrs whose 
ability to enforce their writ stretched no further than 
the General Post Office in Dublin. Irish affairs once 
again obtruded on British politics. The governmentIs 
reaction was swift and devastating: General Maxwell was 
given plenary powers. By Friday the rebels had had enough, 
and the Irish Republic fizzled out in humiliating surrender. 
The ringleaders were rounded up and all, save Eamonn de 
Valera, were shot as traitors. So ended the Easter Rebellion. 
The political ramifications at Westminster, however, were 
only just beginning. 
Despite the party truce over home rule, and although -- 
preoccupied with his war work, Long kept abreast of 
developments in Ireland. He was aware, as Augustine 
Birrell should have been, that the tide of extreme nation- 
alism was flowing inexorably in the direction of a futile 
yet bloody gesture of republican independence. As early 
as 30 December 1914 Long described the potential dangers 
to Lord Lansdowne, emphasiging that British authority was 
being openly flouted by journalism, pamphleteering and 
platform oratory. He recommended that the leaders be 
court-martialled under the Defence of the Realm Act and 
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that the Irish government take immediate steps to 
suppress seditious meetings. In wartime, Long contended, 
the government could ill afford to tolerate treasonous 
behaviour: 
The position is, in short, that the City of Dublin 
now lies at the mercy of an irresponsible mob of 
armed rebels and that the Civil Executive is deliberately 
shirking the responsibility of dealing with them in the 
only possible way - i. e. by military suppression. This 
must be done sooner or later, and the longer it is 
deferred the more trouble it will be. 
... The extreme party in the 
South and West of Ireland, 
though numerically few, is, in time of war, a serious 
menace to the State, and should be peremptorily put 
down 
... The question of a German raid on the 
West Coast 
of Ireland may seem far-fetched and not at present 
within practical consideration. But there is no imposs- 
ibility of such a raid under circumstances which may 
yet arise. If it did take place, everywhere on the 
West Coast an invading army would find sympathy if not 
active help from the'Sinn Feii and extreme party ... 
In conclusion, the time is ripe for vigorous military 
action against Irish sedition, and this action'should 
begin in Dublin. 
This prophetic memorandum was written, it should be noted, 
a full fifteen months before the Easter Rising. 
Long did not rely on official sources for information 
on Ireland. From December 1915 onwards a friend, an 
employee of Longford County Council, furnished him with a 
1Memorandum by Long, 30 Dec. 1914, Lord Lansdowne Papers, 
Bowood House, Calne, Wiltshire. 
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vast quantity of papers relating to voluntary recruitment, 
the state of the country and the weakness of Birrell's 
regime. 
1 Between January and March 1916 Long obtained 
detailed reports for thirteen counties in an attempt to 
gauge the extent of support for Redmond, O'Brien and 
Sinn Fein, and of likely opposition to any attempt by the 
government to introduce conscription. He concluded that 
support for Sinn Fein was increasing in virtually all 
counties. These reports represent an intelligent attempt 
by Long to find out for himself about the state of Irish 
opinion. 
2 Consequently, the Easter Rising was not quite 
such a rude awakening for Long as it was for most of his 
cabinet colleagues. _ 
His reaction to the news of the rebellion was charact- 
eristically firm. He made it clear from the start that 
he expected to be consulted and that he would consider 
resignation if the government tried to impose an Irish 
--------------- 
This friend was James Mackay'Wilson, an Honorary Secretary 
to the Irish Unionist Alliance, 1918-20. The papers which 
he sent to Long, mainly memoranda, letters, republican 
propaganda, and pregs cuttings, may be found in W. L. P., WRO 
947/388/1. 
2The Reports, together with two covering letters from 
Wilson, can be found in ibid., WRO 947/388/2. They cover 
the following counties: Sligo, Mayo, Galway, Limerick, 
Roscommon, Leitrim, Longford, Kerry, Clare, Cork, Wexford, 
Tipperary and Waterford. Wilson visited each of the counties 
to conduct interviews with whoever he could find prepared to 
answer his questions. The interviewees range from large 
landowners through professional people to labourers. They 
include academics, solicitors, Roman Catholic clergy, small 
businessmen, shopkeepers, hotel staff and publicans. For 
the most part - as would be expected from such a diverse 
group - opinions were contradictory, though there was a clear 
trend away from Redmond and O'Brien and towards Sinn Fein 
amongst those of nationalist persuasion. 
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policy with which he disagreed. On 2 May he warned 
Bonar Law in no uncertain terms: 
I desire to express the hope that two questions will 
not be settled without my being allowed to have my say. 
1. The duration of martial law in Ireland. 
2. The reconstitution of the Irish executive. 
... I could not remain a member of the Gov. if these 
questions are settled in a manner which I could not 
support and without my being allowed to air my views. 
' 
As yet, there had been no hint of any attempt being made 
at a negotiated settlement. Asquith decided to assess 
the situation in Dublin for himself, telling the House 
of Commons on 11 May that he planned to visit Ireland to 
consult personally with the civil and military authorities. 
2 
For some months Long had been pushing in cabinet to have 
Ireland included in a scheme of general compulsion, and 
he now argued that the rebellion reinforced his case. He 
recommended that the Military Service Bill, which he was 
currently preparing, include Irdland, the Army first 
taking steps to round up all arms so as to prevent any 
t3 
violent opposition from nationalist dissidents. 
The story of the failure of the proposed home rule 
scheme which followed the quelling of the rebellion has 
been told many times. Long has invariably been portrayed 
as a wrecker, an implacable foe of home rule, an enemy 
1Long to Bonar Law, 2 May 1916, B. L. P., 53/2/3. 
282 H. C. Deb. ser. 5 cols. 959-60. 
3See 
memorandum by Long, 8 May 1916, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
402/23. This memorandum was sent to Asquith, Bonar Law 
and Lansdowne. 
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within the cabinet who successfully thwarted the last 
feasible chance which a British government had to settle 
the Irish question by peaceable means. This interpretation 
leaves much to be desired. It has been seen that by the 
summer of 1914 Long had accepted that some grant of home 
rule would be necessary; he never again deviated from 
this position. In February 1915, for example, the 
under-secretary at Dublin Castle, Sir Matthew Nathan, 
remarked that he found Long very conciliatory over Ireland 
and 'ready to counsel accommodation. '1 
There is no evidence that Asquith had even a tentative 
plan in mind when he visited Dublin. Lloyd George thought 
that he had gone simply to avoid parliamentary difficulties - 
and that he intended to do nothing. 
2 On his return, however, 
the prime minister decided to ask Lloyd George to conduct 
negotiations between the Irish leaders. Long raised no 
objection to this, though he did make it clear that he 
favoured strong government and no experiments for the 
moment, least of all home rule. 
3 Unionist backbenchers 
naturally demanded that Long be appointed to-succeed 
Birrell as soon as martial law could be dispensed with. 
Asquith did not receive this proposal favourably. 
4 
Instead, 
he offered the post of Chief Secretary to Lloyd George on 
1Hobhouse's diary. 3 Feb. 1915, Diaries of Charles 
Hobhouse, p. 220. 
2Riddell, War Diary, p. 183; Christopher Addison, Four 
and a Half Years, 7-Vols. (London, 1934), 1,212. 
3Cabinet 
memorandum by Long, 19 May 1916, B. L. P., 63/C/6. 
4Roy Jenkins, Asguith (Revised edition: London, 1978), 
p. 397. 
258 
22 May. ' Lloyd George declined, agreeing only to act 
as the government's chief Irish negotiator, and Asquith 
decided to appoint no one for the time being, though 
F. E. Smith and Carson were also considered. 
2 
Contrary to his reputation, Long was, in fact, fully 
in favour of Lloyd George opening discussions with the 
Irish leaders. He even wrote on the 23rd to tell him so. 
3 
But the cabinet had only empowered Lloyd George to 
initiate talks, offer suggestions and report back. It 
had not given him plenipotentiary powers, nor had it 
pledged i; self to support any scheme provisionally agreed 
between Lloyd George and the Irish leaders. Long was 
fully in favour of an attempt being made; he was not in 
favour of Lloyd George's arrogation of powers which the 
cabinet had never delegated. On 24 May the cabinet 
approved Lloyd George's appointment as a mediator only. 
Over the next few days Lloyd George managed to secure 
the agreement of both Carson and Redmond to a settlement 
which differed little from what Asquith had promised in 
1914: home rule with exclusion for a six county Ülster. 
C 
Southern Unionists were not so conciliatory. Following 
Long's advice, Lloyd George metri3eorge Stewart, vine- 
chairman of the Irish Unionist Alliance, and Lord Midleton 
on the 29th, both of whom made it plain that they felt let 
-- - ----------- 
'Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 2,149; Colvin, Life of Carson, 
3,163. --- 
2D. G, Boyce and Cameron Hazlehurst, 'The Unknown Chief 
Secretary: H. E. Duke and Ireland, 1916-181, Irish Historical 
Studies 20 (1977), p. 288. 
3Long to Lloyd George, 23 May 1916, L. G. P., D/14/1/9. 
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down by the government and could not contemplate any 
scheme of home rule whilst the war remained to be won. 
The Southern loyalists' response naturally gave encour- 
agement to Long's growing sense of unease. 
l 
On the following day, 30 May, Long visited Lloyd George's 
office at 10.30 a. m. and was for the first time shown a 
rough draft of the proposed scheme. He immediately 
objected to the suggestion that Ulster's exclusion would 
be subject to revision at a later date and that a parliament 
should be set up as soon as possible to govern the remainder 
of Ireland. He told Lloyd George that he could countenance 
neither proposal, but further discussion was cut short by 
the arrival of Redmond. Things moved fast. Immediately 
after the meeting Long saw Lansdowne and they together 
went through their objections and considered a plan of 
attack. At 6 p. m. Lansdowne went off to remonstrate with 
Lloyd George. 
2 
Asquith had blunderedrin failing to prepare the ground 
for a settlement, and he now paid the penalty. On the 
next day, Thursday 1. June, together with Lloyd George and 
Lord Crewe, he met Lansdowne and Long to discuss the scheme. 
The two opponents suggested that'the plan be quietly 
dropped, good government restored in Ireland, and then, 
perhaps, some settlement could be devised. Long knew that 
Carson and Redmond had somehow been deceived - he did not 
1Patrick Buckland, Irish Unionism: One: The Anglo-Irish 
and the New Ireland (Dublin, 1972), pp. 57-60. 
2Memorandum by Long, 15 June 1916, detailing the sequence 
of events and marked 'For Circulation to Unionist Members 
of the Cabinet only', W. L. P., WRO 947/402/5 
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yet understand exactly how - and he believed that the 
Irish leaders would change their tune after putting the 
draft proposals to their followers. He also thought, 
correctly, that Bonar Law had rather naively lent his 
name to a plan which the bulk of the Conservative party 
would refuse to accept. 
Writing to Lansdowne on 3 June, Long commented that 
Bonar Law had 'no actual knowledge of the country' and 
was 'mainly dependent on Carson for his views'. 
1 So far 
there had been no public opposition, but on 6 June members 
of both Houses passed a resolution condemning any immediate 
grant of home rule. 
2 Four days later Redmond made the 
terms of the settlement public, even telling the press 
that Lloyd George's plan had the full approval of the 
government. This was too much for Long. He sent an 
abrupt telegram to the prime minister: 'Regret impossible 
to accept situation as it is. Am coming up tonight. t3 
Realising that his schese was in danger of foundering, 
Lloyd George then issued a rather unconvincing threat of 
resignation and accused Long of disloyalty. Long merely 
responded by making it clear that he resented the way in 
which Lloyd George pretended to have been given a blank 
cheque' in Irish affairs by the cabinet. He refuted all 
of Lloyd George's accusatiops and deprecated the-resignation 
1Long to Lansdowne, copy, 3 June 1916, ibid., WRO 947/268. 
2Copy 
of Resolution of 6 June 1916 passed by members of 
both Houses, B. L. P., 53/3/3. 
3Long to Asquith, cipher telegram, 12 June 1916, A. P., 
MS. Asquith 16/191. 
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threat. 
I He was furious with reports in that day's 
newspapers that Lloyd George had been 'unanimously 
asked by all his colleagues to undertake the task of 
endeavouring to settle the Irish question immediately ... '2 
Long then complained to Asquith about Lloyd George's 
behaviour. He still hoped to avoid a full-scale cabinet 
crisis: 'I am very sorry for all this trouble about 
Ireland but really I am not to blame. I think I have 
been very badly treated. '3 
If Long had accepted that some grant of home rule would 
be necessary, why was he so hostile to Lloyd George's 
proposals? His opposition was based on a number of 
assumptions. First, an immediate grant of an Irish 
parliament would settle nothing, but merely encourage 
Sinn Fein extremists in the belief that force brought 
dividends. Second, the proposals would satisfy nobody. 
They had been accepted by the Ulster Unionists on the 
understanding that the pix counties would be permanently 
excluded, but the Nationalists had been deceived into 
believing that partition would be shortlived. This 
deliberate trickery, Long asserted, was merely storing 
up trouble for the future. Third, Lloyd George's proposals 
reserved control of the military and the police for 
Westminster. In the event, of another violent outbreak It 
would be Britain alone which would have to take action. 
1See Lloyd George to Long, 12 June 1916, and Long to Lloyd 
George, copy, 12 June 1916, W. L. P., WRO 947/283. 
2TheTimes, 12 June 1916. 
3Long to Asquith, 13 June 1916, A. P., MS. Asquith 16/ 
193-4. 
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Sinn Fein had already demanded the cessation of martial 
law and more lenient treatment for the rebels. It was 
likely that a future Irish parliament would set itself 
against Westminster if strong security measures ever 
again became necessary. Thus, home rule could only 
safely be granted once extreme republican nationalism 
had been extirpated and a more favourable climate of 
opinion engendered. 
1 These arguments were both cogent 
and practical: by highlighting the difficult position 
in which Westminster could soon find itself, Long did 
much to undermine the view that Lloyd George's proposals 
represented a workable solution. 
He was also opposed to the suggestion that an Imperial 
conference, let alone a peace conference after the war, 
should endeavour to settle the future government of 
Ireland. The question was one of bitter domestic contro- 
versy which, he maintained, it was the responsibility of 
Westminster to decide. , The government should brook no 
interference from outside, neither from the Dominions nor 
from the United States. 
2 The scheme, Long insisted, had 
never been adequately discussed in cabinet and the reasons 
used to gain the Ulster leaders'iconcurrence - Lloyd George 
had told Carson that the 'national emergency? and the fear 
of 'complications with America'-made an immediate grant of 
home rule essential - were without foundation anyway. 
3 
-------------- 
1Memorandum by Long, n. d., W. L. P., WRO 947/402/2. 
2Ibid. 
3Memorandum by Long, n. d., W. L. P., WRO 947/402/18. 
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But Long's strongest argument was that the proposed 
settlement would be regarded as a atepping stone to 
complete independence; it would do nothing to satisfy 
the demands of the extremists in Ireland, whose support 
was continuing to increase. As Long pointed out, the 
plan was unworkable because it was being portrayed as 
another example of British perfidy, its acceptance a 
betrayal by the Irish parliamentary party: 'England ... 
naturally does not want to enter a Peace Congress', the 
Sinn Fein extremists contended, 
with the blood of Irish martyrs dripping from her 
hands. She is ... trying to force an absolutely 
worthless settlement on the Irish people, with the 
connivance of the renegade Irish representatives, 
while the bravest of our race have been shot in the 
streets of Dublin, or have been murdered under the name 
of English justice, or languish in prison in a foreign 
land. 
l 
What, asked Long, was the point of conceding home rule 
in the face of this kind of hostility? 
By 15 June Long wap making it known both to his cabinet 
colleagues and to his backbench followers that he would, 
if necessary, resign over the issue. Lloyd George, he 
averred, had overstepped his authority: 
The task which Mr. Lloyd George was asked to undertake 
was to secure some basis of agreement among all Irish 
Unionists which would lead to the acceptance of Home 
1From 
a leaflet distributed at a meeting held in Cork by 
O'Brien and Healy on 23 June 1916, a copy of which was sent 
to Long on 30 June by Walter Guinness, ibid., WRO 947/402/ 
26. 
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Rule at the end of the war without bloodshed ... 
1 
Long and Lansdowne began to rally their forces, and on 
17 June the Unionist members of the cabinet met at 
Curzon's house to discuss Lloyd George's proposals. 
Later that day Curzon and Lord Robert Cecil saw Asquith 
to express their disquiet and to request the prime minister 
to issue a statement to the effect that Lloyd George's 
plans did not have the unanimous support of the government. 
Asquith prevaricated but agreed that Lloyd George should 
have submitted his ideas to the cabinet for approval, 
revision or rejection. 
2 
As a result of this meeting the 
full proposals were officially circulated to the cabinet 
the next day, and on the 19th Long told Bonar Law that 
he would not the a party to the setting up of any form 
of H. R. during the war. '3 As tUPs and ministers returned 
to Westminster for the re-opening of parliament on 20 June 
a serious cabinet crisis over Ireland was in full swing. 
Lloyd George was reduced to complaining bitterly to John 
Dillon about Long's 'specially treacherous manner 104 
Over the next few days Long and Lansdowne bombarded 
I 
1Memorandum by Long, 15 June 1616, A. C. P., AC 14/5/13; B. P., 
Add. MS. 49777 (Long's underlining). 
2Memorandum by Lord Robert Cecil, 17 June 1916, A. C. P., AC 
14/5/20; E. S. P.,. MS. Selborne 80/196-7. 
3Long to Bonar Law, 19 June 1916, B. L. P., 53/3/2. 
4Lloyd George wrote to Dillon on 20 June 1916: 'Long has 
behaved in a specially treacherous manner. He has actually 
been engaged clandestinely in trying to undermine the influence 
of Carson in Ulster.... I should not think it possible that 
any man, least of all one with such pretensions of being an 
English gentleman, could have acted in such a way. ' Quoted in 
F. S. L. Lyons, John Dillon (London, 1968), p. 396. 
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their cabinet colleagues with memoranda employing every 
conceivable argument against the scheme, 
' 
and Austen 
Chamberlain even told the prime minister that his (failure 
to call the Cabinet together, and to consult them, has 
produced a division of opinion which might ... have been 
averted ... 12 By 26 June Lord Hugh Cecil had told his 
leader that he intended to make a fight of it, 
3 
and Lord 
Midleton promised that vigorous opposition could be 
expected from the Southern Unionists. 
4 Lloyd George, 
however, thought that Long's resignation threat was bluff, 
for he bet Asquith a box of cigars that Long would stay. 
5 
On the following day the cabinet met twice to discuss 
the situation, once in the morning and again at seven in 
the evening. At the evening meeting Lloyd George suggested 
that a small cabinet committee be appointed"to make further 
recommendations, a suggestion to which Lansdowne and 
Curzon acceded readily enough. Long remained recalcitrant, 
but, isolated in cabinet, he eventually agreed on the 
e 
understanding that some protection would be offered to 
the Southern minorit*. To all intents and purposes Lloyd 
George's scheme was dead. 
6 
This cabinet meeting displayed 
1See, for example, Lansdowne, 'The Proposed Irish Settlement', 
21 June 1916, and Long, 'The Irish Difficulty', 23 June 1916, 
A. C. P.,. AC 14/5/26 and 14/5/27 respectively. 
2Chamberlain to Asquith, 22 June 1916, A. P., MS. Asquith 
37/60-3. 
3Lord Hugh Cecil to Bonar Law, 26 June 1916, B. L. P., 53/3/7. 
4Midleton to Bonar Law, 26 June 1916, ibid., 53/3/6. 
5Christopher Addison, Politics from Within, 2 Vols. (London, 
1924), 1,257. 
6Asquith's Report to the King, 27 June 1916, P. R. O., CAB 
37/150/23; J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, Life of Lord Oxford 
and Asquith, 2 Vols. (London, 1932), 22 219-20; Jenkins, 
Assguith, pp. 400-1. 
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to the full the deep divisions in the Unionist leadership. 
Balfour delivered a characteristically elaborate refutation 
of all the arguments advanced by the opponents; Bonar Law 
insisted that to reject the scheme was pure folly when 
peaceable settlement was at last in sight; Long and 
Lansdowne used the official police and Army reports, all 
of which indicated that public opinion in Ireland was 
turning increasingly against the government, to emphasise 
the absurdity of offering concessions as the reward for 
rebellion. 
1 
The cabinet committee could delay but not resolve the 
crisis, and neither Long nor Lansdowne yet withdrew their 
resignation threats. Long was adamant that the scheme - 
was 'the worst of any that has ever been proposed' and 
he confessed that he was 'utterly puzzled by the line 
adopted by B. L., A. J. B., and Carson. '2 He still intended 
to resign and it was only after Professor Hewins spent - 
two hours with him on the afternoon of 1 July that he 
agreed to stay on for the present. On his way to this 
meeting with Long, Hewins had bumped into Bonar Law. 
When Hewins had remarked that to continue with the 
settlement would break the party Bonar Law had replied 
that perhaps it would be a good thing for the Conservative 
party to split into its twg natural factions. 
3 
On 5 July the cabinet committee reported. Although in 
--------------- 
1Asquith's Report to the King, 27 June 1916, loc. cit. 
2Long to Sir James Campbell, copy, 29 June 1916, W. L. P., 
WRO 94.7/173. 
3Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist, 2,81-2. 
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favour of an immediate grant of home rule - this was to 
be expected as Asquith and Lloyd George were both amongst 
its members - it recommended that the proposed bill be 
amended to ensure protection for Britain's military and 
naval bases in Ireland. Whilst reaffirming his opposition 
to Lloyd George's proposals, Lansdowne told his colleagues 
that he had decided not to resign in view of the war 
situation. Long reluctantly agreed, complaining that his 
dilemma was a 'cruel one' and remarking rather pointedly 
that if he chose to resign he would carry the majority 
of the Conservative party, so smashing the coalition. He 
was staying only from a sense of duty and an unwillingness 
to plunge the country into political turmoil. Lloyd 
George won his box of cigars, and that night Asquith 
cheerfully, but prematurely, informed the King that the 
crisis was over. 
1 Lord Selborne was to be the only 
casualty. 
2 
With Long and Lansdowne responding to the call of loyalty 
and duty, Bonar Law now mistakenly believed that he could 
force a settlement on his own backbenchers. A meeting 
of Conservative MPs was called for 7 July at the Carlton 
Club, and Bonar Law did his best'to persuade the rank and 
file to accept a settlement. His authority was somewhat 
compromised by Lansdowne, who delivered a speech which 
made his hostility to the scheme plain for all to see. 
1Asquith's Report to the King, 5 July 1916, P. R. O., CAB 
37/151/8; Jenkins, Asquith, p. 401. 
2Selborne 
resigned and was succeeded as President of the 
Board of Agriculture by the Earl of Crawford. 
268 
The whips had worked assiduously to avoid a vote which 
might split the party. After Lansdowne's speech it was 
decided to adjourn the meeting without coming to any 
conclusion. Clearly, Bonar Law did not have the party 
behind him and had badly miscalculated its mood. 
l Shortly 
afterwards, Hewins recorded in his diary his impression 
that the party would not split and that Bonar Law would 
back down. 2 
What Lloyd George, Carson and Bonar Law had not fully 
appreciated was the ability of Long and Lansdowne to 
wreck the scheme from within the cabinet. Whatever 
their theoretical loyalty to the government they commanded 
the bulk of the Conservative party in both Houses. 
Accordingly, on 11 July they finished off the already 
moribund scheme for good. Long despatched a statement 
to Lloyd George reiterating his objections and pledging 
that, despite his decision to remain in the cabinet, he 
would fight until the proposals were officially abandoned. 
3 
11 
At the same time Lansdowne made a devastating speech in 
the Lords. He insisted that the exclusion of Ulster must 
be permanent and that the remainder of Ireland would, if 
deemed necessary by Westminster, 'be governed under the 
terms of a strengthened Defence of the Realm Act. Republican 
lawlessness would not be tolerated and the government would 
IA transcript of this meeting is in B. L. P., 63/C/64. See 
also Blake, Unknown Prime Minister, pp. 286-7. 
2Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist, 2,83. 
3Copy 
of a statement sent by Long to Lloyd George, 11 July 
1916, B. L. P., 63/C/11. 
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hold itself free to have recourse to trial by resident 
magistrates under the old Crimes Act. 
l 
Long and Lansdowne had cleverly shifted their ground 
from opposition to any settlement at the present time 
to laying down the terms of a possible settlement which 
they knew would be anathema to the Nationalists. After 
Lansdowne's speech Redmond could hardly continue to 
pretend that partition was only provisional. The two 
opponents had calculated that by stating terms that were 
quite at odds with those of Lloyd George they would 
destroy the notion that any real basis for a settlement 
existed. At a stroke, Lansdowne exposed what should have 
been evident to all: there was no more a basis for 
settlement than there had been in 1912-14. Asquith now 
allowed the negotiations to drift and eventually to peter 
out altogether. With a divided cabinet and a Conservative 
rebellion in the offing, he had little choice. The scheme 
was quietly dropped. 
2 No alternatives were explored, 
though Long and Lansdowne both made it clear that they 
122 H. L. Deb. ser. 5 cols. 645-52. 
2Patrick Buckland, in his Irish Unionism: One: The-Anglo_ 
Irish and the New Ireland, --l885_1222, pp. 
51-82, has argued 
that it was the opposition of the Southern loyalists which 
was mainly responsible for the abandonment of Lloyd George's 
scheme. This account does less than justice to the role of 
Long and Lansdowne in the events of May, June and July 1916, 
nor does it give due weight to the considerations of British 
party politics which gave Long and Lansdowne their victory. 
Whatever the opposition from Southern Unionists, a united 
cabinet could have imposed the scheme on Ireland. Asquith 
and Bonar Law bowed not to pressure exerted by Lord Midleton, 
but to the political exigencies dictated by a divided cabinet 
and restive Conservative backbenchers. 
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were prepared to consider alternative schemes once good 
government had been restored at Dublin Castle. 
It has been suggested that Bonar Law perceived the 
differences between himself, Long and Lansdowne as a 
means to purge the Unionist party of its old guard. 
' 
Certainly, Bonar Law's remark to Hewins about it being 
a good thing if the party was to split seems to support 
this view. By siding with Carson and Lloyd George, Bonar 
Law perhaps hoped to settle his difficulties with Long 
once and for all, emerging as the undisputed leader of 
the party - possibly a much reduced party - in fact as 
well as in name. But Long refused to play this game: he 
remained in the cabinet as much to ensure continued 
Conservative unity as to defeat the Irish proposals. He 
knew that his own resignation would signal not only the 
r 
collapse of the coalition but also possible disaster for 
the party. 'There is no doubt', Long wrote on 12 July, 
that in our Party there is very bitter feeling ... Y 
and I am assured that the number of malcontents are 
daily increasing. On the other hand, I know it to be 
an absolute fact that if the Government were to be 
broken up as the result of our retirement, and it seems 
probable that this would be the case, there would be 
no chance of securing the return of a single one of us 
if we stood on the ground ... that we dissented from 
'David W. Savage, 'The Attempted Home Rule Settlement of 
1916', Eire-Ireland 2 (1967), p. 144. 
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the proposals to which Carson on the one hand and 
Redmond and Devlin on the other have agreed, and that 
we proposed as our only alternative ... 'a policy of 
coerciont. 
l 
Bonar Law was, Long believed, displaying an egregious 
failure of leadership: he risked the erosion of his own 
political powerbase by attempting to force on his party 
a policy which the majority could not accept. Duped by 
Lloyd George, encouraged by Carson, sustained in erudite 
argument by Balfour, Bonar Law was out of touch with the 
party he claimed to lead. Long put it bluntly on 15 July: 
Balfour and B. Law would have much preferred to leave 
matters alone. Balfour does not care what happens ... 
in Ireland, B. Law is in Carson's pocket as regards 
Ireland and in Lloyd George's as regards all other 
affairs of Government, and has besides entirely lost 
his nerve.... he is in a blue funk. He moaned to 
me that "this means a break up of the Government ... 




An indication of the strength of party feeling against 
C 
Bonar Law is to be found in membership of the Imperial 
Unionist Association, an 'ad hocl group called together 
by Lord Salisbury to watch over the negotiations, artic- 
ulate the criticisms of party malcontents, and generally 
make life difficult for Bonar Law unless he paid more 
1Long to Sir James Campbell, copy, 12 July 1916, W. L. P., 
WRO 947/173. 
2Long to Lansdowne, copy, 15 July 1916, ibid., WRO 947/ 
268. 
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heed to the party's wishes. It made no secret of its 
hostility to any form of home rule during the war and 
by mid-July could claim ninety-eight members in the 
Commons and seventy-six in the Lords. 
' If these figures 
are accurate, then approximately one third of all 
Conservative MPs had joined an organisation which was 
unreservedly committed to the destruction of Lloyd George's 
plan. With a third of his parliamentary followers in open 
revolt, Bonar Law was on the edge of a political precipice. 
Meanwhile, Long and Lansdowne continued to bombard the 
cabinet with memoranda urging much tougher measures to 
deal with republican disorder and crime. 
2 Long was by 
now threatening Asquith openly with 'the determined 
opposition of the Unionist party' if the government's 
Irish policy was 'not a firm one, maintenance of the law 
and suppression of sedition. '3 Finally, on the 27th, 
the cabinet decided formally to abandon the settlement -- 
and H. E. Duke told Bonair Law that he would be prepared 
to take on the duties of the Irish Office. Long was 
4 
perfectly satisfied zith Duke's appointment, telling 
Lady Londonderry on 2 August that although 'there are 
rumours of further negotiations :.. I can hardly think 
anybody will care to burn his fingers so soon'. 
5 
The Times, The Dail Telegraph, 18 July 1916. 
2See Lansdowne, 'The Irish Situation', 17 July 1916; Long, 
'Government of Ireland Amendment Bill', 18 July 1916; Long, 
'State of Ireland', 21 July 1916, A. C. P., AC 14/5/38,39, and 
42 respectively. 
3Long to Asquith, copy, 26 July 1916, W. L. P., WRO 947/144. 
4See Duke to Bonar Law, 27 July 1916, B. L. P., 53/4/8. Duke 
was officially appointed on 3 Aug. 1916. 
5Lon to Lady Londonderry, 2 Aug. 1916, L. L. P., D/Lo/C 
666(290). 
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It is important to realise that Long had opposed Lloyd 
George's scheme only because he believed the measures ill- 
timed and unworkable. He was no longer an adherent of 
'diehard' Unionism. 1 On the contrary, he saw that the 
Union could not be upheld indefinitely, and that the best 
course was for Irish Unionists to come up with an acceptable 
scheme before an unacceptable one was forced upon them. 
Long's views are clear from a letter which he wrote to 
George Stewart of the Irish Unionist Alliance on 30 July: 
I honestly believe that it would be impossible in 
these days to secure support in Parliament for the 
maintenance of the Union in its present form, having 
regard to, first, the fact that there is a Home Rule 
Act on the Statute Book, and, second, that any attempt 
to ignore it or repeal it would be followed by violent 
agitation in the House of Commons and by some trouble 
in Ireland ... and therefore there must be some alter- 
native policy. The constituencies in England are sick 
of the Home Rule question ... if we are going to protect 
what is best and what, we care for most, we must be ready 
with an alternative policy. 
2 e 
Longs attitude tochome rule in 1916 has been the 
subject of auch interpretative error. Historians have 
happily assumed that Long's condemnation of the Lloyd 
George scheme represents a further instalment of the 
opposition to all forms of home rule for which he was 
1Sir William Bull's diary confirms that Long was in favour 
of home rule at some later date. Bull's 'Retrospect for the 
Second Half of 1916' includes the following remark: 'I am 
firmly convinced we did the right thing - it will pave the 
way for a better settlement later on - Long was responsible 
for it. ' See Bu. P., 4/14. 
2Long to Stewart, copy, 30 July 1916, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
362. 
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notorious in the years before 1914. It has even been 
suggested that he opposed the settlement tmore out of 
pique than anything else at. not having been consulted, '1 
And Asquith's biographer trod a familiar path by taking 
the view that the scheme represented a genuine opport- 
unity to solve the Irish problem by negotiation, its 
ultimate abandonment due in large part to the stubbornness 
of a few Unionists who could still not concede the desir- 
ability of home rule. 
2 Yet Longts opposition was based 
only on the sensible view that the plan could not work, 
both because the aftermath of an armed rebellion could 
not provide a political climate conducive to compromise, 
and because Redmond and Carson would inevitably differ, - 
whatever they might individually have agreed with Lloyd 
George. 
Indeed, Long did rather more than simply insist that 
the scheme was dropped: he put forward constructive 
alternative proposals -; proposals which Asquith ignored. f 
In a private memorandum to the prime minister, written 
sometime in June 1914, Long provided a way out which did 
not involve abandonment of home rule. He suggested that 
the government should announce that the plan had broken 
down owing to intractable difficulties but that all 
parties were willing to proceed with negdtiations. An 
Irish Conference should then be called under the chair- 
manship of some distinguished lawyer whose sympathies 
1Hyde, Carson, p. 405. 
2See Jenkins, Asguith, pp. 398-402. 
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were known to be with home rule. All parties, including 
Sinn Fein, would be invited to attend, and the conference 
would take up the matter at the point left by the break- 
down of Lloyd George's plan. The government should 
provide a working outline, to be approved in advance by 
the whole cabinet. 
Long adumbrated these working proposals as a basis for 
discussion: separate parliaments to be established in 
Dublin and Belfast, both to be responsible to Westminster; 
the R. I. C. and the Dublin Metropolitan Police to be 
merged into one force, one third to remain under the 
control of the British parliament, the remainder to be 
divided into two forces and placed under the Irish 
parliaments; proportional representation to safeguard 
the nationalist minority in the six counties and the 
Unionist minority in the South; and a general council to 
deal with affairs common to all Ireland. 
' Of course, 
many of these proposals: eventually saw the light of 
10 
day under Lloyd George's premiership: 1917 saw the 
calling of an Irish Convention and Long's own Government 
of Ireland Bill three years later set up separate 
parliaments in Dublin and Belfas4., as well as providing 
for an all Ireland Council. 
This memorandum presented a perfectly feasible alternative 
lA 
copy of this memorandum, dated merely June 1916, can be 
found in C. P., MSS. Eur. F. 112/178. Long sent a copy to 
Curzon nearly a year later in the belief that his plan still 
represented the best means by which the government should 
proceed. In a covering letter, dated 12 May 1917, Long 
remarked that the memorandum had originally been written 'for 
Asquith after the Rebellion. ' 
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to Lloyd George's plan and a method by which the 
government could have proceeded with a united cabinet. 
Instead. Asquith chose to drop home rule altogether. 
Abandonment of Lloyd George's plan did not necessarily 
mean abandonment of all Irish negotiations. In the end, 
it must be concluded that Asquith's attempt to settle 
Ireland in the summer of 1916 was half-hearted and feeble. 
The scheme which he tried was hastily cobbled together 
and based on at least some measure of duplicity. When 
faced with a cabinet crisis he backed down and chose to 
do nothing, even though Long made it clear that he had 
no objection to further discussions, provided only that 
proposals for an immediate grant of home rule were 
dropped. Defeated once, Asquith had no inclination to 
try again, preferring to let his Irish policy drift in 
the rather sanguine belief that victory would somehow 
provide the 'deus ex machina' of a negotiated settlement. 
Long continued to keep an eye on the Irish situation 
f 
throughout 1916, taking a keen interest in any proposals 
which might lead to 4 solution. Late in September he 
suggested that Professor Hewins should act as a negotiator 
with Redmond and Devlin in an effort to find some basis 
for discussion. Negotiations, he argued, should be as 
broadly based as possible and should include representatives 
not just of the conflicting Irish parties, but also of 
the Catholic and Protestant Churches and of Irish economic 
interests. To expect further initiatives from Asquith or 
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Duke was futile, for both 'were completely bankrupt in 
suggestion. ' 
1 Long's motives, then, in blocking Lloyd 
George's home rule plans were neither obscurantist nor 
obstructive. As usual, his attitude was based on a 
fundamentally realistic approach to the problem. To 
sum up, Long was not opposed to the idea of a settlement, 
at some future date, along the lines of partition. 
Rather, he was opposed to the particular settlement which 
Lloyd George had devised. 
The cabinet crisis over Ireland also had important 
implications for party politics at Westminster. Bonar 
Law had never enjoyed much authority as Conservative 
party leader. What authority he did possess was not 
1Hewins, Apologia of an_Imperialist, 2,88-92. 
2The fact that Long was initially prepared to allow negot- 
iations to continue and was at first in favour of Lloyd 
George's exploratory mission is not an indication, as has 
been argued by Patrick Buckland in Irish Unionism: One: The 
Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, p. 73, that Long was a 
late convert to the Southern Unionists' point of view, but it 
is an indication that he was in 4 potentially conciliatory 
mood over Irish policy in 1916. It was only when Lloyd 
George went beyond the cabinet's intentions that Long took 
a hostile line. Contrary to Dr Buckland's argument, there 
was no sudden caprice, engendered by Southern Unionist 
pressure, involved in Long', s opposition from 30 May onwards 
to Lloyd George's proposals. If Lloyd George had stuck to 
the cabinet's instructions to investigate whether there might 
be any basis for a settlement and then report back, Long 
would probably have ignored the objections of the Southern 
loyalists. He was consistently in favour of negotiations 
and his letter of 30 July to George Stewart suggests that he 
had little time for Southern Unionist intransigence. 
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enhanced by the way in which Asquith had relegated him 
to the position of junior partner in the coalition. He 
had held only one cabinet appointment - and that had been 
given by a Liberal prime minister - whereas Long had 
held four, Lansdowne three. A Tory credo of the time 
contained the lines: 
I believe in Henry Asquith, Vicar of Bray, Wait and See; 
And in Andrew Bonar Law, his ardent colleague and dupe; 
Who was conceived in Imperialism; born of Unionist 
expediency; led the opposition of Herbert Henry; was 
circumvented, fooled and diddled. He descended into 
the Coalition, and on the first day he rose to Cabinet 
rank according to the Agreement. He ascended into 
favour with all Radicals, and sitteth at the right hand 
of the Vicar: from whence he will descend again when 
Henry has no further use for him. 
l 
Long's victory both exposed and reinforced this weakness, 
emphasising that it was Long, and not Bonar Law, who had 
the strongest claim tobe regarded as the tde facto' 
leader of the Conservative party, especially where Irish 
affairs were concerned. Lloyd George never again 'under- 
C 
estimated Long's influence, and his own government's 
Irish policy between 1917 and 191 was carefully tailored 
to meet with Long's approbation. Lloyd George also 
realised that Long's support was essential if Conservative 
adherence to coalition was to be guaranteed. This was 
an important consideration in the formation of his own 
1Quoted Stubbs, 'Conservative Party and the Politics of 
War', p. 393. The author is unidentified. 
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government in December. 
The Irish negotiations of 1916 saw the alliance of 
Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Carson working together for 
the first time, albeit on this occasion on the same side 
as Asquith. The danger for Bonar Law was that he would 
be left the leader of a small Tory rump, tied to Asquith 
and destined, no doubt, for eventual absorption by the 
Liberals in much the same way as Joseph Chamberlain's 
followers had been absorbed by the Unionists after 1886. 
Lansdowne in the Lords, Long in the Commons, represented 
a plausible alternative leadership -a leadership, 
moreover, which Bonar Law knew would be more experienced, 
more respected and more popular than his own. He fully 
recognised the weakness of his own position and perceived 
that if he tried to make acceptance of the Lloyd George 
home rule scheme a test of the party's faith in his 
leadership he would lose. 
l Wisely, he chose defeat. 
Thus, Long's victory highlighted the precariousness of 
Asquith's position as prime minister and Bonar Law's as 
Conservative leader., It stultified the pretence that 
Asquith could expect either loyalty from his Unionist 
colleagues or meek acquiescence 'from the backbenches. 
And finally, it suggested that the price which Bonar Law 
might be required to pay for the retention of the party 
leadership would be the desertion of Asquith. The 
Conservative party as a whole awaited only the emergence 
1Blake, Unknown Prime Minister, pp. 286-8. 
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of a credible alternative prime minister; the victory 
of Long and Lansdowne was the precursor of Asquith's 






IN LLOYD GEORGE'S GOVERNMENT, 
DECEMBER 1916 - FEBRUARY 1921 
The dust of historical consensus has refused to settle 
on the political events of December 1916. Lord Beaverbrook's 
well known account, 
' 
written with a good deal of inside 
knowledge, continues to hold sway over the endeavours of 
subsequent historians. Beaverbrook's narrative has become 
a kind of 'authorised version', the source material for 
countless historical recitals. His prose style continues 
to delight, his political vignettes to amuse and inform. 
Yet there is one aspect of this realignment of political 
forces which has received scant attention. As Bonar Law's 
chief confidant and adviser, Beaverbrook seriously under- 
valued Long's role and influence. How was Lloyd George 
able to secure Long's allegiance, and why was Law able 
to carry the Conservative backbenches when just a few 
months earlier his leadership had been exposed as somewhat 
nominal? 
It has been seen that Long fel' no particular loyalty 
either for Asquith or for Lloyd George. He regarded them 
as his colleagues only in qo far as the-war demanded. As 
he had remarked to Lady Londonderry over a year earlier: 
'I would follow the Devil himself in doing what we can to 
---------- ---- - ------------------ 
1Lord Beaverbrook, P211ticiansandthe_W_ar, 2 Vols. 
(London, 1928-32). 
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destroy the enemy. 
" A few days after the famous Nigeria 
debate, when sixty-five Conservatives had voted against 
Bonar Law, Long wrote a revealing letter to Lord Derby. 
It is dated 14 November 1916: 
I entirely share your view: of course the B. Law - 
Carson incident was only the culminating blow. Things 
are very bad.... 
Personally I think things are as bad as they can be 
&I really don't believe the Gov. can usefully and 
creditably go on much longer. Is there any alternative? 
If so for Heaven's sake let them show their hand, I'll 
support any Gov. that will drive the war to an end. 
2 
And on 18 November Long wrote: 
I have heard no news, except ... that Sir E. Carson 
intends to do all in his power to secure ... a 
sufficient number of Unionists to force Bonar Law to 
resign and so smash the Gov. and that Lloyd George 
approves.... It seems to me ... that if Lloyd George 
is not satisfied with ... things he should resign and 
bring the Gov. down ih an open fight and then form his 
own. 
3 
In other words, Long'was not predisposed to keep Asquith 
in office. Nor did he regard Lloyd George's premiership 
as out of the question, though he still implicitly 
mistrusted Lloyd George's methods. 
The political tension which resulted in Asquith's downfall 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 9 Nov. 1915, L. L. P., D/Lo/C 
666(279). 
2Long to Derby, 14 Nov. 1916, Lord Derby Papers (Liverpool 
City Library), 920 DER (17) 33. 




was exacerbated not just by the bleak military outlook 
following the appalling casualties of the Somme offensive, 
l 
but by a number of other factors. In November 1916 Lord 
Lansdowne urged a negotiated peace on the cabinet, much 
to the disgust of his Conservative colleagues. Lansdowne 
thus suggested implicitly that Asquith's government 
could not win the war. Such a proposal naturally rocked 
the political boat. There was further tension over food 
shortages. Lord Crawford, who in July had replaced Lord 
Selborne as President of the Board of Agriculture, the 
latter having resigned over Lloyd George's home rule 
proposals, raised the matter of food supplies on a 
number of occasions in cabinet. He found Asquith lacking 
in any sense of urgency and most other ministers lackad- 
aisical. Long, for example, believed that the populace 
could well survive on a much reduced diet. The government 
decided to appoint a Controller of Food but had consid- 
erable difficulty finding the riFht man. By the end of 
November an appointment had still to be made, Speaker 
Lowther and four others having been offered the post only 
to decline it. 2 
A financial crisis also threatened to overtake the 
1Although the attack on the Somme, which begun on 1 July 
1916, was a failure from th'e beginning it continued until 
November, when it finally ground to a halt in the Flanders 
mud with no strategical gain having been made. As A. J. P. 
Taylor has commented: 'Not only men perished. There perished 
also the zest and idealism with which nearly three million 
Englishmen had marched forth to war. ' A. J. P. Taylor, English 
History 1914-1945 (Oxford, 1965), p. 61. 
2Crawford's diary, 29 Nov. 1916, he-Cra-wford Papers, 
p. 369. -- 
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government. A meeting of past and present Chancellors 
of the Exchequer - McKenna, Lloyd George, Asquith and 
Austen Chamberlain - discussed the exchange problem on 
29 November, contemplating a crisis tso serious that it 
might involve abandonment of the gold standard ... 11 It 
is against this background that the events of the first 
week of December must be set. 
Long first learnt of Bonar Law's negotiations with 
Carson and Lloyd George, designed to secure the appointment 
of a war council with plenary powers, at a meeting of 
Conservative members of the cabinet held on 30 November. 
He reacted by demanding that no steps be taken without 
full consultation, though he agreed that 'the Govt. cannot 
"carry on" as it is' and that 'real reconstruction is 
absolutely necessary'. 
2 Long raised no objection to the 
scheme in principle and in a letter to Bonar Law dated 
2 December he accepted that there must be a change both 
in the composition of the government and in the running 
11 
of the war. His main concern was to forestall any 
independent action or Bonar Law's part; he did not want 
the Conservative party dragged into coalition as the 
servant of Lloyd George in a repeat performance of May 
1915, with Lloyd George merely replacing Asquith at the 
------------- 
IIbid. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 2 Dec. 1916, B. L. P., 53/4/28. 
Beaverbrook quoted this letter in full in Politicians and the 
War, 2,166-7, but misdated it as having been written on 
2 Oct. 1916. A day earlier Long reported to Lansdowne that 
feeling in the Commons was running strongly against Asquith 
and that a change would have to be made. See Long to 
Lansdowne, 1 Dec. 1916, Lord Lansdowne Papers. 
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top. But Long was certainly not contemplating lending 
any support to Asquith. He confided his thoughts to 
Sir William Bull on the afternoon of Saturday 2 December: 
I believe that situation is impossible & cannot go on: 
at same time I dread the change as I dontt like the 
man 
[i. e. Lloyd George]. It is a terrible situation. 




This letter was written at 4.30 p. m., immediately after 
Long had had a talk with Bonar Law, who had agreed to 
meet the Conservative members of the cabinet at his 
house on the following morning. It is clear that Long 
was not prepared to back Asquith from the start and was, 
moreover, fully cognizant of the fact that Lloyd George 
was the only real alternative. 
On Sunday 3 December Long attended the meeting of 
Conservative ministers at Bonar Law's house and lent his 
name to the resolution palling on Asquith to resign. 
Bonar Law had called this Sunday morning meeting in order 
to inform his colleagues of his own intention to resign, 
but he can hardly have expected his guests to push him 
into making a collective resignation of all the Unionist 
ministers. Beaverbrook grouped Long together with the 
'three Cs' - Curzon, Chamberlain and Cecil - in urging 
Asquith to resign as a calculated manoeuvre to expose 
Lloyd George's inability to form a government, thus 
1Long to Bull, 2 Dec. 1916, Bu. P. 4/14. 
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allowing Asquith to return in a far stronger position. 
' 
Yet Long had already made it clear that he favoured change. 
That Long had no intention of bolstering Asquith's position 
is evident from Sir William Bull's private diary. Bull 
met Long at Paddington2 and they walked together to Bonar 
Law's house, Pembroke Lodge, for the meeting at eleven 
o'clock. Bull recorded the conversation: 
I advised Walter that they should write an ultimatum 
to the PM. I advised him not to speak until the others 
had & sit tight - or else it would be said he had broken 
3 
the government. 
It is, therefore, more than likely that the famous 
'ultimatum' to Asquith was written at Long's instigation, 
and written with the express intention of bringing the 
government down. There is nothing in Bull's account of 
the day's events, or in Long's correspondence over the 
preceding twenty-four hours, to suggest that Long intended 
to strengthen the prime'minister; s hand against Lloyd 
George - an interpretation which originates with Lord 
Beaverbrook. 
According to Bull, it was further agreed at the morning 
meeting that the Unionist ministers 'should all separate 
so that they could not be talked round into having another 
------- -------- 
1Beaverbrook, Politicians andthe_War, 2,208-34. 
2Long had spent the night at Iver Heath with Grant Morden, a 
wealthy Canadian Army officer with political aspirations. 
Morden entered parliament in December 1918, having attached 
himself to Long in order to further his political career. In 
1917 he helped Long out of financial difficulties; Bull 
disliked him intensely. See Bull's diary, 'Second Summary for 
1917', Bu. P., 4/16. 
3Bull's diary, 3 Dec. 1916, ibid., 4/14. 
287 
meeting - the old man will creep & beg you to reconsider 
the position. "l Bull also asserts that Asquith asked 
the Conservative leaders to meet again on Sunday after- 
noon whilst he struggled to reach an accommodation with 
Lloyd George. Two meetings did take place, one at 3 p. m. 
and one at 7 p. m. Bull does not say who attended or what 
transpired, merely that 'Walter could not be found & only 
2 or 3 met on each occasion. '2 Bull appears to have 
been slightly misinformed about these later meetings but 
further light is shed on the proceedings by Lord Crawford's 
account. A second Unionist conference took place at 
Pembroke Lodge after lunch. Bonar Law, Austen Chamberlain, 
Lord Robert Cecil, F. E. Smith, Crawford and H. E. Duke 
3 
were present; Curzon and Long were absent. Just before 
6 p. m. Bonar Law was summoned to Downing Street, and the 
remainder of the party then moved to F. E. Smith's house 
in order to be closer to the centre of events. Bonar Law 
returned an hour later4rand told his colleagues that 
Asquith and Lloyd George had reached agreement. He also 
explained his failure to hand in the joint letter of 
resignation by reporting that Asquith had begged him not 
to do so. 
5 




on Sunday 3 Dec. 1916, TheCrawford_Papers, p. 
371. Crawford says that the afternoon meeting took place at 
Bonar Law's house; Bull says that it occurred at F. E. Smith's. 
As Crawford attended the meeting, and Bull did not, it is 
more than likely that Crawford's statement is correct, Bull's 
incorrect. 
'Both Crawford's and Bull's accounts agree that this 
evening meeting occurred at 7 p. m. 
5Memorandum 
on Sunday 3 Dec. 1916, loc. cit. 
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resignation was intended to strengthen Asquith's hand. 
On the contrary, Crawford thought that Lloyd George's 
greatest difficulty lay with the minority parties - 
Labour and Irish Nationalists - and that the Conservatives 
were prepared even as early as Sunday to back him. 
Crawford noted that Lloyd George 
... will probably 
find that though he can easily form 
a government it will be difficult to get the assent of 
Labour and the Nationalists. It is also said that our 
men have only backed him because they distrust Asquith 
still more.... My impression is that he has a big 
support among our friends in the provinces, in the army 
too, and that his energy would enable him to carry out 
policy which the present government as constituted 
would fail in, even if they were united, 
1 
At no time did Long indicate to the prime minister that 
his objective was to destroy Lloyd George's bid for 
power. 
There is some evidencre to suggest that Curzon and some 
other Unionist ministers saw Asquith later on the Sunday 
evening, 
2 but there is nothing to suggest that Long was 
t 
one of this party. Asquith's oft-quoted remark to Pamela 
McKenna that evening - 'The crisis shows every sign of 
following its many predecessors to an early and unhonoured 





a summary of the evidence to support the view that a 
meeting occurred on Sunday evening between Asquith and the 
'three Cs' see J. M. McEwen, 'The Struggle for Mastery in 
Britain: Lloyd Geroge versus Asquith, December 19161, 
Journal of British Studies 18 (1978). p. 149. 
3Asquith to Pamela McKenna, 3 Dec. 1916, quoted Jenkins, 
Asquith, p. 443. 
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the prime minister certainly did not see himself as 
having been reduced to the position of nominal leader 
of the government. The tone of this remark suggests 
that Asquith was confident of getting the better of 
Lloyd George -a confidence possibly inspired by the 
visit of Curzon and his friends. Yet, it must be stressed, 
there is nothing to indicate that Long acted with the 
'three Cs'. Beaverbrook simply lumped them all together 
as the Conservatives who most counted if Lloyd George 
was to form a government, taking no account of the way 
in which Long's readiness to accept change, and his clear 
hostility to Asquith as leader of a nation at war, 
differed from the attitudes of Curzon, Cecil and Chamberlain. - 
Nor did Beaverbrook pay much attention to the fact that 
Long's support was crucial if Lloyd George was to carry 
the Unionists in the Commons. Long should be counted 
amongst the many Conservatives who believed that Asquith 
lacked the determination and drive to finish the war, and 
his potential opposition to Bonar Law was motivated almost 
entirely by the susp. cion that the Conservative leader 
would be gulled into accepting bad terms for his party. 
As for Beaverbrook's assertion tiat 'Curzon and his 
Conservative group in the Cabinet looked on Asquith, not 
Bonar Law, as their real leader', 
' this is very far-fetched. 
Long had certainly never regarded Asquith as his 'real 
leader'. 
- ------------ - -- -- ------------------ - --- 
1Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War, 2,294. 
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The tthree Cs', together with Crawford, Lansdowne and 
Long, met at the India Office at lunchtime on Monday 4 
December to discuss the situation. All agreed that the 
decision to resign was wise. In Crawford's words, there 
were 'no regrets or arriere-pensees'. 
l Long expressed 
annoyance that Bonar Law had not properly communicated 
the Unionist letter of resignation to Asquith. In 
Beaverbrook's version the 'three Cs' saw Asquith on Monday 
morning to express their support and to emphasise their 
determination not to serve under Lloyd George. If this 
is true, it is curious that they remained silent at the 
lunchtime meeting. 
2 There are two possible explanations: 
either the 'three Cs' deliberately misled their colleagues 
as to their true intentions, and so kept quiet, or they 
did not intend to back Asquith at all, an explanation of 
the Unionists' joint letter of resignation which is quite 
at odds with Lord Beaverbrook's account. Possibly, the 
whole Beaverbrook thesip of the ? three Cs' tendering 
r 
their resignations as astratogem to expose Lloyd George's 
weakness is incorrecý. 
On the morning of Tuesday 5 December the Unionist 
ministers met to discuss Bonar Läw's position. They were 
not pleased. The 'three Cs' decided to see Asquith. Long 
meanwhile went to Bonar Law with a request that he explain 
his behaviour at another meeting set for four o'clock that 
------- ------- 
1Memorandum 
of 4 Dec. 1916, TheCrawford_Papers, p. 372. 
2See The Crawford Papers, p. 372, n. 24. 
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afternoon. According to Beaverbrook, Bonar Law regarded 
Long's mission as outrageous and the episode was given 
the rather colourful title of the "Court-Martial". 
l Apart 
from anything else, Long and the 'three Cs' had every 
right to ask for an account of the tortuous negotiations 
which they knew to be proceeding behind their backs. In 
Beaverbrook's account, Bonar Law reacted with uncharact- 
eristic bad temper to Long's request, but he did agree 
to meet his colleagues at five o'clock at the Colonial 
Office. At this meeting Bonar Law promised that the 
resignation of the whole government would be persisted 
in. 
There is, however, a letter written by Austen Chamberlain _ 
which suggests that Long had decided definitely on this 
Tuesday to back Lloyd George. According to Chamberlain, 
it 'was then clear that Bonar Law was deeply committed 
to Lloyd George (he had taken Long into his confidence 
and won him over). '2 This, at any rate, was Chamberlain's 
view many years later -a view which has at least a 
cetain verisimilitude, for it is perfectly possible that 
whilst the 'three Cs' reassured Asquith, Bonar Law 
persuaded Long to come in with Loyd George. But Lord 
Crawford's diary entry for 5 December contains a lengthy 
account of the Colonial Office meeting, an account which 
casts further doubt on Beaverbrook's contention that the 
1Beaverbrook, 
Politicians and the War, 2,272-80. 
2 Chamberlain to J. A. Spender (Asquith's biographer), 
23 June 1931, A. C. P., AC 15/3/26. It must be noted that 
Chamberlain wrote this letter nearly fifteen years after 
the events to which it alludes. 
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'three Cs' still intended to support Asquith. All the 
Unionist members of the cabinet except Balfour attended, 
and Chamberlain, Cecil and Curzon reported their visit 
to Asquith earlier in the day. If the purpose of their 
visit to the prime minister was, as Beaverbrook alleges, 
to back Asquith and not Lloyd George, then they succeeded 
in totally misleading their Conservative colleagues. 
1 
The meeting decided to send a written memorandum to 
Asquith indicating that the Unionists' resignation must 
stand, as reconstruction was quite out of the question. 
Shortly before 6 p. m. Curzon left for Downing Street with 
this message. 
2 According to Crawford, only Austen 
Chamberlain was reluctant to join Lloyd George's camp. _ 
Curzon and Cecil were 'rather anxious to do so as a public 
duty if required. '3 Referring back to the events of Sunday, 
Lord Crawford recorded: '48 hours have elapsed and our 
view is stronger than ever., 
4 That same day, 5 December, 
Lloyd George threw in h. s hand by resigning. Asquith 
called his bluff and followed suit. The question now was, 
could Lloyd George form a government? 
C 
On the following day, Wednesday 6 December, a group of 
Conservative MPs gathered in Long's room to discuss the 
situation. According to Professor Hewins, who recorded 
details of the meeting in his diary a few days later, Long 
announced that he intended to support Lloyd George, a 
-- ---------- ---- ------------ 






decision which was approved by the party backbenchers. 
As Hewins commented, Long's following in the Commons made 
his inclusion essential to Lloyd George whereas 'Austen 
and Robert Cecil are of no importance. '1 That Long had 
decided to join, provisionally at least, is confirmed by 
a letter which he wrote that day to his old friend Lady 
Londonderry: 
There are so many different elements to be considered 
and placated that we can't ... afford to lose a single 
man. I don't care who leads, or who composes the Gov. 
so long as a stable Gov. is set up and this war work 
carried on with vigour. 
2 
Contrary to Beaverbrook's account, then, Long was by 
Wednesday ready to serve under Lloyd George, and if Lord 
Crawford's assessment of the mood of his cabinet colleagues 
was correct, then there was little inclination amongst 
any of the Unionist ministers to back Asquith, with only 
Austen Chamberlain dead set against Lloyd George's 
premiership. 
Thursday 7 December was the critical day for Lloyd George, 
t 
and it is here that Lord Beaverbrook's account leaves most 
to be desired. The Beaverbrook Version of events, followed 
closely by subsequent historians, should be borne in mind: 
Lloyd George made a separate overture to Long to entice 
him to join the new government. This was repulsed, and 
1Hewins, Apoleia_of an_Imperialist, 2,96-8. 
2Long to Lady Londonderry, 6 Dec. 1916, L. L. P., D/Lo/C 
666(292). 
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Long stated that he would act only in concert with the 
other dissident Conservative ex-ministers, the 'three Cs'. 
Lloyd George and Bonar Law then managed together to 
detach Curzon by an offer of a place in the new war cabinet, 
following which Lloyd George saw Long and the 'three Cs' 
again in the evening, this time arriving at an agreement 
by which they would all enter the government. Thus, in 
the Beaverbrook version it is Curzon who makes the decision 
which ensures that Lloyd George will have enough Unionist 
support to form a government. 
' 
In fact, it was Long. 
On Thursday morning, Lord Edmund Talbot, the Unionist 
chief whip, told Lloyd George that he could not guarantee 
to rally the hostile Tory backbenchers 'who might if they 
held out make things very awkward in the House'; 
2 
and 
Christopher Addison's assurances concerning the degree of 
support which Lloyd George could expect from Liberal MPs 
were decidedly over-optimistic. 
3 Correspondence between 
Long and Chamberlain in. 'December 1923, after Bonar Law's 
death, shows that Beaverbrook did not know what had 
transpired on Thursday afternoon. 
4 Lloyd George sent for 
--- - --- - ------------------ -- 
1Beaverbrook, 
Politicians and the-War, 2,313-27. 
---------------- 2 Frances Stevenson's diary, 7 Dec. 1916, A Diary_by Frances 
Stevenson, p. 134. 
3See J. M. McEwen, 'Lloyd George's Liberal supporters=1n 
December 1916: a note', Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical Research 53 (1980). The strength of the parties 
in the House was as follows: 288 Unionists, 260 Liberals, 
82 Irish Nationalists and 40 Labour. 
4 See Long to Chamberlain, 7 Dec. 1923, A. C. P., AC 15/3/20. 
Long's copy is dated 3 Dec. 1923, perhaps indicating that he 
hesitated for some days before posting the letter, and may be 
found in L. P., Add. MS. 62405. Further correspondence 
between Long and Chamberlain concerning what happened in 
December 1916 may be found in W. L. P., WRO 947/826. Long did 
not divulge what had happened until the general election 
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Long and a secret meeting took place - Bonar Law was 
also in attendance. Long was told that the section of 
the Conservative party which would follow him was much 
larger than that which supported either Chamberlain or 
Carson and that it was essential to a stable government 
that he agree to take office. Lloyd George told Long 
that with the exception of the Foreign Office and the 
Admiralty - already reserved for Balfour and Carson 
respectively - he could choose his own office, and, in 
order to give full weight to his appointment, he must 
choose a Secretaryship of State. Bull's account, confided 
to his diary on the following day, confirms what took 
place, differing from Long's version only in that it 
states that Long was told he could not choose the War 
Office. It is worth quoting at length: 
Lloyd George and Bonar Law after keeping Walter out of 
it for 24 hours asked if they might come and see him ... 
If I had been Walter I would have let them come round 
to him now that they were realising they could not form 
------- ----------- 
campaign of December 1923 and his letter was provoked by an 
attack which Lloyd George had made about the role of the 
Conservative party during the war. Long cited the events of 
the afternoon of 7 December 1916, as an example of Lloyd 
Geroge's duplicity. Chamberlainvwas not particularly 
surprised that Bonar Law should in 1916 have tried to drive 
a wedge between himself and Long. He told Long: 'As far as 
the attitude of Lloyd George and Bonar to me at that moment 
is concerned, you must remember that George never liked me.... - 
I also learned later from Bonar himself that at the moment of 
which you speak (1916) Bonar thought I was intriguing against 
him and trying to deprive him of the leadership.... I only 
tell you ... now to show that I understand why Bonar separated 
you from me in his mind at the 1916 crisis and that therefore 
what you tell me will not alter my feeling for Bonar and does 
not pain or puzzle me. ' Chamberlain to Long, copy, 11 Dec. 
1923, A. C. P., AC 15/3/21. 
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a Government without him - but that was not Walter's 
way - He wrote a curt letter back saying as he was a 
junior Minister he would wait on them. 
They then offered him any of the Secretaries of 
State except the War. Office which L. G. said he meant 
to retain for himself. 
Walter said I will consider it if you let me ask the 
advice of two men: - 
No it is a secret & you must decide here and now 
Very well then I decline: - 
They then temporized -I do not know if Long gave any 
names but he meant his son Toby -a Brigadier General 
of 3 weeks standing and myself (Toby was just back from 
the front). 
He came back and Toby and I saw him in his room - 
After a long palava we advised him to accept the 
Colonies.... 
Walter went back & they agreed to his terms at once - 
Austen was not to be told that Long had been sent for 
first. 
On looking back I suppose Lloyd George only pretended 
to take the W. O. to prevent Walter asking for it - not 
knowing that he would never do such a thing. 
l 
Years later Lloyd George claimed that it was Long who was 
ultimately responsib'e for keeping Carson out of the war ' 
cabinet, insisting instead that Carson be 'fitted to a 
post for which he was unsuited'; 
2 
but this does not square 
with Longts later account that Lloyd George had already 
decided that Carson should, go to the Admiralty by the' 
time that he saw Long on Thursday afternoon. Long duly 
claimed the Colonial Office for himself, a post which he 
-- - ---- - ------ 
1Bull's diary, 8 Dec. 1916, Bu. P., 4/14. 
2Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 3,1176; Hyde, Carson, p. 
414. -- --- 
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had wanted for many years. 
1 
Later that same day he 
wrote privately to both Lloyd George and Bonar Law to 
deprecate government by such a small war cabinet, and 
when he learnt that Curzon had been offered a place he 
clearly regretted that he had not driven a harder bargain. 
2 
That evening Long wrote cryptically to Lord Lansdowne: 'I 
hope you will let me come and tell you my experiences of 
today, they have been by no means pleasant. I hope I 
have done the right thing ... '3 To Lady Londonderry 
Long explained: 'I have accepted the Secretaryship of 
State for Colonies, under much pressure. I wished to be 
let off and to support Gov. as a backbencher but Ll. G. 
would not agree. 14 
In order to secure Chamberlain's co-operation, Lloyd 
George wanted to announce Long's consent to join as a 
'fait accompli'. Chamberlain would receive no prior 
word, but would simply hear, along with everybody else, 
that Long was the new Colonial Secretary. 
5 By this strategy 
1On 
13 June 1909 Bull had recorded: 'Long would be the 
first to say he would make a rotten Chancellor - He would 
like the Colonies or the Admiralty for choice. ' Bull's 
diary. Bu. P., 3/19. Long fulfilled both of these ambitions 
under Lloyd George's premiership, 
2See Long to Bonar Law, 7 Dec. 1916, and Long to Lloyd 
George, copy, 7 Dec. 1916, B. L. P., 81/1/9. Lloyd George 
recorded in his War Memoirs, 4,1732, that 'Mr. Walter Long 
was rather piqued at his exclusion from the War Cabinet. He 
was always conscious of the fact that he was regarded by a 
large section of the Conservative party as the most eligible 
successor to the leadership vacated by Balfour. ' 
3Long to Lansdowne, 7 Dec. 1916, Lord Lansdowne Papers. 
4Long to Lady Londonderry, 8 Dec. 1916, L. L. P., D/Lo/C 
666(293). 
5Long to Chamberlain, 7 Dec. 1923, loc. cit. 
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Lloyd George and Bonar Law tried to divide the potential 
opposition to the new government, perhaps hoping to 
exploit the latent enmity between Long and Chamberlain. 
But Long refused to agree to this plan. Later that day 
another private interview took place at the Colonial 
Office between Long and Bonar Law. Long was again pressed 
to allow Lloyd George to announce his decision to join. 
This second interview occurred immediately before Bonar 
Law was due to see Chamberlain and Lord Robert Cecil. 
Again, Long refused to sanction the announcement or to 
allow Lloyd George to use the information to coerce 
Chamberlain and Cecil into joining. Realising that the 
intended trickery would cause bad feeling if it became 
generally known, Bonar Law swore Long to secrecy with the 
words, 'I hope you won't mention what has happened to 
Austen or to any of our colleagues. '1 Long kept quiet 
for seven years. 
It is quite clearly a; mistake to regard Long as working 
in league with the 'three Cs'. Significantly, Frances 
Stevenson's diary does not mention Long as among 'the 
hostile section of the Unionist party'. Cecil, Curzon 
and Chamberlain, however, are alt mentioned by name. 
2 if 
Lloyd George had been: unable to secure the co-operation of 
all the Tory ex-ministers sit the evening meeting on 7 
December, he would still have been able to form a government, 
for Chamberlain and Cecil were already effectively isolated, 
---------------- ------- 
lIbid. 
2Frances Stevenson's diary, 6 Dec, 1916, A Diary_hX Frances 
Stevenson, p. 133. 
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though they were not, of course, aware of it. As it was, 
the evening agreement, to which Long, Curzon, Chamberlain 
and Cecil all lent their names, smoothed things over and 
gave a false impression of unanimity. Long's undertaking 
to join as Colonial Secretary regardless of the 'three Cs' 
remained a secret known only to himself, Sir William Bull, 
Lloyd George and Bonar Law, until he decided many years 
later to tell Chamberlain the full story. And he told 
Chamberlain only when he had retired from active politics, 
when the party had turned against Lloyd George, and after 
Bonar Law had died. 
This version of events is confirmed by a further piece 
of evidence. According to Christopher Addison, Lloyd 
George also saw Herbert Samuel on Thursday afternoon. 
Samuel refused to join the administration on the grounds 
that it would be politically unstable. He was consid- 
erably taken aback when Lloyd George retorted that Balfour - 
and Long had already consented to join. 
1 
0 
Beaverbrook, then, could hardly have been more in error 
than when he remarkeg that Lloyd George had had 'to go 
to Tories like Walter Long to be repulsed. '2 The extent 
to which Beaverbrook was misinfofined can be gleaned from 
a letter which he wrote to Lord Crewe when writing his 
book some years later: 
-------- - ------ 
1Addison, Four and a Half Years, 1,277. 
2Beaverbrook, Politicians andthe War, 2,341. 
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I am not going to publish the full facts in my book, 
but I put them in writing for your benefit.... Lloyd 
George saw Long separately and made him an offer. 
Long declined on the ground that he must stand by his 
friends.... Bonar Law then sent Edmund Talbot to 
Curzon with an offer of a place in the War Cabinet. 
That settled it.... Long comes out of the business 
very well. He was a stupid man, and he would not 
realise that Curzon had swallowed the bait he had 
refused. 
1 
In other words, Beaverbrook knew that Long had been seen 
separately, but he did not know that Long had agreed to 
take office. Long was not as stupid as Beaverbrook made 
out: he had accepted office before Curzon, but had 
avoided any stigma of treachery by managing to keep the 
affair secret. In response to a request from Beaverbrook 
for his version of events, Long simply wrote in November 
1919: 'I have omitted a great deal that happened at the 
time, as I believe I promised not to mention certain 
very interesting incidents. '2 
In fact, Long seems to have taken quite deliberate 
steps to conceal the(role which he played in the crisis. 
To begin with, there is a conspicuous lacuna in his 
papers for December 1916. Apart'fron a copy of the letter 
which he wrote to Chamberlain in December 1923, and some 
ensuing correspondence, there is nothing relating to the 
events. His son, Eric, believed that all relevant 
letters had been deliberately destroyed. Austen Chamberlain, 
-------- - ------ 
1Beaverbrook to Crewe, n. d., L. G. P., G/3/6/20. 
2Long to Beaverbrook, 15 Nov. 1919, quoted McEwen, 'Struggle 
for Mastery in Britain', p. 131. 
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anxious to find out more about Long's behaviour, told 
Lord Robert Cecil on 10 July 1931 that 
Eric Long tells me that he has volumes of his father's 
letters, but nothing connected with the crisis of 1916. 
At that point there is a gap and he says it is evident 
that at some later date his father destroyed all 
letters relating to it. 
l 
Presumably, Long's correspondence with Chamberlain in 
1923, without which many of the details of his fateful 
meeting on the afternoon of 7 December 1916 would remain 
hidden, has survived only because it was written a full 
seven years after the events to which it relates. And 
Sir William Bull's diary, the only piece of contemporary 
evidence regarding Longs role, has hitherto been unavailable 
to historians, remaining until very recently in the custody 
of his son. Lord Crawford's diary, too, - essential 
evidence for the reconstruction of the events of the early 
part of this fateful week in British politics - has only 
11 
very recently become available. 
In his account, Bepverbrook asserted repeatedly that 
Long and the 'three Cs' were acting against the opinion 
of the bulk of the party. Bonar'Law, he argued, always 
had the option of appealing for support to the party at 
large. This is not so. The party did not know what was 
going on; it was suspicious and mistrustful, and Long 
maintained his command over the backbenches throughout 
the crisis. It was always Long, not Bonar Law, who was 
'Chamberlain to Cecil, 10 July 1931, A. C. P., AC 15/3/39. 
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in the position of being able to appeal to the party. 
Lloyd George and Bonar Law had learnt the lesson taught 
by the collapse of the Irish negotiations earlier in the 
year: Long had to be conciliated or he could bring down 
a government which depended for its parliamentary majority 
on Conservative votes. 
To conclude, Long's revelations to Chamberlain about 
his own role would appear to be accurate, Beaverbrook's 
account substantially inaccurate. Long was the pivot on 
which Unionist support for the new government was 
balanced. 
' Certainly, if the 'three Cs' acted throughout 
the crisis with the intention of backing Asquith they did 
so alone, without Longs support. More probably, the 
'three Cs' were not as anxious to keep Lloyd George from 
the premiership, let alone to strengthen Asquith's hand 
against his detractors, as Beaverbrook made out. That 
Lloyd George should have recognised Long's pivotal position 
is not at all surprising. Indeed, Long maintained in later 
years that Lloyd George had approached him well before 
Asquith's fall in the hope that he would join Bonar Law and 
1Dr John Stubbs, in 'The Conservative Party and the Politics 
of War', p. 390, seems to be the only historian who has 
hitherto suspected the significance of Long's letter to 
Chamberlain of 7 Dec. 1923, though he was not able to confirm 
his suspicions by consulting Bull's diary. Nonethless, nr 
Stubbs remarks perceptively that 'there remains a very 
distinct possibility that it was Long not Curzon who did 
provide the leverage that Lloyd George and Bonar Law needed 
to ease the Unionists into the new Coalition government. ' It 
is, however, rather more than a 'very distinct possibility'. 
Long himself referred to the pivotal role which he had played 
in a letter to Lloyd George dated 18 July 1917. See W. L. P., 
WRO 947/568. 
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Carson and so precipitate a crisis. 
' As the an who 
had first broken the party truce and led the opposition 
of the Unionist Business Committee to Asquith's handling 
of the war, Long had proved that he was too dangerous to 
leave outside. His victory over Ireland in the summer 
of 1916 had shown that Bonar Law could not carry the 
party without Long's assent. 
As always, Long's strength lay in his support on the 
backbenches. Even Bonar Law had been forced to admit that 
Long was 'the most popular man in the Tory party'. And 
Lloyd George desperately needed the most popular man on 
his side. Thus, it was Long, and not Curzon, whose 
support was decisive in allowing Lloyd George to inform 
the King, also on 7 December 1916, that he was able to 
form an administration. The contention that 'Law delivered 
the backbench 12 overlooks the fact that he was 
able to do so only because he had first taken the trouble 
to win over Long. With; Long in the Commons, then Curzon 
00 
in the Lords, Lloyd George was home and dry. 
e 
r 
Long's initial impression of Lloyd George as prime minister 
1For Long's accusations see the Morning Post, 4 Dec. 1923. 
Long's motive in disclosing this approach was to portray 
Lloyd George as a dishonest and self-seeking intriguer. Lloyd 
George denied that he had ever approached Long until after he 
had become prime minister. In his War Memoirs. 3,1046, Lloyd 
George claimed that in forming his government he had been 
guided entirely by Bonar Law in the selection of Conservative 
ministers. 
2Taylor, English History, p. 70. 
I 
304 
was very favourable. He told his brother-in-law that 
Lloyd George 'is very determined, very clear as to what 
he wants, and very prompt in his actions. We have made, 
I think, a really good start, and I believe we have the 
country behind us. '1 His own appointment to the Colonial 
Office was the subject of a vitriolic attack by the 
Northcliffe press, 
2 
an attack which Long felt keenly, so 
much so that he even told Bonar Law that he was prepared 
to resign if Lloyd George felt that the new government 
needed a friendly press. 
3 
Why did Long consider resigning over a few derogatory 
remarks in the newspapers? Long knew that Lord Northcliffe 
had played a part in Lloyd George's rise to power, and he 
suspected that Northcliffe would not rest until he 
personally approved of all members of the government. The 
leader in The_Times on 9 December dismissed Long, together 
with Chamberlaim, Cecil, and Balfour, as a 'back number' 
and an 'old fossil'. Lbng had no wish to take office if 
'all the mistakes of the new Government & there will be 
many, will be put down to us. We will be subject to pin- 
pricks all the time. '4 On Sunday Bull went to see Geoffrey 
Robinson at The Times and. manage'd to get a promise that 
there would be no sustained campaign, though Robinson 
made it clear that he personally endorsed the censure of 
1Long to Colonel Hugh Clutterbuck, copy, 8 Jan. 1917, W. L. P. 
WRO 947/541. Clutterbuck had in 1887 married Long's sister, 
Charlotte Anna, who had died in February 1914. 
2See The Times, 9 Dec. 1916. 
3See Long to Bonar Law, 9 Dec. 1916, B. L. P., 81/1/28. 
4Bull's diary, 9 Dec. 1916, Bu-P., 4/14. 
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Long. On reflection, Long chose to stay in office and 
put up with Northcliffe's criticisms. 
' 
Although the Colonial Office is generally regarded as 
something of a backwater in wartime, the workload was 
nonetheless immense. Long's administrative abilities 
were taxed to the full, his correspondence was vast, 
2 
and 
he was fortunate in that Professor Hewins proved a 
devoted and competent under-secretary. The details of 
Long's duties as Colonial Secretary, ranging from the 
inspection of Dominions troops to the supply of war 
materials, are of little interest. Suffice it to say 
that his ability and willingness to work long, irregular 
hours, often on tasks of immense tedium, ensured that he 
not only kept abreast of the work but emerged from his 
two years at the Colonial Office with his reputation 
enhanced. He also managed to find time to serve on a 
number of wartime committees. 
3 
In addition to his orýinary tasks it fell to Long to 
take the chair at the Imperial War Conferences of 1917 
r 
Bull's diary, 10 Dec. 1916, ibid. 
2Long's 
papers contain a considerable quantity of material 
relating to his two years at the1Colonial Office. For his 
general Colonial Office correspondence see W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
503-600. Longs correspondence with the Governors-General 
and Governors of the Dominions and other British dependencies 
may be found in ibid., WRO, 947/601-34. 
3For Long's papers relating to Manpower, 1916-17, see ibid., 
WRO 947/655-7; for the Enemy Interests Committee, 1916-17, see 
ibid., WRO 947/658; for wartime control of the production and 
distribution of foodstuffs, 1916-18, see ibid., WRO 947/659- 
63; for the Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research, 1917-18, see ibid., WRO 947/664; for the 
Raw Materials Board, 1918, see ibid., WRO 947/669; for the 
War Indemnity Committee, 1918, see ibid., WRO 947/673-4. 
306 
and 1918, at the first of which a unanimous resolution 
was passed in favour of imperial preference. 
' Long was 
subsequently appointed, in August 1917, to chair a 
committee charged with giving practical effect to the 
Conference proposals. 
2 He made it clear that he was 
concerned only to discover some workable scheme for 
carrying tariffs into effect, not to spend time discussing 
tariffs on their merits. The policy of imperial preference 
was taken as given. The committee met regularly for 
nearly a year, ploughed through masses of work, and 
produced several interim reports. Although Long was 
passionately interested in imperial unity, he was content 
to let other committee members do the real work and he - 
attended few meetings, usually allowing Hewins to take 
charge. The prestige and authority afforded by Long's 
support were, however, of real value. He may not have 
done much of the hard grind, but he was certainly the 
---- - ---------- - ------ 
1The 
Imperial War Conference of 1917 was the occasion of 
some animosity between Long and Lord Milner. As Colonial 
Secretary Long was not, of course, a member of the war cabinet. 
He felt that his owntresponsibilities as a minister were being' 
devalued if the Dominion prime ministers sat with members of 
the war cabinet without the Colonial Secretary in attendance, 
and he therefore insisted that hp should be allowed to be 
present at every meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet. Milner, 
it would appear, tried to use the Conference to foist a 
federal scheme on the Dominions, threatening to break up the 
proceedings when his efforts to stampede the premiers fell on 
deaf ears. Long resented these moves and had little sympathy 
with the Milnerites' premature intrigues, regarding a confer- 
ence convened solely for the purpose of discussing the war 
effort as no place to undertake the massive task of Empire 
federation. See Gollin, Proconsul in Politics, pp. 396-98. 
2The 
committee was originally known as 'The Imperial Trade 
Policy Committee' but after the Dominions expressed disap- 
proval of this title it was changed, from 7 Nov. 1917, to 
'The Committee on the Trade Relations of the United Kingdom 
within the Empire'. Long's papers relating to the committee 
may be found in W. L. P., WRO 947/665-8. 
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figurehead, seen by Fleet Street as the main architect 
of proposals for post-war imperial policy. 
By July 1918 the committee had more or less completed 
its deliberations and Long obtained the approval of the 
war cabinet for its recommendation that post-war 
reconstruction should include imperial preference, 
subject to ratification by the Empire as a whole. On 
24 July, at a luncheon held at the West India Club, Long 
announced that the government was now committed to imperial 
tariffs. Long's speech received widespread attention in 
the newspapers the next day, almost all of it favourable. 
' 
Officially at least, Lloyd George's government was now 
committed to tariff reform. The old controversy had - 
largely disappeared, eroded by a general consensus, 
itself fostered by the experience of Empire co-operation 
during wartime, that tariffs represented the only way to 
safeguard the fruits of victory and to develop imperial 
resources. Later in the year, Long pressed Bonar Law, 
------- --------------- 
See The Times, the Daily-Telegraph, the Daily_Express, 
the Morning Post, the Daily Mail, and the Westminster Gazette, 
25 July 1918. The Manchester Guardian, predictably enough, 
castigated the scheme as 'ancient economic heresy' and 
predicted 'a peace which is likeýwar and will generate war. 
For such a world the life of no man should have been taken, 
and it will be haunted by the ghosts of a wasted generation 
lured to its death by the false assurance of noble purpose. ' 
But this heady rhetoric was now a voice in the wilderness. 
For the time being at least, imperial preference was the 
orthodoxy of all those who sought shelter behind the aegis of 
a British Empire so strong that its security and economic 
hegemony would be beyond challenge. The Times was more in 
accord with prevailing sentiment when it commented that the 
'Preference decision is thus the beginning ... of a new 
order ... ' 
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unsuccessfully, for permission to announce a more detailed 
policy. 
1 Lloyd George paid lip service to the principles 
of imperial unity and tariff reform, but he would go no 
further and, much to the annoyance of both Long and 
Professor Hewins at the Colonial Office, the work of 
the committee was allowed to lapse. 
1917 was a year of personal tragedy for Long. On 28 
January his eldest son, Toby, 
2 
who held the rank of 
Brigadier-General and who commanded the 6th Battalion, 
the Wiltshire Regiment, was killed in action. He was _ 
thirty-seven years old and had been a professional soldier 
since 1899, serving in France since the beginning of the 
war. He died in the trenches at Hebuterne, hit in the 
head by a shell which killed him outright. Long had 
been devoted to Toby and he never fully recovered from 
this blow. He threw himself into his Colonial Office 
work in an attempt to block out the pain, but the loss 
of his son played its part in contributing to his own 
declining state of health. 
3 
In February Long embarked on an ambitious scheme of 
Colonial Office re-organisation. His working formula was 
1See Long to Bonar Law, copies, 3 Oct. and 4 Oct. 1918, 
W. L. P., WRO 947/668. 
2Long's 
eldest son was christened Walter, but he was 
always known as Toby. 
31n 1921 Long had A Memoir ofBrigadier-General Walter Longe 
published by John Murray of London for private 
circulation. See W. L. P., WRO 947/927-30. 
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that the 'proof of the efficiency of a Department is to 
be found in the brevity of the minutes and the rarity of 
the occasions on which the Secretary of State has to 
differ with the recommendations made to him. ' He did 
not get very far. Realising that the war was no time 
to upset his staff, Long temporarily dropped his plans 
for a major overhaul of departmental procedures. 
' 
He returned to the question in the summer of 1918. 
Overburdened by dreary administrative work, and finding 
much of his time taken up by Irish affairs, Long advocated 
the creation of a Secretary of State for Imperial Affairs, 
to be given a seat in the war cabinet. His suggestions 
were very far-reaching. A new Department of the Crown 
Colonies would be separated from the administration of 
the self-governing Dominions and would be given a staff 
of permanent officials in the usual way. The new 
Secretary of State would, Long submitted, communicate - 
directly with the Domin. on prime ministers, thus cutting 
i 
out the Governors-General. In considering a complete 
reconstitution of the Colonial Office Long went on to 
suggest that the opportunity be used for an overhaul of 
the entire structure of governmeAt. He recommended a 
permanently small cabinet, never to exceed twelve members. 
The cabinet would consist only of Secretaries of State, 
each of whom would be in charge of two or three departments. 
For example, a new Imperial Secretary of State would be 
-- ----- - --- -- - ---- -- 
1Long's 
papers contain a draft memorandum, dated 16 Feb. 
1917, intended 'to lighten the burden and expedite business. ' 
It is annotated 'cancelled'. See W. L. P., WRO 947/509. 
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responsible for the Dominions but would have under him 
a Minister for the Colonies who would undertake the actual 
work previously done by the Colonial Secretary in relation 
to Crown colonies. Long deplored the suggestion that 
Lloyd George should deal directly with the Dominion prime 
ministers, for this would effectively have handed over 
control to the 'Garden Suburb' 'composed of clever young 
men' who tare only after all Private Secretaries'. 
1 Long 
was quite prepared to relinquish some of his responsib- 
ilities to a new department, but not to Lloyd George's 
'clever young men'. In Long's scheme, each Secretary of 
State would be in charge of a number of semi-autonomous 
ministries, each with a minister who might attend the 
cabinet on special occasions as required but who would 
never be a member. 
Long's proposition naturally gave rise to much discussion. 
Lloyd George expressed a predilection for dealing directly -- 
with the Dominion prime, ministers through the cabinet 
secretariat, under the general supervision of Sir Maurice 
Hankey. Long regarded d this plan as anathema, as it would 
seriously have devalued his own status as Colonial 
Secretary, and Lloyd George was iobliged to defer in order 
to maintain the stability of his government. What Long 
wanted was a seat in the wqr cabinet combined with a 
lightening of his administrative burden, perceiving 
himself as the only real candidate for the new Secretaryship 
of State. In the end, there were no changes, and it was 
-- - ------ - ----- 
1Extract from a private letter frort Long to Sir Ronald 
Munro-Ferguson, 3 July 1918, M. P., MS. Eng. Hist. c. 706, 
fos. 5-10. 
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decided, in July 1918, to continue to consult the 
Dominions through the Governors-General in the old: way.. 
The sheer scope of the proposals, however, shows Long 
at his most innovative. 
1 
He pressed strongly as Colonial Secretary for the 
retention of German colonies to be made an avowed British 
war aim, even urging the Foreign Office to make support 
for the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France conditional 
on French acknowledgement that Britain was to have sole 
rights over German colonial territory. 'If we restore 
the German Colonies', he warned Balfour, 'it is good-bye 
to the British Empire. '2 Long had greeted Lansdowne's 
peace proposals of November 1916 with alarm and he 
consistently argued that the cabinet should cone to a 
firm decision on the fate of Germany's colonies before 
taking any steps in the direction of negotiations, even 
after victory. Germany's tentative steps towards peace, 
made through Spain in September 1917 and soon known as 
the Madrid Telegram, prompted Lord Lansdowne to resurrect 
his letter of a year earlier, this time for publication 
in the Daily Telegraphh. 
3 Long was quite out of sympathy 
1For details of Longs ideas see extract fron a private 
letter which he wrote to Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, 1 Aug. 
1918, ibid., fos. 11-14. 
2Long to Balfour, copy, 4'Oct. 1917, W. L. P., WRO 947/514. 
3Lansdowne's 
peace letter was published in the Daily 
Telegraph on 30 Nov. 1917, having been refused by The Times. 
In Nov. 1916 Lansdowne had urged a compromise peace on the 
cabinet but had been much criticised by his Unionist 
colleagues, especially Balfour, Long and Lord 'Robert Cecil. 
He then decided to drop the matter and no more was heard-för 
a year. Two days after publication a government communique 
stated that Lansdowne had not been in touch with any member 
of the cabinet, nor did his published views in any way reflect 
or represent the views of His Majesty's government. 
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with Lansdowne's views and insisted, contrary to the 
wishes of both Lloyd George and Balfour, that the 
Dominions must be kept properly informed about Germany's 
peace overtures. 
' He never deviated from the conviction 
that Britain should entertain no thought of peace before 
beating the Germans thoroughly and decisively in the 
field. 2 
As Colonial Secretary Long argued for an active policy 
of preparation so that Britain would go into a peace 
conference with a clear and firm determination to retain 
German colonies. He had no time for Woodrow Wilson's 
heady rhetoric about national self-determination and a 
crusade for democracy, and he was sceptical of all talk 
concerning the establishment of some form of international 
administration for the conquered territories. 
3 Wilson's 
1Balfour intended to consult only France, Russia, Italy 
and Japan. Long insisted that the Dominions had a right to 
know if the British government was considering a negotiated 
settlement, and on 11 Oct. 1917 he despatched a secret 
telegram to the Dominion premiers disclosing the German 
approach. See Long to Balfour, copy, 9 Oct. 1917, and Balfour 
to Long, 10 Oct. 1917, W. L. P., WRO 947/515.1 
1 2Less than three weeks before the armistice Long wrote 
privately: 'I do most earnestly hope that whatever the 
sacrifice may be we shall not hold our hands now, but shall 
continue until we have really brought the German to his knees. 
To make peace before this has been accomplished would I 
honestly believe mean losing the real fruits of victory. ' 
Long to General Sir William Birdwood, copy, 23 Oct. 1918, 
ibid., WRO 947/534. 
3Long 
cited the British and French condominium in the New 
Hebrides as evidence of the cumbrous and unsatisfactory 
nature of shared systems of government. Joint mandates for 
colonial territories would, he asserted to a private 
correspondent, prove 'probably almost as bad as restoration 
to Germany. ' Long to the Bishop of Pretoria, copy, 23 Nov. 
1917, ibid., WRO 947/553. 
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diplomacy he regarded as naive and fanciful: Britain 
must look to her own future first and foremost, to that 
of her Empire next, and only lastly to the national 
aspirations of others. He readily exploited the furore 
engendered by evidence of systematic and deliberate ill- 
treatment of natives by Germany. 
l Long's humanitarian 
outrage was genuine enough, 
2 but he seized on the evidence 
of German barbarity in Africa as a fillip to his campaign 
for the appropriation of all enemy colonies to be stated 
as a British war aim. To the Foreign Office objection 
that Britain would then be seen to be fighting a war of 
colonial aggrandizement Long was peculiarly indifferent. 
He advocated a foreign policy of barter in dealing with 
Britain's allies over the question of colonial rights. 
Balfour, he urged, should be authorised to 'horse-trade' 
for the German possessions in Africa. To begin with, 
Britain should pursue a 'confidential but definite and 
binding agreement with the French that if we support her 
as to the lost Provinces [i. e. Alsace and Lorraine] she 
will support us over the Colonial question. '3 Similar 
-- ----- -- -------- - ------------- ---- 
1See Papers Relating_to_German Atrocities and Breaches of 
the Rules of War in Africa, Cd. 8306 T1916); Report_on the 
Natives of South West Africa and Their Treatment by_Germany, -------------------- --- Cd. 914677-19-18-T. 
2It 
was on purely humanitarian grounds that Long argued 
with the Foreign Office, early in 1917, that Belgium should 
not be allowed to retain any African territory acquired during 
the war and that generous treatment of Belgium after the war 
should be made conditional on her good behaviour in German 
East Africa. Balfour would not agree. See Long to Balfour, 
copies, 19 Jan. and 6 Feb. 1917; Balfour to Long, 8 Feb. 1917, 
W. L. P., WRO 947/532. 
3Long to Lord Robert Cecil, copy, 1 Mar. 1918, ibid., WRO 
947/538. Cecil was at this time Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign office. 
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confidential arrangements would then be made with the 
other Powers. Gradually, an interlocking system of 
secret agreements would be constructed in Britain's favour. 
Japan could be bought off by reaffirmed and binding 
promises of support in the Pacific; Belgium and Portugal 
could be placated with an undertaking that there would 
be no interference with their existing territories; and 
a few small concessions in East Africa would keep the 
Italians quiet for at least a couple of decades. As 
for the United States, Long believed it best to divulge 
nothing until all the necessary arrangements had been 
concluded, so as to ensure that Wilson's was a solitary 
voice of protest. Needless to say, Balfour had little 
taste for this reclamation of the Bismarckian principles 
of diplomacy, nor for the souring of relations with 
America which it involved, and Long's submissions fell 
on deaf ears.. Consequently, there was little sympathy 
between the Foreign and; Colonial Offices in the consid- 
f 
eration of post-war imperial policy. 
Long was also given overall charge of the supply, 
distribution and consumption of oil. 
l By the spring of 
1917 German submarine attacks forced the government to 
take stock of its administrative machinery for securing 
adequate supplies. On 22 May Long was empowered by the 
war cabinet to examine the question, and a few days 
later he asked for, and received, emergency powers over 
1This 
paragraph is based on G. Gareth Jones, 'The British 
Government and the Oil Companies: The Search for an Oil 
Policy', Historical Journal 20 (1977). 
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all petroleum products. Working closely with John Cadman, 
the petroleum adviser to the Colonial Office, he set 
about building 'an administrative system capable of 
allocating priorities and preventing shortages developing 
in any crucial section. '1 He continued to exercise 
overall responsibility for oil supplies until the end of 
the war, and in 1919 he had discussions with the French 
petroleum minister, Henri Besenger, with the aim of 
securing an Anglo-French agreement. The so-called 
Long-Barenger Agreement grew out of these talks but was 
never implemented as Lloyd George, claiming to have been 
unaware of the negotiations, cancelled the arrangement 
in May 1919. Later in the year Hamar Greenwood took over 
as the British minister responsible for petroleum policy. 
Although by any stretch of the imagination a rather dull 
field of governmental activity, Long was responsible for 
the last two years of the war for ensuring that the 
country had adequate supplies of oil during a period when 
J, 
the peacetime system of supply and distribution was 
patently unable to cope with the increased demands of war. 
V 
Relations between Long and Lloyd George were frequently 
strained, almost as if by habit. This was partly the 
result of Long's resentment at his exclusion from the war 




the Conservative party, and partly the consequence of 
Lloyd George's failure to consult his colleagues over 
changes in the membership of the government. A clash 
occurred in June 1917 over the offer to General Smuts 
of a seat in the war cabinet. Long objected vociferously, 
insisting that the appointment was a flagrant breach of 
constitutional practice for which there could be no 
justification. 
1 He was ignored. 
Nor was he consulted over the appointment of Winston 
Churchill as Minister of Munitions. 
2 What really 
irritated Long was the realisation that Lloyd George 
now felt secure enough to ride roughshod over his 
Conservative ministers, though it is worth pointing out 
that Long opposed Churchill's return not on personal but 
on practical grounds. As he made clear to the prime 
minister on 18 July: 
I had, & have, no sort of objection to Churchill ... 
on personal grounds, :.. but Iffelt, and feel, that 
the inclusion .... would weaken your Gov. & would 
certainly make it extremely difficult for many öf my 
r 
friends to continue their support ... 
This was a blunt reminder to Lloýd George that the government 
----------------------- 
1Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 4,1833-4. 
2The 
appointment was announced on 18 July 1917. According 
to Lord Beaverbrook, MenandPower. 
_1917-1918 
(London, 1956), 
p. 138, Long greeted the news with a veiled threat of 
resignation, a threat which he withdrew only as a result of 
Bonar Law's persuasions. 
3Long to Lloyd George, 18 July 1917, quoted in Martin 
Gilbert, Winston_Churchilli Volume_FourZ_1917-11922 (London, 
1975), p. 29. ý- -- -- -- - 
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depended on Conservative backbench support. Long 
confided his fears to Sir William Bull: 
I fear it is the old story. The Tory party was 
hoodwinked & made hewers of wood & drawers of water 
for the Whips.... No register . '. No election 
:. Ll. G. 
paramount. And in the interval he is to build up a 
Party & we are to find men, money and majorities. 
' 
Long warned Bonar Law that Churchill must be kept firmly 
in his place and prevented from intefering with the work 
of other departments or influencing war strategy. 
Complaints against Lloyd George were, Long pointed out, 
already rife in the party: 
The real effect has been to destroy all confidence 
in Ll. G. ... he has deceived and "jockeyed" us. 
The com- 
plaints come from"our very best supporters, quiet, steady, 
staunch men and W. C. has made things worse by stating 
at Dundee that the opposition to him springs from his 
political opponents.. 
2 
But the issue which caused the most bitter altercation 
was that of agricultural policy, a topic on which'Long 
C 
was an acknowledged spokesman within the party. As a 
general rule, Long would support' wartime controls only 
if they could be shown to be absolutely necessary. He 
thought that controls over farmers were too rigorous and 
that many regulations were ill-conceived. 
3 Lloyd George 
--- ------------------------ ------ 
1Long to Bull, 22 July 1917, Bu. P., 4/16. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 29 July 1917, B. L. P., 82/2/12. 
3For 
example, Long poured scorn on the regulations affecting 
the sale of food, one of which restricted the number of 
courses which hotels and restaurants might serve. Long 
maintained that such a rule could only have been devised by 
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was plagued with differences in the cabinet over agri- 
culture almost from the moment that he became prime 
minister. Frances Stevenson's diary entry for 17 February 
1917 is revealing: 
D. was worried last night. His Unionist colleagues 
have been causing him trouble. I felt certain that 
sooner or later they would come to blows about the 
land, the old bone of contention.... D. was furious 
with them, & turned on them fiercely, & cowed them 
for the moment.... D. is sick of Long and says he 
thinks he will have to get rid of him. Long is 
disgruntled and wants to be included in the War Cabinet. 
This is impossible but he will not take 'not for an 
1 
answer. 
Long was particularly hostile to the introduction of 
guaranteed prices and wages, a control which he knew 
would be execrated by Tory landowners. He told Bonar Law 
that in peacetime he would have resigned immediately on 
the issue. 2 To give a guaranteed wage to all farm 
labourers, regardless of whether'or no they were worth 
it, and to allow farmers to get more than the market price 
C 
for their corn was, Long argued, an unjustifiable 
interference with market forces. 1 
He campaigned hard, and unsuccessfully, to have the 
---------------------- 
$idiots and ignoramuses', for if there had to be any 
restriction at all then clearly it should be of maximum 
values. See memorandum by Long to Lloyd George, 8 Feb. 1917, 
W. L. P., WRO 947/659. 
1A Diary by Frances Stevenson, pp. 144-5. 
2Long to Bonar Law, copy, 18 Feb. 1917, W. L. P., WRO 
947/563. 
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Corn Production Bill dropped. The Bill, which gave the 
government power to enforce particular types of cultivation, 
passed the Commons in April 1917, and although Long 
remained in the government he refused to accept either 
its provisions or its methods of operation. To Lloyd 
George he complained that it empowered the state 'to take 
control of a man's land away from him. '1 Long bombarded 
R. E. Prothero, who had succeeded the Earl of Crawford as 
President of the Board of Agriculture, with letters and 
memoranda expostulating against the seizure of land by the 
military and the injustice of instructions to farmers 
concerning the compulsory ploughing of grasslands. 
2 
Prothero, who had as good a claim to agricultural 
expertise as Long, does not seem especially to have 
resented Long's continual interference, no doubt recog- 
nising that Long's support from the landed element of the 
Conservative party could not be dismissed out of hand. 
Prothero was assailed Vith extracts of letters received 
from irate farmers: Long made wildly pessimistic forecasts, 
asserting repeatedl. x that the milk supply would fail and 
that near famine would sweep the land if policies were not 
drastically altered; he demanded agricultural information 
and statistics, and then frequently proceeded to challenge 
their accuracy; and he predicted that the alienation of 
the landed interest would result in political ruin for the 
Conservative party for several general elections to come. 
1Lloyd George, War Memoirs. 3,1291-2. 
2Long's 
papers contain some ninety letters of this type to 
Prothero. See W. L. P., WRO 947/585-6. 
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In short, Long made an egregious fool of himself. 
By the early summer Long was describing the government's 
policy as one of 'wanton destruction' and the situation 
in Wiltshire as 'Bedlam'. 
' Prothero responded to Long's 
entreaties by asking Lord Derby to put a stop to the 
Army taking men from dairy farms, but Derby refused on 
the ground that women could do the work adequately. 
This 
decision prompted strong words between Long and the War 
Office. 
2 
Longs indictments against the government's policy were 
reinforced by personal difficulties in Wiltshire with 
the local War Agricultural Committee. In August he 
discovered, much to his annoyance, that the commissioner 
for Wiltshire, one F. E. N. Rogers, had a low opinion of 
his capacities as a farmer, whereupon he accused the 
committee of acting from personal interest. In this 
allegation he was supported by the fact that the committee's- 
members included one man who acted as agent to the owner 
r 
of property adjoining his own on one side and another an 
who was a tenant ofethe landowner contiguous on the other 
side. The committee, Long contended, was being used by 
his neighbours to force him to make his own farms 
unprofitable. He thought seriously about taking legal 
action in an attempt to challenge the validity of 
instructions relating to the Rood Ashton estate. 
1Long to Prothero, copy, 27 May 1917, ibid. 
2See Long to Prothero, copies, 28 May, 2 June, 4 June 1917; 
Prothero to Derby, copy, 23 May 1917; Derby to Prothero, copy, 
29 May 1917, ibid. 
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Nor was Long prepared to pretend to his tenants that 
he approved of instructions to plough up good pasture. 
In October he distributed, to all the farmers on the 
Rood Ashton estate, a circular advising disobedience to 
the local committee's instructions. 
' This was to invite 
his tenants to defy the government. Long went on to 
describe the government's policy as 'ridiculous and 
dangerous' and the committee's methods as 'bluff and 
bluster'. Curiously, Prothero had some sympathy with 
Long's stand and even offered some assistance in fighting 
the Wiltshire committee. The trouble was, Prothero's 
instructions were not always carried out at local level. 
When Arthur Lee, the Director-General of Food Production, 
- Long had remarked, 'If that cursed fellow Lee isn't 
stopped, the whole of England will become one damned 
brown spot. '2 - discovered that Long had advised his 
tenants to ignore the orders to plough an official 
complaint was lodged with Lloyd George on the not 
unreasonable ground that Long was engaging in 'clandestine 
activities' against the decision of a government of which 
c 
he was a member. The prime minister rebuked Long for 
3 
'treachery' in the presence of bpth Lee and Prothero. 
At the root of Long's objections lay a fundamental 
dissatisfaction with Lloyd George's readiness to confront 
rather than to conciliate. Asquith, at least, had never 
1Circular letter by Long to his tenants, 13 Oct. 1917, 
W. L. P., WRO 947/660. 
15 
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embarked on policies which set Unionist leaders at odds 
with their supporters. Long believed that Bonar Law 
was totally ineffectual, even tremulous, when it came 
to standing up to Lloyd George; and he was convinced 
that the landed element of the Conservative party should 
not be sacrificed out of loyalty to a prime minister 
interested only in remaining in office. In a memorandum 
to Bonar Law, dated 19 September 1917, Long observed 
that the condition of the party was 'more difficult, 
more puzzling, than any with which I have ever been 
confronted', 
' 
and a month later he was clearly considering 
rocking the political boat. A terse letter was despatched 
to. Lloyd George on 23 October: 
There are a large number of people in Parliament and 
the Country who are good enough to place confidence 
in my opinion; may I remind you that when you did me 
the honour of inviting me to join your Government, you 
placed the number of-the former very high. 
2 
A few weeks later Long's threats became even more explicit: 
'I ... fear if preset policy is pursued I must come 
into 
violent and public controversy with the Board of 
Agriculture. 13 
In peacetime Long would very probably have resigned and 
conducted a powerful campaign at the head of the landed 
interest. But winning the war had become his main goal, 
and to win the war he was prepared to make great sacrifices, 
1Memorandum by Long to Bonar Law, copy, 19 Sept. 1917, 
W. L. P., WRO 947/563. 
2Long to Lloyd George, copy, 23 Oct. 1917, ibid., WRO 
947/568. 
3Long to Lloyd George, copy, 26 Nov. 1917, ibid. 
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even to be associated in the public mind with an 
agricultural policy which he detested. At times he 
bridled at the breakdown of party and cabinet government: 
? the abolition of Cabinet Gov., the substitution of a 
"Council of Six". has created what is really an autocracy. '1 
Yet he never seriously doubted that Lloyd George's 
methods were the only ones suitable for winning the war, 
and this made him reluctant to take his campaign outside 
government circles. For many months Long's refusal to 
publicise his opposition deprived it of real power and 
he achieved nothing, even suffering permanent damage to 
his own lands. 
2 
Gradually, however, Lloyd George was obliged to take 
note of Long's criticisms, which continued relentlessly 
into 1918. Although Long revelled in his role as 
champion of the farmers' liberties, he invariably opposed 
government restrictions and regulations solely on grounds 
of inefficiency or inefficacy. His memoranda became 
more and more outspoken. 'To threaten Agriculturists 
With imprisonment', he told the cabinet, 'if they fail to 
obey the orders of a local committee to plough up land 
which they know will not produceº corn is to adopt the 
worst kind of "Prussianism":! 
3 
Shortages, he averred, 
1Lon 
g to Prothero, copy, 3 Oct. 1917, ibid., WRO 947/585. 
2In the summer of 1918 Long tried to enlist the support of 
the Royal Agricultural Society in his fight against the 
Wiltshire committee, but the Society's secretary, Cecil 
Parker, was understandably reluctant to become involved in a 
political controversy during wartime. See ibid., WRO 947/ 
581. 
3Letter by Long circulated to the cabinet, 25 Nov. 1917, 
ibid., WRO 947/662. 
I 
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stemmed from 'confusion, overwork, and bad administration. 
If there were less red tape, less centralisation ... the 
people would very soon be better off. 'l Writing from 
Rood Ashton on 10 February 1918 Long demanded an interview 
with Lloyd George to discuss the situation: 'I cannot 
sit still', he told Sir Maurice Hankey, 
and see my people here ... suffering severe privations 
when they know and I know that if it were not for 
those hopeless regulations we could keep up all our 
supplies.... The only justification for Rationing and 
Central Control is success and instead we have failure 
following failure ... the position is intolerable. 
2 
Slowly, other Unionist ministers came to share Long's 
view of the regulations, realising that for the Conservative 
party to contemplate a general election with the farmers 
up in arms would be folly. On 22 February Austen 
Chamberlain wrote confidentially to Long to say that he 
took a dim view of Lloyd George's methods and to express 
the hope that Long would continue to use his influence 
to press for a change in the tone of government policy. 
3 
As the end of the war approached, and an election loomed, 
Lloyd George began more and more to feel his dependence 
i 
on his Conservative colleagues. Lee's food policies had 
prompted the acerbity of the landed interest, just as 
Long had predicted, yet Lee remained wedded to the goal 
---------------- 
1Long to Hankey, copy, 8 Feb. 1918, ibid., WRO 947/663(b). 
2Long to Hankey, copy, 10 Feb. 1918, ibid. 
3Chamberlain to Long, 22 Feb. 1918, ibid., WRO 947/539. 
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of ploughing a million acres.. Long, Curzon. Bonar Law, 
Chamberlain and Milner all thought that this was a 
ludicrous policy. With an election approaching Lloyd 
George suddenly became more sensitive to issues which 
threatened the allegiance of his Conservative colleagues: 
once the war was over there was the danger that Long 
might take his case before the public, carrying a large 
section of the party with him. 
Lloyd George decided to change tack over the controversial 
food programme: the sagacity of some of Long's criticisms 
was duly acknowledged; Lee would have to go, for, as Long 
had put it in February, the Food Ministry was 'doing 
fresh mischief every hourt. 
l Throughout the summer of - 
1918 Lloyd George demonstrated his political agility by 
manoeuvring Lee out of office with neither fuss nor 
bother. Lee's resignation, offered as a protest at the 
cabinet's refusal to endorse his food policies, was held 
in abeyance whilst he was persuaded, by a series of 
personal promises, to accept a peerage - Curzon, for 
example, reassured Lee that he might say what he liked 
about his department in the House of Lords. Lee was 
completely blind to the fact thät he was being eased into 
a position of political insignificance by a group of 
Unionist ministers who detested his policies and a prime 
minister who felt obliged to defer to their wishes. The 
offer of a peerage kept Lee temporarily in limbo, so that 
his controversial policies could be quietly abandoned. 
1Long to Lloyd George, copy, 4 Feb. 1918, B. L. P., 83/2/21. 
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Once safely installed in the Lords, Lee's resignation, 
offered in the heat of the moment some six weeks earlier, 
was accepted. 
1 But the hated Corn Production Act remained 
on the statute book, an irritant to Unionist agricultural 
spokesmen for much of Lloyd George's premiership. Many 
years later, in his War_Memoirs, Lloyd George remarked 
laconically that Long had played the role of 'a passive 
resister over wartime agricultural policy. '2 
Lloyd George's handling of changes in the military 
command early in 1918 also provoked Long's ire. Again, 
it was a question of consultation, not of fundamental 
differences over policy. 
3 On 15 February Long informed 
Bonar Law that he was thorrifiedt at Lloyd George's 
decision to replace Robertson as C. I. G. S. 
4 But he did 
------ -- ------------------------- --------- 
1Private 
papers ofLee of_Fareham, pp. 177-81. Lee's 
political naivety is readily apparent from the diary entries 
of his wife, Ruth, for June and July 1918. 
2Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 3,1293. 
3Lord Beaverbrook's account offthe controversy surrounding 
the downfall of Robertson and Haig, in Men and Power, pp* 
186-216, gives the impression that Long was likely to offer 
a serious challenge to Lloyd George in his struggle with the 
generals. It is trug that Long can loosely be termed a 
member of the 'Military Party', but this means only that he 
believed that the generals should receive the unqualified 
backing of the politicians and that the military experts 
should be listened to. It does not mean that he believed that 
the mistakes of the military men should go unchecked. Lord 
Beaverbrook also claimed, in his chapter on F. E. Smith 
entitled 'The Cleverest Man1 in the Kingdom', that Long had 
acted with the 'three Cs' in securing a pledge from Lloyd 
George that Haig would not be dismissed. If true, this is 
curious, for Long had a very poor opinion of Haig's capacities 
as a leader of men in wartime. 
4Long to Bonar Law, 15 Feb. 1918, B. L. P., 82/9/2. This 
letter is printed in full as an addendum to Beaverbrook, 
Men and Power, p. 415. 
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not threaten resignation; he merely advised caution on 
political grounds. He had little faith in Sir Douglas 
Haig. Indeed, nearly two years earlier Long had written: 
Have you noticed the steady and appalling increase 
in the death roll in France?... I am glad I am not 
a member of the War Committee. I believe the great 
mistake of the war will turn out to be the selection 
of Sir D. H..... I believe in success. 
' 
These are hardly the words of a man who believed that 
the generals should be given 'carte blanche', and Long's 
letter of 15 February to Bonar Law, to which Beaverbrook 
attached much significance, - Beaverbrook regarded this 
letter as a threat to resign, though it contains no such 
threat - was in fact concerned only to point out the 
political pitfalls of taking abrupt action for which the 
Unionist party in parliament would be unprepared. Long 
advised that 'so tremendous a step should not be taken 
without much more deliberation'; he did not suggest that 
the step should never be taken. And just four days later 
Long was able to report that 'my difficulties on the 
question are removed. '2 As usual, it had been Lloyd 
George's imperious manner which riad vexed Long. Robertson 
went, Haig survived; Sir Henry Wilson took over as C. I. G. S. 
1Long to Bonar Law, 7 May 1916, quoted Davidson's Memoirs 
and_Pasers, p. 39. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 19 Feb. 1918, B. L. P., 82/9/11. Sir 
Maurice Hankey believed that it was only a conversation which 
he had had with Long on 18 February which persuaded Long not 
to protest at Robertson's removal. See Lord Hankey, The 
Supreme_Commandl_l2llý_1 18,2 Vols. (London, 1961), 2,779. 
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By the spring of 1918 Lloyd George felt obliged to 
deal once and for all with Long's importunate demands 
for a seat in the war cabinet. Lloyd George first 
considered moving Long to the Home Office, a plan which 
he discussed with Hankey on 3 February as the two men 
motored through France on their way back to Boulogne. 
l 
This was because Long had a strong case as Colonial 
Secretary, a fact which Lloyd George could not ignore. 
But if Long was moved to the Home Office then, it could 
be argued, there was no reason for him to join the war 
cabinet. By the end of the month Lloyd George had hit 
on an even more skilful ruse. Long was offered the 
cherished seat in the war cabinet, but as Minister without 
Portfolio. If he had accepted he would have had no 
departmental responsibilities and therefore less influence. 
Lloyd George calculated, correctly, that Long would choose 
to keep his department. 
2 Having turned the offer down, 
Long could hardly continue to badger the prime minister 
for a seat in the war cabinet as Colonial Secretary. 
From 1916 onwards Long had become involved in the 
t 
evolution of franchise reform, and his influence over the 
1918 Representation of the People Act has been considered 
in a recent scholarly study. 
3 Nonetheless, Long's espousal 
1Ibid., 2,773. 
2A 
copy of Long's letter of refusal to Lloyd George, dated 
1 Mar. 1918, may be found in B. L. P., 83/2/21. 
3See Martin Pugh, Electoral_ReforminWar and Peace. 1906_18 
(London, 1978). Long's role has also received more sketchy 
treatment in David H. Close, 'The Collapse of Resistance to 
Democracy: Conservatives, Adult Suffrage, and Second Chamber 
Reform, 1911-1928', Historical 
_Journal 
20 (1977). Long's 
papers contain much material relating to the Representation of 
the People Act. See W. L. P., WRO 947/675-80. 
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of reform even before the war has still not been fully 
appreciated. A memorandum of June 1914 reveals that, 
prior to his return to the Local Government Board, Long 
was far from irreconcilably opposed to electoral reform, 
to include women's suffrage. 'The Franchise', he had 
argued, 
is in a hopeless muddle.... This is costly, ridiculous 
and confusing.... I am entirely opposed to the 
extension of the franchise to women, but ... I would 
say that if ... a Commission were to recommend a 
comprehensive reform of our Electoral system ... my 
objection to Woman Suffrage would disappear.... We 
should get rid of the fantastical franchises which are 
so scandalously abused now, and we should make of it 
what it ought to be, a residential franchise.... The 
Commission ought to be able to report within twelve 
months, and enable us to legislate in 1916.1 
It was imperative, he had insisted, that the Unionists 
'shd. show that we are determined to deal with the 
franchise on a wide and satisfactory basis. '2 That Long 
should have become one of the principal architectg of 
wartime suffrage reform was not, then, wholly without 
precedent .3 
He believed that to ignore the question was to risk 
--------------------------------------------------- 
1Memorandum by Long, 27 June 1914, L. P., Add. MS. 62403. 
2Ibid. 
3It is also worth pointing out that Long's closest political 
adviser, Sir William Bull, had for many years been an 
advocate of women's suffrage. Early in 1908 Christabel 
Pankhurst had told Bull that 'our Cause could not have a 
better exponent. We regard you, you know, as one of the 
few members of Parliament who really wish to help us. ' 
Christabel Pankhurst to Bull, 14 Jan. 1908, Bu. P., 3/17. 
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social unrest, perhaps even revolution: 
... if we ... try and retain the old system of 
franchise ... I believe a very dangerous feeling would 
have been created and the conviction would have gained 
ground that the governing classes were concerned to 
confine themselves to talking about democracy, without 
taking any real steps to give democracy power. 
1 
The same is true of his attitude to reform of the House 
of Lords, which he proposed should be dealt with at the 
same time, 
2 
and to the women's vote. Recognising that 
women must eventually be enfranchised, he preferred to 
settle the issue once and for all than to gamble against 
a more radical bill during peacetime. 
3 The eclipse of 
the sufragettes, an eclipse which might elapse with the 
ending of the war, presented an opportunity which Long 
quickly perceived as too good to miss. Suffice it to 
say, his espousal of an extended franchise was quite 
consistent with his broader political philosophy, for 
in his determination to promote a general measure of 
electoral reform Long epitomised the pragmatic 
Conservative statesman; to act quickly meant a moderate 
bill; delay brought the danger of a really radical one. 
Long's role in this cannot be overestimated, for alone 
among ministers he devoted himself to pushing ahead 
with reform from August 1916 onwards. 
4 
1Long to Sir Francis Chaplin of Southern Rhodesia, copy, 
28 Dec. 1917, W. L. P., WRO 947/540. 
2See Long to Lloyd George, 30 Mar. 1917, L. G. P., F/32/4/58. 
3Petrie, Walter Long, pp. 210-1; Martin Pugh, 'Politicians 
and the Woman's Vote, 1914-1918', History 59 (1974). 
4Pugh, Electoral Reform, pp. 70-1. 
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Long was decidedly unlucky with his health during the 
run up to the 'Coupon' election of 1918. He spent much 
of August at Rood Ashton convalescing from a severe bout 
of influenza, and on 30 August he wrote to Lloyd George 
to apologise for his lengthy absence. 
' On the following 
day he suffered'a most extraordinary accident. Whilst 
trying to kill a bat which had somehow got into his room 
he hit himself in the leg with the shovel he was wielding, 
badly severing a vein. 
2 
During his enforced furlough, Lloyd George evidently 
considered the possibility of dropping Long from the 
government. On 22 August the prime minister held a 
meeting of his closest supporters at Criccieth to discuss 
an autumn election. Sir Henry Norman, recently appointed 
to supervise Lloyd George's central office, kept rough 
notes. According to these notes, Lloyd George stated 
that he proposed to get rid of both Long and Hayes Fisher3 - 
- the latter had sealed his own fate by failing to prepare 
an adequate electoral register. This may have been said 
merely as a sop to Christopher Addison, who had become 
one of Long's most bitter critics, mainly because of the 
failure of the cabinet committed on Ireland. 
4 On the 
other hand, there would certainly have been some advantage 
-------------- 
11 Long to Lloyd George, copy, 30 Aug. 1918, W. L. P., WRO 
947/682. 
2Long to Lloyd George, copy, 1 Sept. 1918, ibid. 
3Barry McGill, 'Lloyd George's Timing of the 1918 Election', 
Journal of Brit±sh Studies 14 (1974), p. 117. 
4See below, pp. 360-78. 
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for Lloyd George if he could have succeeded in ousting 
Long. 
The prime minister desperately wanted to settle the 
Irish problem, but with Long in the government he had 
to move circumspectly. With Long out of the way, he 
may well have reasoned, Bonar Law could easily be cajoled 
into accepting a quick Home Rule Bill. Lansdowne was a 
spent force and so there would be no danger from the old 
team of 1916. Of all the leading Tories it was Long's 
opposition which Lloyd George most feared; and for good 
reason. Bonar Law the prime minister could control; Balfour 
was above party squabbles, playing out the role of elder 
statesman; Chamberlain was too loyal to be a trouble-maker; 
Curzon was clever and unpredictable, but too pompous to 
gain the widespread support of the party; and Milner was 
hardly a Conservative at all. But Long's capacity to 
make trouble remained undiminished. Nothing came of the 
Criccieth discussions;, Long returned to work when his leg 
1 
had healed. 
He was certainly in favour of the party following Lloyd 
George, if only because nobody else would command sufficient 
support in the country to keep tabour out. In Loig's 
judgement, Curzon was 'brilliant ... but our men won't 
have him' and Bonar Law 'wpuld not receive anything like 
widespread support. '1 He adopted the somewhat illogical 
position of supporting the coalition whilst simultaneously 
defending the right of each constituency association to 
-------- --------------- 
1Long to Derby, copy, 10 July 1918, W. L. P., WRO 947/547. 
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select its own candidate. What really rankled was that 
Conservatives were expected to stand down in favour of 
Lloyd George Liberals. He told the party chairman, Sir 
George Younger, that he regarded it as quite unfair that 
the Conservative party should be called upon 'to sacrifice 
itself to a nodescript 
[icJ Party which has neither 
members nor policy. Surely as long as the Prime Minister 
is secure in the support of our Party he is not entitled 
to ask for more. '1 Long wanted it both ways, exhorting 
that the party should 'certainly secure return of M. Ps 
who support Ll. G., if not for same seat for another. But 
you can't, and in my view have no right to, force 
Constituencies to adopt Candidates against their will. '2 
Gradually, Long accepted the paralogism of his view, 
reluctantly conceding that local autonomy must inevitably 
clash with coalition discipline. By October he had 
moderated his tone, telling Younger: 'I quite agree that 
we must not oppose a sitting member who is prepared 
cordially to support the Prime Minister and the Government. '3 
And when it came tocsecuring the return of Professor Hewins, 
who was not acceptable to his local association in 
Herefordshire, Long was not averse to Central office using 
its influence to find him a seat. Always keen to assert 
4 
the independence of the Conservative party, Long was 
1Long to Younger, copy, 12 Sept. 1918, ibid., WRO 947/599. 
2Long to Younger, copy, 15 Sept. 1918, ibid., WRO 947/682 
(Long's underlining). 
3Long to Younger, copy, 10 Oct. 1918, ibid. 
4See Long to Younger, copy, 22 Nov. and Younger to Long, 
23 Nov. 1918, ibid., WRO 947/683. 
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concerned lest Bonar Law, whom he described in October 
to Lord Derby as 'hopelessly lost', 
' 
submerge the party's 
identity in a coalition whose only function would be to 
serve Lloyd George. 
He was reluctant to give his full backing to the 
'Coupon' system out of a sense that it was somehow a 
disreputable innovation, a piece of political trickery 
which militated against the whole purpose of an election. 
Long was not, moreover, in favour of an election so soon 
after the end of the war, preferring instead to postpone 
the new parliament until at least the broad principles 
of the peace treaties had been hammered out. 
2 His own 
'coupon', number fifty-nine, was issued without fuss on 
20 November, Lloyd George having abandoned any hope of 
dropping Long from the government by promoting him to 
the Lords. At the general election in December Long 
moved smoothly to St. George's, Hanover Square, a safe, 
decidedly up-market Conservative stronghold where a 
candidate of Long's calibre could expect to poll at 
least two-thirds of=the vote. 
3 
r 
With the return of the coalition government to power, 
Long was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty. The offer 
1See Long to Derby, copy, 23 Oct. 1918, ibid., WRO 947/548. 
2Ibid. 
3Pelling, Social Geography, p. 30. In the event, Long 
received 90.2% of the poll in a straight fight against a 
Liberal. 
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was made in a manner which he could not refuse: his 
name was submitted to, and approved by, the King before 
Lloyd George troubled to inform him. 1 Long was not 
particularly pleased by this; 
2 he would have much preferred 
to remain at the Colonial Office, 
3 hoping to play a part 
in the peace conference as the government's representative 
for the Dominions and Crown Colonies. 
4 Nevertheless, the 
Admiralty was an office to which Long had aspired for 
many years, and on 14 January 1919 he was sworn in as 
First Lord. The manner of Long's appointment was a 
deliberate manoeuvre on Lloyd George's part. In 1918 
Long had been offered, and had turned down, the choice 
of the two top jobs in Ireland, the Chief Secretaryship 
or the Lord Lieutenancy. 
5 He had also declined the offer 
of a peerage. This had left Lloyd George with a problem. 
------------------ 
11 See Lloyd George to Long, 9 Jan. 1919, L. P., Add. MS. 
62424. 
2Long 
confided to Pr9fessor Hewins on 11 January 1919: 
'The whole thing has come like a thunderclap. I left London 
on Thursday because I honestly believed the P. M. had made up 
his mind to leave me out.... I had no idea he wa, s going to 
ask me to go somewhere else; in fact, I learnt this for the 
first time yesterday morning when I received a letter from 
him telling me that he had submitted my name ... and that H. M. had approved. ' W. L. P., WRO 947/556. 
3See Long to Younger, copy, 1ý Jan. 1919, ibid., WRO 
947/599. 
4At the end of October Long had approached Edwin Montagu, 
the Secretary for India, wýth a view to making a formal 
protest to Lloyd George concerning their exclusion from the 
peace conference. Long also considered making a public 
protest. See Long to Montagu, copy, 29 Oct. 1918, ibid., 
WRO 947/576. 
'See below, pp. 356-7. Lloyd George's desire to move 
Long to the Lords was undoubtedly connected with the row 
over agricultural policy and the prime minister's fear that 
Long might use his popularity in the Commons to challenge 
the government. 
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Long's support in the Commons still made him too dangerous 
to leave out, so Lloyd George manoeuvred him into the 
Admiralty in order to guarantee the stability of the 
government. Long told Sir William Bull that if given 
the chance he would have rejected the offer. 
l 
Throughout the 'Coupon' election campaign, the 
Northcliffe press, in particular the Daily Mall, pursued 
an editorial policy of vilification against Long, whom 
it habitually referred to as a 'narrow-minded squirearch'. 
2 
Northcliffe put considerable pressure on Geoffrey Dawson 
to have The Times adopt a similar line, pressure which 
was steadfastly resisted. 
3 One of the things for which 
Long was attacked was his attitude towards the unemployment 
problem, an attitude which, contrary to press misrepres- 
entation, was very progressive. 
4 But Long made the 
mistake of remarking publicly that soldiers returning 
from the war with no jobs to go to could do worse than to 
1Long to Bull, 12 Jan. 1919, M. P., 4/19. 
2History 
of "The Times"; Volume Four, -The 
152.1h_Anniversary 
and Beyond 1 12_1948 (London, 1952), part 1, p. 451. 
3Dawson's 
refusal to toe the proprietorial line contributed 
significantly to his replacement as editor by Wickham Steed 
early in 1919. 
4Long 
wrote to the Minister of'Labour, Sir Robert Horne, 
on 8 November 1919: 'When it is evident to the Government 
that in certain parts of the country unemployment is 
becoming serious, it is the duty of the Government to do 
everything in their power tö lessen it. ' See W. L. P., WRO 
947/741. Ever since he had been President of the Local 
Government Board under Balfour's premiership, Long had 
maintained that government should take steps to alleviate 
unemployment, if necessary by directly subsidising jobs. 
He did not believe that the Conservative party should be 
hidebound by the dogma of economic non-intervention. 
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take up bee-keeping as a profitable and enjoyable hobby. 
Northcliffe's newspapers systematically ridiculed him 
for this unguarded observation, with leading articles 
on the theme that Long had 'clearly got into the honeypot 
with both feet. ' On 6 December 1918 the Evening News, in 
an article reporting the recommendations of the War 
Indemnity Committee, stated that 'the only objector to 
making Germany pay was a well-known Tory junker, of the 
bee-keeping variety. ' 
Long seized on the statement, which was not true, as 
the opportunity to bring a libel action against Associated 
Newspapers. A writ was duly issued and Northcliffe backed 
down: the Evening News printed a full apology, paid all 
of Longs legal costs and even donated one hundred guineas 
to a charity in his constituency. 
1 Despite the satis- 
faction of his victory, Long deeply resented Northcliffe's 
malicious calumnies, confiding to Bull on 4 January that: -- 
I 
It is evident I have done what I always said I wd. 
never do, viz: overstayed my welcome - when whole Press 
combine to secure Fne's dismissal ... there must be good 
reason: I don't think it is quite fair, I don't admit 
my adminn. of C. O. or L. G. B. have been failures, but 
evidently this is not the general impression - as you 
know I am quite ready to go but one naturally hates to 
be kicked out as a failure or worse up. 
2 (sic) 
When the new cabinet was announced Northcliffe described 
1See W. L. P., WRO 947/674 for correspondence relating to 
the dispute. 
2Long to Bull, 4 Jan. 1919, Bu. P., 4/19. 
it as an 'appalling 
and his papers atta 
the next few years. 
the 'old Tory gang' 
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result', 'even worse than I foretold', 
' 
cked Lloyd George relentlessly over 
The prime minister's failure to sack 
became a stock item of their discursive 
comment, 
2 
and Associated Newspapers rarely missed an 
opportunity to censure Long's policies and decisions. 
3 
Lord Crawford recorded that '... the 'bon mot' in the 
lobbies is that the prime minister has resigned and Lord 
Northcliffe has sent for the King. '4 Following disclosures 
of cabinet business late in 1920 Long told Sir Maurice 
Hankey that he detested the newspapers and regarded 
The Times as 'the lowest of the lot. '5 He held Northcliffe 
in the utmost contempt, describing him to Moreton Frewen 
as a 'blackguard and a liar'. 
6 
From his retirement Long 
at least had the satisfaction of bringing a libel action, 
in the summer of 1921, which played a not insignificant 
part in persuading Northcliffe to give up his directorship 
of The Times and resign; from Associated Newspapers. 
7 
1History 
of "The Times"i_1212-A8. part 1, p. 461. 
2Ibid., 
p. 470. ' 
3For 
example, in the dispute between Admirals Wemyss and 
Beatty in 1919 over the post of first Sea Lord the-Northcliffe 
press demanded Wemyss's immediate retirement more to 
animadvert Long than to espouse the objective merits of Beatty. 
4Crawford's diary, 15 Mar. 1920, The_CrawfordPapers, p. 406. 
5Long to Hankey, copy, 6 'Dec. 1920, P. R. O., Adm. 116/3623. 
6Long 
to Frewen, 3 Nov. 1920, ibid. 
7Northcliffe 
resigned with effect from 15 July 1921, his 
fifty-sixth birthday, but not before writing a most 
disingenuous letter to his solicitor: 'I find that I am held 
responsible for a libel action concerning Walter Long, whom 
I know and like.... In the last five years I have been 
completely out of touch with the business, often for months 
at a time.... I do not in the least object to responsibility, 
but I vigorously object to being responsible for that which I 
disapprove. ' See Reginald Pound and Geoffrey Harmsworth, 
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Towards the end of 1918 Long had involved himself in 
proposals to overhaul the Secret Service, which he 
recognised as incompetent and inefficient. Like many of 
his colleagues he took an exaggerated view of the danger 
posed by so-called revolutionary groups and he spoke 
repeatedly of a strong 'Bolshevik Agency' which supposedly 
fomented strikes, waiting in the wings to seize power. 
To counter this 'threat' Long became a keen advocate of 
prophylactic measures: all suspicious persons were 
ruthlessly to be dealt with. Long tended to blame virtually 
all aspects of domestic discontent on Bolshevik agitators 
or on the surreptitious activities of German plotters and 
spies. His judgements on the industrial unrest of the 
postwar years could not have been more insensate; he saw 
the hand of sedition everywhere and reason quailed before 
the spectre of rampant communism. He had no evidence to 
support his allegations, save rash statements from people 
whose opinions were already as alarmist as his own, and 
f 
often he was insouciant to the distinctions between Soviet 
Bolshevism and Labour, Ramsay MacDonald and Lenin. 
t 
Many of Long's suggestions were downright fatuous. For 
example, he pressed for a system'of permits to check the 
flow of people into and out of London, even contending 
that the government should seek to 'stop altogether the 
stream of idle people into London for pleasure purposes, 
which is ... a great scandal. ' He also recommended that 
Northcliffe (London, 1959), p. 797. 
1Memorandum by Long, n. d., probably late 1918, W. L. P., 
WRO 947/672. 
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severe restrictions should be imposed on overseas travel. 
This was Long at his most blinkered; he could not under- 
stand why a victorious Britain should lapse into strikes 
and disorder and so he searched for a scapegoat, in the 
process arriving at the most erroneous conclusions and 
proposing the most asinine policies. All that can be 
said in mitigation is that Long was by no means alone in 
his analysis of Britain's ills. The rather more down-to- 
earth Hankey remarked to Tom Jones early in 1920: 
The ministers ... seem to have 
'the wind-up' to the 
most extraordinary extent about the industrial 
situation.... From a meeting yesterday evening I 
came away with my head fairly reeling. I felt I had 
been in Bedlam. Red revolution and blood and war at 
home ... 
1 
Shortly before he left office Long realised the foolhardiness 
of some of his earlier outbursts. Nor did he continue to 
view with trepidation the imminent rise of the Labour 
party. In a classic Conservativb exposition of faith in 
the good sense and moderation of the majority, Long wrote 
in August 1920, as the prospect of a miners' strike loomed 
before the cabinet: 
r 
The idea that England is becoming more revolutionary, 
is foolish in the extreme.... The broad commonsense 
of our workpeople and of our stalwart, virile middle- 
class will save our country today and tomorrow as it has 
always done. 
We know perfectly well that whatever we do, whether it 
I 
1Hankey to Jones, 17 Jan. 1920, quoted in Gilbert, Churchill, 
Volume Four, Companion, part 2, p. 1004. 
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be agreeable to the Labour party or the reverse, that 
it won't affect votes. Why should it? They have got 
their own organisation, their own Party; and they are 
determined to try their best to get into power - and I 
for one do not object to this in the least. 
' 
As First Lord of the Admiralty Long was a great believer 
in the value of tours of inspection and frequent meetings 
with naval officers of all ranks. He spent much of his 
time travelling aboard the Admiralty yacht - he found 
these cruises very beneficial to his health - and he 
became a keen advocate of better recreational facilities 
for the men, partly as a means to guard against discontent 
below decks. 2 He was responsible for the appointment of 
a committee, under Admiral Habey, to investigate pay aid 
conditions in the Navy. Long insisted that pay rises 
for all ranks were overdue, and he argued that because 
sailors spent long periods away from home, living in 
cramped quarters, they should be entitled to higher rates 
r 
of pay than soldiers, airmen or policemen. He consistently 
argued that economies should not include cuts in Bailors' 
pay. Much of Long's time in 1919 was taken up with the 
' 3 
dispute between Admirals Wemyss and Beatty, a tedious 
affair orchestrated by the Northcliffe press, over the 
post of First Sea Lord. The altercation was eventually 
resolved in November with Wemyss's retirement and Beatty's 
subsequent appointment, no doubt much to Lord Northcliffe's 
1Long to Sir Basil Zaharoff, copy, 20 Aug. 1920, W. L. P., 
947/712. 
2Memorandum by Long, n. d., ibid., WRO 947/704. 




Longs most important responsibility was the formulation 
of postwar naval policy. 
2 
a task which brought him into 
conflict with both the prime minister and the Treasury. 
At the end of the war Britain's fleet was still the 
largest and most powerful in the world. The government 
was aware that this situation could not be indefinitely 
maintained and the problem became one of restraining the 
American naval programme so as to enable Britain to 
place acceptable limits on defence expenditure. The need 
for financial stringency made it imperative that American 
shipbuilding be kept in check. Accordingly, on 26 March 
1919 Long went to Paris to bargain with American repre- 
sentatives for reductions in their building programme. 
3 
Aware of the need to reconcile the conflicting needs 
of defence and economy Long nevertheless felt obliged to 
request the cabinet on 19 June to approve naval estimates 
in excess of £170 millions. He encountered stiff resistance 
to this demand and on 5 July he presented his cabinet 
colleagues with a meiorandum in which he pointed out that 
although the German navy might be extirpated, the government 
would be wise to bear in mind thrat a strong fleet was 
Britain's only guarantee that America would refrain from 
1See ibid., WRO 947/713. 
2Long's involvement in the formulation of postwar naval 
policy has been considered in J. Kenneth McDonald, 'Lloyd 
George and the Search for a Post War Naval Policy', in 
A. J. P. Taylor, ed., Lloyd George: Twelve Essays (London, 1971) 
to which I am indebted. Long's papers also contain much 
material relating to naval policy. See W. L. P., WRO 947/685- 
718. 
3McDonald, 
op. cit., pp. 192-3. 
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dictating Irish policy. Long was not suggesting that 
Anglo-American differences over Ireland might conceivably 
lead to armed conflict, merely that British naval strength 
forced Wilson to forego the contemplation of interference. 
l 
Austen Chamberlain, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, could 
not endorse such huge naval expenditure, and an argument 
between the Admiralty and the Tresury, redolent of old 
conflicts between Long and Chamberlain, soon developed. 
Although not envisaging war in the foreseeable future, 
Long wanted a large, powerful fleet, at the very least 
the equal of the American navy; Chamberlain, naturally 
enough, was more concerned with financial stringency. 
2 
During this dispute Lloyd George toyed with the idea _ 
of creating a Secretary of State for Defence, to be 
responsible for all the services. Churchill, hoping to 
secure the job for himself, was a ready supporter of the 
plan. Lloyd George 'put up all the objections he could - 
think of but they were not very strong and in reality 
... rested on the difficulty of getting Walter Long out 
of the Admiralty. ' 
r 
On 12 July Sir Henry Wilson recorded, 
3 
after a talk with the prime minister, that Lloyd George 
'quite agrees about the Defence Minister but has grave 
doubts as to whether he can move Walter Long, especially now 
that Walter is bitten with, the charms of the 'Enchantress'! '4 
1Ibid., 
p. 195.2Ibid., pp. 196-7. 
3Sir Henry Wilson's diary, 11 July 1919, quoted in Gilbert, 
Churchill, Volume Four, Companion, part 2, p. 739. 
4Wilson's diary, 12 July 1919, ibid., p. 741. The 
'Enchantress' was the name of the Admiralty yacht. 
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As usual, Lloyd George was afraid to tackle Long and 
risk trouble from the Conservative backbenches, and the 
plan was put into cold storage. 
l 
Thus, Long and the Admiralty emerged the victors and 
on 24 July 1919 Long presented the approved estimates to 
the House of Commons. Chamberlain did not accept his 
defeat with good grace, circulating a Treasury memorandum 
two days later in which he called for substantial 
reductions in all three services if financial catastrophe 
was to be avoided. 
2 Long's attitude towards the American 
navy was somewhat ambiguous. He admitted publicly that 
the United States could not seriously be regarded as an 
aggressive or potentially hostile power, yet he refused 
to sanction reductions which would undermine Britain's 
traditional supremacy at sea. America was not a potential 
enemy, but Britain had nonetheless to maintain a fleet 
whose size would be determined as if she might be. This 
rather illogical position is to be explained by the fact 
that Long privately harboured the suspicion that America 
wanted a large fleet not to impose general disarmament 
but to force Britain to accept naval inferiority. 
Quite apart from the question 'of Britain's postwar 
naval strength, Long had little time for America's new 
-------- ---------- 
lIt 
seems that later in the year Lloyd George considered 
moving Chamberlain from the Treasury to the Admiralty, but 
was again held in check by apprehension at Long's response. 
Wilson noted in his diary on 25 October 1919: 'LG wants to 
put Austen into the Admiralty & move out Walter Long, but 
as usual LG was afraid to kick out Walter. ' Ibid., p. 941. 
2McDonald, 
op. cit., p. 202. 
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status as a world power. Woodrow Wilson's talk of a 
war to end war, of disarmament, of freedom of the seas 
- all, he believed, was mere rhetoric, and 
it did not 
square with the policy of building a huge navy. As far 
as Long was concerned, Wilson was guilty of hypocrisy and 
humbug, for America 
talked about securing the peace of the world ... and 
the first thing they do is to try and establish a 
navy bigger than they have ever had before, and for 
which they can have no. earthly use. It is pretty bad 
... they are not practicing 
[sicI what they preach. 
1 
Long was not, therefore, in agreement with the decisions 
arrived at on 15 August 1919 when the cabinet laid down 
the famous 'ten year rule', directed the Admiralty to 
undertake no new naval programmes, and made it clear 
that future estimates must be kept below a ceiling of 
£60 millions. 
2 Lloyd Georgets postwar naval policy 
amounted to the gradual; surrender of Britain's naval 
supremacy, a policy which Long found unpalatable but 
could not prevent. Longs own preference was for 'the C 
big ship and parity with the next Power. ' As First Lord 
he found himself responsible forra policy with which he 
was in fundamental disaccord. 
One of Long's many tours of inspection disguised a 
more important diplomatic mission. In August 1920 he 
visited the Netherlands to inspect the restoration work 
1Long to Zaharoff, copy, 20 Aug. 1920, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
712. 
2McDonald, op. cit., pp. 212-3. 
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being carried out by the Admiralty on the ports of 
Ostend and Zeebrugge. 
' At the same time he visited 
Heligoland to make sure that all German fortifications 
were being properly destroyed, reporting back to the 
cabinet that all was well. 
2 But the real reason for his 
tour was to visit Denmark in order to conciliate the 
Danish government in the wake of disturbances caused in 
Copenhagen by British sailors. It was essential that 
Britain retain the right to use Copenhagen for refitting 
and repairs whilst operating in the Baltic against Soviet 
Russia. The unruly behaviour of British crews had placed 
this right in jeopardy, and Long's visit was designed to 
patch things up. He arranged for a few distinctions to 
be conferred on Danish statesmen, at the same time assuring 
the Danish government that British warships would be with- 
drawn as soon as the need to police the Baltic had passed. 
3 
Long's trip was wholly successful. When he arrived the 
Danish authorities were; on the point of making a formal 
r 
request that British warships be withdrawn; when he left, 
Denmark had agreed teat Britain should enjoy full use of 
all port facilities for as long as she considered necessary. 
By persuading the Danish governm'ent that the Russian naval 
forces at Kronstadt represented a real threat to Danish 
security, likely at any moment to sally forth once British 
------------------------------------ 
1Long had previously made a tour of inspection, between 
14 and 17 March 1919, of Zeebrugge Harbour and the devastation 
around Ostend. For papers relating to, and photographs of, 
this trip see Bu. P., 4/19. 
2See Long's memorandum for the cabinet, 24 Aug. 1920, W. L. P. 
WRO 947/702/1. 
3See Long's memorandum for the cabinet, 24 Aug. 1920, ibid., 
WRO 947/702/2. 
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ships were recalled. Long guaranteed Britain's role as 
policeman of the Baltic. 
1 
This was Long's last important work at the Admiralty, 
for soon afterwards his health deteriorated sharply and 
he was confined to bed at Rood Ashton. For weeks at a 
time Long was unable to leave home and all reports and 
papers were sent to him so that he could make his views 
known by letter. On Christmas Eve Sir James Craig, now 
Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, intimated that Long 
should retire, 
2 but he chose to hang on in the hope that 
his health would recover. Even now, when it had become 
quite clear that Long's administration of the Admiralty 
had become unsatisfactory, Lloyd George did nothing to 
hasten his departure. Clearly, though, Long's career 
was nearing its end: he was suffering from extreme 
arthritis of the spine. 
0 
Long was a member of Lloyd George's government for just 
over four years, and although he carried out his work 
diligently and served loyally he1never overlooked the 
interests of the Conservative party. He was committed 
to coalition only as a necessity, and he was always very 
wary lest Lloyd George's ascendancy split the Unionists 
as Asquith's followers had been split. Part of the problem 
1See Long's account of his discussions with the Danish 
authorities, 30 Aug. 1920, ibid., WRO 947/702/3- 
2 Craig to Long, 24 Dec. 1920, ibid., WRO 947/717. 
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was that Long had little respect for Bonar Law, fearing 
that the Conservative leader was like plasticine in 
Lloyd George's hands. Long always regarded Bonar Lawts 
insensitivity to the party rank and file as potentially 
dangerous. His opinion of his leader during this period 
is frankly revealed by a letter which he wrote to Lady 
Londonderry on 16 August 1917: 
B. L. does his work in the House quite admirably, his 
speeches are excellent, his replies to questions ready, 
quick and effective, he is thoroughly at home and 
manages the business very well, and yet he counts for 
nothing in this House with any Party - all look at him 
much in the same way as they do the Sergeant at Arms, 
or the Head Doorkeeper.... He has no following, no 
personal control. 
' 
Long did not care to see the party acting as handmaiden 
to the fulfilment of Lloyd George's ambition, a role 
which seemed to be confirmed by the 'Coupon' election 
result of December 1918. As Long put it to his neighbour 
at dinner one night early in March 1919: 'George thinks 
he won the election. t Well he didn't. It was the Tories 
that won the election. '2 These feelings were compounded 
by a series of petty disputes with Lloyd George, invariably 
caused by the prime minister's dictatorial manner or sudden 
1Long to Lady Londonderry, 
C 666(298). 
2Frances Stevenson's diary, 
Stevenson, p. 169. 
16 Aug. 1918, L. L. P., D/Lo/ 
5 Mar. 1919, A Diaryby_Frances 
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bursts of activity. 
l 
It is worth noting that Long only completely abandoned 
his aspirations for the party leadership during the very 
last years of his career. Even as late as October 1917, 
when Bull informed him of talk amongst the backbenchers 
that Bonar Law should resign, Longs smouldering ambition 
is evident. His response to Bull's approach was prompt 
and unequivocal: 
If ... a vacancy does occur I shall not hesitate to 
accept nomination if my friends desire me to stand.... 
I am v. much afraid there is a tendency to create a 
new party of which the leaders would be L. G., B. L. and 
W. C. while our Party will be expected to be their 
followers. 
2 
Throughout his four years in Lloyd George's government 
------- ------------------------------------- 
lA 
good example of this kind of petty incident occurred in 
November 1919 over the commanding officer of the 'Ramillies' 
who had somewhat indiscreetly entertained a Russian general 
on board his ship. Lloyd George demanded that the officer be 
disciplined by the Admiralty. Long maintained that naval 
officers should continue to exercise independent discretion 
when entertaining aboard H. M. ships. Long confided to Craig: 
... of course the Officer ... made a grave blunder, ... but 
this was, and is, a matter solely for the First Lord.... It 
is one of the P. M's failings. However brilliant a man may be, 
he must have some failings, and I never faltered in my deter- 
mination that the first time he interfered between'me and my 
responsibility ... would be the last.... ' The anodyne inter- 
vention of Craig put an end to this venial altercation, and 
Lloyd George backed down. It is, however, a good example of 
the kind of arguments whic} developed between Lloyd George and 
Long, arguments with the potential to threaten the stability 
of the government. In this case, the Navy and the bulk of the 
Conservative party would certainly have supported Long. See 
St. John Ervine, Craigav_oni_Ulsterman (London, 1949), pp. 
366-7. 
2Long to Bull, 31 Oct. 1917, Bu. P., 4/16. 
350 
Long never forfeited his popularity with, or command 
over, the Tory backbenches - even after December 1918, 
when the general election brought large numbers of new 
MPs to the House, Long remained an influential force. 
Bull and the London Conservative members formed a nucleus 
around which Long's followers gathered. Whenever there 
was talk of the party deserting Lloyd George - and there 
was a good deal of this kind of talk from 1919 onwards - 
Bull was always asked to sound out Long, almost as if 
the backbenchers would consider stepping out of line only 
with Long's approbation. Whilst Long backed Lloyd George, 
the party would do likewise. 
1 
The significance of Longs membership of the Lloyd George 
coalition lies not so much in his work at the Colonial 
Office or the Admiralty, which coruscates neither with 
ingenuity nor achievement, but in the political stability 
which was afforded by his popularity with Tory stalwarts 
in the Commons. Lloyd George baulked again and again at 
10 
moving Long from the Admiralty, let alone insisting that 
he retire to the Lords, because he knew that his own 
C 
parliamentary support was conditional on Conservative 
goodwill and that this goodwill tas not guaranteed-by the 
1Towards the end of 1919, for example, Bull told Long that 
there was increasing dissatisfaction with Lloyd George amongst 
Tory MPs and that there were rumours of a plot to desert him. 
Long replied: 'I can't believe B. L. wd. betray L. G. but he 
was in the intrigue agst. Asquith!... I shall support Ll. G. 
unless he goes wrong on Navy or some other big question, in 
wh. case I shall quit, but I will join no cabal. ' (Longs 
underlining) The rumours quickly died down. See Long to 
Bull, 1 Jan. 1920, Bu. P., 5/1. 
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mere fact of Bonar Law's allegiance. Lloyd George was, 
of course, aware that there was dissatisfaction amongst 
Tory MPs; but he was also aware that this dissatisfaction 
could be contained whilst Long remained in the government. 
Even when, in 1920, Long's ill health rendered him 
incapable of carrying out his duties, Lloyd George wisely 
preferred to grant several months convalescence rather 
than force a resignation and so risk disruption from 
Longts followers in the House. 
What Lloyd George could not afford to contemplate was 
a Conservative party split into two factions with even 
a minority following Long into opposition. Bonar Law 
might be efficient and dependable, Chamberlain loyal and 
trustworthy - but a Conservative rump was no good to 
Lloyd George. Long's unique position amongst the party 
rank and file, a position of confidence, popularity, 
respect and authority carefully nurtured and consolidated 
over the years, made him a central pillar in Lloyd George's 
01 
support. Removal of the pillar posed at least the 





IRELAND AGAIN: THE ROAD TO PARTITION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND ACT 
The crushing of the Easter Rebellion by the superior 
might of British armed force, and the subsequent collapse 
of Lloyd George's ill-timed home rule proposals, left 
nationalist Ireland cowed but hardly contented. A remark 
made by Leo Amery seemed to sum up the position: 'No 
British government can solve the Irish problem by legis- 
lation and no British statesman can solve it by negotiation. ' 
In common with other senior politicians, Long began by 1917 
to hope that some settlement might come from Ireland itself. 
Southern Unionists realised that the old policy of 
resistance to all forms of home rule was no longer tenable: 
the Ulstermen had made it clear that they would readily 
abandon the Union as the price of their own exclusion; 
leading Conservative politicians made no secret of their 
desire to see an end to the Irish problem in British 
C 
politics; and Long, who had been the Southern loyalists' 
most ardent and influential champion, now held firmly to 
the opinion that a Home Rule Bill excluding Ulster and 
offering protection to the Southern minority was the best 
that might be hoped for. Anxious to find some settlement, 
Lloyd George accepted that he would have to carry the 
1Memorandum by Amery, 18 Feb. 1917, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
409. 
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Unionists with him, particularly Long and Lansdowne. 
Fortunately for the prime minister, Long was ready to 
support a new initiative, though he was still sure that 
home rule and partition would make strange bedfellows. 
In May 1917 he wrote: 
Believe me, I don't write as a Unionist, I will support 
any fair workable measure which will be accepted by 
Ireland, even though at first there has to be some 
compulsion, but Partition they won't have. 
l 
In the spring and early summer of 1917 the government 
considered whether to proceed with home rule, and in April 
Curzon, H. E. Duke and Christopher Addison were asked to 
prepare a draft bill, to replace the Act of 1914, which 
was on the statute book but suspended for the duration 
of the war. Long and Bonar Law were not happy with this 
course. On 15 May Long warned Lloyd George: 'I am 
satisfied that you are on the edge of the precipice as 
regards Ireland.... Ireland will never accept a scheme 
devised on this side. '2 Lloyd George was persuaded to 
drop the idea of a bill and to promote a convention in 
Dublin instead, a course which kept the Conservative 
party united behind the government. Addison, who had 
prepared a bill to give immediate home rule with exclusion 
for a six county Ulster and provision for a Council of 
All Ireland, 'strongly resented this week-kneed suggestion, 
3 
---------------- 
11 Long to Lloyd George, copy, 11 May 1917, ibid., WRO 947/ 
568. 
2Long to Lloyd George, 15 May 1917, L. G. P., F/32/4/75. 
3Addison, 
Four and_a Half Years, 2,380. 
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and predicted, erroneously, that 'a spectacular Convention 
will not succeed. ' On 19 May Long promised the prime 
minister that the convention would have his whole-hearted 
backing. 2 Lord Midleton accepted the invitation readily 
enough, though he, too, would not contemplate partition 
as the ultimate solution. With Southern Unionist support 
the Irish Convention thus assembled, on 25 July 1917, at 
Trinity College, Dublin, charged with finding some basis 
for the future government of Ireland. 
3 
Lloyd George had taken a significant step on the road 
to home rule without alienating, as he had done in 1916, 
his Unionist colleagues in the cabinet, although the 
amnesty for the rebels of the Easter Rising went some 
way to vitiate this new spirit of compromise amongst 
Conservatives at Westminster. As Long had some months 
earlier remarked to the Chief Secretary, 'the Irish are 
a very bad people to run away from ... 14 Announced by 
Bonar Law on 15 June, the release of the prisoners 
soured the feelings of many Unionists. Long insisted 
that Duke's decision was misguided and foolhardy. There 
was nothing mean-spirited or vindictive in this. It was 
simply that Long recognised that' to release the Irish 
rebels would do nothing either to erode their extremism 
1Ibid., 2,381. 
2Long to Lloyd George, 19 May 1917, L. G. P., F/32/4/76. 
3For Southern Unionist participation in the Convention see 
Buckland, IrishUnionism: The Angl_Irishandthe New Ireland, 
pp. 83-128.4Long 
to Duke, copy, 29 Dec. 1916, W. L. P., WRO 947/409. 
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or to smooth the path towards a political settlement. 
Events proved him right, for on the very day of their 
release the rebels petitioned Woodrow Wilson in the name 
of 'the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic', 
prompting a march through the streets of Dublin and the 
wrecking of the jail at Cork. 
l By the end of June, Irish 
newspaper headlines painted a picture of escalating 
disorder: 'Outrage in County Clare. Shots at motor car 
party'; 'Cattle Maiming in County Louth'; 'Disorders in 
Dublin. Chamber of Commerce warns Irish Executive'; 
'Baton charge in Ennis'. As the tension mounted, fuelled 
by the death of the hunger striker, Thomas Ashe, the 
government pursued a policy of weak coercion and the 
Convention continued its deliberations. Meanwhile, Sinn 
Fein made it clear that the parliamentary path had been 
deserted in favour of a less compromising, and more 
sanguinary, form of nationalism. As Tim Healy expressed 
it to Long in August 1917: 
I tremble lest the Govt. be driven ... into extremer 
action.... Duke i's doing well by not doing too much.... 
He is faced with a situation which never existed since 
the Union -a recklessness of buffering and death - 
almost a thirst for sacrifice. No govt. can encounter 
it with success by repression. 
2 
I 
As yet the republican extremists within Sinn Fein were a 
-- ------ - ---------- 
'Colvin, Life of Carson, 3.294. 
2Healy to Long, 28 Aug. 1917, L. P., Add. MS. 62422. 
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minority, but they were a growing and ever more popular 
minority. 
Rather surprisingly, Long has been allotted only a 
minor role in the many published accounts of Anglo-Irish 
history during the period leading up to partition, for 
it was Long who possessed what has justly been described 
as 'probably the most powerful single voice on Irish 
1 
affairs in British governing circles' between 1916 and 
1920. 
On 28 February 1918 Lloyd George offered Long the post 
of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland with plenary powers - the 
offer was made, of course, partly because Long was causing 
difficulties over agricultural policy and Lloyd George 
would have liked to remove him from the Commons. Long 
refused, giving frail health as dis reason, whereupon 
the prime minister invited him to join the war cabinet 
as Minister without Portfolio. This offer, too, was 
rejected, though Long was sorely tempted by both oppor- 
tunities. 2 He had already been offered the Chief 
Secretaryship, again with plenary powers. He had declined 
partly because he wanted td continue with his colonial 
work, but mainly because he wanted to remain in London 
1Boyce 
and Hazlehurst, 'The Unknown Chief Secretary', p. 301 
2Long's diary, 1 Mar. 1918, W. L. P., WRO 947/952; Long to 
Lloyd George, 1 Mar. 1918, L. G. P., F/32/5/9. 
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where he could keep a close eye on a prime minister whom 
he had never trusted. At the beginning of February Long 
had proposed that Macpherson be appointed Chief Secretary 
and that Londonderry be made Lord Lieutenant. 
' For 
himself, Long had other plans. 
Faced with Long's persistent refusals to take a full 
time Irish job, Lloyd George was rather anxious by the 
beginning of March as to what line Long intended to 
adopt. 
2 Apart from the trouble which Long could cause 
on the Conservative backbenches, he was the one man who 
had the trust of both Ulster and the Southern Unionists. 
With Long at the head of Irish affairs any settlement 
would be much easier to steer through parliament. On 4 
March Long reiterated that he regarded MacPherson as the 
best candidate for the Chief Secretary's job, with H. A. L. 
Fisher a poor second. He also told Lloyd George exactly 
what he had in mind for himself: 
You put me at the Head of all, the Departments concerned, 
to represent the Cabinet ... and I really believe in 
6 
months you would hp. ve Ireland quiet and be able to carry 
a measure of self-government.... I would go to Ireland 
occasionally ... 
3 
On the same day, the 'Call to Unionists' appeared in the 
press, a symptom of*the stnuggle going on within the Irish 
Unionist Alliance between those who would not abandon the 
1Long to Lloyd George, copy, 4 Feb. 1918, W. L. P., WRO 
947/569. 
2Riddell, War Diary, p. 317. 
3Long to Lloyd George, 4 Mar. 1918, L. G. P., F/32/5/10. 
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Union and those who were prepared to work for a reasonable 
settlement. 
1 It was also an indication to Lloyd George 
that there might be trouble from a section of the 
Southern Unionists. For the moment, the prime minister 
chose to ignore Long's request. 
That same month, March 1918, the cabinet decided that 
there must be Irish conscription, and Lloyd George opted 
for the 'dual policy' - home rule in return for compulsion. 
Long argued that the government should go boldly ahead 
with conscription and face the consequences, evolving a 
workable home rule scheme over a much longer period. The 
'dual policy', he contended, would mean 'a row with both 
sides and no satisfaction. I should deal with the two 
issues separately.? 
2 Finally, on 5 April, after months 
of debate and discussion, the Irish Convention voted in 
3 
favour of self-government for all Ireland, thus inviting 
the government to make the next move. Next day, a Saturday, -- 
the cabinet met to discuss the Irish problem. George 
Barnes made it clear that he could only agree to conscription 
'if Home Rule is really carried' whilst Churchill was 
-------- ------------- 
'The 'Call to Unionists' demanded maintenance of the Union, 
a stricter enforcement of the law, and conscription for 
Ireland. By early April it had been signed by nearly 6,000 
people. For a list of prominent citizens amongst the 
signatories see the Irish Times, 3 Apr. 1918. By June it was 
claimed that over 13,000 signatures had been obtained, but 
this was probably exaggerated for effect. See Buckland, 
Trish Unionism: The Anglo_Irish and the New Ireland, p. 158, 
n. 54. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 4 Apr. 1918, B. L. P., 83/2/2. 
3See Report of the Proceedings of the Irish Convention Cd. 
9019 (1918). Sinn Fein had not sent representatives, but the 
Southern Unionists voted in favour of an Irish parliament 
within the U. K., a major departure from earlier Loyalist 
attitudes towards home rule. 
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characteristically 'vehement for the immediate forcing 
through of the measure - "a battlefield decision". '1 It 
was decided that the 'dual policy' represented the only 
feasible way forward. 
Long promptly advised Bonar Law 
Lloyd George to appoint a cabinet 
a bill strictly in accordance with 
recommendations. He thought that 
make a good chairman and that the 
to put pressure on 
committee to work out 
the Convention's 
General Smuts would 
government should commit 
itself no further than to promise to submit the bill to 
parliament. 
2 A Military Service Bill providing for 
conscription in Ireland was duly introduced in the Commons 
on 9 April, but there was to be a delay pending an Order 
in Council. The cabinet decided that a Home Rule Bill 
should be drafted immediately, to be introduced before 
the final vote on conscription. Much to his surprise, 
Long was on the 11th appointed to chair a committee charged 
with preparing an Irish; bill as speedily as possible. 
3 
In Long's own words, the idea that he should end up being 
entrusted with the preparation of home rule was 'very odd 104 
e 
That the government should embark on such a course in 
H. A. L. Fisher's diary, 6 Apr. 1918, MS. Fisher 10. 
2See Long to Bonar Law, 7 Apr. 1918. B. L. P., 83/2/7. 
-3The official title was tihe 'Committee on the Government of 
Ireland Amendment Bill'. It consisted of Long (chairman), 
Austen Chamberlain, Curzon, Duke, George Cave, H. A. L. Fisher, 
Smuts, Addison, Barnes and Hewart (the Solicitor-General). It 
has been discussed by John Kendle in 'Federalism and the Irish 
Problem in 1918', otherwise this practice run for the 
Government of Ireland Bill of 1920 seems largely to have been 
ignored by historians. 
4Long to Balfour, 14 Apr. 1918, B. P., Add. MS. 49777. 
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such haste can be explained by sheer necessity. The 
huge German offensive of March 1918 and the threatened 
collapse of the British Fifth Army raised an acute demand 
for men, and the report of the Irish Convention seemed 
to provide the ideal opportunity for linking home rule 
with conscription. The appointment of Long was one of 
Lloyd George's more inspired strokes. It guaranteed the 
acquiescence of Conservative MPs; it reassured the 
Ulstermen, for short of asking Carson to draft a bill - 
an absurd prospect - there was no one else who would 
receive as much trust from the Ulster Unionists; and it 
indicated that the Southern loyalists would not be given 
short shrift in the attempt to find a quick solution. 
And as Colonial Secretary, Long was guaranteed to look 
for a solution which would best serve the interests of 
the Empire. All in all, Long's appointment was an adroit 
move on Lloyd George's part. Long had also begun to 
espouse publicly the merits of federalism, a cause with 
which he had flirted ever since home rule had become 
inevitable in 1914, qo that his appointment was also 
acceptable to the group of Tory Federalists whose activities 
added to Lloyd George's measure of political troubles. 
Long's cabinet committee held its first meeting at 3 p. m. 
on Monday 15 April. It made little headway. Lloyd George 
now decided that Long should prepare a bill on his own, 
and when the committee met on the following day it endorsed 
the prime minister's decision, with only Christopher Addison 
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mounting any protest. Addison was overruled; Long was 
given authority to draft a bill personally, 
1 
subject only 
to the provision that he should use the report of the 
Irish Convention as a basic framework. 
2 Duke reported 
that a revolution in Ireland was 'imminent' and that the 
government forces would be insufficient to deal with it. 
Lord French, however, said that the forces at his disposal 
were adequate provided that he was 'allowed to use all 
modern scientific means of warfare', including aeroplanes. 
When the cabinet dispersed Lloyd George and Bonar Law 
remained behind, and H. A. L. Fisher was offered the Chief 
Secretaryship. He refused on the ground that he would 
be 'very averse to enforcing conscription' and that he 
would prove 'not strong enough'. 
3 That afternoon Lloyd 
George made a speech announcing the government's intention 
to proceed with home rule. 
The news that Long had been asked to prepare a bill was 
greeted by the witticism, 'To set Walter Long drafting 
a Home Rule Bill is like asking the Bishop of London to 
draft the regulation$ of a 'maison toleree''; 
4 
and one 
historian has called it 'an incredible assignment'. 
5 What 
it shows, however, is that Lloyd George was determined to 
1Addison", Politics from 
_Within, 
2,244-5; idem, Four and 
a Half Years, 2.511. 
2Cabinet 
minutes, 16 Apr. 1918, P. R. O., WC 392, CAB 23/6. 
3H. A. L. Fisher's diary, 16 Apr. 1918, MS. Fisher 10. 
4Sir Almeric Fitzroy, Memoirs. 2,674. Fitzroy claimed 
that the remark emanated either from Dillon or from Carson. 
5Alan J. Ward, 'Lloyd George and the 1918 Conscription 
Crisis', Historical Journal 17 (1974), p. 115. 
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bludgeon his colleagues into accepting an Irish settlement 
provided that he could keep the leading Unionists on his 
side. Two days later, on the 18th, the new Military 
Service Bill received the royal assent; but the deter- 
iorating situation in Ireland forced repeated postponement 
of its implementation, and when the armistice came on 
11 November conscription had still not been enforced in 
Ireland. 
When the cabinet met on 23 April Long argued that his 
bill should be consistent with federalism for the whole 
of the United Kingdom; he also warned that he might find 





home rule with 
have doubts as 
he pointed out 
ously dented the prospects for an early 
Lloyd George now knew that he must commit 
to federalism if Ireland was to be given 
Longs backing. Long was beginning to 
to the wisdom of proceeding further. As 
to Bonar: Law, the, real difficulty was tto 
answer the question "Why touch H. R. now? " It is not 
appeasing Nationalisis. It is enraging Ulster. '2` 
Christopher Addison, on the other hand, believed that 
Long's insistence on watertight safeguards would render 
the bill useless. 'If we set up a Parliament at all', 
he recorded on 26 April, 'we must at least do it the justice 
of trusting it in a reasonable way. '3 In Long's view, 
1Cabinet 
minutes, 23 Apr. 1918, P. R. O., WC 397, CAB 23/6; 
Long to Bonar Law, 22 Apr. 1918, B. L. P., 83/2/25. 
2Long to Bonar Law, 26 Apr. 1918, ibid., 83/2/29. 
3Addison, Four and a_HalfYears, 2,519-20. 
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continued nationalist opposition combined with the 
hostility of the Roman Catholic hierarchy to conscription 
completely altered the situation, rendering it pure folly 
to grant home rule in the circumstances. 
' 
Long's views on the advisability of an early bill seem 
to have changed almost within a week. On 19 April he 
was quite sanguine, confiding to his diary: 'Made great 
progress with H. R. Bill. What an occupation for me! '2 
But eight days later he recorded: 'Grave news as to 
Ireland.... Impossible to proceed with H. R. or indeed 
Conscription for the moment. '3 Long changed his mind in 
response to government information that Sinn Fein was 
conspiring with Germany to land arms in Ireland. On 12 _ 
April a German agent had been arrested and the government 
believed that Germany intended to assist Sinn Fein in 
fomenting another rising. 
4 Thus, Sinn Fein succeeded in 
destroying what had hitherto been the serious intention 
of the government to pass home rule as quickly as possible. 
On Monday 29 April Lloyd George, Long, Bonar Law, Lord 
French, General Byrne, H. A. L. Fisher, Christopher'Addison , C 
and Lord Midleton gathered in the cabinet room at Downing 
Street to consider Irish security. The prime minister 
1See Long to Bonar Law, 27 Apr. 1918, B. L. P., 83/2/32. 
2Long's diary, 19 Apr. 1018, W. L. P., WRO 947/952. 
3Longts diary, 27 Apr. 1918, ibid. 
4This information was not made public until May: on 18 May 
Lord French issued a proclamation stating that the government 
would take strict measures to crush the 'German Plot' and 
some 150 republicans were arrested, of whom nearly a third 
were incarcerated at Holyhead. 
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argued that British public opinion would applaud the 
violent enforcement of conscription as a response to 
Sinn Fein's intended treason. He suggested using 
aeroplanes to disperse hostile crowds. Long, too, 
advocated a resolute show of force. 
' When the cabinet 
committee met later that afternoon Long announced that 
a German landing was likely and that Conservative opinion 
had hardened against an early bill. The committee then 
considered Long's draft proposals and there was heated 
objection to what some, principally Addison, considered 
his over-protective clauses for Ulster. Lloyd George 
nonetheless insisted that Long should put everything else 
to one side and continue with his work. 
2 Clearly unhappy 
with the prime minister's instructions, Long had an 
interview with Bonar Law on 2 May and made it clear that 
he could not support a policy of home rule for the moment. 
3 
He was not turning his back on home rule, merely asking 
for a more favourable climate. 
Long's committee had been divided from the start, even 
as to its function -, inevitable given its composition. 
As a practical politician, Long was determined to produce 
a bill that would safely pass the Commons. Unlike'Addison, 
he recognised that it was futile to attempt to frame a 
bill which would both satisfy the nationalists and placate 
Ulster. Strongly supported by Austen Chamberlain, Long 
1H. A. L. Fisher's diary, 29 Apr. 1918, MS. Fisher 10. 
2Addison, Politics from Within, 2,245. 
3Long's diary, 2 May 1918, W. L. P., WRO 947/952. 
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wanted a federal bill; other members hoped to rule out 
federalism once and for all. 
' On 7 May Long laid his 
views squarely before the prime minister. He advised 
Lloyd George to leave the actual government of Ireland 
to Lord French and pass a home rule bill in the meantime, 
but suspend its operation until all nationalist extremists 
had been dealt with, then the new Act could be brought 
swiftly into operation by an Order in Council. 
2 By passing 
a bill the government would prove its commitment to an 
eventual settlement, and by suspending home rule the 
government would gain breathing space in which to deal 
with the minority amongst the nationalists which threatened 
any reasonable solution. What Long did not appreciate at 
this stage was that the nationalist extremists could not 
easily be rooted out and a more moderate climate engendered. 
Two days later the cabinet committee met again. It 
decided unanimously that strict enforcement of the law 
must be the pre-requisite of any grant of home rule and 
that because the 'atmosphere in Ireland at this moment 
was the most unfavourable that could be conceived'3 there 
C 
could be no question of an early bill. Long reported to 
the cabinet that 'the Committee were of one mind in 
deprecating any statement in Parliament which would seem 
to imply that the Bill could be taken at an early date?, 
1Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary_ Volume Three: Ireland.. 
1918-25 (London, 1971), p. 5. --- --- 
2 Long to Lloyd George, 7 May 1918, L. G. P., F/32/5/31. 
3Draft 
statement by Chamberlain on the proceedings of 
the Irish Committee, 9 May 1918, A. C. P., AC 31/1/7. 
Chamberlain's draft was incorporated into Long's memorandum 
for the cabinet. 
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for it was first necessary that the government should 
? enforce the law, and above all, put down with a stern 
hand the ... conspiracy which appears to be widespread 
in Ireland. '1 In a private letter to the prime minister 
Long confirmed that no bill could be hoped for until at 
least after the Whitsuntide recess. 
2 Not surprisingly, 
the government's intention to introduce Irish conscription 
was quietly shelved. 
On 4 May Edward Shortt took over as Chief Secretary, 
an appointment which was made partly in response to Long's 
demand, late in April, that Duke would have to go if the 
cabinet committee was to continue to work on home rule. 
3 
Long had been pushing for months for a reconstruction of 
the Irish administration, and the change was tacit 
acknowledgement of his growing influence in Irish affairs. 
Indeed, before accepting the Chief Secretaryship Shortt 
went to Long to find out whether he could count on his 
support. 
4 The appointment also afforded the newspapers 
41 
an opportunity to indulge in some light-hearted comment 
on 'the Long and theeShortt' of the Irish situation. The 
Daily_Express even produced a piece of doggerel to 
commemorate the occasion: ' 
1Memorandum by Long, 9 May 1918, W. L. P., WRO 947/413h; 
L. G. P., F/32/5/40; Long's diary, 9 May 1918, W. L. P., WRO 947/ 
952; Jones, Whitehall Diary: IrelandZ_1218_25, pp. 7-8. 
2Long to Lloyd George, 9 May 1918, L. G. P., P/32/5/39. 
3See Long to Lloyd George, copy, 25 Apr. 1918, W. L. P., WRO 
947/569. Long's private opinion of Duke is clear: 'Duke was 
really no better than Birrell, in fact I think he was worse. ' 
Long to Colonel J. H. Rivett-Carnac, copy, 29 May 1918, ibid., 
WRO 947/588. 
4H. A. L. Fisher's diary, 26 Apr. 1918, MS. Fisher 10. 
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Some years ago a chieftain strong 
Was found in Mr. Walter Long; 
Today a stranger holds the fort, 
A Duke gives place to Edward Shortt. 
May his administration fuse 
The Shorttest cut, the Longest views! 
' 
By the time that the cabinet committee decided on 9 
May not to proceed with an early home rule bill, Long 
had become convinced that Ireland could only be settled 
within the wider context of federalism. He circulated 
to the cabinet a lengthy memorandum setting forth his own 
conception of the way forward: 
If I had my way I would decide that the federal system 
must be adopted, and I would make this declaration 
when bringing in the Irish Bill.... What I would like 
to do would be to make the Irish Bill, not merely as 
it is now, consistent with the Federal plan, but 
actually in words a part of a Federal plan. I would 
like to set up English, Scottish and Welsh committees 
... to prepare the particular constitutional systems 
suited to their various ideas and respective countries; 
for the powers which the subordinate legislatures are 
to exercise will hfave to be settled by the Government 
of Ireland Act. They will be the same for England, 
Scotland, and Wales as they ark for Ireland. 
2 
Just as in 1905, when he had been Chief Secretary, Long 
still believed that Ireland should be treated in much the 
1Dai1y Express, 2 May 1918. 
2Memorandum by Long, 9 May 1918, W. L. P., WRO 947/413g 
(Longs underlining); this memorandum is very similar in 
content to one dated 12 June 1918 and written by Sir William 
Bull, ibid., WRO 947/413t. 
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same way as the rest of the United Kingdom, though his 
opinions had otherwise altered very greatly. His work 
at the Colonial Office seems to have encouraged him in 
favour of a federal solution, as much to hold the Empire 
together as to solve the Irish problem. Lloyd George 
could not agree to make an Irish bill dependent on a 
general scheme of federalism, for wartime constitutional 
reform on this scale was just not feasible, although 
the Coalition Liberal chief whip, Frederick Guest, 
reckoned that about one hundred Conservative MPs were 
ready to support federalism in May 1918.1 As Leo Amery 
was quick to point out, the attraction of federalism 
was that it would 'secure for Ulster every possible 
advantage it would get out of exclusion and yet maintain, 
in principle at least, the unity of Ireland. '2 
But why had Long become such a keen advocate of 
federalism? Unequivocal abandonment of the 'dual policy' 
was, Long argued, the simplest course, but this ran the 
risk of provoking a breach with Labour. Barnes would 
probably resign if home rule was formally abnegated; 
Labour might then become restive in parliament. An Irish 
bill, though, was out of the question, for it would meet 
contemptuous obstruction from the Nationalists at 
Westminster, who would feel obliged-to object to Ulster's 
exclusion, scornful dismissal from Sinn Fein in Ireland, 
1Guest to Lloyd George, 3 May 1918, L. G. P., F/21/2/20; 
D. G. Boyce, 'British Conservative Opinion, the Ulster Question 
and the Partition of Ireland, 1912-211, Irish Historical 
Studies 17 (1970), p. 96. 
2Quoted ibid. 
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and possible opposition from Irish Unionists, both north 
and south. Long grasped at federalism largely as a means, 
or so he thought, by which moderate nationalist demands 
might be assuaged, parliament controlled and Irish 
conscription facilitated. A federal plan for the whole 
of the United Kingdom would pacify Labour, erode the 
support given to Irish MPs who refused to accept it as a 
major concession, and rally a large number of English 
MPs. 
l 
This is not to say that Long's open conversion to 
federalism was divorced from the ideology of a united, 
self-sufficient Empire. Nor was it unconnected with 
pressure exerted in the spring of 1918 by Tory Federalists, 
men like Chamberlain, Amery and F. S. Oliver. 
2 But Long 
certainly clutched at federalism as a means to extricate 
the government from an immediate problem: he saw feder- 
ali"sm as the only way to pass a measure of home rule 
which Ulster might be persuaded to endorse and the more 
11 
moderate nationalists bullied to accept. Federalism 
was a kind of disguise behind which Long's form of home 
rule would masquerade as acceptable to everyone. To 
cloak home rule in the guise of federalism was somehow 
to take the sting out of the whole concept of Irish 
autonomy. For a while in 1918", federalism offered the 
1For 
a very full account of Long's reasons for espousing 
federalism see his copy letter to Lord Derby, 28 June 1918, 
W. L. P., WRO 947/547. 
2See ibid., WRO 947/207 and 322 for Long's correspondence 
with Professor Dicey and F. S. Oliver regarding federalism in 
1918; see also a 'Note on Federal Decentralisation', 26 Apr. 
1918, by Oliver, ibid., WRO 947/413f. 
I 
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illusion, if not the substance, of compromise. 
Anxious not to give an impression of having abandoned 
home rule, Lloyd George tried to ignore Long's insistence 
on a federal solution. Indeed, he reacted to Long's 
report of 9 May - that a bill must be temporarily delayed 
- by offering a considerable extension of Long's powers. 
Accordingly, on 10 May Long was authorised to act on 
behalf of the cabinet in all Irish matters. This gave 
Long a very free hand, with precisely the kind of authority 
he had sought earlier in the year. He could personally 
decide what the cabinet should or should not discuss in 
relation to Ireland; he had an influential voice in the 
formulation of Irish policy at Westminster; he could 
oversee the policies o. f the new Lord Lieutenant, Lord 
French, and Edward Shortt without moving to Dublin Castle; 
and he had sole jurisdiction over the framing and timing 
of an Irish bill. 
Long took immediate steps to ensure that he would be 
10 
consulted in all matters relating to the actual policies 
carried out. in Irelapd. On the 13th he obtained the 
necessary assurances from Lord French. 'You may rest 
assured', French promised, 'that' questions of Policy and 
Appointment will always be submitted to you. 'l As French 
was willing to follow'a tough policy of law enforcement 
and to defer to Long in matters of policy, the two men 
worked well together. When, later in the year, French 
1French to Long, 13 May 1918, ibid., WRO 947/229. 
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experienced difficulties with Shortt, difficulties which 
brought him to the brink of resignation, Long abruptly 
changed his earlier views on the respective positions 
of the Lord Lieutenant and Chief Secretary. As Chief 
Secretary in 1905, Long had forcefully asserted the 
supremacy of his'own office, but in 1918 he backed 
French. At the end of August he told the prime minister 
that 'Shortt has done well, but ... he and Campbell 
[the 
Lord Chancellor] talk too much Home Rule and too little 
Conscription ... if necessary I shall ask you to 
let me 
caution both these officials. '' The complete concurrence 
expressed in Lloyd George's reply2 indicates both the 
responsibility and independence of action which Long had 
assumed in Irish affairs. French intended to ask the 
prime minister for a precise definition of his powers. 
Long prevented this, telling French to inform Shortt that 
he, French, was the effective head of the Irish adminis- 
tration. 'You are', Long wrote, 'de jure and de facto 
41 
Governor of Ireland - in other words you are in the position 
previously occupied pn some occasions by the Lord Lieutenant 
who was a member of the Cabinet when the Chief Secretary 
was not. '3 Long took this step 'on his own initiative: he 
was clearly backing the man, not the office. 
4 When he 
1Long to Lloyd George, 30 Aug. 1918, ibid., WRO 947/569. 
2Lloyd George to Long, 30 Aug. 1918, ibid. 
3Long to French, 15 Oct. 1918, ibid., WRO 947/231. 
4Two 
years later, with a different Chief Secretary now in 
office, Long changed his view again, this time instructing 
French that 'the Chief Sec., being in the House of Commons, 
... must be regarded as the responsible Minister. ' Long to 
French, 6 July 1920, ibid., WRO 947/232. 
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moved to the Admiralty in January 1919, Long continued 
to represent the Irish government in cabinet, heartily 
endorsed by Lord French. 
1 
From May 1918 onwards Long came under increasing 
pressure to drop home rule altogether. John Walsh of 
the Irish Unionist Alliance wrote to remind him that 
Southern Unionists expected him 'to champion their cause, 
as you have so fearlessly done in the past, and for which 
you have earned their lasting gratitude'; 
2 
and a group 
of nineteen peers, led by Salisbury and Londonderry, 
forwarded an address on 17 May demanding an abandonment 
3 
of home rule. His old friend J. M. Wilson put the 
Southern Unionists' position bluntly: ? if and when a 
Federal scheme for the whole of the U. Kingdom be proposed, 
we could not really oppose it, but, short of that we are 
for the Union and nothing else. ' A number of Ulstermen 
turned against Long, 
4so 
much so that he felt obliged to 
offer his resignation tp the Ulster Unionist Council, 
although this was refused. 
5 At the same time, Lloyd George 
- ------ --------------------=------- 
1See French to Lloyd George, copy, 14 Jan. 1919, ibid., 
WRO 947/229. 
2Walsh to Long, 14 May 1918, Aid., WRO 947/382. * 
3See ibid., WRO 947/341; A. C. P., AC 31/1/11. The nineteen 
peers, almost a roll-call of 'diehard' Unionism, were as 
follows: Barrymore, Bedford, Beresford, Buccleuch, Churchill, 
Colville, Desborough, Foredter, Halsbury, Harewood,. Jersey, 
Londonderry, Northumberland, Plymouth, Salisbury, Saltoun, 
Somerset, Sydenham, and Willoughby de Broke. 
4For 
example, James Barr of County Down wrote: II am 
disgusted with this Home Rule Bill.... I hope you are not 
going to have another Curragh.... Be a staunch Unionist, not 
a Home Ruler. ' Barr to Long, n. d., but Long's reply is 
dated 5 May 1918, W. L. P., WRO 947/149. 
5See ibid., WRO 947/153. 
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pressed him to produce an early bill; Long responded by 
demanding a free hand for the Irish government to suppress 
disorder. Only then, he insisted, would he agree to home 
rule. 
l 
The government seemed to be drifting inexorably towards 
the policy of repression which was to hold sway until 
the treaty negotiations of 1921, a policy which has been 
described by a distinguished historian of this period as 
'a monument to ignorance, racial and religious prejudice, 
and ineptitude. '2 That the government initially decided 
in favour of a tough policy had much to do with Long's 
influence. In a cabinet memorandum of 1 June 1918 Long 
argued that the Irish administration, with Lord French 
acting as military overlord, should be given a more or 
less free hand in dealing with Sinn Fein extremists: 
It is a fact ... that it would be easier to enforce 
Conscription than to carry Home Rule. The former 
could be done ... at considerable cost of life and 
with very questionable results'as regards recruits, 
but the latter is for the time being absolutely 
impossible. 
I venture to express the earnest hope that the 
Government will not enquire in too much detail into 
the action of the Irish Government.... I have willingly 
undertaken the difficult and laborious task of acting 
as the representative of the Cabinet ... but if every 
act ... is to be discussed and debated ... I fear the 
1See Long to Lloyd George, 14 May, 20 May, and 29 May 1918, 
L. G. P., F/32/5/41,42 and 44 respectively. 
2Kenneth 0. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The_Lloyd_George 
Coalition Government, 1,918-1922 (Oxford, 1979)v p. 132. 
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wheels of the machine will be badly clogged.... I am 
extremely hopeful.... But everything depends upon the 
support given to the Irish Government and their freedom 
from undue criticism. 
' 
The cabinet committee on Ireland met again at the 
Colonial Office on 4 June. By now there were considerable 
differences as to procedure. Long proposed to recommend 
to the cabinet that the committee be wound up and the 
bill officially dropped, but Christopher Addison objected 
strongly and argued that for the government to drop home 
rule only a few weeks after pledging itself to bring 
forward new proposals would be discreditable. Addison 
later described Long's policy as 'half-hearted', with 
Lloyd George 'heading the drifters'. 
2 
He failed to realise 
that Lloyd George could go no faster on home rule than 
his Tory colleagues would allow and mistakenly concluded 
that Long's dominant influence was 'a triumph of obstruction 
for those who ... never seriously intended to get on with 
the business. '3 Yet, as Thomas Jones recorded on 6 June, 
Long still hoped that a federal bill might be feasible 
r 
later in the year. 
On Monday 10 June the committee considered a memorandum 
by Long which, as chairman, he proposed should form the 
basis of its report. As far as was possible, the 
-------------- 
1Cabinet 
memorandum by Long, 1 June 1918, A. C. P., AC 
31/1/15- 
2 Addison, Politics from Within, 2,243-6. 
3Idem,.. Four and a Half Years, 2,537. 
4Jones, Whitehall Diary : _Irelandt_1918_2ý, pp. 
10-11. 
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memorandum was altered to suit conflicting views - it 
was for this reason that the report was so ambiguous in 
its recommendations. Addison, predictably, was far from 
satisfied, regarding the outcome as 'a piece of disastrous 
folly. 
" He rather naively believed that all Lloyd George 
had to do was put his foot down firmly in favour of an 
immediate bill and Long would jump into line. In 
Addison's view, the prime minister was 'timid to the last 
degree in his dealings with the Tory party. '2 This 
insensitivity to Conservative feelings was in 1921 to 
cost Addison his place in the cabinet. Addison's remarks 
make it clear that the proceedings of the committee were 
considerably less harmonious than the official records 
would allow. 
Four days later the committee produced its report, a 
hotchpotch of the members' conflicting views: it 
described an Ireland in which any immediate grant of 
home rule would be folly; it condemned the 'dual policy' 
II 
of home rule in return for conscription; and it asserted 
the willingness of the committee to proceed with a bill 
if so instructed. Long also produced a draft Federal 
3 
Bill for the whole of the United; Kingdom, although this 
was well beyond his remit. He proposed local parliaments 
for England, Ireland, Scot], and and Wales empowered 'to 
make laws for the peace, order and good government of 
--------------------- 
'Addison, Four and a Half Years, 2,541. 
2Ibid., 
p. 552. 
31nterim Report of the Committee on the Government of 
Ireland Amendment Bill, 14 June 1918, P. R. O., G. T. 4839, 
CAB 27/46. 
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the country ... '1 The chief interest of this draft 
bill lies in its evidence of Long's radical disposition 
to change the constitution almost beyond recognition: 
in well under a decade Long had moved from total agreement 
with A. V. Dicey on the sanctity of the constitution to 
advocacy of four national parliaments with an imperial 
House of Commons reduced to only three hundred and fifty 
members. 
2 Lloyd George would have nothing to do with the 
plan, although it received the strongest possible support 
from Austen Chamberlain, who produced a cabinet memorandum 
insisting that 'the attempt to solve the Irish question 
in isolation has always failed and is doomed to failure. '3 
The cabinet considered Long's report onl9June. When 
Long pointed out that the government had rather foolishly 
pledged itself to resign if it failed to carry home rule 
as promised, Lloyd George prevaricated by contending that 
the activities of Sinn Fein cancelled any earlier promises, 
making any grant of home rule impossible. George Barnes 
came up with a happy 'via media': Lloyd George and Long 
were quite correct, tome rule was out of the question for 
the moment, but the government should nevertheless be 
ready with a measure when circumstances permitted. A bill 
should be worked out but put into cold storage. Long was 
therefore instructed to produce an Irish bill in the full 
knowledge that the cabinet would not take it up. Chamberlain 
1'Draft 
of a Bill for a federal system for the United 
Kingdom, prepared by Mr. Walter Long's Committee, June 1918', 
P. R. O., G. T. 8239. CAB 24/89. 
2Ibid. 
3Cabinet 
memorandum by Chamberlain, 17 June 1918, A. C. P., 
AC 31/1/2. 
377 
made a last appeal on behalf of federalism, but, as he 
well knew, federalism was a non-starter. 
1 
As Long 
explained to Lord Derby, recently despatched to Paris as 
British Ambassasor, later that day: 'The country is in 
a condition which calls for drastic measures, and which 
makes it impossible to contemplate ... any bill for a 
reform of the constitution. '2 
Even so, Long continued to toy with federalism throughout 
the summer and autumn of 1918, declaring to Lloyd George 
on 20 July that 'you can't conscript without some form 
of H. R. The old kind is dead as Queen Anne, Federalism 
is only substitute. '3 In cabinet four days later Lloyd 
George renounced the 'dual policy' and countered Long's 
observation - voiced in the hope that the prime minister 
would feel obliged to give the go ahead to a provisional 
federal scheme - that the government had promised to 
proceed with home rule or resign by asserting that 
conscription would, if militarily necessary, be imposed 




The Irish committee met again at the Colonial Office 
on Tuesday 6 August and agreed, äs an alternative to 
Long's federal bill, to consider resurrecting the bill 
drawn up in 1917 by Curzon  Duke and Addison. A draft 
1Cabinet 
minutes, 19 June 1918, P. R. O., WC 433, CAB 23/6. 
2Long to Derby, copy, 19 June 1918, W. L. P., WRO 947/547. 
3Long to Lloyd George, 20 July 1918, L. G. P., F/33/1/11. 
4Cabinet 
minutes, 29 July 1918, P. R. O., WC 453, CAB 23/7. 
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Irish bill was thus hastily prepared in August, more as 
a sop to Christopher Addison and the government's critics 
than as a serious effort to bring home rule forward. The 
bill proposed exclusion for a six county Ulster, subject 
to a plebiscite at the end of the war and a confirmatory 
referendum again seven years later. 
' More significant, 
however, was a proposal to establish a Council for the 
. whole of Ireland. 
Already, then, Longs committee had 
foreshadowed the basic outlines of the settlement which 
was to be embodied in the Government of Ireland Act more 
than two years later. As Long expected, the cabinet did 
not choose to take up the bill. Home rule was dead, at 
least for the time being. 
Christopher Addison harboured a deep resentment against 
Long after the failure of home rule in 1918 and became 
a bitter critic of his role in the government and the 
influence which his position in the Conservative party 
afforded. Addison quite wrongly held Long personally 
responsible for the failure to settle Ireland, regarding 
him henceforth as t&ctively reactionary'. 
2 In fact, the 
reasons for the failure of the 1918 Irish committee are 
considerably more complex. To begin with, Long believed 
that an Irish bill on its own could not work, even 
attempting in September to'have United Kingdom federalism 
included in the election manifesto, and encouraging Milner 
- -------------- ------ --- 
''Draft 
of a Bill for the Government of Ireland, prepared 
by Mr. Walter Long's Committee, August 19181, P. R. O., G. T. 
8240, CAB 24/89. 
2For Addison's highly critical remarks about Long's 
usefulness see Four and a_Half_Years, 2,553,565 and 597. 
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to put pressure on the prime minister from within the 
war cabinet. 
1 He did not accept Professor Dicey's 
argument that Irishmen were 'pre-eminently unsuited for 
taking part in a federal system. '2 Rather, he was reluctant 
to proceed with home rule in the hope that delay would 
provide an opportunity for the government to produce a 
single grand design with which to cement the bonds of 
Empire, provide a framework for dealing with all domestic 
and imperial questions, and solve the intractable Irish 
problem. 
By the autumn Long realised that a federal scheme 
would have to include provision for Irish partition, and 
this he regarded as impractical in the prevailing climate 
of intimidation and violence. To Lord Reading Long 
confirmed in October that 
if any scheme is to be produced it must be based upon 
partition lines. Is it worth while to produce any- 
thing of the kind? It would be violently resisted in 
Ireland by Nationalists generally. It would be equally 
strongly opposed by Unionists outside of Ulster..... 
3 
C 
He was determined that dominion home rule could not be 
conceded because Ireland 'is toornear to us, and occupies 
a position of far too great importance in regard to defence, 
to make it possible for us, to allow her what is in reality 
absolute independence. t4 Therefore, Long maintained, the 
- ------------- -------- - 
1See Long to Milner, copy, 8 Sept. 1918, W. L. P., WRO 
947/574. 
2Dicey to Long, 22 Nov. 1918, ibid., WRO 947/207. 
3Long to Reading, copy, 24 Oct. 1918, ibid., WRO 947/330. 
4Long to Father John Flattery of County Mayo, copy, 12 Sept. 
1918, ibid., WRO 947/224. 
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men of violence in Ireland must first be rooted out, 
then home rule would become feasible. 
Long had high hopes in 1918 that the policy of repression 
first, concession later, would succeed, reporting to 
Austen Chamberlain on 20 September that 'French is Master 
and his policy prevails ... the malcontents are coming 
to heel. ' 1 He mistakenly believed that a new moderate 
party in Ireland could defeat Sinn Fein. 
2 Southern 
Unionists, he hoped, could be persuaded to unite with 
moderate Nationalists to form what Long called a Federal 
party. This hoped-for alliance would run candidates in 
every seat outside Ulster, stepping into the breach 
between the Nationalist party at Westminster and Sinn Fein. 
3 
By conferring real powers of self-government at the eleventh 
hour, Long anticipated that the moderates might make a 
comeback. Ireland would abandon hopes of a republic and 
the mass of the people would turn away from Sinn Fein. 
4 
1Long to Chamberlain, 20 Sept. 
'1918, 
A. C. P., AC 31/1/24. 
2In 
common with most other English politicians of the 
period, Long used th@ term 'Sinn Fein' to denounce the 
republican 'murder gang' in Ireland. In many of his statements 
and much of his correspondence from January 1919 onwards, 
'Sinn Fein', 'murder' and 'outrage' are used as synonyms. It 
should be remembered that over seventy Irish MPs called them- 
selves Sinn Fein, yet those nationalists prepared to murder 
and destroy always remained a small proportion of the 
population. Long's use of the term 'Sinn Fein' must be 
treated with caution: he invariably meant Irish murderers 
and rebels. He did not mean the Sinn Fein party which, after 
1918, legitimately represented the great majority of Irishmen 
. outside 
Ulster. 
3For Long's ideas concerning a new Irish party see his 
letter, asking for a contribution towards getting the new 
alliance started, to Viscount Lascelles, 4 Oct. 1918, W. L. P., 
WRO 947/269. 
4An Irish Centre party was, in fact, formed in January 1919 
to promote autonomy for Ireland within the Empire through an 
all Ireland parliament, with provincial parliaments for local 
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But he never really grasped the deep psychological and 
emotional appeal which Sinn Fein was able to exercise in 
Ireland. He was simply being over-optimistic. In a 
sense Long was still living in the days of 'bloody' Balfour: 
he still believed in a judicious compound of coercion and 
concession. Home rule could no longer be killed by 
kindness, but Sinn Fein might be. 
That Christopher Addison was wrong to suspect Long of 
never seriously intending home rule in 1918 is indicated 
by a proposal which Long put to the prime minister on 
22 November. Recognising that many months must elapse 
before an Irish bill could be passed in the knowledge that 
there would be no recrudescence of crime, Long proposed 
an interim measure, arguing that it was very dangerous 
for the government to be seen to be doing nothing. With 
the full approval of the Irish administration, Long 
recommended that'a short bill be introduced giving statutory 
powers to an Executive Council of representative Irishmen 
appointed by the Lord Lieutenant. 
' This Council would 
become a kind of cab4net-in-waiting for Ireland, the 
nucleus, Long hoped, of a new, constitutional Irish 
Nationalist party. In the shortrterm it would serve to 
affairs. The party's general committee was chaired by 
Captain Stephen Gwynne and included General Sir Hubert Gough. 
The party played only the most peripheral role in the 
unfolding of Anglo-Irish politics. Early 1919 also saw a 
definite breach in the Irish Unionist Alliance, with the 
formation of a breakaway group calling itself the Unionist 
Anti-Partition League. 
1Memorandum by Long, 22 Nov. 1918, L. G. P., F/33/1/35. 
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militate against the critics who accused the government 
of having no policy except the old one of repression. 
Perhaps unwisely, Lloyd George took the idea no further. 
The Sinn Fein triumph in the general election of 
December 1918 merely confirmed the fact that nationalist 
Ireland would no longer settle for the kind of home rule 
for which it had campaigned for nearly four decades. 
Ironically, almost at the very moment that Long and other 
leading Unionists reconciled themselves to working 
constructively towards home rule, Ireland turned against 
it. By the end of the year the battle lines were drawn 
up: Who was to govern Ireland? - Dublin Castle or Sinn 
Fein? On the last day of the year Long succinctly defined 
the problem for the cabinet. The Sinn Fein hardliners, 
he wrote, 
... are brave and fanatical and do not fear imprisonment 
or death; they are not to be influenced by private 
negotiations with Bishops or Priests, or captured by 
getting the patronage of appointments.... Neither do 
they care a straw for the press. I 
It is a fair an (Y square fight between the Irish 





From the autumn of 1918 until late in 1919 home rule was 
dead as a practical political issue, and Long concerned 
1Me'morandum by Long, 31 Dec. 1918, P. R. O., G. T. 6574, 
CAB 24/72. 
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himself with the administration in Ireland and the means 
by which violence might be stamped out. In a climate 
of worsening violence there could be no question of 
concession, a view to which Lloyd George adhered with 
equal rigidity. With the murder of two policemen, the 
first R. I. C. fatalities since the Easter Rising, and the 
capture of a wagonload of explosive at Soloheadbeg, County 
Tipperary, on 21 January 1919, Sinn Fein gave notice that 
the old idea of 'physical force' rebellion had not been 
abandoned. 
By the early summer of 1919 Long had little confidence 
that the R. I. C., the Dublin Metropolitan Police or the 
Special Crimes Branch at Dublin Castle could deal effectively 
with the situation, and he gave his full backing to Lord 
French in pressing for reorganisation of the security 
forces. On a visit to Ireland in May Long was appalled 
to find that merely to travel down to the Curragh races 
he was obliged to take an escort of five armed detectives 
f 
and a car loaded with soldiers. These conditions, he 
reported to the prime minister, 
c 
work in the Castle itself.... 
were 'the result of bad 
I firmly believe that this 
unfortuante state of things ... das grown up owing-to the 
weakness and inefficiency of some ... officials ... ý1 
He pushed throughout the year for strong measures and lent 
i 
his full weight to the policy of repression which the Lord 
Lieutenant followed and which has so blackened Anglo-Irish 
1Long to Lloyd George, copy, 21 May 1919, W. L. P., WRO 
947/292. 
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history in this period. Especially significant for the 
future development of policy was Long's proposal, first 
mooted in May 1919, that the strength and efficiency of 
the R. I. C. be improved by the recruitment of ex-servicemen. 
Ruthless men, he contended, could be countered only by 
ruthless policies, and by September he was prepared to 
recommend that Ireland be governed as a Crown Colony 
until such time as home rule became feasible. 
2 
Concerned lest his government appear to have no policy 
other than repression, Lloyd George appointed another 
Irish committee, again under Long's chairmanship, on 
7 October 1919, thus bouncing the home rule ball back 
into the political court. This body was charged with 
3 
monitoring the Irish problem and recommending a long term 
solution, and it was this body which was ultimately to be 
responsible for the Government of Ireland Act. The 
committee first met a week later; it worked hard and fast, 
--------------------- 
1Charles Townshend, The British_Campaign_inIreland, l919_21 
(Oxford, 1975), p. 25. Dr Townshend has shown that the 
notorious 'Black and Tans' were first recruited at the end 
of 1919, from which time recruiting offices were set up in 
Britain, and not in the summer of 1920 as is commonly 
thought (Ibid., pp. 45-6; Appendix I, p. 209). 
2Memorandum by Long, 12 Sept. '1919, W. L. P, WRO 947/293. 
3The terms under which Asquith's Home Rule Bill had been 
placed on the statute book in September 1914 and then suspende 
for the duration of the war meant that it would automatically 
come into force as soon as'the last of the peace treaties was 
signed. With the most important of the peace treaties - the 
Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28 June 1919 - now out of the 
way, Lloyd George naturally felt obliged to do something about 
Ireland. The government effectively had only three options: 
to pass an Amending Bill to exclude Ulster and then to let 
Asquith's Act come into operation; to repeal the 1914 Act; or 
to pass a new measure which would supersede Asquith's Act. 
Lloyd George chose the latter course. 
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meeting for two hours on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday 
of each week. 
l Partition was clearly the only way 
forward, and on 15 October the committee agreed to 
separate. ' parliaments for North and South and a Common 
Council 'with certain powers for the whole of Ireland. 
Such a scheme. not to be inconsistent with a Federal 
system of Government for the United Kingdom. '2 
A few days later the committee had three working schemes 
under consideration. The first entailed one parliament 
for the whole of Ireland with county option to protect 
Ulster, those counties opting out to continue to be 
governed by Westminster; the second likewise contemplated 
one parliament for the whole of Ireland but with an 
Ulster Committee to be granted both legislative and 
administrative veto powers; and the third scheme envisaged 
separate parliaments for North and South, with a federal 
council enjoying power over the whole of Ireland only at 
the delegation of the two parliaments. The third scheme, 
then, avoided the onerous task of defining exactly what 
powers any all Ireland parliament might exercise. Instead, t 
it conceded the possibility of one governing body but left 
the role of such a body for the Irish to decide. The 
council was intended only as a symbol of an Irish unity 
The committee comprised the following: Long (chairman), 
H. A. L. Fisher, Lord Birkenhead (F. E. Smith), Shortt, 
Worthington-Evans, Geddes, G. H. Roberts, F. G. Kellaway, Sir 
Gordon Hewart and Sir Robert Horne. Lord French and 
MacPherson were 'ex officio' members. Philip Kerr and 
Captain L. F. Burgis acted as secretaries. 
2Conclusions 
of committee meeting, 15 Oct. 1919, P. R. O., 
C. I. 2nd Cons., CAB 27/68. 
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which did not exist. The third scheme was politidally 
expedient. Of the three it was the only one with the 
slightest chance of proving workable. 
' 
Long's first report was ready by 4 November. The 
committee agreed unanimously that a fresh legislative 
attempt should be made to deal with the Irish problem 
once and for all and it decided firmly in favour of the 
third option. The general outline of the Government of 
Ireland Bill was thus already clear: there would be two 
parliaments and a council to promote ultimate unification. 
This was an adroit proposal: it was consistent with 
government pledges not to hand Ulster over to the South; 
it allowed the withdrawal of British rule from the whole 
of Ireland; and it theoretically satisfied the demands 
of nationalist Ireland for self-government. The committee 
also pointed out that a two parliament solution was by 
far the least contentious method of achieving partition, 
for the nationalists could not claim that any part of 
Ireland remained under British domination. 'No nationalists 
would be re-tained under British rule. All Irishmen would 
be self-governing. '2 
On the same day that Long's committee presented its 
report, 4 November, Long's Irish policy was bitterly 
censured by the Morning Post, and his willingness to work 
towards, indeed to take the initiative over, an Irish bill 
1Government 
of Ireland Alternative Schemes A, B, and C, 
20 Oct. 1919, P. R. O., C. I. 12, CAB 27/69. 
2Report 
of Irish Committee. 4 Nov. 1919, P. R. O., C. P. 56, 
CAB 27/68. 
387 
provoked considerable disquiet amongst many of his 
oldest friends and political allies. Long's advocacy 
of an. ear)y bill was based on the view that Sinn Fein 
could be suppressed before any form of Irish autonomy 
came into effect. Meanwhile, he offered the most 
unswerving support to Lord French and was the government's 
most powerful spokesman for the employment of ruthless 
policies against the republican insurgents. To the Lord 
Lieutenant Long wrote at the end of the year: 
These vile criminals must be exterminated.... I 
observe that M. de Valera styles himself the President 
of the Irish Republic.... In my opinion, he should 
be regarded as a rebel ... the Government of the United 
Kingdom will resist - by force of arms if necessary, 
any attempt to establish a Republic in Ireland. 
1 
Long fully expected the destruction of Sinn Fein before 
his bill passed into law; stern measures in Ireland would 
be wedded to practical concession at Westminster. 
It was an act of deliberate political policy that 
repression in Ireland, often carried out with sanguinary 
it 
ferocity by the British security forces, should feature 
as a backcloth to the grant of hoffie rule contained in the 
Government of Ireland Act. Long's bill was not conceived 
as a hasty concession to terrorism. It was brought forward 
in the belief, ultimately mistaken, that home rule could be 
turned against Sinn Fein. As Long put it to Lloyd George 
1Long to French, copy, 26 Dec. 1919, L. P., Add. MS. 
62h24. 
388 
in June 1920: 
If we steadfastly adhere to the ... double-barrelled 
policy of firm and effective dealing with the Sinn 
Feiners, murderers, and other scoundrels, and at the 
same time pursue our policy of reform by passing our 
measure through Parliament with as little delay as 
possible ... I am satisfied that we shall win through. 
1 
If necessary, Ireland must be treated as a war zone and 
the most drastic measures employed, for Long always 
regarded destruction of Sinn Fein as the pre-requisite 
of a successful bill. 'I do not believe', he wrote to 
Lord French, 'that we shall defeat S. F. until we take up 
the challenge which they have thrown down, and go to war 
with them in earnest. '2 
The cabinet considered the Irish committee's report on 
1Long to Lloyd George, copy, 18 June 1920, W. L. P., WRO 
947/240. 
2Long to French, copy, 2 July 1920, ibid., WRO 947/232. 
The level of violence with which the Irish government had to 
deal can be gleaned from the following official statistics: 
Between 1 Jan. 1919 and 31 Dec. 1919.17 policemen were 
killed. The following year saw a marked increase. in violence. 
Between 1 Jan. 1920 and 31 Dec. 1920,165 policemen were 
killed. In the two years commencing 1 Jan 1919,182 policemen 
were killed and 265 wounded, 50 military were killed and 122 
wounded, and 39 civilians were killed and 108 wounded. 
Figures relating to destruction of Crown property paint an 
equally grim picture: Between 1 Jan. 1919 and 19 Feb. 1921, 
536 police barracks and 70 courthouses were destroyed. A 
further 212 police barracks were attacked and damaged, and 
there were 3,052 raids forearms. On top of this, republican 
terrorists encouraged and pursued a persistent policy of 
arson against private property, land-grabbing and cattle 
stealing. Loyalists naturally suffered the brunt of these 
attacks. These figures can be found in Irish Crime Statistics 
Cmd. 709 (1920) and Outrages_Slreland) Cmd. 1165 (1921). 
They are also available in Buckland, Irish Unionism: The Anglo. 
Irish and the New Ireland, pp. 201-2, together with a 
representative list of outrages perpetrated against Southern 
Unionists. 
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11 November 1919. Rather than have the government embark 
on a contentious bill, Lloyd George drew back, suggesting 
that a series of resolutions be laid before parliament 
for discussion. Lloyd George wanted to test the mood of 
the House, particularly of the Tory party, before proceeding. 
Two days later, however, the committee rejected this 
proposal, insisting unanimously that it must be a bill or 
nothing, 
' 
and by the 17th the committee had produced a 
second report emphasising the necessity of an early bill. 
2 
A third report, dealing with the financial aspects of the 
proposed bill, was presented to the cabinet a week later, 
3 
and a fourth and last report was presented on 2 December. 
This last report recommended the transfer of extensive _ 
powers to the two Irish parliaments and laid down a 
schedule to put the plan into effect. 
4 
Once it had been decided to establish a separate 
parliament in Ulster the old question of 1914 raised 
its head - what, precisely, was to be the geographical 
area excluded? Long pointed out that if eventual 
reunification was to be the goal a nine county historic 
t 
province of Ulster ought to be excluded, and on 10 December 
the cabinet decided. provisionally; in favour of such-an 
5 
arrangement. The Ulster Unionists objected vociferously 
1Minutes 
of committee meeting, 13 Nov. 1919, P. R. O., C. I. 
9th Minutes, CAB 27/68. 
2Second 
report of Irish committee, 17 Nov. 1919, P. R. O., 
C. P. 137, CAB 27/68. 
' 
3Third 
report of Irish committee, 24 Nov. 1919, P. R. O., 
C. P. 190, CAB 27/68. 
4Fourth 
report of Irish committee, 2 Dec. 1919, P. R. O., 
C. P. 247, CAB 27/68. 
5Cabinet 
conclusions, 10 Dec. 1919, P. R. O., CAB 23/18. 
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so that, just five days later, the cabinet was informed 
that the Ulster leaders were of the opinion that a 
Northern parliament would be unworkable if it was to 
govern three counties with a clear nationalist majority. 
l 
Already, then, the Ulster leaders were implicitly 
committed to a viable Northern state, prepared to surrender 
historic Ulster rather than give credence to the possibility 
of a united Ireland at some future date. 
Long took great care in planning the introduction of 
the bill to ensure that it received the minimum amount 
of criticism. Sensing that the critics would seize upon 
particular details which were easy to attack, he was 
careful to make the measure as watertight as possible. 
Much of the actual drafting was done by H. A. L. Fisher and 
Philip Kerr, with Long keeping a watchful eye on the bill's 
progress. Lloyd George originally intended that the bill 
be presented to parliament before the Christmas recess, 
but to this Long would not agree. He wanted to have the 
final draft examined by a number of people who had not 
served on the cabinet committee but who were nonetheless 
C 
thoroughly conversant with the Irish problem. 
2 This was 
done in great secrecy so as to ensure that the term's of 
the settlement would not leak out before the government 
was ready. Long spent the Christmas break going over the 
1Cabinet 
conclusions, 15 Dec. 1919, P. R. O., CAB 23/18. 
2Realising that these tactics would carry more weight if 
recommended by the Chief Secretary, Long enlisted MacPherson's 
help. See Long to MacPherson, 12 Dec. 1919, W. L. P., WRO 
947/211. 
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measure with a fine toothcomb to eradicate any weak 
clauses, intending to have a final version ready for the 
new session. 
Press reaction to the government's proposals, both in 
Ulster and the South, was mostly hostile, 
1 but Long had 
expected as much and took comfort from the fact that 
there had been no nationalist outburst or attack in Ireland 
in response to the government's announced intentions. 
2 
Early in the New Year Long visited the North to confer 
with the Ulster leaders, reporting to Lloyd George on his 
return that 'the inclusion of Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan 
would provide such an access of strength to the Roman 
Catholic party, that the supremacy of the Unionists would 
be seriously threatened. '3 He was not prepared to force 
a settlement which put the Ulste. rmen at risk, and although 
by February 1920 the bill had been fully revised and 
re-drafted the Ulster problem had still not been dealt 
with. Long therefore asked the cabinet for a decision 
as to the precise jurisdiction of the Northern parliament; 
it also remained to be decided whether Ireland should 
C 
continue to be represented in the cabinet by a Chief 
4 Secretary. 
These problems were thrashed out at a committee meeting 
held on 17 February, with Bonar Law taking the chair. 
1For 
a study of the press and public reaction to the 
government's Irish policy see D. G. Boyce, Englishmen and Irish 
Troubles, British_Pub_lic_Opinion and theMaking_of Irish 
Policy, 1918-22 (London, 1972). 
2Memorandum by Long, 1 Jan. 1920, P. R. O., C. I. 46, CAB 27/69.. 
3Memorandum by Long, 3 Feb. 1920, L. G. P., F/34/1/6. 
4Report by Long, 5 Feb. 1920, p. P. O., C. P. 565, CAB 27/68. 
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Despite Long's recognition of the Ulsterments case for 
six county exclusion the committee decided to recommend 
the nine county option. To exclude the historic province 
of Ulster, it declared, would lead to the ultimate 
unification of Ireland, whereas a six county Ulster with 
a deliberately tailored Unionist majority would be 
permanently divisive. Here, then, was a major concession 
to the fiction of Irish unity: a majority of the 
committee, though not. its chairman, was of the opinion 
that unification must be the long-term goal. Partition 
must be a temporary expedient only. 
l 
The Ulster leaders now began to work determinedly 
against the bill, in particular they refused to countenance 
an all Ireland judiciary. Long was ready to put his bill 
before the cabinet for final approval when he learnt, as 
a result of an interview between MacPherson and the Ulster 
MPs on 18 February, that Ulster would do everything in 
her power to wreck the bill 
judiciary. A meeting at the 
following day considered the 
Long informed Bonar Law that 
. finless granted a separate 
E 
House of Commons on the 
question and on the 20th 
the bill would have to be 
re-drafted to take account of U16ter's conditions, 'so 
that there was no chance of its being ready for the cabinet 
2 
as promised. 
Despite the conclusions of the Irish committee the Ulster 
1Report by Bonar Law, 17 Feb. 1920, P. R. O., Supplement to 
C. I. 15th Minutes, CAB 27/68. 
2See Long to Bonar Law, letter and memorandum entitled 
'The Irish Bill', 20 Feb. 1920, B. L. P., 98/7/11. 
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Unionists got their way. Anxious to have the Ulster 
leaders' support for the bill, the cabinet preferred to 
back down. The price of Ulster's support was the six 
counties; the Ulstermen wanted only what they could 
control. 
1 On 24 February the cabinet decided to ignore 
1It 
would appear that Long informed Lloyd George that 
Ulster's support could only be bought by a pledge guaranteeing 
that the boundaries of the six counties would remain virtually 
untouched, excepting very slight adjustments which might prove 
desirable. Long was then authorised to make a secret pledge 
to this effect to the Ulster leaders. As is well known, the 
idea of a Boundary Commission was used by Lloyd George in 
December 1921 as a tactical manoeuvre to persuade the Irish 
representatives to arrive at a settlement. The Irish later 
claimed to have agreed to the Treaty in the belief that 
Ulster's area would be so reduced as to make her separate 
existence impossible, so that a united Ireland would result 
in a few years. The pledge to the Ulster leaders in 1920 
meant that Lloyd George's hands were tied when in the 
following year he came to negotiate the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
with Michael Collins. Worried in 1924 that the Labour 
government might unwittingly renege on this guarantee, Long 
confirmed to Lord Londonderry that 'it was on this distinct 
pledge that we were able to pass the Bill with the aid of the 
Ulstermen; they did not care for it and they did not want it. ' 
(Long to Londonderry, copy, 26 Aug. 1924, W. L. P, WRO 947/290). 
Eight days before he died Long told Lord Selborne the story 
of how he had secretly bargained, with Lloyd George's full 
blessing, with Carson and Craig to win Ulster's support for 
the Government of Ireland Bill. (dee memorandum and covering 
letter by Long to Selborne, 18 Sept. 1924, ibid., WRO 947/ 
352). When Long died on 26 September 1924 Selborne made the 
story public, a dramatic disclosure in view of the fact that 
parliament was shortly to meet to deal with the question of 
Ulster's boundaries. On 1 October Lloyd George, with 
characteristic mendacity, issued a denial in the Commons, 
alleging that Long's memory must 'have been at fault and 
stating categorically that there had been no boundary pledge 
to Ulster in 1920 (see 177 H. C. Deb. ser. 5 col. 189). Long's 
story, however, rings true. The newspapers had a field day 
with stories about Long's 'voice from the grave', and 
Selborne's revelation proved a serious embarrassment to the 
government. On 2 October 1924 the Irish Free State Bill 
passed the Commons. 
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the committee's official recommendation and listen instead 
to Long's advice: the bill should grant one parliament 
in Dublin to administer twenty-six counties and one 
parliament in Belfast to administer the remaining six. 
l 
With this surrender to the Ulster Unionists' capacity 
for disruption the cabinet turned its back on a united 
Ireland and effectively ensured that partition would be 
permanent. On the following day the bill received its 
first reading in the Commons2 and two weeks later, on 10 
March, the Ulster Unionist Council decided officially to 
offer no opposition. 
The situation in Ireland, meanwhile, continued to 
deteriorate. The Irish government had 'since the 
beginning of 1919 been dominated by a Unionist clique as 
incompetent as it was extreme. They were successful only 
in one respect, squeezing Catholics, who had become objects 
of suspicion, out of positions of power. '3 General Byrne, 
whom Long regarded as a Sinn Fein fellow-traveller who 
had (lost his nerve', was eased out of his post as head 
of the R. I. C. and James MacMahon, the Roman Catholic 
r 
under-secretary, kept his job only by keeping quiet 
. 
E. A. Saunderson, until August 19RO principal private 
secretary to Lord French, referred to Catholic officials 
as 'the dirty elements in Dublin Castle' and described 
1Cabinet 
conclusions, 24 Feb. 1920, P. R. O., CAB 23/20. 
2125 H. C. Deb. ser. 5 col. 1694. 
3Eunan O'Halpin, 'Sir Warren Fisher and the Coalition, 1919- 
1922', Historical Journal 24 (1981), p. 920. 
4Ibid. 
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relations within the administration as 'steady war'. 
l 
During the spring of 1920 General Macready, formerly 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, was placed in 
charge of the Irish forces, and Hamar Greenwood replaced 
Ian MacPherson as Chief Secretary, though Long recommended 
either Jack Sandars or William Bridgeman for the job. 
2 
Despite these changes Sir Warren Fisher, the permanent 
secretary to the Treasury, still reported in May that 'the 
Government of Ireland strikes one as almost woodenly stupid 
and quite devoid of any imagination. It listens solely 
to the ascendancy party and ... it never seemed to think 
of the utility of keeping in touch with opinions of all 
kinds. t3 It was against this background that the government _ 
proceeded with home rule. 
4 
1See Saunderson to Long, 28 Jan. 1919, W. L. P., WRO 947/347. 
French later described Saunderson as 'prone to insolence' and 
'the victim of extraordinary hallucinations', and, after an 
acrimonious incident between the two men at the end of July 
1920, French dismissed the secretary. Saunderson subsequently 
begged Long to offer hit a position assisting the Irish 
committee, but Long declined. See French to Long, 1 Aug. and 
7 Aug. 1920; Long to French, 5 Aug. 1920, ibid., WRO 947/232. 
2See Long to Bonar Law, 18 Mar. 1920, B. L. P., 88/8/13. 
3Report 
on the Government of Ireland by Sir Warren Fisher, 
15 May 1920, L. G. P., F/31/1/33. Fisher, it should be noted, 
was strongly biased in favour of1the nationalist South and 
deprecated the government's use of force to restore order, so 
much so that he suggested in August 1920 that the Irish 
government be recalled to London and Dublin Castle abandoned. 
See Eunan O'Halpin, op. cit., p. 921. 
4The 
government responded to Fisher's criticisms by 
instituting a number of reforms during the spring of 1920. In 
May a team of highly respected officials from British 
departments arrived in Dublin. The most significant new 
appointment was that of Sir John Anderson as joint under- 
secretary with James MacMahon, a Roman Catholic official who, 
though regarded as incompetent in many ways, the government 
decided to retain in order to appease the Catholic hierarchy. 
It was as part of these administrative reforms that J. J. Tayloi 
was forced to retire. See John McColgan, British Policy and 
the_Irish 
_AdministrationZ_19.20-22 
(London, 1983Y, pp. 4-21. 
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The Government of Ireland Bill received its second 
reading on 29,30 and 31 March. It was carried by three 
hundred and forty-eight votes to ninety-four, and Lloyd 
George countered the government's critics by remarking 
that ? there is no Union with Ireland. A grappling hook 
is not Union. '1 Long then proposed the setting up of a 
committee, composed of members selected from the Irish 
committee which had originally drafted the measure, to 
consider amendments. His proposal was adopted and, once 
again, Long took the chair himself. 
2 He was also in 
charge in the Commons. 
By May the government was looking for a way to postpone 
the bill, realising that the state of the country made 
its successful operation an impossibility. The difficulty 
was somehow to delay the bill without appearing to admit 
to the charge that there was no real intention of ever 
passing it, that the bill had all along been a ploy 
designed solely to undermine support for Sinn Fein. Long Is 
e 
frequent absences, owing to illness, during the summer 
and autumn of 1920 b2came a convenient excuse for the 
government to delay. Amendments, too, proved troublesome. 
Bonar Law and Long both envisaged amendments against 
partition, or against only a six county exclusion, or 
insisting on an all Ireland, parliament. At this stage, 
the government was convinced that any intimation of an 
all Ireland parliament with real powers would provoke 
1127 H. C. Deb. ser. 5 col. 1335. 
2See Long to Bonar Law, 8 Apr. 1920, B. L. P., 103/5/1. 
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determined opposition from the Ulster MPs, who had come 
to regard Long with increasing suspicion. On 6 May 
Bonar Law confided to Lloyd George: 'I wish it were 
possible to postpone the Irish Bill. '1 Two days later 
Long assured Lord Derby that unless there was a marked 
improvement in the success of the security forces in 
Ireland 'the Bill will not be allowed to come into 
operation. 
2 
At eleven o'clock on Saturday morning, 8 May 1920, a 
small committee met to discuss a number of amendments 
which had been proposed. Long was not due to return to 
London until Monday, recovering at Rood Ashton from 
rheumatic arthritis, 
3 
so Bonar Law took the chair in 
his absence. It was decided to reject the proposal for 
a senate common to both the Northern and Southern 
parliaments on the ground that such an amendment ran 
counter to 'the whole scheme of the Bill. '4 
Long's work on the bill naturally placed him in a 
difficult position with regard to many of his old allies 
in the struggle against home rule. Accusations of I caprice, 
t 
betrayal and fecklessness abounded. For many years the 
self-appointed defender of the soattered Loyalist population 
of the South, he came in for such criticism. Lord Ashtown, 
-- - ----------------- ------------- 
1Bonar Law to Lloyd George, copy, 6 May 1920, ibid., 
102/5/14- 
2 Long to Derby, copy, 8 May 1920, W. L. P., WRO 947/203. 
3Long's 
poor health was exacerbated by a recent bereavement. In March 1920 his eldest daughter, Mrs. George Gibbs, died of influenza. 
4Typescript 
of decisions arrived at regarding Government of Ireland Bill, 8 May 1920, B. L. P., 102/5/17. 
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for example. wrote bitterly: 
It is cruel to see the results of the betrayal of 
the Irish loyalists for the last 50 years. England 
will gain nothing by it.... The more liberty you 
give the people the worse they are. They simply use 
it to commit outrages.... Home Rule will only make 
matters worse. I cantt understand you supporting it. 
l 
Long could only reply, with his usual pragmatic resolve, 
that whilst it was easy to condemn partition 'nobody is 
apparently able to produce an alternative that will stand 
a moment's examination. '2 His old friend J. M. Wilson 
objected to Hamar Greenwood as following 'in the footsteps 
of a long line of bloody fools ... whose whole object seems 
to have been to try and placate those who are implacable 
and to ruin England's friends here', 
3 
and many members of 
the Irish Unionist Alliance denigrated Long as traitor 
to a cause which had once been proud to have him as its 
parliamentary leader. 'A letter published in the Irish Times 
by W. M. Jellett, the Member for Dublin University, gave 
forceful expression to the outrage and fury with which 
many Southern Unionists greeted Long's 'breach of faith': 
We in the South and West', Jellett complained, 'must 
apparently be given a taste of the tyranny contemplated 
1Ashtown to Long, 30 July 1920, W. L. P, WRO 947/142. Ashtown 
had good reason to complain. Threatened by Sinn Fein ruffians, 
he was unable to harvest his crops or farm his lands. Several 
attempts were made. on his life, one by placing a bomb in his 
personal Church pew. 
2Long to Ashtown, COPY. 3 Aug. 1920, ibid. 
3Wilson to Long, 27 Apr. 1920, ibid., WRO 947/392. 
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by Mr. Long before the Government are compelled to 
realise the madness ... of their proposals. '1 
In October the I. U. A. sent a letter of protest to all 
members of the coalition. 'Should this Bill be passed', 
it asserted, 'we see nothing for Southern Ireland but a 
welter of confusion, ending either in surrender to the 
republican party or in despotic government as a Crown 
Colony.... Irish peace will never be achieved except on 
secure foundations ... '2 Normally immune to political 
criticism, Long felt deeply these animadversions from 
some of his oldest and most respected Irish Unionist 
friends. His only comfort was that he had at least 
guaranteed the support of the Ulster leaders. 
3 
The critics of the government were legion. In July a 
special Trades Union Congress passed a resolution 
demanding a single Irish parliament with full Dominion 
powers; Labour proposed an all Ireland assembly elected _ 
by proportional representation so as to protect minorities; 
and the Asquith Liberals clung to the old policy of 
county option 
. Even The Times ran a series of leading 
articles in June and July highly critical of the 
government's proposals. 
5 Perhapt surprisingly, the only 
group which was prepared to let Sinn Fein have a republic 
1Iri-sh Times, 9 June 1920. 
2Circular letter sent by the I. U. A. to Long, 28 Oct. 1920, 
W. L. P., WRO 947/383. 
3See Long to Bonar Law, 21 June 1920, B. L. P., 163/5/6. 





and full independence was a small section of the 
Conservative party -a view which was motivated by fierce 
detestation of the Irish and the belief that to throw 
Ireland out of the United Kingdom could only be of benefit 
to Britain. 
Still, the government stuck to its guns. As Winston 
Churchill put it, in an article published on 13 June in 
the IllustratedSunday_Herald, the coalition intended to 
take 'every possible measure to break the murder campaign 
and to enforce the authority of the law, while at the 
same time pressing forward the Home Rule Bill' - Long 
told Churchill that he found this article 'most admirable 
& very helpful. ' 
1 On 24 June Lloyd George stepped up 
the campaign against the terrorists by appointing an 
Irish Affairs Committee (also known as the Irish Situation 
Committee), again with Long as chairman, to make suggestions 
for the suppression of crime and disorder. The committee 
had at its command a formidable array of talent: apart 
from Long it included Balfour, Churchill, Birkenhead, 
Harnar Greenwood, Sir James Craig and H. A. L. Fisher. Its 
s 
meetings, the first of which took place on the 29th, soon 
became known as 'Irish Lunches' owing to the fact that 
members gathered at luncheon - the only available time - 
in the House of Commons. The committee's function was to 
discuss Irish questions in the light of information 
available in London, and with regard to the political 
- ---------- ----------------- 
'Gilbert, Churchill, Volume Four, pp. 453-4. 
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situation at Westminster, to call the attention of the 
cabinet to items of special interest, and to make policy 
suggestions to the Irish government, particularly in the 
area of security. 
1 
Some three weeks later, on 22 July, Long recommended 
that the security forces 'actively assume the offensive' 
and that martial law be imposed immediately in order to 
give 'moral support' to 'the military in the carrying 
out of their duties. '2 The cabinet met on the following 
day to discuss the recommendation. This was the first 
occasion on which Dominion status was raised in cabinet 
as a possible solution, with Lord Curzon even suggesting 
negotiations with Sinn Fein with a view to modifying the 
bill. Long rejected this proposal outright and told his 
colleagues that if it were not for the complexity of the 
financial clauses of his bill he could have the measure 
on the statute book in a matter of days. 
3 The Law Adviser 
to Dublin Castle, William Wylie, argued that the legal 
system was collapsing and endorsed Curzon's view that it 
4 
would be prudent to . vitiate negotiations. General Tudor 
confirmed that the position was parlous, even informing 
the cabinet that the R. I. C. was 'finished as an effective 
1For Longts views on the committee's primary function 
see his letter to Sir Maurice Hankey, 26 June 1920, W. L. P., 
WRO 947/424. 
2Irish Situation Committee, 4th Conclusions, 22 July 1920, 
P. R. O., CAB 27/107; C. P. 1672, CAB 24/109. 
3Jones, Whitehall Diary: IrelandZ_1218_2j, pp. 25-31. 
4Speech 
of William Wylie, Law Adviser, 23 July 1920, P. R. O.,, 
C. P. 1693, CAB 24/109. 
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force, but far from recommending conciliation he advised 
much sterner measures. Tudor requested the immediate 
imposition of martial law, a system of identity cards, 
restricted domicile, and the incarceration of all Sinn 
Fein prisoners on the mainland. 
1 Long reiterated that 
he would countenance no concessions to the gunmen. 
After heated discussion. the cabinet conference broke 
up without reaching any firm conclusions. Despite the 
grim warnings from both the Law Adviser and the Police 
Adviser that Sinn Fein was winning the battle, the 
policy of restoration of the law coupled with home rule 
remained intact. 
2 According to Thomas Jones, the 
instigation of the 'Irish Lunches' was known immediately 
in Sinn Fein circles and was regarded by most members 
of the cabinet as responsible for the sudden upsurge in 
crime. 
3 Two days later, on 25 July, Long prepared for 
his colleagues a memorandum in which he stated unequiv- 
ocally that he would neither water down his bill so as 
/ 
to conciliate Sinn Fein nor lend any support to any 
moves towards Dominion home rule. 
4 In this he was t 
supported by Lloyd George, who referred to himself as 
'still a Gladstonian Home Ruler. 15 
There was much debate concerning Dominion status during 
1Speech 
of General Tudor, Police Adviser, 23 July 1920, ibid. 
2For the cabinet conference of 23 July 1920 see also 
Townshend, British Campaign_in_Ireland, pp. 101-3. 
3Jones, Whitehall Diary: Ireland 1918_2 , p. 32. 4Memorandum by Long, 25 July 1920, P. R. O., C. P. 1688, 
CAB 24/109. 
5Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles, p. 121; Sheila Lawlor, 
Britain and Irelandi_lg1A-22 (Dublin, 1983), p. 65. 
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the summer and autumn of 1920, its advocates pointing 
out the improvement in relations which had resulted in 
the case of both Canada and South Africa. But Ireland 
was different: its geographical contiguity led Long and 
Lloyd George to harbour the deepest apprehension when 
considering a proposal which involved the surrender of 
complete responsibility for defence. The government 
knew that, once granted, Dominion home rule would soon 
become full sovereign independence. As Long predicated 
in a memorandum to the prime minister: 
The demand for Dominion Home Rule ... cannot ... be 
seriously regarded, for the simple reason that it is 
impossible to grant it unless we are prepared to go 
the whole length and accept the inevitable conclusion, 
namely, practical if not legal independence. 
' 
Long resisted Dominion status until the end of his career, 
Lloyd George until he had no other choice. It never had 
a serious chance of gaining acceptance in 1920, though 
it did win Asquith's backing. 
2 
Instead, the government decided to endorse Long''s 
if 
demand for even stronger measures in Ireland, and Harnar 
Greenwood hastily cobbled together a bill to allow-capital 
cases to be dealt with by courts-martial. The bill was 
pushed through with great celerity in exactly a week: the 
Restoration of Order in Ireland Act became law on 9 August. 
Long spent September dealing with the question of financial 
1Memorandum by Long to Lloyd George, 29 Sept. 1920, L. G. P., 
F/34/1/b6. 
2See letter by Asquith, The Times, 5 Oct. 1920. 
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autonomy. His bill reserved to Westminster powers over 
income tax and postage, customs and excise, and he now 
let it be known that he was prepared to drop these 
clauses if in so doing the measure could be made more 
attractive to nationalist Ireland. On 10 September he 
proposed that full fiscal autonomy be granted, provided 
only that the South accept a fair share of past debt. 
l 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain, 
readily concurred. 
2 By the end of the month Long stated 
that he was prepared to give to each of the Irish 
parliaments full control over all administration, including 
finance, reserving to Britain only the control of certain 
harbours and other defensive arrangements. 
3 Draft amend- 
ments to give effect to these proposals were prepared. 
4 
Long recognised that to grant fiscal autonomy to the two 
Irish parliaments was to perpetuate the division between 
North and South, but he justified such a move on the 
ground that Irish unity had always been a chimera. Indeed, 
he had come to regard debate over an all Ireland parliament 
as purely academic; the Council of Ireland featured in 
t 
his bill was merely a harmless sop to nationalist sentiment. 
No understanding with Sinn Fein could be expected, -even 
hoped for, therefore the aim was to grant as much to the 
1Memorandum by Long, 20 Sept. 1920, P. R. O., C. I. 83, CAB 
27/70. 
2Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 16 Sept. 1920, 
P. R. O., C. I. 84, Cab 27/70. 
3Memorandum by Long, 29 Sept. 1920, P. R. O., C. I. 87, CAB 
27/70. 
4'Draft 
amendments for giving effect to the proposal No. 1 
in Mr. Long's Memorandum of 10 September 1920 (C. I. 83) that 
complete financial control be given to the two Irish 
parliaments ... ', P. R. O., C. I. 89, CAB 27/70. 
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South as was consistent with British security and to 
protect Ulster. The bill, Long maintained, was the best 
that could be achieved in the circumstances. As such, 
it deserved to be put on the statute book as soon as 
possible. Southern Ireland must then decide whether to 
Stake it or leave it. 'l 
Speaking on behalf of Southern Unionists, Lord Midleton 
described Long's proposed concessions over fiscal autonomy 
as 'a red rag to a bull', 
2 
meaning that they would simply 
provoke the Sinn Fein extremists into holding out for 
even more. The cabinet met to discuss the question on 
13 October. Despite Long's recommendation, Lloyd George 
would not hear of fiscal amendments until Sinn Fein 
indicated a willingness to enter into negotaitions to 
make the bill workable. 
3 In other words, the prime 
minister saw no reason to give something away for nothing, 
and the draft amendments were dropped. Similarly, a 
proposal by Long, later in the month, that the South be 
given a nominated second chamber as a matter of 'expediency, 
not principle'4 so as to guard against the possibility of 
i 
Sinn Fein taking seats in Dublin and then proceeding to 
For Long's views on why the bill should be passed into 
law by Christmas 1920 see his letter to Bonar Law, 3 Oct. 
1920, B. L. P., 103/5/10- 
2 Midleton to Chamberlain, ' 25 Sept. 1920, A. C. P., AC 30/1/4. 
3Cabinet 
conclusions, 13 Oct. 1920, P. R. O., CAB 23/23; Jones, 
Whitehall dial: Ireland. 1918-25, p. 41. In the Preface to 
her recently published Britain and Irelan_di_1g11A. _22 Dr Sheila 
Lawlor states, erroneously, that 'Law and Long continued to 
oppose fiscal autonomy ... I 
4'Copy 
of a letter from Mr. Long to the Secretary' (Capt. 
L. F. Burgis), 30 Oct. 1920, P. R. O., C. I. 98, CAB 27/70. 
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make the Act unworkable, came to nothing. The bill thus 
completed its committee stage with no major amendments. 
Long's health deteriorated markedly at the beginning 
of November and he was forced to take to his bed at 
Rood Ashton. Ulster's opposition to an Irish Council 
still represented a potential obstacle to the bill's 
progress. By 9 November Long's health was so bad that 
he told Bonar Law that whilst he had no desire to 
abandon his work he would feel obliged to resign if 
Lloyd George wanted to entrust the bill to a fitter man. 
l 
Two days later the bill received its third reading. In 
the Lords Willoughby de Broke still advocated fighting 
to the finish to preserve the Union, an attitude which 
provoked a mordant rebuke from Lord Curzon. 'Nothing', 
Curzon mocked in a debate in the upper House on the 25th, 
will convert my noble friend Lord Willoughby de Broke. 
He still remains a magnificent relic of the old guard, 
but the backwoods in Which my noble friend ranged at 
the head of a formidable band some years ago are now 
relatively deserted, and his picturesque figure is 
seen stalking ... amid the scenes that were once those 
of his adventures and triumphs. 
2 
The Lords' amendments were considered by the Commons on 
16 December3 and exactly a week later the Government of 
1See Long to Bonar Law, 9 Nov. 1920, B. L. P., 103/5/15. 
242 H. L. Deb. ser. 5 col. 667 (25 Nov. 1920). 
3136 H. C. Deb. ser. 5 cols. 759-894. 
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Ireland Act received the royal assent. 
' As the Nationalist 
leader, Joseph Devlin, had told the House on second reading: 
'They have created for the first time in history two 
Irelands. Providence arranged the geography of Ireland 
and the Right Honourable Gentleman has changed it. '2 
The Government of Ireland Act has not on the whole met 
with the approval of historians. 
3 Indeed, in some 
quarters partition has been singled out as the root cause 
of Ireland's subsequent troubles and the Act condemned 
as a telling example of British ineptitude. Leo Amery 
pointed out that the Act, although an 'ingenious constructive 
alternative', failed because it solved not the Irish problem, 
but 'what had been the Irish problem before the war.... It 
could only have succeeded after the war if anything like a 
1The 
provisions of the Government of Ireland Act can be 
summarised as follows: It created two parliaments, one for 
the six Protestant counties of Ulster (Antrim, Armagh, Down, 
Fermanagh, Londonderiy and Tyrone), one for the remaining 
twenty-six counties. It provided for a Council of Ireland, 
comprising twenty representatives of each parliament and a 
president nominated by the Lord Lieutenant of Southern Ireland, 
The Council was given only very 'limited powers, and it could 
neither receive nor assume further powers without the mutual 
authority of both parliaments. The Act provided for a united 
Ireland only if the two parliaments so agreed. Thus, Long 
conceded the political means for unification in the certain 
knowledge that those means would never be used. 
2127 H. C. Deb. ser. 5 col. 1149 (30 Mar. 1920). 
3There 
are, however, some notable exceptions to this 
general rule. Dr D. G. Boyce, for example, has commented in 
En lg ishmen and Irish Troubles, p. 112, that 'whatever else 
might be said about the Government of Ireland bill at least 
it corresponded to the realities of the situation. ' 
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normal political situation had first been restored by 
the effective suppression of revolutionary terrorism. 
" 
This was precisely Long's intention: he always maintained 
that government from Westminster through the Lord 
Lieutenant and Chief Secretary should be upheld until 
all republicans operating beyond the law had been either 
imprisoned or executed. Writing to Austen Chamberlain 
from his retirement, Long emphasised this point: 
I think I ought to tell you that when we were passing 
the Home Rule Bill through Committee the idea in my 
mind - which I think found expression in my speeches 
and which, I believe, was the general idea of the 
Government about bringing the Act into force in Southern 
Ireland - was that we hoped and believed then that 
before the time came to put the Act in force the 
condition of Ireland would be materially improved, but 
if it remained in its then state of rebellion we should 
not attempt to hold elections in the country. Unfort- 
unately the condition of Ireland is now even worse. 
2 
The Act, therefore, was not a failure in itself: it 
failed. because its provisions were attempted before 
conditions in Irelan$ were conducive to success. 
Long's espousal of home rule after 1918, more than any 
other area of policy with which he was associated, gives 
the lie to the oft-repeated allegation that he was a 
blinkered reactionary. His attitude was essentially one 
1L. S. Amery, My Political Life. Volume Two: War and Peace, 
1914-1929 (London, 1953), pp. 227-8. 
2Long to Chamberlain. 25 Apr. 1921, A. C. P., AC 30/1/15. 
See also Chamberlain to Long, copy, 27 Apr. 1921, and Long 
to Chamberlain, 28 Apr. 1921, ibid., 30/1/16 and 17. 
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of expediency. In June 1920 he explained to a friend: 
I have come to the conclusion that after the passing 
of the Act of 1914 it has been impossible to avoid 
one of two courses: (a) to allow that Act to come 
into force; (b) to amend it or substitute another for 
it - simple repeal being in my judgement, impossible.... 
Therefore, I set myself to work to try and frame a 
practical, working scheme. 
' 
It is a credit to Long's practical ability and plain 
commonsense that he was able to recognise the futility 
of maintaining his earlier stand and was able, instead, 
to take a prominent part in drafting the only measure 
which necessity demanded, however much he disliked its 
content. As he had told the Archbishop of Westminster 
in 1918: 'I feel that it cannot, must not, be beyond 
the power of statesmanship to avert the awful disasters 
with which we appear to be threatened ... '2 
The Government of Ireland Act carried notable political 
advantages. The Ulster'Unionistp had been a nuisance in 
British politics for some years;. but the setting up of 
a Northern parliament meant that Westminster could turn 
its back on Ulster and let others govern the unruly 
province. A two parliament solution took Ireland out 
of the realm of British politics, and it allowed Britain 
to withdraw from Ireland on' her own terms. Sovereignty 
would be retained 'de jure' but 'de facto' the Irish could 
1Long to A. F. Blood, copy, 16 June 1920, W. L. P., WRO 
947/160. 
2Long to Cardinal Bourne, copy, 11 May 1918, ibid., WRO 
947/161. 
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get on with governing themselves. A Northern parliament 
had the added bonus that no Irishman could complain of 
government by Westminster. 
autonomous. 
In theory, all Ireland was 
Many Southern Unionists were far from satisfied with 
the Act and regarded Long as a traitor. One of his 
correspondents described the measure as 'equivalent to 
shutting a man in a tiger's cage and advising him to make 
himself as comfortable as possible. ' 
1 Yet it was fortunate 
for Southern Unionists that Long was in charge of the 
measure, for of all senior ministers he was by far the 
most sympathetic, to their plight, 
2 
and the Act gave 
protection where it could. For example, neither Irish 
parliament was permitted to impose additional income tax 
or surtax, and private property could not be expropriated 
without adequate compensation. 
If Sinn Fein had first been destroyed or if the Irish 
Nationalist party had still commanded majority support 
in the South, then the Act would have been a brilliant 
solution. It corresponded to all the realities of the 
situation except the one that the government could least 
afford to acknowledge: Sinn Fein was master in the South. 
In 1886,1893 and 1912-14 home rule had foundered on the 
rock of Ulster. In 1920 it satisfied Ulster] but the 
nationalists had waited too long for too little. 
I 
1Rev. Colthurst to Long, 18 Feb. 1920, ibid., WRO 947/185. 
2For Southern Unionist attitudes to the Government of Ireland 
Act see Buckland, Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New 
Ireland, pp. 223-32. 
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That the Act was a brave attempt to face political 
realities, to reconcile the demand for home rule with 
the determination of Ulster to resist those demands, 
cannot be denied. It faced squarely up to the fact that 
Ireland contained two irreconcilable, and fundamentally 
hostile, communities; and it gave to nationalist Ireland 
much greater powers than ever contemplated by either of 
Gladstone's Home Rule Bills or by Asquith's Act of 1914. 
To stigmatise the Government of Ireland Act, and the 
Treaty of 6 December 1921 which effectively amended it, 
as the root of subsequent Irish troubles is to ignore 
the fact that partition was the only option left if 
Britain was to withdraw from Ireland without coercing 
Ulster. Partition was the only way out of an otherwise 
insoluble problem. In recognising this neither Long nor 
Lloyd George were guilty of opportunism: both were 
simply being pragmatic. Together they solved the Irish 
problem to a greater extent then any other British 
statesman, before or since. That the solution was not 





THE RETIREMENT YEARS 
With the passing of the Government of Ireland Act, 
Long's political career was effectively over. He was 
suffering from chronic arthritis of the spine. Lord 
Lansdowne told Curzon after a visit to Rood Ashton in 
December 1920 that the is as gallant as ever, but I think 
he must realise that his official career is nearing its 
end. ' He resigned, at the insistence of his doctors, 
in February 1921 and felt the forced withdrawal from 
public life acutely. His mind still active, he spent 
many months flat on his back, bound up in a tight, 
uncomfortable strait-waistcoat, a position from which 
he was unable even to write letters. 
Moves were afoot to secure Long's promotion to the 
House of Lords within days of his retirement. Some of 
Long's Unionist colleagues were worried that if he returned 
to the Commons when his health recovered he would 'find 
t 
it very difficult to avoid giving a lead. Lloyd George, 
acting through Lord Edmund Talbot, therefore pressed Long 
to take a peerage. There was some talk of an earldom - 
Long had, after all, sat in the House for forty-one years 
and served in the cabinets of Lord Salisbury, Balfour, 
Asquith and Lloyd George. In April 1921 George Gibbs, 
Long's brother-in-law, travelled to Rood Ashton to talk 
413 
things over. 
' Long agreed to go to the Lords with 
great reluctance and only at the entreaty of the party 
leaders. He had intended to retain his seat and return 
to the Commons when he could. As he told George Younger: 
I cannot tell you what I feel about it all, but I 
can talk to you without reserve -I love the House 
of Commons, and I like my own name. However, the odds 
are against me just now ... 
2 
On 13 May Long was officially informed by the prime 
minister that he was to be offered a viscounty. 
3 He took 
the title Viscount Long of Wraxall. 
The by-election caused by his elevation proved a 
serious embarrassment to the government. St. George's, 
Westminster, should have been one of the safest Conservative 
seats in the country, but feeling against the coalition 
had already reached such proportions that the government 
nominee, Sir Herbert Jessel, was defeated by an 'Anti-Waste? 
candidate run by Lord R; othermere0and his son, Esmond 
Harmsworth. 
4 Lloyd George had good reason to regret that 
For Long'-s record of this conversation, dated merely 
'April 1921', see L. P., Add. MS. 62426. 
2Long to Younger, copy, 9 May L921, ibid. For further 
evidence of Long's reluctance to go to the Lords see also 
Long to Carson, copy, 9 May 1921, ibid., and Long to Bonar 
Law, 8 Apr. 1921, B. L. P., 107/1/12. 
3Lloyd George to Long, 1J May 1921, L. P., Add. MS. 62426. 
Long seems to have been led to believe that he would later be 
granted an earldom if he first accepted a viscounty. This 
promise, or perhaps it was just an intimation, was never 
honoured, although, at Lady Doreen's request, Sir William Bull 
later tried on Long's behalf to secure such a promotion. See 
Lady Doreen Long to Bull, 28 Nov. 1922, Bu. P., 5/12. 
4See Maurice Cowling, The ImpactofLabour, 1920-1924 
(Cambridge, 1971), p. 56. 
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he so hastily pushed Long into vacating such a 'safe' 
seat. 
When his health permitted, Long continued to flirt 
with federalism, lending his support in 1921 to J. A. Murray 
MacDonald's campaign for a Parliament Relief Bill which 
would set up a federal constitution for the whole of 
the United Kingdom. Indeed, Long drafted some of the 
proposed measures himself. 
' He wrote a letter of support 
to The_Times2 and even suggested starting a federal 
campaign in the country, though this idea had to be 
3 
dropped for lack of interest. 
During the summer of 1922 Long involved himself in the 
campaign for greater economic co-operation within the 
Empire. In a letter to The Times he called for a cabinet 
committee to prepare the way for an Imperial Economic 
Conference which should 'deal finally and effectively 
with the whole subject', 
4 
and on 21 July 1922 the 
formation of the Empire Development Union , with Long as 
president and Professor Hewins as chairman, was announced 
in the Daily Telegraph. The Union -a pet scheme'of 
Hewins's - devoted itself to the promotion of full 
partnership within the Empire onr'a11 economic matters, 
hoping ultimately to secure legislation to develop imperial 
1See Murray MacDonald to Long, 13 Apr. 1921, W. L. P., WRO 
947/749. J. A. Murray MacDonald was Liberal MP for Stirling 
and Falkirk Burghs. 
2See The Times, 13 May 1921. 
3See Long to Murray MacDonald, copy, 13 May 1921, W. L. P, 
WRO 947/749. 
'The Times, 7 July 1922. 
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resources by joint action, to organise supplies of raw 
materials, to safeguard important industries and to 
protect against dumping. Long laid down the Union's 
programme in a rather pedestrian article which he contributed 
later in the year to The Nineteenth Century_andAfter, 
using virtually the same arguments as Joseph Chamberlain 
had used twenty years earlier. 
Long tried during his retirement to remain aloof from 
party politics, although he was often badgered for his 
opinions by Conservative backbenchers. He warned Austen 
Chamberlain repeatedly during the early months of 1922 
that the party would not much longer support Lloyd George. 
'There is no doubt', he told Chamberlain, 
... that L. G., whether intentional or not, 
by hanging 
onto the leadership is gradually wearing out and 
destroying our Party ... and, frankly, I do not think 
you ought to risk. your personal position ... by undue 
loyalty to the P. M. 
2 
r 
To Sir George Younger Long remarked that 
... the Conservatiie Party have never 
been accustomed 
to be dragooned or ordered about and they won't have 
it. The Leaders can lead them; if they are courageous 
and tactful, but they cannot drive them. 
3 
1Long 
of Wraxall, 'Why weg should concentrate on the Empire', 
The Nineteenth Century and After (October, 1922). For Long's 
papers relating to the Empire Development Union see W. L. P., 
WRO 947/882. 
2Long to Chamberlain, copy, 27 Mar. 1922, L. P., Add. MS. 
62405. 
3Long to Younger, copy, 27 Mar. 1922, ibid., Add. MS. 62427. 
In February Long had advised Chamberlain to prepare for a 
general election and-to lay down a programme of party policy 
in order to stave off the growing discontent. He believed 
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Although the critics of the coalition were legion, 
only the 'diehard' group led by Lord Salisbury wanted to 
destroy it. Most wanted only to replace Lloyd George 
as prime minister. 
' With this intention, Long played a 
small part in the crisis of October 1922. On Tuesday 
10 October he took the chair at a party meeting summoned 
discreetly by Sir William Bull at Brown's Hotel. The 
'diehards' were represented by Joynson-Hicks; Long's 
intention was to find some basis on which the coalition 
could be saved and Lloyd George ousted from power. He 
was asked to represent the meeting in conversations with 
Lord Salisbury, for as the elder statesman of the party 
it was hoped that Long's influence might be used to heal 
the breach. 2 Long met Salisbury at the Curzon Hotel on 
the 12th, and a statement was drawn up to be passed on 
immediately, through Younger, to Chamberlain. 3 It demanded 
Lloyd George's resignation or, it asserted ominously, the 
Conservative party would break up. 
4 Chamberlain responded 
with the most egregious political insensitivity: he 
threatened to resign himself and declared that a Conservative 
that a bold policy statement and a clear commitment to winning 
an election as a separate. party, falthough the coalition might 
be reconstructed afterwards, represented the only means by 
which Chamberlain could maintain his position. See Long to 
Chamberlain, copy, 19 Feb. 1922, W. L. P., WRO 947/825. 
1Cowling, Impact of Labour, p. 194. 
2Hewins, Apologia of_an_Imperialist, 2,258-9. 
3Long, 'Memorandum of what took place on Tuesday, Wednesday 
and Thursday, the 10th, 11th and 12th October 1922', W. L. P., 
WRO 947/845. Hewins, op. cit., be. cit., dates the meeting 
at Brown's Hotel as 15 October. 
4Long to Younger, copy, 12 Oct. 1922, W. L. P., WRO 947/845. 
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government would have to take office which none of the 
leaders would be prepared to join. 
l 
Whilst Long had clearly allied himself with those who 
were challenging Chamberlain's policy, he had no desire 
to oust Chamberlain from the leadership; but from the 
moment of Bonar Law's retirement he had recognised that 
Chamberlain would have difficulty in holding the party 
in check. He hoped to persuade Chamberlain to modify 
his position and abandon Lloyd George if necessary. On 
the same day that Long laid his cards on the table by 
writing to Younger as the spokesman of the anti-Lloyd George, 
pro-coalition faction he also wrote to Chamberlain advising 
him to think again before precipitating an open party 
revolt. 
2 
Once it became clear that the coalition could not be 
saved Long was a prominent proponent of the view that 
'even those who had supported the Coalition should recognise ._ 
that it was finished. ' He could see no sense in 
ex-Conservative Coal, itionists. refusing to follow Bonar 
Law in a last gesture of defiance. 
3 Chamberlain's 
C 
behaviour he regarded as blinkered and foolish. 
Long did not personally attendrthe famous Carlton Club 
meeting, which sealed the fate of the coalition and 
deposited Lloyd George forever in the political wilderness, 
but he sent a telegram backing Bonar Law, having assured 
1Cowling, Impact of Labour, p. 196. 
2See Long to Chamberlain, copy, 12 Oct. 1922, W. L. P., WRO 
947/845. 
3Cowling, Impact of_Labour, p. 254. 
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J. C. C. Davidson on the 21st that his support could be 
counted upon. 
1 As he had:, remarked to-Younger on I. September: 
'It is in my opinion most unjust but I am afraid it is 
true that Austen has only a slender following in the 
H. of C. while in the country he really counts for 
nothing. 12 Once again, Long's political judgement had 
proved sound, Chamberlain's unsound. This was Long's 
last contribution of note to Conservative party politics. 
He devoted the remaining two years of his life to writing 
his memoirs, published late in 1923, and to travel. 
Long's retirement was bedevilled by poor health and 
financial worry. He was not one of those politicians 
who retire from public life personally better off than 
when they enter it. In 1919 part of his Wiltshire 
estates at South Wraxall were sold and by the end of 
1920 he was heavily overdrawn, his affairs in a parlous 
condition. Bull recorded: 'Walter Long's affairs are 
C 
in a rather serious condition &I have been compelled to 
take over the management of his banking account. '3. Shortly 
after his resignation Lady Doreen confided to Bull that 
'Walter has not discussed our finances with me, but I 
1See Long to Davidson, 21 Oct. 1922, B. L. P., 112/26/2; Bonar 
Law to Long, 24 Oct. 1922, L. P., Add. MS. 62404. 
2Long to Younger, copy, 4 Sept. 1922, W. L. P., WRO 947/$59. 
3Bull's diary, 27 Dec. 1920, 'Retrospect for 2nd half of 
1920', Bu. P., 5/2. 
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fear he lies and broods. I wish he would now try and 
make some effort to do things, I am sure he could but 
he seems to dread trying. "l 
His health improved only very slowly, and even towards 
the end of 1921 he s. ti. ll needed assistance before he 
could move. At the end of the year he decided to travel, 
hoping that the warmer climes of the Mediterranean would 
assist recovery, and the first three months of 1922 were 
spent visiting North Africa, Malta, Sicily and the French 
Riviera. The trip abroad produced a marked improvement 
and on his return he was able to take his seat in the 
Lords, launching immediately into a campaign to secure 
better treatment for disbanded R. I. C. men. 
Such improvement, however, was shortlived. By the 
summer of 1924 Long was again seriously ill. His last 
letters make pathetic reading. On 18 September he gave 
the following summary of his condition to Lord Selborne: 
I have gone back rather than forward and I am 
entirely depend4n't-: up. 9n__thia. aid of'. two, nurses with 
whose aid I am able to do a little work, in the middle 
of the day. What is really most troublesome is that I 
am rendered practically speechless.... I am so short 
of breath that if I were to attempt to make a long 
deliverance I. should have a dreadful fit of coughing 
& be quite useless. for an hour or two. 
2 
Just eight days later, on the evening of Friday 26 September 
1Lady Doreen Long to Bull, 23 Mar. 1921, ibid., 5/3. 
2Long to Selborne, copy, 18 Sept. 1924, W. L. P., WRO 
947/352. 
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1924, he died at Rood Ashton. The Sunday Times 
commented that 
... he brought into politics much common sense, a very 
great competence as an administrator, ... and, above 
all, the inestimable asset of an absolutely upright 
and dependable character. Such men carry a weight in 
our affairs which is deserved because they are 
representative; and in our time there has been no more 
representative Englishman than Walter Long. 
l 
A memorial service was held on 30 September at 
St. Margaret's Church, Westminster. The mourners 
included Lloyd George, Asquith, Baldwin, Curzon, Milner 
and Carson. The funeral took place on Wednesday 1 October 
at the tiny Church of St. John in Rood Ashton park, 
situated by the side of the lodge gates to the house 
which had been his home for fifty-seven years. A memorial 
service was held simultaneously in Salisbury Cathedral. 
The coffin, made on the estate from plain oak, was carried 
from the house to the small churchyard on a farm wagon 
drawn by two chestnut mares, with the tenantry acting as 
bearers. And there, iin a humble coffin in an obscure 
country churchyard, Walter Long was laid to rest. 





Despite sitting in parliament for forty-one years, 
holding cabinet office for sixteen of them, and very 
nearly becoming leader of the Conservative party, Walter 
Long has received scant attention from historians. And 
most of the attention which he has received has been 
either misguided or plain wrong-headed, relying far too 
heavily on the highly critical remarks of his political 
enemies instead of looking in detail at the track record 
of the man himself. 
1 Nowadays Long is something of an 
obscurity, relegated to a passing mention in the assorted 
histories of the Conservative party, occasionally awarded 
a paragraph when the leadership contest of 1911 is discussed. 
Yet in the years 1905-21 he was, with Balfour, Bonar Law, 
Austen Chamberlain, Lansdowne and Curzon, one of the most 
important men in the Conservative party. 
Historical judgement has, on the whole, been harsh. 
p 
Lord Blake, a distinguished historian of the Conservative 
party, has described 
if 
Long as 'neither an intelligent nor 
a quick-witted man. He was hot-tempered and inclined to 
be impulsive. He was an indifferent and discursive 
debater. '2 John Ramsden, also an historian of the modern 
1As Cameron Hazlehurst has rightly observed of Lloyd George, 
'it is not enough to cite contemporary gossip and opinions - 
especially the opinions of those least likely to be objective 
- as evidence of a man's character. ' Cameron Hazlehurst, 
'The Conspiracy Myth', a lecture delivered at Nuffield College, 
Oxford, in January 1967 and published in Martin Gilbert, ed., 
Lloyd George (New Jersey, 1968). 
2Blake, IInknown Prime Minister, p. 73. 
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Conservative party, has confirmed that 'Long was a 
choleric, short-tempered man who was a constant trial 
to colleagues in opposition or in power. 'l These 
pejorative assessments have been echoed by Peter Rowland, 
an historian of the Liberals during this period: 
Walter Long ... was a hot-tempered, loud-mouthed man 
... a splendid representative of 
the English squirarchy.... 
His sturdy Toryism ... commanded a considerable 
degree of 
support in the party and he could always be relied upon 
to stand firm against any Radical innovation. 
2 
Even more censorious, and equally misleading, is a contem- 
porary description penned by F. S. Oliver: 
He is a very dangerous creature to deal with: partly 
because of his limited intelligence which makes it 
difficult for him to understand anything outside official 
routine and wirepulling; but chiefly because of liability 
to attacks of violent personal jealousy (wh. come upon 
him like epileptic fits and for which therefore he should 
not perhaps be held morally accountable) ... 
3 
P 
The view that Long was an archetypal Tory squire was 
nurtured during his iown lifetime. The following piece 
of contemporary journalism, which appeared complete with 
an illustration of Long on horseback jumping a hedgerow. 
hounds at his side, well indicates how the myth of the 
pure-squire Conservative developed. It was first published 
1Ramsden, Age of Balfour and Baldwin, p. 94. 
2Peter Rowland, The Last Liberal Governments: The Promised 
Landa 1205-1912 (London, 1968), p. 51. 
30liver to Chamberlain, 7 Mar. 1918, A. C. P., AC 14/6/78. 
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in November 1915: 
There is nothing your stout yeoman hates like having 
a squire over him who smells too much of learning. 
What he wants is not a prig or a pedant but a wholesome 
human being who will think more of him than he does of 
Plato and the dead philosophers. A hale and hearty 
English gentleman who plays cricket, breeds prize bulls 
and fat sheep, rides to hounds, and takes his duties 
as a Justice of the Peace seriously - that's the sort 
your yeoman wants and that's the sort Walter Long is. 
One might almost say that Walter Long's career is 
the triumph of physical fitness, ... and of all people 
in the three kingdoms Walter Long is one of the fittest. 
The north wind across the moors could not be keener, 
fitter, and when he breezes into the House he brings 
all outdoors with him in his ruddy countenance. 
... He represents all the good old 
Tory virtues - 
loyalty, patriotism, live and let live, responsibility 
to dependants, the ability of the ruling classes ... 
1 
This sort of description, inaccurate in almost every 
respect, was not put to rights by Long's own account of 
his political life. Indeed, the standard picture of 
Long is aided and abetted by his autobiography, Memories, 
s 
which made its first appearance in 1923. The book is a 
compound of reminiscence, anecdoites, platitudes and 
diatribes. It is not an attempt to throw light on the 
political history of the preceding decades, nor to 
illuminate Long's role in shaping that history. As a 
'Article 
on Long in the series 'Politicians I have met' by 
A. F. Gadsby, Saturday Ni ht (a Canadian periodical), 20 Nov. 
1915. W. L. P. WRO 947/5007 
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reliable source, Memories is almost worthless. To list 
its many inaccuracies and falsifications would require 
a chapter in itself. Important episodes are glossed 
over, trivial incidents given pages. To take but one 
example, the Budget of 19'09 and the ensuing struggle 
over the House of Lords is dismissed in barely a page 
of gross over-simplification 
1 
whereas the iniquities of 
land tax are deemed worthy of a tortuous, rambling 
discourse covering four pages. 
2 
The picture which emerges from Memories is quite at 
odds with the evidence of Long's papers, which convey an 
impression of a hard-working, sensible politician, a an 
at the heart of public affairs whose views carried weight _ 
with those in authority and whose judgements were invariably 
the product of much reflection and a sound grasp of the 
facts. Historians have for many years taken Long at his 
word, the narrow simple-minded author of a bad political 
autobiography, but in so doing they have quite underrated 
him. He fostered the image of the country gentleman, of 
the old-fashioned squire from Wiltshire, of the landowner 
s 
who loved horses and dogs and fresh country air and the 
thrill of the chase. But it wasiessentially a political 
image, much of it deliberately contrived; and his auto- 
biography has helped to sustain the image. Of course, 
Longs bucolic loves were genuine enough; but this did 







He was, as Robert Sanders put it after Long withdrew 
from the leadership contest in November 1911, 'the country 
gentleman at his very best. '1 
It is, in fact, not difficult to find contemporary 
appraisals of Long which challenge the oft-quoted 
criticisms of his political enemies. Professor Hewins, 
a close friend for many years, published a description 
in 1929 which gets much closer to the truth than the 
vignettes of many subsequent historians: 
Writers of memoirs in recent years have shown little 
appreciation of his work. In fact he is scarcely 
mentioned. In honest effort to find a way through the 
Irish difficulties and the part he played in war 
organisation ... he certainly deserves the gratitude 
of his country.... Public administration was in his 
blood, and though he was not brilliant in the academic 
sense of the term, he had grea"t aptitude for management.... 
There are many important people who believe that if the 
question could have been put to the vote, Long would 
certainly have been elected leader of the party. He 
had a great following in the House of Commons.... He 
was not clever nor was he at all conspicuous in the more 
showy characteristics of the successful politician, but 
in administration and the patient overcoming of diffic- 
ulties and in unprejudiced consideration of practical 
alternatives in action, Walter Long was a most efficient 
member of the Government.... He was certainly not 
appreciated as he ought to have been. 
2 
1Sanders diary, 15 Nov. 1911. 
2Hewins, Apologia_of_an_Im erialist, 1,11-13. 
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F. E. Smith recognised that Long was a man of 'remarkable 
commonsense' and 'great administrative experience', 
' 
whilst George Lansbury remembered that Long tried hard 
to understand Labour's point of view and aspirations. 
2 
Sir Ian Malcolm, who knew Long well for many years and 
who wrote his entry for the Dictionary ofNational_Biography 
penned the following sketch: 
Walter Long ... was a plain blunt man, very irascible 
at times and took no pains to disguise the fact ... his 
gusts of temper passed as quickly as clouds across the 
sun.... What he did not know about Agriculture and 
Local Government ... was not worth knowing, and the 
Government offices that deal with these intricate 
subjects were never better managed than during the 
years when he presided over them.... He was a man of 
immense courage and was never afraid of letting his 
opinions be known ... he was a real success in Ireland. 
... If honesty, plain speaking and 
hard work were the 
only qualities necessary in a leader, we could not have 
chosen a better man.... But there are other gifts at 
least as necessary as: these.; wide vision, imagination, 
dexterity in debate, and a certain serenity which he 
could not always command ... he was a splendid party 
man ... and a better chief never walked 
the floor of a 
Government office. 
3 
These character sketches, all written by men who knew Long 
personally, not only challenge the strictures of Long's 
1Earl 
of Birkenhead, Contem orary-Personalities (London, 
1924), p. 7. ---- 
2Lansbury 
wrote: 'Our best friends were the late Henry 
Chaplin, Lord Long, and Gerald Balfour; they all, at least, 
tried to understand us. ' Quoted in Marchioness of Londonderry, 
Henry Chaplin, A Memoir (London, 1926), p. 190. 
31an Malcolm, Vacant Thrones (London, 1931), pp. 150-2. 
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more prejudiced contemporaries but offer a balance and 
insight lacking in most subsequent historical appraisals. 
Part of the secret of Long's success was that he was 
an extremely courteous man, even in small things. For 
example, he took the trouble to learn the names of all 
the staff at the House of Commons and the Carlton Club 
and always asked after their health and their families. 
' 
This exceptional courtesy spilled over into all official 
matters. Referring to a dinner at the Guildhall the 
previous evening, Lord Riddell recorded a private conver- 
sation with Lloyd George on 9 November 1919 which throws 
light on Long's parliamentary popularity: 
L. G.: ... I was lost in admiration of Walter Long. 
The old boy made a most excellent speech - nothing but 
platitudes, but he said them in the right way.... He 
made all the proper references. '... He also said the 
right thing about his colleagues. 
R.: He understand Parliamentary life. When most 
ministers receive a deputation they wait until the 
deputation has assembled. Then1 they enter in state 
followed by their satellites, take the chair, and make 
a bow. Not so Walter Long. He is there five minutes 
beforehand and has a nice word of welcome for each of 
the members of the deputation as he arrives. The result 
is that he starts the proceedings having made friends 
with everybody. 
L. G.: Yes ... Long has the art of dealing with Parliamentary 
1Sir William Bull, 'A Great Englishman, Some Personal 
Reminiscences', Bu. P., 5/12. 
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points.... All this seems simple and commonplace, but 
it is effective and the outcome of a genial, kindly 
personality. 
1 
Long's courtesy, hard work, and scrupulous honesty, 
allied to a very considerable parliamentary knowledge 
and skill, formed the base on which his political 
career was constructed. 
In his personal habits Long paid equal attention to 
detail. He was always impeccably dressed and he could 
be very fastidious about trivial matters. He kept his 
office table in spotless order and would tolerate no 
loose papers, even demanding new pens and fresh blotting 
paper of his staff each day. His pet hate was the sight 
of dead matches littering a lawn. Sir William Bull 
recorded that Long would sit outside in his chair at 
Rood Ashton and, whilst in conversation, would continually 
poke the lawn in order to bury any matches thrown down 
by his guests. 
2 
One of the charges most frequently levelled at Long is 
that he was capricious and impulsive. Lord Selboi'ne 
C 
even joked that Long's opinions 'depended on what he had 
for breakfast. 13 Long was well aware that he invited 
1Lord 
Riddellts Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and 
After, 1.218-1923 (London, 1933 . 140-1. 
2Bull, 'A Great Englishman'. 
3Selborne 
wrote this when noting down his impression of 
each member of the cabinet immediately after resigning from 
Asquith's government at the end of June 1916, in protest 
against Lloyd George's proposed home rule scheme. Long had 
several times during the crisis indicated his own intention 
to resign, as had Lord Lansdowne. In the event, Long and 
Lansdowne stayed, Selborne went. Selborne's remark may 
therefore be explained by a natural feeling of resentment that 
Long had not carried out his threat. For Selborne's brief 
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accusations of fickleness. As he once told Asquith, 
policies had to be altered quickly because the political 
situation could change 'from day to day, and what appears 
to be a satisfactory and justifiable solution one day 
is completely knocked out the next. '1 In the words of 
William Blake: 'The man who never alters his opinion is 
like standing water, and breeds reptiles of the mind. ' 
Long believed that a good statesman should regularly 
change his opinions and adapt to new circumstances. It 
was his lifelong conviction that 'the one inalienable 
possession of mankind is the tendency to err. '2 The 
politician was therefore obliged to review his attitudes 
frequently, otherwise his errors might never be rectified. 
To contradict one's own speeches was simply to acknowledge 
that one could not always be right. To Lord Derby Long 
explained that 'while I would have made that speech 
yesterday I would not make it today, and it is impossible 
to say what my remarks would be had I to speak next week. '3 
r 
Long's caprice was not so much a weakness, but a deliberate 
and conscious attempt not to close his eyes to change or 
t 
to insist on any personal political rectitude. 
The influence which Long commanded with the party leaders 
was sustained by his immense popularity amongst Tory back- 
benchers. He was a man whose support came from the bottom 
character sketches of his colleagues see E. S. P., MS. Selborne 
80/285-90. 
1Long to Bonham-Carter, 16 Apr. 1916, A. P., MS. Asquith 16/ 
142-3. Long was on this occasion referring to recruitment. 
2Long to Derby, copy, 8 Sept. 1920, L. P., Add. MS. 62405. 
3Long to Derby, copy, 11 Nov. 1921, ibid. 
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rather than from the top of the political hierarchy. 
Always a hard worker, he had shown signs of a practical 
turn of mind from his earliest days in parliament. 
' It 
was this ability to grasp what was possible, rather than 
what was desirable, which appealed to the Conservative 
rank and file. Jack Sandars wrote the following percipient 
comments in 1908 concerning Long's standing in the party: 
Mr. Long is a lobby favourite. He listens to the 
chatter of the young member: he shows respectful 
sympathy with the protest of the old. He understands 
the vernacular of the backbEnch, and he holds grave 
converse with the front. He combines an agreeable 
alacrity of expression and a sanguine temperament with 
an industry which is beyond all praise. 
2 
Longts was also a major voice in the affairs of the 
Carlton Club from about 1912 through to his death in 1924.3 
It was largely as a result of Long's influence that the 
Club began to take a much more prominent part in party 
1A 
good early example of this pragmatic attitude to politics 
can be found in a letter which Long wrote in October 1891 to 
thee Conservative ehi*f whip, Aretas Akers-Douglas. Long 
suggested that it would be wise not to run a Unionist 
candidate in Cork following the death of Parnell, on the ground 
that Parnell had been a moderateyforce in Ireland and would 
turn out to be a loss to the Unionist party. Long argued that 
the best course would-be 'to quietly support the Parnellite - 
our object is to maintain the Union and this seems just now 
the best way. $ See Long to Akers-Douglas, 16 Oct. 1891, 
quoted in Chilston, Chief Whip, pp. 223-4. 
2Sandars, Studies of Yesterday, p. 59. 
3Sir Charles Petrie, The Carlton Club (London, 1955), 
- -- -- - pp. 151-3. 
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politics through the revival of the Political Committee, 
set up in March 1914 to assist the party organisation, 
to advise the leader, to ascertain opinion in the 
constituencies, to promote the candidature of prospective 
Unionist MPs and to stimulate undergraduate Conservative 
clubs at Oxford. Longs standing at the Carlton naturally 
promoted and maintained his influence over Tory back- 
benchers, and he took care to look in at the Club whenever 
he could on his way home from Westminster. 
' 
It is impossible to over-emphasise the role of Sir 
William Bull in sustaining Long's career, for it was Bull 
who provided the link with the Conservative backbenches 
on which Long depended. George Gibbs, Long's brother-in-law,. 
was another important go-between, and Sir John Lonsdale, 
MP for mid-Armagh from February 1900 onwards and honorary 
secretary and whip to the Irish Unionists, acted in a 
similar capacity between Long and his Irish followers. 
Bull served Long faithfully from 1903 onwards. He acted 
as parliamentary private secretary to Long in five offices. 
He canvassed and organised Long's backbench support and 
C 
he frequently helped Long's relations with the press. His 
reward was a knighthood in 1906, iappointment to the Privy 
Council in 1918, and a baronetcy in 1922. Bull was an 
intensely ambitious man - self-made with practically no 
formal education - and his loyalty and friendship to Long 
possibly kept him out of office. 




constantly hoped for office up until about 1920; many 
of his private diary entries concern his conspicuous failure 
to advance. 
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own view. In 1920 Bull confided to his diary: 
I have renounced all idea of Parliamentary advancement. 
I have now been 20 years in the House.... 
Sometimes I think I should have done wiser not to 
have bound myself so closely to Walter Long. As a 
Parliamentary Private Secretary I must vote and act with 
the Government. I can hardly question them. I therefore 
get all the criticism and none of the emoluments of 
office. My comfort is that I am a comfort to him & at 
times of use by way of advice. I have kept him out of 
some messes but not as many as I should have liked to 
do. l (sic) 
No man played a more important part in assisting the last 
twenty years of Long's career, nor served him with greater 
loyalty, than Sir William Bull. 
What, then, can be said in conclusion concerning Long's 
work and achievements between 1905 and his retirement in 
1921? Long's obituary in The Timea was surely right to 
claim for him to great fund of commonsense, reasonableness, 
tact and sound judgement. '2 But more than this can perhaps 
be argued. Although Chief Secretary for Ireland for only 
ten months in 1905 he worked extremely hard to restore the 
country to a condition of orderliness which it had not 
enjoyed since the days of 'Bloody Balfour' and to re-establish 
1Bull's diary, 'Retrospect for First Half of 1920', Bu. P., 
5/1. 
2The Times, 27 Sept. 1924. 
433 
the credibility of traditional Unionist policy in 
Ireland. In this he was a marked success. 
After the electoral humiliation of 1906, which he had 
accurately predicted, he worked to restore Conservative 
fortunes by countering the Chamberlainite emphasis on 
tariff reform, insisting that the party must produce 
policies attractive to a mass electorate if it was 
again to hold office. He played a significant part in 
speeding Balfour's withdrawal from the party leadership, 
first by insisting, often in strident tones, on a more 
coherent and disciplined style, then by pushing Balfour 
towards an early resignation. In the ensuing contest 
with Austen Chamberlain in November 1911 he withdrew to 
avoid splitting the party despite every indication that 
he had the backing of a majority, albeit a small one, a 
fact which even Lord Beaverbrook, Bonar Law's main 
sponsor, later acknowledged. 
' 
It is a mistake to regard Long as reckless and 
11 
intemperate over Irish home rule in the years before 1914. 
The Conservative 1eaýers' more extreme utterances over 
Ulster were merely the price which had to be paid for 
party unity. Threatened by 'diehard' resistance in the 
1See Beaverbrook to Long, 6 Nov. 1923, L. P., Add. MS. 62428. 
Many years later, in 1929, 'whilst compiling a volume of 
original cartoons and drawings of Long, Sir William Bull 
annotated a caricature of the two principal contenders in 
November 1911 with the following marginalia: 'I had in my 
pocket sufficient votes to have enabled Walter Long to have 
been elected by. a considerable majority over Austen 
Chamberlain if it had come to a division at the Carlton Club 
on that eventful day -I told Walter this but he magnanimously 
gave way ... ' This volume is now in the private possession 
of Dr Colin Matthew, Christ Church, Oxford. 
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Lords and potential division in the Commons, Bonar Law's 
main concern was not Ulster but to keep his party 
together. The British Covenant, although ferocious in 
tone, was in reality little more than a conventional 
gesture of protest. The Irish question in 1912-14 
has 
to be understood in terms of British party politics. 
The Unionist leaders were manoeuvring for a general 
election to be fought on their own terms - Ulster rather 
than tariff reform - and Bonar Law's hands were tied by 
his dependence on Long's backbench following. Long used 
home rule to advance the Conservatives' political fortunes: 
by the time war broke out in August 1914 the party was 
not committed to Ulster to the point that it would 
realistically have supported armed insurrection. Rather, 
it had made Ulster's cause its own almost solely for the 
purpose of winning a general election which it believed, 
probably rightly, must come soon. 
Throughout the war Bonar Law had little authority over 
his own backbenches and, as a compromise leader, he was 
frequently obliged too defer to Long's opinions. As a 
wartime administrator Long was of considerable help to 
both the Asquith and Lloyd Georg6 coalitions, having 
played a key role during the early months of the war in 
the disruption of the party, truce. Without Long's 
allegiance Conservative support for coalition could not 
be guaranteed. Long's agreement to serve in December 
1916 was, in fact, the pivot on which Lloyd George's 
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ability to form a government turned. 
In the summer of 1916 Long smashed the Irish home rule 
scheme hastily cobbled together by Lloyd George not 
because he was still opposed to any grant of home rule, 
but because he recognised the plan as ill-timed, ill- 
conceived, and-based on a fundamental deception of the 
Irish leaders. From 1917 onwards he devoted himself 
to solving the Irish problem. Only recently has Long's 
role as a wartime reformer in the cause of a wider 
franchise been recognised and he made a significant 
contribution to the Representation of the People Act of 
1918.1 If cabinet backing had been forthcoming Long 
would have gone much further, completely replacing 
Britaints unwritten constitution with the rigidity of 
a federal system. Partly as a means to cut the Gordian 
knot of the Irish problem, partly to bind closer together 
the far-flung reaches of the Empire, Long became the 
advocate of sweeping constitutional reforms. From April 
1918 until his retirement Long's was probably the most 
important voice in British governing circles on Ii'ish 
t' 
affairs. He represented the Irish government in cabinet, 
sanctioned and guided the war agAinst Sinn Fein extremists, 
and was responsible for the Act which ultimately partitioned 
Ireland. 
Long was, in the words of Stanley Baldwin, I... a man who 
by industry, by tradition and by temperament, was a true 
1See Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and peace. 
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House of Commons man for the greater part of his life ... 11 
Far from being a dull-witted Tory squire, he was inventive, 
sometimes progressive, always pragmatic; and his standing 
amongst Conservative backbenchers made him in many 
instances, and over a period of many years, party leader 
in fact if not in name. LongIs record belies his 
reputation. 








A NOTE ON 'LONG OF WRAXALL: THE POLITICAL 
CAREER OF WALTER LONG, 1854-1924' BY RODERICK CLIFFORD 
(Johns Hopkins Ph. D., 1970) 
Roderick Clifford, an American scholar, is the first 
person since Sir Charles Petrie to have devoted any 
considerable attention to a study of Walter Long's 
political career. His verdict accords entirely with the 
convention of representing Long as slow-witted, obdurate, 
and reactionary, an anachronism in an age of rapid 
political change and improvisation. Long was, in Dr 
Clifford's considered judgement, 'eminently lacking in 
the necessary qualities of leadership and brilliance.... 
Walter Long's defects of judgement and competence have 
been ... confirmed by the assessments of his colleagues 
and political contemporaries' (p. 271). 
But the assessments by the colleagues and political 
contemporaries whom Dr Clifford adduces in evidence were, 
for the most part, the statements of political enemies, 
and therefore inherently prejudiped. If Long was so 
'eminently lacking' in all qualities of leadership it is 
inconceivable that he could gave commanded such support 
on the backbenches. "The opinions of obscure backbench 
MPs have, of course, usually not survived, and the 
historian is presented with what1purports to be a significant 
quantity of evidence with which to denigrate Long's 
character and competence. Only when the highly tendentious 
nature of most of this derogatory evidence is realised can 
one begin to arrive at a more accurate, less partial 
assessment. Almost everybody within the Conservative 
party - friend and foe alike - conceded that Long would 
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have taken the leadership in 1911 if the issue had been 
put to a ballot. No man can inspire this level of 
political support if, as Dr Clifford suggests, he lacks 
all qualities of leadership. 
Clifford describes Long's months as Chief Secretary for 
Ireland in 1905 as characterised by 'a needless feud with 
his Lord Lieutenant' (p. 272) and seems totally to 
disregard the fact that the dispute was about two very 
important issues - policy and the precedence of the Chief 
Secretary. 
Clifford also makes great play with Long's 'grumbling 
and complaints'. It is true that Long was by temperament 
inclined to grumble: he did not suffer fools gladly and 
was not one to keep his opinions to himself. But this 
particular idiosyncrasy is hardly a reflection of Long's 
political competence. It explains why he made enemies 
and why so many harsh judgements were passed by contem- 
poraries, but that is all. 
Long is also charged with being a 'supreme egoist' who 
'entirely misread the Irish situation' (p. 273). On many 
occasions, most notably in November 1911 and again in May 
1915, he subordinated his own ambition to the demands of 
party unity, a trait not generally associated with supreme 
egoism. As for Ireland, pragmatism was the hallmark of 
Long's Irish policy. Before 1914, when he believed that 
the Conservatives could first demand and then win 'a 
general election, he=opposed home rule steadfastly. As 
soon as that policy had been overtaken by events he began 
to search for another way out, cönceding that home 'rule 
would have to be granted and looking increasingly towards 
federalism and partition to provide the answer. 
He opposed home rule in 11916 because the plan was a bad 
one and the timing inauspicious. Those historians who, 
like Dr Clifford, argue that Lloyd George could have 
solved the Irish problem in 1916 if Unionists like Long 
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and Lansdowne had been more far-sighted ignore the fact 
that the scheme had the backing of Nationalists and 
Ulstermen only in so far as Lloyd George had succeeded 
in misleading them, hardly a basis for any lasting 
settlement. From 1918 onwards Long devoted the remainder 
of his political career to finding a solution. Partition 
may not have been an ideal solution, but it was the only 
one in the circumstances. The Government of Ireland Act 
and the Anglo-Irish Treaty which followed it brought 
Ireland the only kind of home rule which was possible 
without coercion of Ulster. Dr Clifford's treatment of 
these events is extremely sketchy. 
When it comes to an examination of the political crisis 
of December 1916 Dr Clifford quotes from Long's extremely 
important correspondence of December 1923 with Austen 
Chamberlain but fails fully to grasp its significance, 
or to relate it to Beaverbrook's published account, or 
to tie it up with other evidence which indicates that Long 
agreed to join Lloyd George before Curzon, Cecil or 
Chamberlain, thereby guaranteeing support in the Commons 
for the new administration. Dr Clifford quite fails to 
grasp Long's pivotal role in the events which led Lloyd 
George to the premiership. 
Finally, Clifford is unable to resist the charge that 
Long was 'a reactionary', unable 'to change his political 
outlook or adapt to the changing demands of Conservatism 
in the early twentieth century' (p. 273). Many instances 
could be cited to show that Long often changed his outlook 
to suit changing circumstances. iIndeed, other writers 
have described Long as impulsive and capricious. Suffice 
it to say that he was an advocate of social reform, land 
reform, and reform of the House of Lords; he played a 
major role in the making of the 1918 Representation of 
the People Act; he supported a radical overhaul of the 
imperial constitution; and, of course, he played a key 
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role in the partition of Ireland. The term 'reactionary', 
like all terms of political abuse, is misleading and 
carries different meanings for different people, but in 
no sense can it be applied to Walter Long. It would be 
more appropriate to call him a progressive Conservative 
-a discriminating Tory who kept a sharp eye on the 
social movements of his day in order to preserve the 
best of the past. 
Dr Clifford realises that there is a problem in 
explaining how a man of such indifferent talents could 
rise to the top of the Conservative party, but instead 
of attempting to face the problem, and so give his own 
conclusions at least a veneer of credibility, he dismisses 
it with the convenient observation that 'a precise answer 
cannot always be offered to explain political success' 
(p. 274). 
Apart from the fact that Clifford's work is littered 
with such platitudes as 'during an active parliamentary 
career Long naturally became involved in the day-to-day 
issues and political struggles of his party' (p. 4) and 
'his recurrent bouts of ill health must have contributed 
to the irritation and frustration he experienced' (p. 134), 
it offers only the most commonplace of political narratives, 
fails to consider objectively Long's role and achievements, 
neglects to emphasise the command over the Tory backbenches 
by which Long sustained his influence amongst the party 
leaders, glosses over some of the most important aspects 
of Long's career, and contributes only marginally to the 
picture presented some thity-foui years earlier by*Sir 




THE LONG PAPERS 
The papers of Walter Long comprise an archival source 
which is much underused by political historians of the 
period 1905-24. In Walter_Long_andHisTimes Sir Charles 
Petrie noted in the Preface that Long destroyed a great 
many personal papers before his death in 1924. Although 
his junior by over forty years, Petrie was a personal 
friend of Long's - it was at Long's behest that Petrie 
became at the age of only twenty-five the youngest member 
of the Carlton Club - and was therefore in a position to 
have private information regarding Long's papers. Of the 
extant papers there is practically nothing relating to 
Long's political career before 1905 and it must be assumed 
that these early papers have been destroyed. Apart from 
an obvious gap occurring in the papers for December 1916 
the material would appear to be more or less complete 
for the years 1905-24, though it is impossible to be sure. 
Exactly-why Long should have destroyed papers from the 
early half of his political career yet retained those from 
the later half must remain a mystery. 
The papers are divided into two collections, a larger 
one at the Wiltshire County Record Office and a smaller 
t 
one only recently acquired by the British Library. There 
is also an additional volume of Long's papers, of 
miscellaneous contents, in the Public Record Office at 
Kew (ref: ADM 116/3623). The papers at Wiltshire County 
Record Office have been described by Cameron Hazlehurst 
and Christine Woodland in A'Guidetothe Papers of British 
Cabinet Ministers, 1900-1951 (London, 1974). The papers 
described by Hazlehurst and Woodland as having been discovered 
in June 1973, in a tin trunk and five dispatch boxes, by 
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Long's grandson, the present Viscount Long of Wraxall, 
have now been added to, and incorporated in, the main 
collection. The papers include material on all aspects 
of Long's career from 1905 onwards and a detailed 
catalogue, running to over two hundred pages, is available. 
The important new collection now in the British Library 
was purchased at Sotheby's on 20 July 1981 
(lot 141). It 
comprises forty-one volumes, and when used by me early 
in 1982 this collection had not been catalogued but was 
identified as Deposit 7466. Since then it has been added 
to the British Library's collection of Additional Manuscripts 
and a catalogue placed in the 'Rough Register of Accessions' 
(Add. MSS. 62403-62443). Again, most of the material covers 
the period after 1905, although there is a file of general 
correspondence covering the years 1873-1904 (Add. MS. 
62408). 
The section containing miscellaneous, mostly printed, 
material, including press cuttings and photographs, is 
Add. MSS. 62430-62442. The first two volumes in this 
series are bound albums, the contents not in chronological 
order but of the period 1853-1915. Add. MS. 62432 contains 
material, 1879-1904; thereafter the order continues 
chronologically to Add. MS. 62441, which contains 1924 
material. Add. MS. 62442 is undated matter. 
The most interesting section of the papers, however, 
contains Long's correspondence. General correspondence 
from 1905 onwards is covered by Add. MSS. 62409-62429. 
The heart of the collection is to be found in Add. MSS. 
62403-62407, containing files of correspondence from each 
of the following: A. J. Balfour, r'Lord Lansdowne, H. H. Asquith, 
Andrew Bonar Law, Austen Chamberlain, Lord Derby, Lord 
Stamfordham, Henry Chaplin, Professor A. V. Dicey and Lord 
Charles Beresford. . 
The division of the papers into two collections appears 
to have been carried out according neither to subject' 
matter nor to correspondent, and it is difficult to perceive 
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any rational basis for the separation. Taken together, 
the two collections clearly form one coherent archive. 
Both collections cover the same period, both contain 
letters from the same correspondents and both deal with 
the same subjects. The only obvious difference is that 
the bulk of personal political correspondence from 
front-rank Conservatives is to be found in the British 
Library and the bulk of official correspondence is to be 
found at the Wiltshire Record Office. There is, nonetheless, 
a considerable overlap between the two collections and 
one can only comment that if the division was carried out 
on this basis then it was carried out very poorly. 
Long's grandson, the 3rd Viscount Long of Wraxall, has 
assured me that, to the best of his knowledge, the family 








THE REVOLUTIONIST: or LINES TO 
A STATESMAN 
by 
G. B. CHESTERTON 
"I was never standing by while a revolution was going on. " 
- Speech by the Rt. Hon. Walter Long. 
( 
When Death was on thy drums, Democracy, 
And with one rush of slaves the world was free, 
In that high dawn that Kings shall not forget, 
A void there was and Walter was not yet. 
Through sacked Versailles, at Valmy in the fray, 
They did without him in some kind of way; 
Red Christendom all Walterless they cross, 
And in their fury hardly feel their loss ... 
Fades the Republic; faint as Roland's horn, 
Her trumpets taunt us with a sacred scorn ... 
Then silence fell: and Mr. Long was born... 
C 
From his first hours in his expensive cot 
He never saw the tiniest; viscount shot. 
In deference to his wealthy parents' whim 
The mildest massacres were kept from him. 
The wars that dyed pall Mall and Brompton red 
Passed harmless o'er that one unconscious head: 
For all that little Long could understand 
The rich might still be rulers of the land, 
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Vain are the pious arts of parenthood, 
Foiled Revolution bubbled in his blood; 
Until one day (the babe unborn shall rue it) 
The Constitution bored him and he slew it. 
If I were wise and good and rich and strong - 
Fond, impious thought, if I were Walter Long - 
If I could water sell like molten gold, 
And make grown people do as they were told, 
If over private fields and wastes as wide 
As a Greek city for which heroes died, 
I owned the houses and the men inside - 
If all this hung on one thin thread of habit 
I would not revolutionize a rabbit. 
I would sit tight with all my gifts and glories, 
And even preach to unconverted Tories, 
That the fixed system that our land inherits, 
Viewed from a certain standpoint, has its merits. 
I'd guard the laws like any Radical, 
And keep each precedent, however small, 
However subtle, misty, dusty, dreamy, 
Lest man by chance should look at me and see me; 
Lest men should ask what madman made me lord 
Of English ploughshares and the English sword; 
Lest men should mark how sleepy is the nod. 
That drills the dreadful images of God! 
Walter, be wise! avoid thee wild and new! 
The Constitution is the game for you. 
Walter, beware! scorn not the gathering throng, 
It suffers, yet it may not suffer wrong, 
It suffers, yet it cannot suffer Long. 
And if you goad it these grey rules to break, 
For a few pence, see that you do not wake 
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Death and the splendour of the scarlet cap, 
Boston and Valmy, Yorktown and Jemmappes, 
Freedom in arms, the riding and the routing, 
The thunder of the captains and the shouting, 
All that lost riot that you did not share - 
And when that riot comes - you will be there. 
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